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Abstract 
I examine the nature and the structure of basic logico-mathematical kllowledgp. 
What justifies the truth of the Dedekind-Peano axioms and the validit.y of Modus 
Ponens? And is the justification we possess reflectively available? To make progress 
with these questions, I ultimately embed Hale's and Wright's neo-Fregeauism iu a 
general internalistic epistemological framework. 
In Part I, I provide an introduction to the problems in the philosophy of mathemat-
ics to motivate the investigations to follow. I present desiderata for a fully satisfactory 
epistemology of mathematics and discuss relevant positions. All these positions turn 
out to be unsatisfactory, which motivates the abstractionist approach. I argue that 
abstractionism is in need of further explication when it comes to its central epistemo-
logical workings. 
I fill this gap by embedding neo-Fregeanism in an internalistic epistemological 
framework. In Part II, I motivate, outline, and discuss the consequences of the frame-
work. I argue: (1) we need an internalistic notion of warrant ill our epistemology 
and every good epistemology accounts for the possession of such warrant; (2) to avoid 
scepticism, we need to invoke a notion of non-evidential warrant (entitlement); (3) 
because entitlements cannot be upgraded, endorsing entitlements for mathematical 
axioms and validity claims would entail that such propositions cannot be claimed to 
be known. 
Because of (3), the framework appears to yield sceptical consequences. In Part III, 
I discuss (i) whether we can accept these consequences and (ii) whether we have to 
accept these consequences. As to (i), I argue that there is a tenable solely entitlement-
based philosophy of mathematics and logic. However, I also argue that we can over-
come limitations by vindicating the neo-Fregean proposal that implicit definitions can 
underwrite basic logico-mathematical knowledge. One key manoeuvre here is to ac-
knowledge that the semantic success of creative implicit definitions rests on substantial 
presuppositions - but to argue that relevant presuppositions are entitlements. 
iii 
Contents 
Introduction 1 
I Old solutions to old problems 8 
1 Epistemology of mathematics: issues and options 9 
1.1 Puzzles about arithmetical knowledge ..... 9 
1.1.1 Puzzle 1: how are the axioms justified? . 10 
1.1.2 Puzzle 2: incompatible constraints 10 
1.2 Desiderata for a solution .... 14 
1.2.1 Arithmetical Platonism 14 
1.2.2 Reconstructing arithmetical knowledge. 17 
1.2.3 Additional desiderata for the reconstructive project. 22 
1.3 Unsatisfying approaches 
· . 
24 
1.3.1 Godelian Platonism 25 
1.3.2 Fregean logicism · . 27 
1.3.3 The indispensability argument 33 
1.3.4 Nominalistic positions 37 
1.4 Intermediate conclusion · .. 41 
2 Neo-Fregeanism (abstractionism) 42 
2.1 Frege's Theorem ......... 42 
2.2 Neo-Fregeanism: two (Fregean) aims 44 
2.2.1 Neo-Fregean Logicism 45 
2.2.2 Neo-Fregean Platonism. 47 
2.3 Implicit definition. . . . . . . . 49 
2.3.1 Explicit vs. implicit definitions 49 
2.3.2 Three dimensions of achievement 52 
2.3.3 Proposed conditions for semantic and epistemic success 54 
2.3.4 The epistemology of implicit definition 56 
2.3.5 Hermeneutic reconstruction again . 62 
2.4 Three objections to neo-Fregeanism .... 67 
iv 
2.4.1 The Caesar problem .. . . 67 
2.4.2 The Bad Company objection 72 
2.4.3 Epistemic rejectionism 79 
2.5 Intermediate conclusion 
· . 82 
II An epistemological framework 84 
3 Internalism 85 
3.1 Motivating the distinction · .......... 85 
3.1.1 Analysing knowledge and justification 85 
3.1.2 Scepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
3.2 Epistemic warrant and the internalism VB. externalism debate 89 
3.2.1 The notion of warrant 89 
3.2.2 Warrant pluralism · . 91 
3.2.3 The question of internalism vs. externalism 92 
3.3 Relevance Internalism about the external world 96 
3.3.1 Accessible warrant · ........ 96 
3.3.2 Arguing for Relevance Internalism 98 
3.3.3 The Traditional Epistemic Project 99 
3.3.4 Scepticism. . . . . . . . . . . . 103 
3.3.5 Wright's Instability Argument . 105 
3.4 Wright's notion of being in a position to claim a warrant. 110 
3.5 Wright Internalism about Arithmetic ........ 113 
3.5.1 The argument from mathematical practice . 113 
3.5.2 The Argument from Analogy ........ 115 
3.5.3 Arithmetic and the Traditional Epistemic Project. 117 
3.6 Intermediate conclusion ........ . . . . . . . . . . . 117 
4 Scepticism and non-evidential warrant 119 
4.1 Cognitive projects, belief-forming methods, and foundationalism . 119 
4.1.1 Cognitive projects and their belief-forming methods 119 
4.1.2 Foundationalism .................... 123 
v 
4.1.3 Two basic belief-forming method:; . 
4.2 Conservativism ............. . 
4.2.1 Conservativi:;m about Perception 
4.2.2 Deduction............. 
4.3 Scepticism, circularity, and non-evidential warrant 
4.3.1 A sceptical challenge ..... . 
4.3.2 Circularity at the second-level . 
4.3.3 Internalistic warrant by default 
4.4 Entitlement of cognitive project . . . . 
4.5 Leaching and Justification Generation 
4.5.1 The Leaching Worry ..... . 
4.5.2 Two models of Justification Generation. 
4.6 Pragmatism and epistemic consequentialism 
4.7 Intermediate conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . 
5 Transmission-failure 
5.1 The weak status of entitlement 
5.1.1 Entitlement, evidence, and knowledge 
5.1.2 The epistemic value of claimable knowledge (and evidence) 
5.1.3 We should prefer internalistic knowledge over entitlement 
5.2 Transmission-failure .... 
5.2.1 Mooreau upgrading . 
5.2.2 Wright's diagnosis 
5.2.3 Consequences.. 
5.3 Rule-circular arguments 
5.3.1 Transmission-failure 
5.3.2 The failure of Justification Generation 
5.4 Two responses ......... . 
5.4.1 Discharged assumptions 
5.4.2 Entitlement for rules . . 
5.5 Intermediate conclusion: unavoidable sceptical consequences? 
vi 
123 
124 
124 
127 
128 
129 
130 
132 
134 
140 
140 
142 
147 
153 
155 
156 
156 
159 
161 
162 
162 
163 
167 
169 
169 
172 
174 
175 
176 
177 
III New solutions to old problems 180 
6 Entitled mathematics 181 
6.1 Entitlement and arithmetic 181 
6.1.1 Axioms as entitlements 182 
6.1.2 A regress argument ... 184 
6.1.3 Wright on entitlement and arithmetic 186 
6.1.4 Wright on avoiding a leaching worry for arithmetic 189 
6.1.5 Transmission-failure ................ 190 
6.1.6 Presupposition expansion and extended leaching 193 
6.2 Semi-sceptical foundationalism 195 
6.2.1 The idea .... 196 
6.2.2 A toy example 198 
6.2.3 SSF beyond arithmetic . · 200 
6.2.4 Inapplicable theories · 201 
6.2.5 Mixed statements. · 202 
6.2.6 Indispensability .. · 204 
6.2.7 Meeting the desiderata . 205 
6.3 Intermediate conclusion .... 206 
1 Knowledge by meta-linguistic stipulation 208 
7.1 Abstractionism reconsidered . · 209 
7.1.1 The basic idea .... · 209 
7.1.2 An argument for the basic idea · 210 
7.1.3 The Abstractionist Inference 
· 215 
7.1.4 Defending the proposed structure of justification (1) 
· 221 
7.1.5 The generation of internalistic justification . · 224 
7.1.6 A refined Hero story ............. 
· 225 
7.1.7 Transmission-failure and the justification of consistency 
· 227 
7.1.8 Hermeneutic abstractionism 
· 229 
7.1.9 Meeting the constraints .. · 230 
7.2 The presuppositions of the Abstractionist Inference 
· 234 
vii 
7.2.1 Three presuppositions of success .. 235 
7.2.2 Presuppositions of cognitive success 239 
7.2.3 Interpretationism . . . . . . . . 243 
7.2.4 Mathematical presuppositions. 246 
7.2.5 Ontological presuppositions .. 248 
7.2.6 Presuppositions of uniqueness . 252 
7.2.7 Epistemological presuppositions . 253 
7.2.8 Summary: essential presuppositions 255 
7.3 Extending the proposal: logic 257 
7.3.1 Another Hero story . . 258 
7.3.2 Presuppositions in the logical case 259 
7.3.3 Entitlements for presuppositions 260 
7.3.4 Defending the proposed structure of justification (2) 262 
7.3.5 Justification generation, and hyper-circularity 263 
7.3.6 Intermediate conclusion: logicism? ...... 264 
7.4 Extending the proposal: implicit definition in general . 266 
7.4.1 The Sentential Stipulation Inference 267 
7.4.2 Stipulating abstraction principles . . 268 
7.4.3 A special role for abstraction principles? 268 
7.4.4 Against epistemic analyticity 270 
7.4.5 A third notion of analyticity. 271 
7.4.6 Ebert's proposal 273 
7.5 Intermediate conclusion 
· 280 
8 Conclusion 281 
8.1 Insights 
· 281 
8.2 Open questions 
· 282 
References 284 
viii 
Introduction 
Motivation 
\Ve claim to know many things. We claim to be justified in believing many things. I know 
that I have two hands, that 1+1=2, and that Modus Ponens is a valid rule of inference. 
I am justified in believing that it is raining outside, because I see it. I am justified in 
believing that there are infinitely many prime numbers, because I can prove it. 
Knowledge and justification matter to us. Knowledge is a guide to action. Using an 
example of Williamson's, suppose "a burglar spends all night ransacking a house, risking 
discovery by staying so long" (Williamson 2000, p. 62). Clearly, that the burglar knows 
that there is a diamond in a house explains this behaviour. Contrast the explanation 
that the burglar merely hoped that there is a diamond in the house. This would be very 
implausible as an explanation - at least under normal circumstances. 
Justification enables us to give satisfactory responses to the doubts of others, and 
ultimately enables us to convince others. Only a network of justified beliefs will withstand 
critical scrutiny. Without our propensity to gather justified beliefs, modern science - with 
all its practical advantages - would be impossible. 
Knowledge and justification are extended in the context of a plethora of cognitive 
projects: projects of finding out about the world, using a variety of cognitive and sensory 
capacities. Such projects can be very general, as the project of obtaining knowledge about 
the physical world or the project of discovering the structure of the natural numbers. 
However, cognitive projects can also be very specific, as the project of determining how 
many words this thesis has. 
The success of some projects rests on the possibility of the success of other projects. 
For example, the project of determining what my fair share of a bag of Skittles is rests 
on the possibility of finding out about the external world by visual experience, and the 
possibility of dividing the number of sweets in the bag. 
In this sense, logic and mathematics are fundamental projects, because a great many 
projects rest on their success (and the possibility of their success). Without mathemat-
ics - the project of discovering the mathematical facts - contemporary physics would 
be radically impaired. Without logic - the project of discovering what, in general, (de-
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ductively) follows from what - determining the (logical) consequences of our non-logical 
beliefs would be impossible, which would radically impair our cognitive lives in almost 
every respect. Not only because we would not be able to extend knowledge by means of 
logical reasoning. But also because logic is required for determining the consistency of our 
beliefs, and for rational (self-)criticism. 
In this thesis, I shall provide epistemological foundations for mathematics (and some 
outlines for logic) by arguing for a particular option. In Part I, I provide an introduction 
to the problems in the philosophy of mathematics to motivate the investigations to fol-
low. I present desiderata for a fully satisfactory epistemology of mathematics and discuss 
relevant positions. All these positions turn out to be unsatisfactory, which motivates the 
abstractionist approach. I argue that abstractionism is in need of further explication when 
it comes to its central epistemological workings. 
I fill this gap by embedding neo-Fregeanism in an internalistic epistemological frame-
work. In Part II, I motivate, outline, and discuss the consequences of the framework. I 
argue: (1) we need an internalistic notion of warrant in our epistemology and every good 
epistemology accounts for the possession of such warrant; (2) to avoid scepticism, we need 
to invoke a notion of non-evidential warrant (entitlement); (3) because entitlements cannot 
be upgraded, endorsing entitlements for mathematical axioms and validity claims would 
entail that such propositions cannot be claimed to be known. 
Because of (3), the framework appears to yield sceptical consequences. In Pari Ill, I 
discuss (i) whether we can accept these consequences and (ii) whether we have to accept 
these consequences. As to (i), I argue that there is a tenable solely entitlement-based 
philosophy of mathematics and logic. However, I also argue that we can overcome limi-
tations by vindicating the nea-Fregean proposal that implicit definitions can underwrite 
basic logico-mathematical knowledge. One key manoeuvre here is to acknowledge that the 
semantic success of creative implicit definitions rests on substantial presuppositions - but 
to argue that relevant presuppositions are entitlements. 
This ~rop08al is an embedding of (classical) nea-Fregeanism in the epistemological 
framework discussed in Part II. Thus, I show how to kill two birds with one stone: I 
provide an explication of the epistemological workings of classical neo-Fregeanism, and 
thereby provide a non-sceptical internalist epistemology for mathematics, which might 
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also be applicable to logic. 
One final aspect of my proposal is worth stressing: this thesis, and its final proposal, 
is in the spirit of what has been called the Traditional Epistemic Project, i.e. the project 
- famously initiated by Descartes - of vindicating from scratch and from the armchair 
our right to claim knowledge of most of the knowledge we pre-theoretically take ourselves 
to possess, bracketing all antecedently held beliefs about the external world. I will engage 
in this project by telling an epistemological Hero Story - a story of a subject successfully 
engaging in this project. Of course, the idea is that Hero could be you. 
Anticipation 
The following paragraphs provide a brief, but slightly more detailed overview over the 
content of the chapters of this thesis. 
Part I In Part I, I motivate the neo-Fregean position and argue that it is in need of 
further clarification when it comes to its exact epistemological workings. 
Chapter 1 Chapter 1 provides a brief overview over some issues and options in the 
epistemology of mathematics. I begin with presenting Benacerraf's famous dilemma and 
Field's generalization of it. I then define some key terms, and extract some desiderata for 
a satisfactory epistemology for arithmetic. After that, I provide an (incomplete) overview 
over the space of options, by providing brief discussions of some of the most important 
Platonist positions: Godelian Platonism, Frege's Logicism, and the indispensability argu-
ment. I argue that these positions fail to meet our constraints, or face other substantial 
difficulties. I then examine whether this motivates giving up Platonism. I argue that this 
is not so, because the nominalist positions also face substantial difficulties. This sets the 
stage for the position I investigate in chapter 2 - neo-Fregeanism, or: abstractionism. 
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 is an opinionated survey of Hale's and Wright's neo-Fregeanism. 
I motivate and outline the position, and discuss three important objections to it. In the 
course of the discussion, it will become apparent that the proposal is in need of explication 
when it comes to its exact epistemological workings. 
In some more detail: I sketch how neo-Fregeanism emerged from an analysis of Frege's 
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failures and achievements. After that, I present the position's core components, and sketch 
how exactly they are supposed to work together. The epistemological core component of 
neo-Fregeanism - the proposal that apriori knowledge of abstraction principles can be 
obtained by means of implicit definition - will be investigated in some more detail. It 
shall transpire that it is unclear how exactly the postulated belief-forming process and the 
process of warrant generation are supposed to work. Among other things, the proposal 
relies on an unclear notion of warrant by default. Hale and Wright later suggest that it 
might be explicated by Wright's notion of entitlement, but how exactly the notion is to be 
applied remains open. 
I close with presenting the three most pressing objections to classical neo-Fregeanism: 
the Caesar problem, the Bad Company objection, and epistemic rejectionism. Towards the 
end of the thesis, I will return to these problems, and show that my own proposal sheds 
light on them. 
Part II The epistemological gaps in Hale's and Wright's proposal shall be closed by 
embedding their idea about implicit definition in a general epistemological framework. Part 
II contains a motivating introduction to as well as a detailed discussion of the framework 
I endorse for this purpose. For the sake of clarity, I endorse a particular explication of the 
type of framework I am advocating, building upon Wright's most recent epistemological 
works. My framework is based on three tenets: (access) internalism, (internalistic) warrant 
by default, and the transmission-failure diagnosis for Moorean argument. There is one 
chapter for each tenet. 
Chapter S Chapter 3 is on internalism. I begin by outlining two debates in epistemol-
ogy to which the issue of internalism vs. externalism is relevant. After drawing some 
distinctions, I argue for a particular version of what I call Relevance Intemalism: the 
claim that every satisfactory epistemology has to explain how we can possess rationally 
claimable warrants - warrants whose possession is available on the basis of self-knowledge 
and introspection. I argue for Relevance Internalism by arguing for the claims that (i) 
the most interesting sceptical challenges are directed against our right to claim warrants; 
(ii) externalistic notions cannot be used to provide dialectically stable responses to simple 
closure-based sceptical challenges; (iii) that successfully pursuing what has been called the 
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Traditional Epistemic Project requires accounting for the pussessiun uf ratiunally daimaLle 
warrants in the sense above. I argue that some of these considerations can alsu be applied 
to the arithmetical case. 
Chapter 4 Relevance Internalism invites scepticism. In chapter 4, I argue that the 
internalist can avoid scepticism, but that he or she needs to invoke internalistic wU1'1'Unis by 
default, i.e. internalistic warrants one can possess without having done any priur evidential 
work. I endorse Wright's entitlements of cognitive project to render the envisaged response 
to scepticism explicit. 
After drawing some relevant distinctions, I argue for a position that has been called 
conservativism. Conservativism about perception and deduction makes it hard to see how 
we can avoid certain radical forms of scepticism. This is because it renders it hard to see 
how we can acquire first evidential warrants for relevant propositions at the basic level, 
and it makes it impossible to claim any warrants because secund-order arguments become 
viciously circular. I present a very general argument to the effect that, in order to avoid 
scepticism, every access internalist needs to invoke a notion of an internalistic warrant by 
default at the basic level, i.e. a notion of an internalistic warrant one can possess without 
having done any prior evidential work. 
I render this response to scepticism explicit by endorsing Wright's notion of entitlement 
of cognitive project. After motivating and introducing the basic idea, I provide two models 
of how exactly entitled presuppositions might serve the generation of evidential warrants 
sufficient for claimable knowledge. 
Chapter I) The moral of chapter 5 is that it matters a lot in terms of the consequences of 
our epistemological framework, what we regard to be the canonical structure of justification 
in relevant areas of cognitive enquiry. 
The argument goes as follows. First, I point out some aspects in which Wright's en-
titlements are weak warrants. In particular, I agree with Wright in that entitled true 
belief cannot amount to claimable knowledge. One might think that one can avoid this 
consequence by epistemically upgrading entitled basic propositions by some form of boot-
strapping. However, secondly, I argue that such bootstrapping fails. This is due to the 
phenomenon of failure of warrant transmission, which Wright uncovers in his reflections 
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on Moorean arguments. Responding to scepticism by invoking entitlements is inevitably 
concessive in the sense that certain basic propositions - what I call the pr'esuppositions 
of basic belief-forming methods - can never be claimed to be known. This might yield 
sceptical consequences. 
As an example, I consider the logical case. I argue that, because of conservativeness 
about deduction, rule-circular arguments are just as bad as Moorean arguments. Thus, 
if validity claims were entitlements, then they could never be claimed to be known. This 
would be a revisionary sceptical consequence. 
This motivates looking for basic belief-forming methods that allow for justifying validity 
claims without invoking validity as a presupposition. In general, what the basic belief-
forming methods are determines what the presuppositions are. Finding a suitable structure 
of justification might avoid revisionary sceptical consequences. 
Part III What has just been said is obviously relevant to the mathematical case. For 
example, if axioms are entitlements, then they cannot be claimed to be known. This would 
also be a revisionary sceptical consequence. In Part III, I answer two questions regarding 
these limitative results. Firstly, can we bite the bullet and live with the revisionary conse-
quence that we cannot claim to know arithmetical truths? Secondly, can we hope to find a 
non-sceptical solution, i.e. a way to apply the framework in such a way that mathematical 
axioms can be claimed to be known after all? Chapter 6 provides a positive answer to the 
first question, and chapter 7 provides a positive answer to the second question. 
Chapter 6 It is not obvious that it is devastating to our cognitive lives if it turns out 
that we only possess entitlements for important basic propositions. Wright wholeheartedly 
accepts such limits in the external world case. However, it seems that, in the mathematical 
case, entitlement at the basic level entails that all of mathematics turns out to be merely 
entitled. 
I will argue that this result is not devastating to our epistemology overall. The idea is 
that we could still fruitfully apply mathematics and logic in other cognitive projects, such 
as the sciences. I will discuss three versions of the fallback position, and argue that even 
the most concessive one is a viable and interesting position. 
6 
Chapter 7 In chapter 7, I embed the neo-Fregean thesis about implicit definition in the 
framework discussed in Part II, in such a way that we can avoid the consequence that 
mathematical axioms are entitlements and cannot be claimed to be known. As mentioned 
above, the proposal promises to kill two birds with one stone, because it also provides an 
explication of the central epistemic workings of the idea that apriori knowledge can be 
obtained on the basis of implicit definitions which has been requested in Pad [. 
The basic idea is that implicit definition can be associated with a basic belief-forming 
method with entitled presuppositions, whereas the presuppositions are just the relevant 
preconditions of definitional success. I explain the account by sketching its application to 
the arithmetical case. I investigate the presuppositions of definitional success for the case 
of Hume's Principle, and shed light on the three objections to neo-Fregeanism discussed in 
chapter 2. 
I then sketch, in broad brushstrokes, how the account might be applied to the logical 
case, and thereby provide the outlines of a unified epistemology for mathematics and logic 
that I imposed as a desideratum at the beginning of the thesis. Moreover, I argue that my 
account reveals a flaw in Boghossian's notion of epistemic analyticity, and I shall suggest 
a new explication of an epistemic notion of analyticity. 
7 
Part I 
Old solutions to old problems 
8 
1 Epistemology of mathematics: issues and options 
1.1 Puzzles about arithmetical knowledge 
We know many mathematical truths, and we know a lot about arithmetic in particular. 
Every educated person knows that there are infinitely many prime numbers, and every 
child knows that 1+1=2. Moreover, we know many things about the world which we 
describe with the help of mathematical concepts. Do not most of us know that the number 
of planets is 8, and that many believe falsely that the number of planets is 9? 
Mathematical knowledge matters to us: there is a vast number of :Mathematics de-
partments around the world - dedicated to extending mathematical knowledge. Without 
knowing a great deal of mathematics, contemporary physics would be impossible. Without 
mathematical knowledge, there would never have been space shuttles. 
Mathematical knowledge is good for many things. So much the worse that some 
straightforward philosophical reflection makes mathematical knowledge look rather puz-
zling. We just need to ask the following questions: how exactly are mathematical beliefs 
justified? How exactly do we know mathematical truths? And how exactly can we ratio-
nally claim this knowledge? 
I first show how these questions lead to philosophical puzzles, and then discuss some 
classical responses to them. The questions are hard enough for the case of arithmetic. I 
mostly stick to this particular case, although I say a little bit more about other cases along 
the way. 
So why are these questions about arithmetical knowledge so hard to answer? After all, 
for many arithmetical beliefs - or other beliefs involving arithmetical terms - the ques-
tions of how exactly they are justified seem to admit of straightforward answers. However, 
there are at least two strategies to create puzzles about arithmetical knowledge. The first 
is to ask the "How?" question one time too many. The second is to look at what exactly 
arithmetical statements say. I discuss both strategies in turn. 1 
lSince this thesia ia also concerned with basic logical knowledge, it is worth mentioning that at least 
the first puzzle also arises for logical knowledge. It ia not clear whether the second puzzle arises as well 
(Field 2005, section 6). 
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1.1.1 Puzzle 1: how are the axioms justified? 
Consider the question of how we can justify that the nUIIlbers of knivet:; on a table it:; equal 
to the number of planets (assume there are 8 knives on the table). The answer seems 
simple: we know that the number of planets is 8, so if we count 8 knives, there is not much 
more to say. 
Another example is the proposition that there are infinitely many primes. How can 
we justify it? Again, the answer is straightforward: by a proof, of course. For any prime 
number p, the product of all prime numbers "S p" plus 1 is prime, and greater than p. So 
we always find a greater prime number. q.e.d. 
However, there will be some mathematical facts for which it is far less obvious how we 
are to justify them. And we do not have to consider complicated number-theoretic conjec-
tures. Interestingly, an answer to our question gets harder for very simple mathematical 
truths. Here is an example: how can we justify the belief that 1 + 1 -2? Whereas most 
non-experts lack a good answer (or simply say "this is obvious" or "I learned that"), mathe-
maticians might refer to the Dedekind-Peano axioms (henceforth: Peano axioms). In Peano 
Arithmetic (PA), the deductive closure of these axioms, the equivalent of"l + 1 = 2" in the 
language of PA ("SO + so = SSO") is a theorem. We can thus still obtain an inferential 
justification from more basic principles. 
However, we philosophers can easily puzzle the experts as well. We simply ask the 
"how" question one time too many. We ask: how are the Peano axioms justified? At this 
point, a further appeal to a proof from more basic principles is useless. After all, the 
Peano axioms are axioms. Mathematicians regard them as mathematical basic beliefs -
fundaments of the tower of canonical mathematical knowledge. In actual mathematical 
practice, the axioms are just introduced and accepted. So are we just assuming the axioms? 
It would be worrying if we could not say more: for we can assume anything. Obviously, 
mere assumptions cannot amount to knowledge. 
1.1.2 Puzzle 2: incompatible constraints 
Benacerraf's challenge The second puzzle is a notorious challenge by Paul Benacerraf 
(1973). Benacerraf argues that it is hard to combine a reasonable semantics for arith-
metical statements with a reasonable epistemological background picture. In other words, 
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Benacerraf imposes a condition on a successful philosophy of mathematics which appears 
(almost) trivial, and shows that it faces a dilemma. The condition is: 
(Benacerraf's Triviality) A successful philosophy of arithmetic has to combine a 
reasonable semantics for arithmetic with a reasonable epistemological theory in such a 
way that arithmetic knowledge is possible. 
According to Benacerraf, this generates a dilemma. On one horn of the dilemma, we 
assume the most reasonable semantics for arithmetical statements. Then it is hard to see 
how mathematical knowledge is possible. On the other horn of the dilemma, we assume an 
epistemological theory that makes it easy to see how arithmetical knowledge is possible: 
then it does not give the right picture of what mathematical statements mean or really are 
about. Thus, we either have to give up our most reasonable semantics, or we have to give 
up our most reasonable epistemology. 
In order to render his dilemma more concrete, Benacerraf uses the prevalent assump-
tions of his time. This yields the following tenets: the semantics for arithmetic must be 
based on Tarski's theory of truth (Tarski 1935), and the most plausible epistemological 
background picture is a causal theory of knowledge. Now consider the sentence: 
(NOP1) There are 8 planets in the solar system. 
It seems to be equivalent to: 
(NOP2) The number of planets in the solar system is (identical to the number) 8. 
The second sentence expresses an identity. In particular, "The number of planets" and 
"8" are singular terms. Thus, according to Tarski's theory of truth, the sentence can only 
be true if and only if both terms refer to the same object. The general point to note 
here is of course that arithmetic is about arithmetical objects - the (natural) numbers. 
Arithmetical statements are true if and only if they express facts about these objects. 
But what kinds of objects are numbers? They certainly aren't objects like tables and 
chairs, located in space and time. We cannot see the number 7, and it does not make 
sense to suppose that it ceases to exist in 2000 years. It is easy to arrive at the picture of 
a distinct Platonic realm of mind-independent abstract objects. 
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However, this picture is hard to reconcile with the cauf:ial theory of knowledge. Assume 
that arithmetic is indeed the science of natural numbers, and the numbers are abstract 
objects in a Platonic realm. Then how could we ever be in cauf:ial contact with them? But 
this is just what the causal theory of knowledge demands. According to the causal theory 
of knowledge, we possess knowledge of some fact F if and only if our belief that F stands 
in the appropriate causal relationship to the fact that F. For example, so the thought goes, 
we can obtain knowledge of the existence of a barn in front of us if there is in fact a barn 
in front of us reflecting some of the incoming sunlight, which in turn causes an image on 
our retina which finally causes an experience and the forming of the appropriate belief. :;'Il'o 
such causal story seems to be available in the arithmetical case.2 
To sum up: we either have to give up Tarski's semantics for arithmetic or the causal 
theory of knowledge. Now, of course this is only a dilemma if we want to uphold both 
Tarski's semantics and a causal theory of knowledge. And although the first assumption 
can be defended, the second is contentious, to put it mildly. 
How can we defend Benacerraf's first assumption? First, we note that Tarskian seman-
tics is suitable for other areas of discourse. For example, when we interpret a discourse 
about tables and chairs, it makes sense to say that singular terms refer to objects and sen-
tences expressing an identity are true if and only if the terms on both side of the identity 
refer to the same object. Second, we note that it at least appears as if number terms are 
singular terms: we assign numbers to concepts,3 we talk about numbers being identical, 
etc. Now, the following principle is very plausible (Benacerraf 1973, p.670): 
(Uniformity Principle) We should aim at a uniform semantic theory for all our factual 
discourses. 
And this enables us to infer that we should interpret number terms as referring to 
objects, since mathematical discourse is clearly factual. 
AB I said, Benacerraf's second assumption is not so easily defended. A reason in favour 
of the causal theory of knowledge is that it provides a response to Gettier cases (see e.g. 
Goldman 1967). However, the causal theory is not without problems, and alternatives have 
been suggested, such as re1iabilism (Goldman 1979) and sensitivity-based accounts (Nozick 
2Note that the problem is only an instance of a general problem with knowledge of abstract objects. A 
similar puzzle could be created for properties, musical works, etc. 
sThis observation is, of course, due to Frege. It famously appears in Grundlagen §46. 
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1988}. Such accounts do not generate the same problems for knowledge of abstracta as the 
simple causal theory does, at least not obviously so (Hale 1994a, p. 170). 
Field's challenge However, the general idea behind the challenge remains untouched by 
the fact that the simple causal theory does not withstand critical scrutiny. According to 
Field (2005), the real challenge is not about a particular epistemological theory. It is about 
explaining how our beliefs can reliably match mathematical truth. For without being able 
to explain how this can happen, we cannot rationally claim any mathematical knowledge. 
The thought is that for any subject matter M we want to claim knowledge of, and 
whatever our conception of knowledge is exactly - the following condition holds: 
(Field's Constraint) We cannot rationally claim knowledge about M if it is impossible 
to explain how we can reliably form M-beliefs, i.e. how it can come about that many 
(or most) of our beliefs about M correspond to the M-facts. 
The immediate problem is that it is very hard to see how such an explanation might 
look, if we assume the above-described semantic picture. Field (1989) presents a dilemma 
which emerges by dividing up the space of possible explanations into causal and nOll-
causal explanations. The explanation cannot be causal, so the thought goes, because 
the Platonist is forced to hold that numbers are not in causal contact with anything. 
And the explanation cannot be non-causal either because, given the mind and language-
independence of mathematical entities, "it is very hard to see what this supposed non-causal 
explanation could be" (Field 1989, p. 231). 
Field does not offer an argument for this claim. Divers and Miller (1999) interpret Field 
as just seeing no option for someone who holds that mathematics is mind-independent in 
the sense that the existence of mathematical facts does not depend on the existence of 
minds. One option Divers and Miller consider and dismiss on behalf of Field is that the 
truths of mathematics are constituted by mental states. Although this would render the 
explanation ofreliable mathematical belief-formation a lot easier, it contradicts our picture 
of mind-independent mathematical facts, for whatever is constituted by mental states is 
mind-dependent. 
H Field is correct, then, since both the causal and the non-causal route to an expla-
nation of the reliability of our mathematical beliefs are closed, and these alternatives are 
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exhaustive, there is no explanation of reliable mathematical belief-formation and arith-
metic violates (Field's Constraint). In this case, we should not (or cannot) claim any 
arithmetical knowledge. 
1.2 Desiderata for a solution 
To put more carefully the upshot of the discussion of (Field's Constraint), it is that we 
should not (or cannot) claim any arithmetical knowledge as long as we uphold a Tarskian 
semantics, and a picture of mind-independent mathematical facts and numbers as mind-
independent abstract objects. Furthermore, it is necessary to develop this thought in detail 
and to define some of the key terms involved. 
1.2.1 Arithmetical Platonism 
I have already explained how, given some plausible background assumptions, the problem-
atic semantic picture naturally arrives from a reflection on arithmetical discourse. The 
following three claims are very plausible: 
(Minimal Arithmetical Realism) 
1. The surface grammar of arithmetical propositions has to be taken at face value. 
In particular, number terms are singular terms - terms whose semantic role is 
to refer to objects. So, for example, the sentence "1+1~2" expresses a genuine 
identity, namely that the object denoted by "2", and the value of the function 
denoted by "+", applied to the objects denoted by "1" and "1", are in fact one and 
the same object. 
2. Arithmetical discourse is factual. For example, people have genuine disputes about 
whether there are numbers with certain features. Arithmetical discourse is about 
what the facts about the arithmetical objects (the numbers) are. 
a. Arithmetic is a body of truths. Given 2, this entails that its distinctive objects -
the numbers - (really) exist. 
With surface grammar, I mean the logical structure that is suggested by paraphrasing 
the sentence literally, i.e. the logical structure of the most straightforward paraphrase of 
the sentence to standard (second-order) logic. The surface grammar of a sentence can be 
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contrasted with its real logical form, which is the logical structure of the best paraphrase 
of the sentence to standard (second-order) logic - roughly, the paraphrase which captures 
the meaning of the sentence in an important sense, which captures its commitments, and 
so on. To say that the surface grammar of a sentence S has to be taken at face value is to 
say that the surface grammar of S and the real logical form of S are identical. 4 
To repeat: the first claim can be motivated by looking at actual mathematical practice 
and Benacerraf's (Uniformity Principle). We talk as if numbers exist. For example, 
when mathematicians find a new large prime number, they claim nothing short of exis-
tence. Number terms seem to meet the syntactic criteria for singular termhood (for an 
analysis of such criteria supporting this claim, see Hale 1994b, 1996). By the (Uniformity 
Principle), we should treat singular terms in mathematics just as in ordinary external 
world discourse, i.e. as terms whose semantic role is to refer to objects. 
For the purposes of this project, I will assume that there are singular terms, terms 
whose semantic role is to refer to objects. I will also assume epistemic transparency in the 
sense that someone possessing the relevant mathematical and philosophical concepts and 
skills - in a sense that includes the reader of this thesis - is able to justify claims about 
the real logical form of relevant sentences apriori, in a sense of apriority that does not 
rule out empirical defeasibility. I cannot rule out here that linguistic investigations reveals 
that ordinary number terms should not be treated as singular terms - this is certainly 
an epistemic possibility - but I assume that this is false. I briefly come back to these 
assumptions in 2.2.2,2.3.5, and 7.1.8. 
The second claim - the factuality of arithmetical discourse - is easily motivated 
by observing that we take arithmetic (very) seriously. In particular, we neither treat 
arithmetical discourse relativistically nor does it seem as if we treat arithmetical discourse 
fictionally. It is not a matter of taste whether three is a prime number. And saying that 
three is a prime number does not seem to be like saying that Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
The first part of the third claim - that arithmetic is a body of truths - is a piece of 
common knowledge: of course, arithmetic is true. It can be motivated further by noting 
that it is hard to see how it can be so usefully applied if it is untrue. Of course, this does 
4Sometimes, the surface grammar of a sentence is different from the logical form of the best paraphrase 
of the sentence. For example, one might think that "It is raining" is not best translated in the same way 
811 "It is a blue car". 
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not mean that we do not have false arithmetical beliefs from time to time. However, at 
least the experts' beliefs are largely correct. 
A stronger claim than (Minimal Arithmetical Realism), but still a popular claim, 
is the following: 
(Arithmetical Realism) (Minimal Arithmetical Realism) holds, and the objects 
of arithmetic - the natural numbers - are mind- and language-independent. 
That the natural numbers are neither mind- nor language-dependent is to mean that 
their existence does not counterfactually depend on the existence of minds or languages.5 
This claim can be motivated by noting that the following counterfactual seems to be true: 
if there were no minds or languages, it would still be the case that 1+1-2. It is hard to 
see how the minimal realist can avoid (Arithmetical Realism). 
Now, (Arithmetical Realism) in turn leads to the following, even stronger position: 
(Arithmetical Platonism) (Arithmetical Realism) holds, and the numbers are 
(pure) abstract objects, i.e. they do not exist in space and time (and we cannot be 
spatiotemporally related to them). 
Here is one way to motivate the claim that numbers do not exist in space and time. 
It seems clear that they are not physical objects like tables and chairs, objects that ean 
be seen, measured, or destroyed. If they were located in space and time, the question of 
where the number 7 is would be meaningful, where "where" is not deviantly interpreted 
as in "Where is the number 7?" - "Well, in-between 6 and 8, of course".6 Moreover, the 
question of when the number 7 exists would be meaningful. However, both questions sound 
absurd. 
Henceforth, I will also say "numbers" instead of "natural numbers" and "Platonism" 
instead of" Arithmetical Platonism". Someone rejecting either (Minimal Arithmetical 
Realism) or (Arithmetical ReaUsm) will be called an anti-realist about arithmetic. 
Someone rejecting (Arithmetical Platonism) will be called a nominalist. 
(Arithmetical Platonism) is the position that Benacerraf and Field assume to be 
the standard picture of arithmetic. In order to generate problems as above, we just need 
81 thus roDow Diven and Miller (1999). 
tlNote that if numbers were mind-dependent objects, then "in our heads" might be an eligible answer. 
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to impose it as a constraint for our epistemology of arithmetic that it has to work together 
with (Arithmetical Platonism). Let me note, however, that the beHt verHion of Field'H 
challenge is one that does not straightforwardly assume (Arithmetical Platonism), but 
which just assumes that it is a plausible position whose denial needs motivation and ex-
planation. This opens up a lot of new space for manoeuvre. Suppose that we jUHt cannot 
find any way to reconcile our epistemological COIlHtraints with (Arithmetical Platon-
ism). Then one might be able to find an epistemology for arithmetic which - although it 
does not work for full-blown (Arithmetical Platonism) - at least works for (Minimal 
Arithmetical Realism) or (Arithmetical Realism). A fortiori, if it really can be made 
plausible that we are even mistaken in assuming (Minimal Arithmetical Realism), we 
are entitled to give up even this basic semantical constraint. If, on the other hand, the 
position giving up any of the principles above has problems of its own, this adds up to the 
initial implausibility of denying one of the plausible semantic constraints. 
Simply put: I believe that in the philosophy of mathematics, we ultimately have to 
carry out a cost-benefit analysis. In this thesis, I argue that a cost-benefit analysis reveals 
that we do not have to give up (Arithmetical Platonism). In particular, I argue that 
nominalist positions have problems on their own, and that there is a plausible account of 
knowledge of arithmetic, Platonistically construed. 
1.2.2 Reconstructing arithmetical knowledge 
We are left with two challenges for (Arithmetical Platonism): 
• We need to respond to Field's worry, i.e. we need to account for the possibility of 
reliably forming beliefs about the arithmetical realm . 
• We need to account for a way to justify (obtain knowledge of) arithmetical axioms. 
These formulations are highly ambiguous. Firstly, it is not clear which notions of justifica-
tion and knowledge are presupposed. For example: is it the ordinary, everyday notion of 
knowledge, or some precisified, philosophical one? I leave this question open here, because 
I do not think that much hangs on it.7 Secondly, the challenges can be understood as a 
challenge about actual knowledge. However, one might also have the more modest aim to 
11 expand on this issue in chapters 3 and 4. 
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explain how it is possible to reliably form mathematical beliefs, and how it is possible to 
justify axioms, remaining silent about the actual situation. 
If we understood the challenges as being about actual mathematical beliefs, and ac-
tual mathematical knowledge, then we would surely have to use an ordinary notion of 
knowledge, and conceive of our two challenges as challenges to the following claim: 
(Actual Knowledge) Most of our arithmetical beliefs are items of knowledge. 
However, the use of "our" here is suboptimal. In fact, we can focus on mathematicians 
without loss of generality. For if the mathematicians have a lot of arithmetical knowledge, 
knowledge of the non-mathematicians could be explained, among other things, as acquired 
by testimony. We thus obtain the following, more precise claim: 
(Actual Knowledge') Most of the mathematicians' arithmetical beliefs are known by 
them. 
In this thesis, I shall not attempt to establish (Actual Knowledge) and (Actual 
Knowledge'). Rather, my primary aim is just to establish the following: 
(Possible Knowledge) There is a route to acquiring knowledge of the arithmetical 
facts. 
Arithmetical facts should be understood as the facts about the numbers that fully 
competent users of number talk and mathematicians talk about. They are expressed by 
ordinary - and, when it comes to the mathematicians, sometimes technical - statements 
about numbers, which can be found in mathematical, scientific, and everyday discourse of 
sufficiently competent speakers. I call the theory consisting of the true ordinary statements 
about numbers the ordinary theory (or ordinary arithmetic), and I call the number terms 
of ordinary arithmetic ordinary number terms. 
The phrase ''there is a route" is ambiguous. It is important that it shall be understood 
in a sense which is not too demanding. I shall argue that every non-defective epistemic 
agent, in a sense of "non-defective epistemic agent" which includes the readers of this thesis, 
is able to acquire knowledge of the truths of ordinary arithmetic. 
In particular, I shall engage in a henneneutic reconstructive epistemological project. A 
hermeneutic reconstructive epistemological project about a region of thought X is a project 
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of explaining a canonical process by which a non-defective epistemic agent can vindicate -
from scratch - all relevant X-knowledge. It is reconstructive because it is not required that 
the described process has anything to do with actual belief-formation. It is henneneutic 
because the reconstructed knowledge is knowledge of the same subject matter.s We can 
visualize such projects as follows: 
ordinllrY 
belief-form ZII: Ion 
Ordin~ry beliefs 
hermeneutic claim 
ideaUzed 
belief-formation 
Recon!tructed knowledge 
One can conceive of the project as involving a two-step process. The first step consists 
in construing a route of how our epistemic agent can come to acquire knowledge of some 
artificial theory, suitable for the reconstructionist's purposes. The second step consists in 
arguing for a hermeneutic claim, i.e. that the terms and statements of the artifical theory 
have the same meaning as the terms of the discourse to be reconstructed, and the ordinary 
theory in particular. Ideally, it will also be possible to argue that the hermeneutic claim 
is available to Hero as well, but note that this is not part of the hermeneutic claim. Given 
the above assumption that the fact that the surface grammar of ordinary arithmetical 
statements has to be taken as face value is available apriori to sufficiently competent 
agents (see 1.2.1), this claim can be argued for. I will briefly discuss this further in 2.3.5 
and 7.1.8. 
There is an ambiguity as to what exactly the hermeneutic claim involves. Using the 
Fregean distinction between sense and reference, we can distinguish the following two 
claims: 
(Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction) The terms9 of the reconstructed theories 
have the same referents as the corresponding terms of the ordinary theories. 
And: 
'This terminc:ilogy is inspired by a similar terminology endorsed by Burgess and Rosen (1997). 
'Note that this claim is not restricted to singular terms. I mean all terms, including predicates. I 
8881UDe here that predicates refer to properties. 
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(Strong Hermeneutic Reconstruction) The terms of the reconstructed theories 
have the same sense / express the same concepts as the corresponding terms of the 
ordinary theories, and corresponding statements express the same thoughts. 
The weak hermeneutic claim already entails that the reconstructed theories have the 
same subject matter, and that the statements of the ordinary theory are true just in case 
corresponding statements of the reconstructed theory are true. ~ote that, if arithmetic 
is about necessarily existing abstract objects, the weak hermeneutic claim will already 
entail that it is necessarily the case that the propositions expressed by the statements of 
the ordinary theory are true just in case the propositions expressed by the corresponding 
statements of the reconstructed theory are true. The strong hermeneutic claim entails this 
in any case. 
There will be a variety of strong hermeneutic projects, if there is a variety of ordinary 
concepts of number. There might be different concepts of number possessed by subjects 
with different levels of sophistication (mathematical, conceptual, and otherwise).1 0 The 
question then arises of which of the concepts I am concerned with. If there are different 
concepts of number, then I am most interested in the ordinary concept of number that is 
possessed by someone who is a fully competent user of ordinary number talk (in a sense 
that includes mathematicians 1 1 , scientists, and the reader of this thesis). For the purposes 
of this project, I assume that there is only one such concept. 
As Burgess and Rosen (1997) point out, hermeneutic reconstructions should be distin-
guished from what we may call revolutionary reconstructions, i.e. reconstructions that pro-
vide an epistemically kosher replacement for the old theory. Revolutionary reconstructions 
replace the hermeneutic claim by a weaker claim to the effect that the missing hermeneu-
tic link is harmless. One plausible candidate for a weaker claim is that we can replace 
the ordinary theory by the reconstructed theory without (explanatory) loss because the 
reconstructed theory can play the same role in the sciences and elsewhere: 
(Revolutionary Reconstruction) The reconstructed entities can be used to replace 
the ordinary entities without (explanatory) loss, and the reconstructed theories can be 
1°1 am indebted to Andrew McGonigal for raising this issue. 
llMathematicl&D8 might pOll8e88 different concepts of number. I always mean the concept that they 
employ in ordinary Dumber talk, and not different artificially introduced concepts they might use in the 
math clasIroom. Moreover, I am of course only concerned with cardinal numbers here, not with other 
types of numbers such 88 real numbers. 
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used to replace the ordinary theories without (explanatory) loss. 
Arguing for hermeneutic claims requires substantial further work. In the arithmetical 
case, it is not even clear what exactly the ordinary theory is. For example: is it a pure 
arithmetical theory, such as PA, or is it a theory implicit in our everyday arithmetical 
practice (or both)? I will return to this issue in 2.3.5. 
In this thesis, I will argue mainly for (Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction), but 
I take it to be a live option that my proposal also accounts for (Strong Hermeneutic 
Reconstruction). I conceive of (Revolutionary Reconstruction) as a fallback option. 
Thus, regarding arithmetic, the claim to be argued for is the following: 
(Arithmetical Knowledge) The readers of this thesis can acquire knowledge of a 
theory which is a weak hermeneutic reconstruction of ordinary arithmetic (the theory 
containing the true ordinary arithmetical statements). 
It is desirable to argue for (Arithmetical Knowledge) because, among other things, 
it enables us to make claims like the following: 
• The mathematicians, the scientists, and sufficiently competent users of mathematics 
in everyday discourse have true arithmetical beliefs. This is because the truth values 
of relevant ordinary arithmetical propositions (including "1 + 1 ~2", but also suitable 
versions of the Peano axioms such as "Every number has a successor") are the same 
as the truth values of corresponding theorems of the reconstructed theory, and we 
know that the reconstructed theory is true . 
• Given that we can show that the reconstructed theories are about mind-independend 
abstract objects, the arithmetical objects the users of arithmetic seem to fiddle 
around with uncritically all the time turn out to really exist as mind-independent 
abstract objects, and theorems of arithmetic mathematicians make every effort to 
prove turn out to be truths about these objects. For it can be shown that these 
objects are the same as the objects our reconstructed theory is about, and we know 
that the reconstructed theory is true. 
This is a huge advantage, psychologically as well as philosophically. If we can only argue 
for (Revolutionary Reconstruction), we cannot justifiably make these assertions. The 
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status of the propositions of the old theories, and the status of the beliefs of those who do 
not use the new theories remain open. 
1.2.3 Additional desiderata for the reconstructive project 
I now carve out some additional desiderata for our reconstructive project. 
Additional epistemological desiderata I will eventually argue that we need an in-
ternalistic notion of knowledge, i.e. a notion of knowledge whose possession is reflectively 
available by the subject. Details will be provided in chapter 3. What is more important 
for my current purposes is that arithmetical knowledge is apriori, and our epistemology 
should account for this fact. 
In short, a belief is justified apriori if the justification for the belief is not essentially 
based on experience, and apriori knowledge is knowledge based on an apriori justified 
belief. A belief that is justified, but not justified apriori, is justified aposteriori. Aposteriori 
knowledge is knowledge based on aposteriori justified belief. 
The phrase "essentially based" allows for apriori knowledge in cases where acquiring 
or possessing relevant concepts requires experience. For example: that nothing is red and 
green allover should count as knowable apriori, although acquiring the concepts red and 
green requires experiencing red and green things. Moreover, it allows for the generation of 
apriori knowledge by proofs which are carried out using pen and paper. 
We obtain the following constraint: 
(Apriority Constraint) There is a way to acquire apriori knowledge of arithmetical 
facts. 12 
A further epistemological desideratum does not concern the epistemic status of arith-
metic in general, but of a special class of arithmetical statements: the Peano axioms. In 
1.1.1, we saw that it is especially puzzling how we are justified in believing these axioms. If 
we account for their knowability, we will have made a big step towards solving the problem 
of canonical arithmetical knowledge, which is based on axioms and proofs. It is worth 
making the special role of axioms explicit: 
12 A further distinction can be made here between weak and strong apriori knowledge (see e.g. Field 
20(5). I come back to this distinction in a footnote in 7.1.3. 
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(Arithmetical Foundationalism) We must be able to explain how we can know 
arithmetical axioms in particular, and how all other arithmetical knowledge can rest on 
this knowledge. 
Applicability A desideratum of a different type emerges from the fact that mathematics 
has an important role to play in the sciences, and indeed also in ordinary life. In the 
sciences, it serves at least three purposes (Bueno & Colyvan 2011, section 5.4): 
• Explanation: mathematics is used in scientific explanations. We do not need to 
restrict this claim to physics. For example: the prime lifecycles of cicadas can be 
explained by the fact that prime lifecycles minimize intersections (Baker 2005). 
• Prediction: it is obvious that mathematics plays an important role in scientific pre-
dictions. As I said at the beginning of this chapter: without mathematics, there 
would not have been space shuttles. 
• Unification: new mathematical theories can help with unifying scientific theories. (Bueno 
& Colyvan 2011, p. 351; Colyvan 2002). 
Every satisfactory epistemology of mathematics needs to say something with respect to 
the question of how mathematics (and mathematical knowledge) can serve these roles. 
However, in this thesis, I cannot focus on all these roles in detail. What I take to be central 
to all these cases, is that mathematics helps with the extension of knowledge in other areas 
(I will come back to this issue in chapter 6). This general possibility every satisfactory 
epistemology of mathematics needs to explain. This yields our final constraint: 
(Applicability Constraint) We must explain how our reconstructed arithmetical 
knowledge can be used to extend knowledge in other areas of cognitive enquiry, e.g. 
the sciences. 
This almost completes my discussion of desiderata for a satisfying epistemology of 
arithmetic. Before I look at some Platonist positions in the philosophy of mathematics 
and examine to which extent they meet these desiderata, a note is in order regarding the 
role of logic in a reconstructive project for mathematics. 
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Two notes on logic Mathematics cannot be done without logic. Proof is a canoni-
cal belief-forming method in all of mathematics, and proofs are logical deductions from 
mathematical axioms. Any epistemology of mathematics rests on the premise that logical 
reasoning extends knowledge, in such a way that some special epistemic status is preserved, 
such as apriority. This is often only tacitly assumed, and it is worth making it explicit: 
(Extension of apriori knowledge) Ceteris paribus, logical reasoning can be used to 
extend apriori knowledge. 
A second (optional) desideratum arises from a comparison between logic and mathe-
matics. Both logic and mathematics are apriori, both are regarded as especially certain, 
and both serve the extension of knowledge in a wide range of cognitive projects. This 
suggests they have something important in common. One plausible idea - for which I will 
argue in the last chapter of this thesis - is the following: 
(Same Source) Our knowledge of mathematics and our knowledge of logic rest on the 
same epistemological source. 
I take this claim to be clear enough for my purposes here, but I will precisify it later. 
Frege famously defended it. It was only after he discovered that his programme in Grund-
lageR was destined to failure that he gave up the claim that both mathematical and logical 
knowledge rest on what he called a logical source, and that he conjectured that the former 
rests on both logic and what he called the geometrical source of knowledge (Frege 1979c,b). 
Note, however, that the (Same Source) desideratum does not amount to assuming 
that mathematics is nothing else than logic. Rational intuition, for example, would also 
be a source delivering logical as well as mathematical knowledge. 
In any case, the (Same Source) desideratum is optional. We cannot use it to rule out 
an otherwise successful epistemology of mathematics. 
1.3 Unsatisfying approaches 
I first discuss three approaches to arithmetical knowledge which preserve (Arithmetical 
Platonism), and show that they face strong objections. I then (very) briefly look at 
nominalistic positions. It turns out that these positions also confront huge problems, so 
there is no epistemological reason to give up (Arithmetical Platonism). 
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1.3.1 Godelian Platonism 
Godel, in a supplement to his 1947 paper on the continuum hypothesis (GodeJ 1964), 
endorses a generalization of (Arithmetical Platonism), and notoriously combines it 
with the idea that we possess a faculty of mathematical intuition. G6del claims: (i) that 
there are reliable belief-forming methods associated with this faculty; (ii) that these can 
deliver apriori justified true beliefs about mathematical axioms, and (iii) these aIllount to 
knowledge of mathematical axioms. Godel's writing even suggests that the workings of 
the relevant belief-forming processes are similar to those of sense perception. For example, 
Godel speaks of mathematicians perceiving mathematical objects (G6del 1964, p. 268). 
This suggests that Godel believes that we can be in some kind of causal contact with 
mathematical objects. 
Unfortunately, it remains entirely unclear how exactly all of this is to work. G6del 
never develops his theory of mathematical intuition any further. However, Bonjour (1998) 
develops a general theory of rational intuition which seems to be applicable here. Except 
for Bonjour's claim that one should not appeal to a special cognitive faculty of rational 
intuition (Bonjour 1998, p. 109), and that he rejects the claim that one can be in any 
direct causal contact with abstract objects (Bonjour 1998, section 6.2, pp. 159f), Bonjour's 
proposal seems to be compatible with Godel's. Since Godel's remarks are too thin to draw 
on, I will discuss an application of Bonjour's proposal to the mathematical case. 
Bonjour argues that all apriori knowledge must ultimately rest on primitive rational 
insights (or rational seemings) to the effect that something is (necessarily) true (Bonjour 
1998, section 4.3, p.106). These insights can confer apriori justification upon their target 
beliefs (Bonjour 1998, p.107). However, the relevant belief-forming method is fallible: 
it is possible that something clearly seems (necessarily) true to us, but turns out to be 
(necessarily) false in the end (Bonjour 1998, 4.4). It might help to conceive of rational 
seemings as an apriori analogue of perceptual seemings. Hallucinations and optical illusions 
can occur, but clearly they are the exception rather than the rule. 
As to the application to the mathematical case, Bonjour discusses the proposition that 
2+3=5. According to Bonjour, everyone understanding and entertaining this proposition 
will be confronted with a rational seeming of its (necessary) truth (Bonjour 1998, p.104). It 
is worth noting that Godel's proposal is first and foremost meant to apply to mathematical 
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axioms (Parsons 1995, pp. 59f). However, there is a very natural way in which Bonjour's 
proposal accomodates this. For example, it seems natural for Bonjour to say that everyone 
who understands what natural numbers are, and understands the proposition that every 
natural number has a successor, will be confonted with a rational seeming of its truth. 
Of course, this is not to say that everyone has the same rational insights. The experts 
will have much more such seemings, and much more adequate ones, than the layman. 
Moreover, it seems that even the experts will not have clear seemings regarding every 
mathematical truth. Often, they will need to help themselves with constructing proofs, 
based on axioms or rules that are clear cases of rational insight. 
Is such a position a candidate for a satisfactory solution to our epistemological problem? 
It is surely initially attractive, because it meets (Arithmetical Platonism), (Arith-
metical Foundationalism) and the (Arithmetical Knowledge) by design. Since the 
faculty of mathematical intuition could also provide knowledge of axioms, we would also 
meet (Arithmetical Foundationalism). 
The problem is that it is not clear how such knowledge is possible, because it is not 
clear how precisely the belief-forming method of rational intuition is supposed to work. 
Where do rational insights come from? Why do they carry any epistemic force? The 
position is quite spurious when it comes to its central epistemological workings. 
For example, one might worry whether the position is really compatible with (Arith-
metical Platonism): is it possible to explain rational intuition without postulating some 
kind of causal contact with mathematical objects? 
This points towards a more general problem: rational intuition might be so spurious 
that it cannot count as a proper explanation of how our mathematical beliefs can track 
mathematical truth. Thus, (Field's Constraint) might kick in and we might be unable to 
claim arithmetical knowledge after all. To be sure, the proposed faculty of mathematical 
intuition would certainly entail that we can be in touch with the mathematical facts. 
However, the question is whether this is effectively just taking it to be a brute fact that 
we can be in touch with mathematical reality (Field 1989, p. 28). 
Moreover, and this is related to the unclarity of the postulated belief-forming method, 
more needs to be said about how the knowledge delivered is apriori. Whether it should 
count as apriori depends on two factors: 
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• The range of the term "experience" in the definition of apriority . 
• How seriously we have to take the analogy between rational intuition and sense 
perception. 
If rational intuition is a kind of perception, and this kind of perception counts as expe-
rience, then the postulated belief-forming method might render mathematical knowledge 
aposteriori, and the (Apriority Constraint) would be violated. 
In sum, the Godel-Bonjour position is replacing our initial puzzles with other puzzles, 
and no satisfactory account of its exact epistemological workings has been produced. I 
share this opinion with many philosophers of mathematics (Boghossian 2001, p.6; Wright 
2004a, p. 156). We should look for alternatives. 
1.3.2 Fregean logicism 
In his seminal Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege 1884, 
henceforth GL), Frege argued that arithmetic - platonistically interpreted - can be 
based on logic and (explicit) definitions alone, as opposed to some form of intuitioIl. 13 
Whereas GL contains the philosophical groundwork of his programme, he carries out the 
logico-mathematical component of his programme in full detail and rigour in Grundgesetze 
der Arithmetik (The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, henceforth GG), using a further devel-
oped version of the logical system he introduced in his earlier work Begriffsschrift. The 
programme is well-known as F'rege's Logicism.14 
Frege's philosophical aim in GL is to provide epistemological and semantic foundations 
for arithmetic. After dismissing several rival positions, Frege argues that number talk is 
genuine object talk. According to Frege, numbers are objects belonging to concepts (GL 
§46). For example, the statement ''There are three knives on the table" really expresses 
the claim that the number three - an abstract object - belongs to the concept of being 
a knife on the table. 
Frege then asks how we can obtain apriori knowledge of the existence and the nature 
of these objects. His answer is that arithmetical truths are analytic in the following sense: 
laIn particular, Frese attacks Kant's epistemology of arithmetic, which also rests on some form of 
intuition. 
l4Often, Lop:iam is ODly identified with the epistemological claim that mathematical knowledge is logical 
Imowledp. In this thelia, Logicism is understood as including (Arithmetical Platoni.m). 
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(Frege Analyticity) A statement S is Frege-analytic if and only if it follows from 
definitions and logic. 
Frege thus explicitly opposes Kant's view that arithmetic consists of synthetic apriori 
truths, which would imply that they must be justified with the help of some sort of intuition. 
What are the definitions underlying arithmetical knowledge? First and foremost: what is 
the definition of number? At the heart of Frege's first train of thought in GL lies his 
notorious Context Principle, which he lays down in the introduction GL, and which he 
repeats in GL §62 (see also Wright 1983, p.6): 
(Context Principle) Never ( ... ) ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only 
in the context of a proposition. 
This enables Frege to argue that fixing the meaning of all sentential contexts including 
a hitherto undefined term suffices to fix the meaning of this term. Moreover, according to 
Frege, the meaning of a sentence can be fixed by fixing its truth conditions. Hence, so the 
thought goes, fixing the truth conditions for a sufficient range of sentences containing a 
hitherto undefined term suffices to fix the meaning of this term.15 
Number terms are singular terms. Thus, in order to apply the Context Principle here, 
Frege needs to single out a suitable class of sentences whose truth values must be fixed in 
order to introduce new singular terms. He does that in GL §63, where he argues that we 
can introduce a new sort of object into discourse by laying down an identity criterion for 
this kind of object. 
This is where (Fregean) abstraction principles enter the picture. Abstraction principles 
are universally quantified bi-conditionals of the following form, where ct and 71 are blocks 
of m different variables of the same order n, 1:: is a term-forming operator (the "abstraction 
operator"), and Eq (ct, 1) is an equivalence relation between the ct s and the 71 s: 
(AP) V7iv1 (I: (ct) = I: (1) ~ Eq (at, 1)) 
Frege's idea is that abstraction principles might be laid down in order to fix the truth 
conditions of identity statements for new sorts of objects and thus provide a means to 
180£ coune, the whole issue becomes much more complicated with the distinction between "sense" and 
"reference" that &ega draws after baving written GL. In particular, the question arises of whether to 
interpret the (Context Principle) as a claim on the level of sense or on the level of reference. I cannot 
go into these issues here. 
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refer to them and to acquire knowledge of them. Let me go through an example which 
Frege uses to demonstrate how this might work in GL §§64-66: the" Dir'ection Abstmction". 
The idea is that directions are objects belonging to directed objects (e.g. lines), and that 
the directions of two directed objects are identical if and only if the directed objects in 
questions lie parallel. This yields the following first-order l6 abstraction principle: 
(DA) VxVy (Dir (F) = Dir (G) +-t VxVy (FxIIGx» 
In GL §63, Frege suggests applying the same idea to the number case, claiming: "Once 
we possess a means to grasp and recognize a certain number by this procedure, we are 
allowed to assign it a proper name" (GL §62, own translation). Thus, according to Frege, 
what needs to be done is to find suitable identity criteria for numbers, where numbers are 
objects belonging to concepts. 
Such a criterion is readily available, and can be uncovered by considering examples. 
How can we come to know that the number of forks on the table is identical to the number 
of knives on the table? One way is to observe that we can align each fork with exactly one 
knife. Why? Because this shows that the knives on the table and the forks on the table 
are equinumerous, i.e. there is a bijection between the knives on the table and the forks 
on the table. 
The equinumerosity of two concepts is not only a sufficient, but also a necessary condi-
tion for the numbers belonging to these concepts to be identical. We thus obtain a criterion 
of identity: the numbers belonging to concepts are identical if and only if the respective 
concepts are equinumerous. Frege notes that this criterion has already been suggested by 
Hume in his "Treatise of Human Nature" (GL §62). We may call it Burne's Principle 17. It 
can be formalized as the following second-order18 abstraction principle: 
(HP) VFr/G(#(F) = # (G) +-t 3R(Bij(R,F,G») 
"Bij (R,F,G)" stands for "R is a bijection between the Fs and the Gs", which is ex-
pressible in second-order logic. 19 "#" is called the ''number operator"; read "#F' as "the 
number belonging to the concept F'. 
16The abstraction principle is fint-order because the outer quantifiers are first-order. They range over 
(directed) ohject •. 
1TThe name "Bume's Principle" has been introduced by George BooI08. 
lIThe abstraction principle is aecond-order because the outer quantifiers are second-order. They range 
over concepts. 
llFormaUy: Bi; (R, F, G) =def Vz (Fz -+ 3111 (GlI" &11»" 'ill (G'/J -+ 31x (Fx" &11» 
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If (HP) is a good definition of the number operator, then it is easy to obtain the 
concept of (cardinal) number by the following explicit definition: 
(Number) "Ix (Number (x) B 3F (#F = x» 
However, directly after suggesting (DA) and (HP) as definitions introducing new kinds 
of objects into discourse, Frege rejects them both, because he thinks such definitions suffer 
from a quite general problem. 
For example, according to Frege, one cannot - by means of (DA) - "decide whether 
the direction of the Earth's axis is (identical to) England" (GL, §66, own translation). This 
gives rise to the infamous Caesar problem. Similarly, so the thought goes, (HP) will not 
enable us to decide whether the number of planets is identical to Julius Caesar.20 To be 
sure, the question of whether the number of planets is identical to Caesar may seem absurd 
(or trivial), and certainly does not actually arise in any non-philosophical context, but the 
problem that we do not seem able to decide the question by means of (HP) suggests that 
abstraction principles alone cannot introduce new kinds of abstracts in a fully satisfactory 
way, since they fix the identity conditions only between abstracts of the same sort (e.g. 
when both sides have the form "#t//'). 
Frege's own formulation suggests that the Caesar problem is an epistemic problem. 
Abstraction principles, so the thought goes, must give us means to decide all questions 
that could arise with regard to the newly introduced objects, and this includes mixed 
identity statements. However, there is also a semantic reading: that abstraction principles 
such as (HP) do not suffice to determinately fix a concept of number. For example, so 
the thought goes, it has not been fixed whether Caesar is identical with some number or 
not. It has been argued that, in the light of what Frege says about the same problem 
in Grundgeaetze, it must have been the semantic problem that Frege worried about most 
(Schirn 2003). However, I do not have to (and cannot) decide this issue here. I will come 
back to different versions of the Caesar problem when I discuss the analogous worry for 
neo-Fregea.nism in 2.4.1. 
For now, it suffices to note that Frege regarded the Caesar problem as a devastating 
objection to using (HP) as a definition of number. According to Frege, the moral of this 
HID GrundIapD §56, .F\-ep givs this example in a slightly different context, but it is now usually used 
in this COIltext, to point out Frege's worries about abstraction principles. 
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problem is that one has to define "the number of Fs" explicitly, using the notion of extension 
(think of extensions as sets), and to derive (HP) from the definition. As a definition for 
"the number of Fs", Frege suggested "the extension of the concept 'equinumerous with 
the concept F'" (GL §68). With this definition, Frege must have thought to have solved 
the problem of what kinds of things numbers are (see GL §67). This also suggests that 
"definition" in Frege's definition of analyticity should be understood in a narrow sense. 
The Caesar problem can be regarded as an objection against a more liberal conception of 
definition. 
The new definition presupposes extensions, which Frege has available in his logical 
system. The notion of extension is governed by two axioms, corresponding to both sides 
of the following abstraction principle - the famous infamous Basic Law V: 
(BLV) VNG (f (F) = f (G) +-+ VxVy (Fx +-+ Gx)) 
(BLV) says that the extensions of two concepts are identical if and only if the respective 
concepts are co-extensional. Using the above-mentioned explicit definition of cardinal 
numbers, Frege was able to prove (HP). Moreover, Frege was able to (explicitly) define 
the remaining arithmetical notions, and to prove the axioms of arithmetic in turn (for the 
basic idea, see Frege 1884, §§70-83). Interestingly, his derivation of the Peano axioms from 
(HP) does not make any use of (BLV). The result that arithmetic is derivable from (HP) 
alone has been called Frege's Theorem. 21 
With cardinal numbers defined as extensions the Caesar problem does not arise for 
numbers, assuming that we have solved it for extensions. However, the question arises of 
why (BLV) is not subject to the same sort of criticism as (HP). In other words: how 
does Frege avoid the Caesar problem for extensions? This is one of the most difficult 
questions for Frege exegesis. We can only speculate, but I think the best way to answer 
this question is this: (BLV) is not meant to be a definition. Hence, it is not subject to 
the same standards. Rather, (BLV) is meant to be a logical basic law which must only 
meet the standard of logical basic laws, i.e. it must be self-evident, absolutely general, 
and not capable of further proof. Moreover, Frege takes the objects (BLV) is about -
the extensions - to be logical objects which are already well-understood. In particular, 
21Fot a more precise formulation, see 2.1. 
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Frege assumes that we already know that Caesar is not a logical object and thus cannot 
be identical with any extension. 
Be that as it may, the resulting logical system is too strong, for (BLV) is inconsistent 
in Frege's logical system. It leads to Russell's paradox, which Russell cOIIlmunicated to 
Frege in a famous letter in 1902. 
One can conceive of Frege's logical system without (BLV) as second-order logic with 
unrestricted comprehension. The paradox arises by defining the Russell predicate as the 
property of ''being an extension which does not have itself as a member". By the right-
to-left direction of (BLV), there is an extension of this property. Call it the Russell set. 
Using the left-to-right direction of (BLV), we can show that the Russell set has itself as a 
member if and only if it does not. Contradiction! 
Thus, assuming the logical background system is correct, (BLV) cannot possibly be 
true, and thus cannot serve as a logical axiom. Interestingly, Frege was never absolutely 
sure about the status of (BLV), which he mentions in a letter to Russell (Frege 1980, 
letter XV /7). After the inconsistency had been discovered, he tried to fix his system, but 
did not manage to do so. Frege became convinced that his efforts to defend logicism had 
failed. 
Many attempts have been made to properly understand just why Russell's Paradox 
arises. This was not because Frege's system was popular or widely accepted, but because 
Russell's paradox looms in our naIve conception of set.22 Set theory began to evolve as 
the foundational theory for (most of) mathematics, so it was of extreme importance to 
properly understand the problem that Russell had discovered. 
Russell himself analysed Frege's system and came up with his own version of Logicism. 
He saw the reason for the inconsistency in Frege's system as arising from the vicious 
circularity of the definition of the Russell set (Burgess 2005, p.36).23 
In their Principia Mathematica (Russell & Whitehead 1910-1913), Russell and White-
head tried to ban circularity and - as far as we know - succeeded in constructing a 
consistent system.. However, some of the axioms of Principia look far less like logical ax-
2'MIIlY let theories that were modeUed on the basis of the naive view were subject to the paradox: this 
includes RusseU's own preferred system at the time of his discovery (Burgess 2005, p.32). 
2Jlt ill obviously c:ircu1ar in the 88DIIe that the definition of the Bet talks about the set itself. It is vicious 
because this leads to paradox. A similar vicious circularity arises for properties: define the Russell property 
as the property of all properties which do not fall under themselves. This leads to a similar paradox, which 
has been called the Iaeterological pGrc&do~ 
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ioms than Frege's. In particular, in order to obtain something as strong as arithmetic, 
they had to make use of the so-called axiom of infinity, which says that there are infinitely 
many individuals. Surely, such an axiom cannot count as logical. Thus, Russell's and 
Whitehead's version of logicism cannot count as logicism proper. They did not succeed 
in putting arithmetic on logical foundations, but just found another axiomatization for a 
theory that interprets arithmetic. In particular, their system cannot be used to solve our 
epistemological problems: for the question of how to justify the axiom of infinity is just as 
difficult to answer as the question of how to justify the Peano axioms. 
Still, logicism remained one of the main contenders in the philosophy of mathematics. 
This is due to the influence of the Vienna Circle, according to which theories such as arith-
metic are analytic in the sense that they are true in virtue of meaning alone. However, and 
especially because of the mentioned notion of analyticity, logical positivism was commonly 
deemed to be mistaken after Quine's battery of objections to the notion (e.g. Quine 1951). 
By the middle of the 20th century, attention had turned away from logicism. 
Until recently, it was common ground that we have to draw this negative conclusion 
about logicism, and about Frege's philosophy of mathematics in particular. Dummett, 
for example, wrote that "Frege, as a philosopher of mathematics, is indisputably archaic" 
(Dummett 1991, p. xx). 
However, if Frege's system had not been inconsistent, and his axioms had been self-
evident logical axioms, Frege's logicism would have met all of our constraints. Frege would 
have provided a route to apnon knowledge of numbers, based on definitions and self-evident 
logical axioms, whilst accepting (Arithmetical Platonism).24 
1.3.3 The indispensability argument 
What else could justify the existence of numbers, and reveal their properties? There is 
a third option, which is based on much more general considerations in metaphysics and 
epistemology. It is the option of justifying platonistically interpreted arithmetic on the 
basis of its being indispensable to our best scientific theories. This route to knowledge 
of abstract objects has been famously defended by Quine (e.g. Quine 1953) and Putnam 
(e.g. Putnam 1979). Contemporary versions of the indispensability argument - which are 
24The claim that basic logicallaWB are self-evident needs a sustained defence. This is another big gap 
in Freze'. programme. 
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based on inference to the best explanation - are taken very seriously even by nominalists 
(see e.g. Field 1989). 
I will just discuss one particular version of the argument, building up on Field's ex-
cellent discussions in (Field 1980, 1989). The argument uses two premises to establish an 
epistemological point: that we are justified in believing that some mathematical theory 
is true. It is analoguous to arguments for the truth of scientific theories about unobserv-
able entities, such as quarks. The first premise is that there is a belief-forming method of 
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) which can be used for justifying whole theories. 
regardless of what these theories are about: 
(mE) For any theory T, if we Use T in our best explanations of the data, we are 
justified in believing that T is true. 
It is not easy to say what exactly should count as the data. For my purposes here, think 
of it as the sum of Our experiences. The second premise is a claim about how mathematics 
features in our best scientific theories: 
(Indispensability) Some mathematical theories are indispensable to our best scientific 
theories.25 
Since our best scientific theories are used in our best explanations of the data, we 
are justified in believing that the mathematical theories which are indispensable to these 
scientific theories are true. Since we also assume that we should take the surface grammar 
of mathematical statements at face-value, and mathematical discourse is factual, we are 
justified in believing in the existence of the referents of the mathematical terms used. 
The argument is meant to be analogous to arguments for the existence of unobservable 
entities. Consider quarks, for example. Postulating their existence might be indispensable 
to our best physical theories. Thus, we can believe in their existence, although they are 
unobsenloble in an important sense of term. 
Obvious candidates for indispensable mathematical theories are arithmetic and real 
analysis. Quine thought that at least some set theory is indispensable (Quine 1953). 
31011e mi&ht think that the lMl'8 fact that mathematical theories feature ill our best theories already 
entails that some mathematical theories are indiapenslJlJle to our best scientific theories. For, presumably, 
simplicity is a tbeoretica1virtue featuriD.g in our account of what the best theories are. If they were 
dispensable, then the theory doinl without mathematics would - all other things being equal - be better 
becaUBe it is simpler. 
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However, any such claim is in need of further argument. In fact, that our best theories 
include mathematical theories is very contentious. Dispensabilists such as Field (1989) 
accept (mE) but deny (Indispensability). They argue that we can rephrase our scientific 
theories in such a way that they do not quantify over mathematical entities, but still yield 
the same empirical consequences, and that this shows that mathematical theories are not 
indispensable to our best scientific theories. This does not mean that dispensabilists do 
not think that mathematical theories have an important role to play. Field, for example, 
still thinks that they can be used as means to shorten certain lines of reasoning. However, 
when the chips are down, we do not need them. 
Carrying out the dispensabilist project requires substantial technical work. There are 
attempts to carry out this programme in detail for physics. For example, in Science Without 
Numbers (Field 1980), Field argued that we can dispense with (real) numbers in ~ewtonian 
physics. And there is some research about other parts of physics (e.g. Arntzenius & Dorr 
forthcoming) . 
Moreover, a lot depends on what theoretical virtues are important to single out our best 
theories. Indispensabilists might reject the claim that the theories offered by dispensabilists 
are more virtuous than the theories that make reference to mathematical entities. Virtues 
different from parsimony might be decisive. 
In recent years there has been a lot of attention paid to what one might call genuine 
mathematical explanations. The thought is that mathematics does not only play a role 
because it is indispensable to obtain certain empirical predictions, but that it is indispens-
able to good scientific explanations - good answers to "Why?" questions. For something 
to be a good explanation, 80 the thought goes, more is required than just parsimony of 
the background theory: we also need to come to understand what has to be explained. It 
seems plausible that mathematics has an important role to play here. 
The issue of mathematical explanation and their role in indispensability arguments is 
wide open. It seems that we are not even in possession of a suitable theory of (genuinely) 
mathematical explanation. Without being in possession of such a theory, it is hard to 
decide on which side the burden of proof lies. 
Independently, a dispensabilist might respond that the indispensability of mathematics 
in good explanations does not suffice for us being justified in believing in the existence of 
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numbers. The thought is that, for such purposes, a fictionalist interpretatioll uf mathe-
matical discourse suffices. This points towards a strategy to deny (IBE) for mathematics 
without denying it in plausible cases such as the quark case. One might argue that only 
those parts of theories used in our best explanations that say how the world is are sub-
ject to (mE), and that mathematics is only needed to formulate these descriptions in an 
elegant way, but not part of the description (Melia 2000). 
Be that as it may, there are some general considerations that seem to show that the 
whole debate about indispensability cannot address all issues about Platonism in math-
ematics anyway. Firstly, even if the indispensabilist can defend (IBE) and (Indispens-
ability), it still seems as if mathematics and the empirical sciences should not be treated 
as being on a par. For example: 
• We often believe mathematical propositions with a much higher degree of confidence 
than propositions about the physical world . 
• Mathematical facts seem to obtain necessarily, whereas physical facts just contin-
gently obtain. It is not clear whether indispensability theorists can account for this 
difference, and whether they can account for the necessary truth of mathematics in 
particular . 
We need to explain such differences, and the picture underlying the indispensability argu-
ment makes it hard to see how this might be done. On this picture, mathematical entities 
such as numbers have exactly the same status as other theoretical entities such as quarks 
or strings. 
Secondly, there are interesting pure mathematical theories which are not applied in the 
sciences. However, we want to acquire knowledge of these theories as well. Maybe the 
questions are not as pressing because the theories do not have the same practical impor-
tance; but we will have to address them sooner or later. The indispensabilist, however, 
cannot say anything about these theories (or even has to concede that he or she is not able 
to account for their literal truth). 
Finally, even if the indispensability argument does give us justification to believe in 
some mathematical theories, it does not address (Field's Constraint), at least not di-
rectly. There are responses to this worry, but there are also objections to these responses 
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(see e.g. Field 1980, pp. 28ff). I cannot go into this here. I leave it with the remark that 
it is not at all clear who wins the debate. 
In sum, it would be nice if we had an account that is less contentious and that does 
more justice to the particularities of mathematics. Be that as it may, I am happy to regard 
indispensability arguments as the Platonist's "last resort", albeit a contentious one. 
1.3.4 Nominalistic positions 
One might think that the failings of Godelian Platonism and Fregean Logicism, as well as 
the existence of dispensabilist reformulations of scientific theories suggest that our main 
assumption - (Arithmetical Platonism) - is misguided. Maybe we can do better 
without it. In the end, a philosopher of mathematics has to appeal to cost-benefit consid-
erations. IT it turns out that accounting for mathematical knowledge requires giving up 
(Arithmetical Platonism), then we have to do so. However, in this section, I shall argue 
that nominalists also face pressing objections, and thus are unable to motivate giving up 
(Arithmetical Platonism) by appealing to cost-benefit considerations. 
Dispensabilists take the possibility that we have to quantify over mathematical objects 
very seriously. They just think that it does not obtain. Thus, they think they can avoid 
commitment to the truth of mathematical theories by providing nominalistic reformulations 
of our best scientific theories, i.e. reformulations that do not quantify over mathematical 
objects. Let us focus on the case of arithmetic again. Because arithmetic is dispensable to 
our best scientific theories, so the thought goes, we are not committed to (Arithmetical 
Platonism). 
Some dispensabilists hold that (Arithmetical Platonism) is false: for their back-
ground view entails that one should deny the existence of entities one does not need in 
order to obtain a sound world-view - this is one reading of Occam's Razor. Other dispens-
abilists are agnostic about the existence of mathematical entities. Both kinds of theorists 
need an error theory which explains how we could fruitfully apply arithmetic even if it was 
- strictly speaking - false. 
Fictionalism To this end, Field (1980, 1989) endorses a fictionalist picture of mathe-
matical discourse and combines it with an explanation of how mathematical fictions can 
be useful. 
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Very roughly, fictional ism about X is the view that X-talk is nonfactual talk like talk 
about a story containing non-existent characters. For example, we should be fictionalists 
about the Sherlock Holmes story. Sherlock Holmes does not really exist, but - according 
to the Sherlock Holmes story - he does. Fictional talk can serve communication and 
the expansion of our knowledge, so the thought goes, no matter whether the entities in 
question really exist. One trivial example is knowledge of literature. If Hero, who does not 
know much about Sherlock Holmes, is told that Sherlock Holmes did this and that, Hero 
can acquire knowledge about the Sherlock Holmes story. Hero does not take the story 
seriously - he knows this is only fictional discourse - but still learns something about 
the real world. 
Field's thought is that mathematical theories such as arithmetic can be interpreted 
in a similar fashion. Even if mathematical theories were false when taken literally, so the 
thought goes, we could conceive of them as fictions about mathematical entities, which can 
still be used to extend our knowledge about the world. That mathematical theories can 
serve this purpose is established by a technical result: the conservativeness of arithmetic 
over the relevant empirical theories. The notion of conservativism is this: 
(Field Conservativeness) A mathematical theory M is conservative if and only if for 
any assertion A about the physical world and any body N of such assertions, A doesn't 
follow from N + M, unless it follows from N alone. (Field 1982, p. 58) 
Field shows that arithmetic and real analysis are conservative over his nominalized 
physical theories in this sense (Field 1980, pp.I6-19). Thus, so the thought goes, we can 
endorse these theories as useful fictions since they enable us to shorten trains of reasoning, 
but cannot possibly yield anything undesired, such as new consequences about the real 
(physical) world that we could not already obtain from our physical theory alone (MacBride 
1999, p. 434). 
However, one of our stated epistemological aims was that we can acquire arithmetical 
knowledge, and not only additional scientific knowledge. According to Field's position, it is 
possible that we do not possess any arithmetical knowledge, where "arithmetical knowledge" 
is read as "knowledge of the natural numbers". However, there is an alternative conception 
of arithmetical knowledge - knowledge which is distinctive of experts on arithmetic -
that Field (1984c) wants to account for. The idea is, very roughly, that such knowledge is 
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logical knowledge: knowledge about consistency and knowledge about what follows from 
arithmetical axioms with necessity. Note that Field needs modal notions here. One reason 
why this is important is that Field cannot analyze modal notions in the usual way: for 
if modal talk is possible world talk, Field cannot avoid abstract entities (MacBride 1999, 
p. 446). However, assuming that Field can meet this and other challenges about his 
analysis of what mathematical knowledge consists of, he will at least be able to account 
for a suitably modified version of (Arithmetical Knowledge). 
So does Field win the debate? A lot depends on whether the dispensabilist programme 
above can be carried out for all relevant cases, and the indispensabilist responses can be 
rebutted. However, even if we assume that the technical programme of providing nomi-
nalistic reformulations succeeds, it is not clear whether Field really has an epistemological 
advantage over the Platonist. 
For Field suggests to replace the mathematical version of Newtonian physics by a 
version that quantifies over infinitely many space-time points. :"ITow, why are infinitely 
many space-time points any less problematic than numbers? In particular: 
• How do these entities meet (Field's Constraint)? Is the claim that we can reliably 
form true beliefs about such objects any less problematic than the claim that we can 
reliably form true beliefs about numbers? Although there is a sense in which space-
time points exist in space and time, they are not like tables and chairs. We need an 
additional story of how we can refer to them and acquire knowledge of them. In this 
respect, Field does not have any initial explanatory advantage over the Platonist . 
• Field's reformulation presupposes the existence of infinitely many concrete objects. 
This is problematic. Intuitively, it should be possible that only finitely many concrete 
objects exist. However, if there were only finitely many objects, Field's reformulated 
theory could not be true.26 
In sum, it is not clear that Field's position does any better with regard to our initial 
puzzles. Field discusses some such worries (Field 1984a), but I cannot pursue this issue 
any further here. 
28 Also, 8Uppo8e that there are inftnitely many nomiDalistically acceptable objects. Then why not take 
Dumbers to be space-time points and say that numbers exist after all? This will enable us to preserve at 
least (MInimal Arithmetlcal ReaUam). 
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Structuralism Some nominalists have tried to provide paraphrases for the mathematical 
theories that do not carry commitments to the existence of infinitely many objects of any 
sort. Paraphrases can either be understood as providing a kosher replacement of Platonist 
theories which are, strictly speaking, false; or as displaying the real content of mathematical 
statements. Only the latter strategy will allow for some form of hermeneutic reconstruction. 
The first can at best achieve what I called (Revolutionary Reconstruction). I only 
consider hermeneutic strategies here. 
According to eliminatitJe structuralism, arithmetical claims should not be read as par-
ticular propositions about natural numbers, but as universal propositions about all natural 
number structures. For example, the claim that 1+1==2 should be read as "For every nat-
ural number structure 8 27 , the interpretation of" +" in this structure maps the sum of its 
first element and its first element to its second element". It is easy to see that accepting 
this sentence does not commit one to the existence of any entity, since it is a universally 
quantified conditional. 
However, this lack of commitment backfires. If there is not at least one natural number 
structure, the universally quantified paraphrase will be vacuously true (Parsons 1990, p. 
310). However, it is a necessary condition for there to be a natural number structure that 
there are infinitely many objects. And how is that claim to be justified? 
There is a variant of eliminative structuralism which tries to avoid this problem by 
using modal notions - so-called modal structuralism (Hellman 1989). The idea is that the 
problem can be avoided by demanding that the universally quantified conditional needs to 
obtain necessarily. Even if there actually are no natural number structures, it is certainly 
possible that there are such structures. Thus, the sentence "Necessarily, for every natural 
number structure 5, the "+"-function in this structure maps the sum of its first element 
and its first element to its second element" will not be vacuously true. 
However, the use of modal notions backfires as well. The modal structuralist might 
be able to avoid ontolOgical commitment to natural numbers, but only by increasing his 
ideological commitments. For.he needs to explain the used modal notions, and this expla-
nation should not involve reference to abstract objects. Possible world talk, for example, 
is not an option. It is plausible that modal notions have to be taken as primitive. 
2TTbat is: for every structure S that satisfies the Peano axioms. 
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It is not clear whether the resulting position is better off in terms of explaining how 
we acquire mathematical knowledge. For the modal structuralist not only needs to explain 
his modal vocabulary, but also needs to account for modal knowledge, such a,o; knowledge 
of the possible existence of infinitely many objects (Ebert 2005a, pp.3lf). 
1.4 Intermediate conclusion 
Let me take stock. I presented two puzzles about arithmetical knowledge, followed by 
a list of desiderata for a fully satisfactory epistemology of mathematics. I argued that 
classical Platonist positions face substantial difficulties, and violate one or more of our 
epistemological constraints. A version of the Indispensability Argument has been identified 
as the Platonist's last resort. I then temporarily bracketed (Arithmetical Platonism) 
and examined nominalist positions, to see whether the epistemological problems can be 
avoided. It transpired that relevant nominalist positions face substantial difficulties as 
well. Thus, there is no reason to give up (Arithmetical Platonism) already. We could 
just as well reconsider Platonist positions. This sets the stage for yet another Platonist 
position: abstractionism (or neo-Fregeanism). 
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2 N eo-Fregeanism (abstractionism) 
In this chapter, I examine yet another Platonist position, and argue that it promises 
to meet all our epistemological constraints, although there is some unclarity about its 
exact epistemological workings. The position is based on a train of thought that Frege 
entertained, but dismissed in GL - that (HP) is a proper definition of number and can 
underlie our knowledge of arithmetic. 
2.1 Frege's Theorem 
In (Parsons 1965), Parsons made explicit what is nowadays known as Frege '8 Theorem: the 
astonishing above-mentioned technical result, implicit in Frege's work, that the concept of 
extension is not needed to obtain arithmetic once one has (HP) available, and thus that 
(HP) as a single axiom suffices for a derivation of the Peano axioms in second-order logic 
(Parsons 1965, p. 194). Call the deductive closure of (HP) under second-order consequence 
Frege Arithmetic (FA). The result can be expressed as follows: 
(Frege's Theorem) FA interprets second-order Peano Arithmetic. 
The notion of interpretation I use here is the notion of relative interpretability, intro-
duced by Feferman (1960). In short, a theory Tl relatively interprets another theory T2 
just in case a definitional expansion of Tl (syntactically) entails a version of T2 with rela-
tivized quantifiers. In our case, the relevant result is that a definitional expansion of FA 
(syntactially) entails the second-order Peano axioms, relativized to a number predicate.28 
For example, the successor axiom a definitional expansion of FA needs to entail is not: 
Yx3y (Sxy) 
But: 
Vx (Number (x) ~ 3y (Number (y)" Sxy» 
28Acomplete statement of a "relativized" versioD of the axioms can be found in (Wright 1983, p.158), 
for example. 
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For the purposes of this chapter, nothing hangs on the notion of interpretability, and 
the reader can think of the theorem as the result that (HP) entails (second-order) PA.29 
Almost twenty years later, Wright (1983) provided a proof of Frege's Theorem in mod-
ern notation and conjectured that FA is consistent. This conjecture was later confirmed 
by Boolos (1987), who proved that FA is consistent if and only if second-order arithmetic 
- which is deemed consistent by the whole mathematical community30 - is consistent. 
These technical results motivate a new position in the philosophy of mathematics, when 
combined with some optimism about the epistemic and semantic status of (HP). Could 
we not base arithmetic on (HP) directly, as opposed to proving (HP) from some other 
principle (that, in Frege's case, led to inconsistency)? 
Parsons already notes that "Frege does show that that the logical notion of one-to-
one correspondence is an essential constituent of the notion of number" (Parsons 1965, 
p. 203). Wright (1983) suggests that some Fregean abstraction principles, and (HP) in 
particular, have a better epistemic and semantic standing than Frege thought they had in 
GL, based on considerations about Frege's Context Principle. In particular, Wright argues 
that the Caesar problem can be solved and that (HP) is a proper explanation of the 
number operator. Thus, Frege made a major mistake in abandoning (HP) as a definition, 
trying to define the concept of number in a different way, and proving (HP) from this 
definition. The results above show that it is only because of this further move that Frege's 
system becomes inconsistent. 
This position became known as neo-F'regeanism, a name emphasising the origins of the 
position. Later, it also became known as abstractionism, which emphasises the central role 
of abstraction principles, and the possibility to generalize the position.31 In this chapter, 
I will be concerned with the details of this position. 
Before I turn to the details, a note is in order concerning the scope of my presenta-
tion. Firstly, although Wright's original line of thought rests a particular interpretation 
on Frege's Coutext Principle, I will not be concerned with an exegesis of this principle 
"I am, however, aware of the fact that it is very important to be precise here, and that the notion 
of interpretabiHty one uses has philosophical consequences (Walsh 2010). Unfortunately, I cannot discuss 
these issues in this thetis. 
soThere are always exceptioua. However, 80 far every attempt to show that arithmetical theories are 
incouaistent - notably a recent attempt by Edward Nelson (2011) - has failed. 
31Sometimes also "neG-Logicism". However, I prefer to use "neG-Logicism" to single out a particular 
component (aim) of the neG-Fregeau position, namely that arithmetical knowledge can be based on logic 
and definitions. 
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here. I will only sketch the mature position as it is explicated and defended today. My 
primary resources will be Hale's and Wright's collection on neo-Fregeanism (Hale & Wright 
2001a), their survey essay (Hale & Wright 2005), and MacBride's survey essay (:\1acBride 
2003).32 Secondly, I will keep focusing on the arithmetical case. Discussing neo-Fregeau 
reconstructions of other mathematical theories is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2.2 Neo-Fregeanism: two (Fregean) aims 
Neo-Fregeanism (for arithmetic) has two components - or aims - which exactly cor-
respond to the two major elements of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic (Hale & Wright 
2005, pp. 166f). The first component may be called neo-Fregean Platonism. 33 It is the 
conjunction of a semantic and a metaphysical claim: 
(Neo-Fregean Platonism) 
• Number terms refer to objects: the numbers . 
• Numbers are mind-independent abstract objects. 
Note that this claim is just terminologically different to what I dubbed (Arithmetical 
Platonism) in 1.2. The second component may be called neo-Fregean Logicism, and is an 
epistemological claim: 
(Neo-Fregean Logicism) There is a route to acquiring apriori knowledge of arith-
metical truths on the basis of logic and definitions. 
However, both "logic" and "definitions" have to be construed relatively widely here: 
for the neo-Fregean logic comprises second-order logic, and the definitions include Fregean 
abstraction principles such as (HP).34 I now examine both claims in some more detail. 
32 Although there is more recent work on neo-Fregeanism (e.g. Hale & Wright 2009; Wright 2009), the 
later work introducea new lines of thought which sometimes seem to be opposed to the original ideas. 
Moreover, there seems to be some divergence between Hale and Wright in most recent work. I will come 
back to some of these issues later in this thesis. 
311 endorse the terminology that Hale and Wright use in the introduction to their (2001a). 
'''This yields two points of divergence from Frege's own view. Firstly, neo-Fregean logic is weaker than 
Frega's, because it does not include set theory. Secondly, the neo-Fregean notion of definition is wider than 
Frege's: Frege just accepted a:plicit definitions in his framework, whereas neo-Frege&D8 need an additional 
notion of implicit definition. I expand on these two conceptions of definition below. 
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2.2.1 Neo-Fregean Logicism 
The idea underlying (Neo-Fregean Logicism) is as follows. First, according to the 
neo-Fregean, (HP) can be known apriori: 
(Abstraction) A range of (good) abstraction principles - including, of course, (HP) 
- can be known apriori. 35 
Secondly, a priori knowledge is transmissible over second-order consequence.36 That is: 
(Transmission) If we know tP apriori and .,p is a second-order deductive consequence 
of tP, then, ceteris paribus37 , we can come to know .,p apriori by virtue of deriving it 
from tP by means of second-order logic. 
Thus, we can acquire apriori knowledge of FA, on the basis of logic and definitions. 
By (Frege's Theorem), we can obtain apriori knowledge of a theory that interprets 
second-order arithmetic on this basis. 
However, there is a potential gap between the claim that one reconstructed knowl-
edge of a theory interpreting arithmetic and the claim that one reconstructed arithmetical 
knowledge. So the nea-Fregean also needs to claim: 
(Same Subject Matter) Knowledge of the FA-interpretation of arithmetic is knowl-
edge of arithmetic. 
This claim is ambiguous. Remember the discussion of hermeneutic reconstruction in 
the last chapter. Focusing on the case of pure arithmetic, the claim could either be that the 
number terms of FA refer to the same objects as the number terms of second-order PA or 
ordinary number terms, or that relevant statements of FA even express the same thoughts 
as corresponding theorems of second-order PA or ordinary mathematical statements. I will 
discuss these hermeneutic claims in due course, and temporarily assume the weaker claim 
for the sake of the argument. Given this assumption, the nea-Fregean will be able to meet 
both (Arithmetical Knowledge) and (Arithmetical Foundationalism). 
IINote that the claim. is Dot just a claim about (HP). This more general claim is required for extending 
the programme to other parts of mathematics, and I will come back to it below. 
38In fact, the neo-FnIgeaa does Dot require secoDd-order logic with full comprehension in order to prove 
a versioD the PeaDO ~OID8. n ~ ..comprehension suffices (LiDDebo 2004). 
STThe rea8OD8 for invoking a ceteris paribus clause win become apparent in chapters 4 and 5. However, 
for the purpoeaa of this chapter, the reader can safely ipore this complication. 
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How can (Abstraction) and (Transmission) be justified? The neo-Fregeans do not 
say much about logic, but the thought seems to be that (i) any proper logic38 transmits 
apriori knowledge, and (ii) the following holds (see e.g. Hale & Wright 2001a, p.430): 
(Logicality) Second-order logic is logic proper. 
This entails (Transmission). A similar thought applies to the claim that the relevant 
abstraction principles are (implicit) definitions. Surely, so the thought goes, any pmper' 
definition can be known apriori. Thus, nea-Fregeans also claim: 
(Definition by Abstraction) The relevant abstraction principles - including, of 
course, (HP) - are proper (implicit) definitions of the respective abstraction operators. 
(Logicality) and (Definition by Abstraction) provide the basis for (Neo-Fregean 
Logicism) - the claim that mathematics follows from logic and definitions. However, the 
connections between logic and mathematics the neo-Fregeans postulate might run deeper. 
This is because it seems an attractive option for the nea-Fregean to hold that logic is also 
semantically and epistemically based on (implicit) definitions. 
That Hale and Wright possess the resources to endorse such a picture of logic becomes 
apparent at several occasions. In their work on implicit definition (Hale & Wright 2000), 
they also consider Gentzen's suggestion that logical constants can be defined by a stipu-
lation of their introduction and elimination rules (Gentzen 1934). In later work, Wright 
(2007a) explicitly suggests endorsing inferential-role semantics for the (second-order) quan-
tifiers, citing the above-mentioned paper on implicit definition. Although Wright's paper 
is mainly on the issue of ontological commitment, Wright mentions in a footnote that he 
hopes that this move also solves epistemological problems (Wright 2007a, footnote 9). 
There are good reasons to apply the idea of implicit definition to both abstraction 
principles and logical operators. This would provide a uniform epistemic and semantic 
basis for logic and mathematics, and fits well together with Wright's characterization of 
logicism as "the thesis that logical knowledge and at least basic mathematical knowledge 
are, in some important sense, of a single epistemological kind" (see Wright 2007a, p.4). 
Note the similarity to the (Same Source) desideratum from the last chapter. As I said, 
I do not think that this claim is strong enough to capture what logicists such as Frege 
"This is meant to exclude dialetheism etc. 
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really had in mind, since the rational intuition proposal would also meet this description. 
Logicism should rather be conceived of the (Same Source) claim plus the claim that 
logico-mathematical knowledge is not based on rational intuition. This is precisely what 
the neo-Fregeans would establish if the idea of implicit definition could be applied to logic 
and mathematics. 
2.2.2 Neo-Fregean Platonism 
What is the neo-Fregean argument for (Neo-Fregean Platonism)? The basic idea is 
this: (i) if a true atomic sentence contains a singular term t, then t will refer to an object; 
(ii) since the number terms of FA are singular terms, and FA is true (we can know that 
by (Neo-Fregean Logicism»), number terms refer to objects; (iii) because of (Same 
SUbject Matter), ordinary number talk is also (true) talk about these objects, and the 
ordinary number terms also refer to objects; (iv) some additional considerations show that 
these objects must be mind-independent abstract objects. 
The steps the neo-Fregeans pay most attention to are (i) and (ii). Wright (1983) 
argues that these steps can be extracted from Frege's Context Principle - the claim that 
we should never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a 
proposition. According to Wright, one can interpret the Context Principle as: 
the thesis of the priority of syntactic over ontological categories. According to 
this thesis, the question whether a particular expression is a candidate to refer 
to an object is entirely a matter of the sort of syntactic role which it plays 
in whole sentences. If it plays that sort of role, then the truth of appropriate 
sentences in which it so features will be sufficient to confer on it an objectual 
reference. (Wright 1983, p.51) 
The thesis consists of three claims, which MacBride (MacBride 2003, p. 108) calls Syntactic 
Decisiveness, Referential Minimalism, and Linguistic Priority. The first is: 
(Syntactic Decislvene88) Expressions which syntactically behave like singular terms, 
are singular terms (i.e. terms which have the role to refer to objects). 
Thus, 80 the thought goes, purely syntactic investigations can reveal that some terms 
are singular terms, and thus that they have referential potential.39 Of course, this requires 
89Thia is also Fine's interpretation of the Context Principle (Fine 2002, pp. 57f). 
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an account of what kind of syntactic behaviour is characteristic for singular terms. Hale 
(1994b, 1996) builds up on Dummett's idea (Dummett 1973) that one can argue for the 
claim that number terms are singular terms by examining their inferential role. 
Examining the inferential role of the number terms in FA is not too difficult, because it 
is an artificially introduced formal system with well-defined properties. Presumably, such 
investigation can be carried out apriori.4o After the referential potential of number terms 
has been revealed by appropriate criteria, so the thought goes, one can infer from the truth 
of a sentence which contains such terms that they must refer: 
(Referential Minimalism) If a true atomic sentence containing a singular term t is 
true, then t refers (MacBride 2003, p.108). 
Since one's ontology may not only contain objects - for instance, we should allow for 
the possibility of there being objects and concepts - the following third claim is needed: 
(Linguistic Priority) If a singular term refers, it refers to an object. 
This completes the argument for (i) and (ii). I discuss (iii) in 2.3.5. As to (iv), in their 
classical works, Hale and Wright say surprisingly little, except when it comes to the related 
Caesar problem. I briefly return to this issue when I discuss this problem in 2.4.1. 
Secondly, the question arises of whether (Neo-Fregean Logicism) is really compatible 
with (Neo-Fregean Platonism). In particular: is it possible to lay down (HP) as a 
definition ifit commits us to the existence of infinitely many objects? Can the heavyweight 
ontological commitments of such abstraction principles be reconciled with the proposal that 
they are '~ust definitions"?41 We have to examine the neo-Fregean conception of implicit 
definition in more detail. 
400f course, the rea&oDiD& could also be applied to ordinary number talk directly. Additional complica-
tions might arise in tlUa case, because ordinary number talk does not take place in a formal system. In 
particular, one might wonder whether the required investigations are aposteriori. The presented version of 
neo-FrepanUm faces these worries when it comes to step (iii). I come back to these complications when I 
diacus8 hermeneutic: neo-Frepaoiam awl the (Same Subject Matter) claim in 2.3.5. 
41There is a related furtha' problem: if property terms refer to properties, and second-order variables 
range OWl' properties, how c&Il aecond-order logic be logic? I cannot discuss this problem here. One 
possible answer is a position caUed "neutralism" - defended in (Wright 2007a) - according to which 
secoDd-order quanti1lers are DOt associated with domains of entities of any sort. Another option is to bite 
the bullet, arguiq that a commitment to properties is just as unproblematic 88 a commitment to numbers. 
For this train of thought, see (Hale" Wright 2005). 
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2.3 Implicit definition 
The neo-Fregean account of implicit definition - which is to account for knowledge of 
abstraction principles and maybe also for knowledge of the underlying logic - is discussed 
in (Hale & Wright 2000). In this paper, Hale and Wright defend the following thought 
(they dub it the Traditional Connection): 
(Neo-Fregean Implicit Definition Thesis) "at least some important kinds of non-
inferential apriori knowledge are founded in implicit definition" (Hale & Wright 2000, 
p. 177). 
To implicitly define something is to stipulate that a sentential matrix containing a 
hitherto undefined term is to be true (Hale & Wright 2000, p. 117). By virtue of this act, 
so the thought goes, one fixes a pattern of use for the hitherto undefined term such that it 
is endowed with the unique meaning that renders the matrix true. Moreover, by virtue of 
this act, one can come to know the stipulation apriori. 
I will ultimately endorse and defend this idea. However, on my own account, knowledge 
founded in implicit definitions turns out to be inferential. So Hale's and Wright's claim 
needs to be distinguished from the claim I will defend later, which is the following, weaker 
claim: 
(Implicit Definition Thesis) At least some important kinds of apriori knowledge are 
founded in implicit definition. 
2.3.1 Explicit VS. implicit definitions 
The term "definition" can either be applied to acts of stipulating something or to the 
linguistic entities that are used as the defining devices. I will use the term in both ways, 
without explicitly mentioning which sense of "definition" is intended, since this will always 
be clear from the context. 'Iraditionally, only a small class of sentential matrices are 
regarded as definitions proper - so-called explicit definitions: 
(Traditional Conception of Definition) Only explicit definitions are definitions 
proper, i.e. definitions which are both eliminable and conservative (non-creative) 
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In this context, the following infonnal characterizations of these two criteria are suffi-
cient: 
(Eliminability) All statements in the new language - the language including the new 
tenn - can be translated into statements of the old language - the language without 
the term introduced by the definition - whereas the two statements are (provably / 
semantically) equivalent in the new theory. 
And: 
(Conservativeness) All statements of the old language which are consequences of the 
new theory - the old theory together with the definition - are also consequences of 
the old theory. 
In a first-order language, definitions fulfilling these two criteria can be stated in "normal 
fonn" (Gupta 2009). This is the form paradigmatic "explicit definitions" take. It renders 
it immediate that they are eliminable. For example, a new one-place predicate P can be 
introduced by stipulating the biconditional ""'Ix (Px f-+ <p (x»" to be true, where <p is already 
understood, the only free variable in <P is x, and P does not occur in <p. For example: "For 
all x, x is a bachelor if and only if x is an unmarried man". To eliminate "Pa" (e.g. "Frank 
is a bacbelor"), one just has to replace it by "<p(a)" ("Frank is an unmarried man"). 
Explicit definitions impose no special epistemic or semantic obstacles whatsoever. Be-
cause of (Eliminability), the meaning of the new terms is uniquely determined (assuming 
all the terms of the "old language" have determinate meanings), and the new language (in-
cluding the defined term) can be seen as an expansion providing convenient shortcuts. 
These shortcuts are epistemically unproblematic, because the definition meets (Conser-
vativeness) . 
The (Standard Conception of Definition) has been endorsed by both Frege (1893) 
and Russell (Russell & Whitehead 1910-1913). However, it cannot be endorsed by the ab-
stractionist, because relevant abstraction principles such as (HP) do not meet the criteria: 
"#F' as. defined by (HP) is not eliminable in contexts where the number operator occurs 
in the definition of the property F (Dummett 1991, p.138)j and (HP) is not conservative 
in the above-defined sense either, because it (semantically and syntactically) entails the 
claim, expressible in second-order logic, that there are infinitely many objects. 
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Since (HP) is regarded as a definition, the neo-Fregean needs to reject both (Elim-
inability) and (Conservativeness). There is, however, a second reason why the neo-
Fregean might want to reject the (Standard Conception of Definition). If the neo-
Fregean wants to account for (Same Source) by applying the idea of knowledge by defi-
nition to the (basic) logical case - building on Gentzen's idea - he or she also needs to 
account for the stipulability of (the validity of) inferential matrices, and not only for the 
stipulability of sentential matrices. This yields the: 
(Liberal Conception of Definition) Ceteris paribus, we can define one or more terms 
by stipulating that sentential matrices containing one or more undefined terms are to 
be true (necessarily true), or by stipulating that inferential matrices containing one or 
more undefined terms are to be valid42 • 
The ceteris paribus clause is crucial. Of course, there will be some restrictions. :'\rot 
every sentential matrix or inferential matrix containing an undefined term will amount to 
a definition proper. However, so the thought goes, there are relevant cases in which there 
is semantic success - i.e. a unique meaning will be fixed such that the stipulation is true 
(or valid) - and epistemic success - i.e. the stipulation will enable the epistemic agent to 
acquire apriori knowledge of the truth of the stipulation. This possibility can be initially 
motivated as follows: 
• Semantic success: because explicit definitions just provide shortcuts, they cannot 
possibly serve the introduction of new fundamental concepts, or provide means to 
refer to objects we are not able to refer to in the old language. We need to explain 
that possibility. Implicit definition would provide such a means in some relevant 
cases (Hale & Wright 2000, p. 18) . 
• Epistemic success: we need to explain the possibility of apriari knowledge. The idea 
that Borne apriori knowledge is grounded in definition is initially plausible, and has 
a long tradition (Hale & Wright 2000, p. 117). Moreover, it would provide a way to 
apriori knowledge that is not grounded in a dubious faculty of rational intuition (see 
e.g. Boghossian 1996). 
42Think of validity as necessary truth-preservation here. 
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For the neo-Fregean, two cases are particularly relevant. Firstly, the case of (HP). The 
neo-Fregean needs to argue that one can stipulate its truth, and thereby not only bring it 
about that "#" gets assigned the unique meaning that renders it true - by virtue of fixing 
a sufficient pattern of use for "#" - but also be able to acquire apriori knowledge of (HP). 
Secondly, it transpired that the implicit definition theorist might also want to allow for the 
stipulation of the validity of introduction and elimination rules. As an example, consider 
the stipulation of Modus Ponens (MP) and Conditional Proof (CP), which is meant to 
define the conditional ,,--.":43 
( ) r,c/*:1/! MP rhl>~1/J (CP) n-p and I~J-P~1/! r ,t:.~1/J 
By virtue of stipulating CP and MP to be valid, so the thought goes, one can fix a 
pattern of use such that "--." is endowed with the unique meaning that renders these rules 
valid, and also come to know apriori that they are valid. 
Two questions need to be answered in both the mathematical and the logical case: 
1. How can it be brought about that - in the relevant cases - a unique meaning is 
fixed? In other words: in virtue of what is semantic success achieved? 
2. How can it come about that - in the relevant cases - the epistemic agent can arrive 
at apriori knowledge of the truth or the validity of the stipulation in question? In 
other words: in virtue of what is epistemic success achieved? 
I now turn to the (neo-Fregean) answers to these questions. 
2.3.2 Three dimensions of achievement 
We need to clarify the notions of semantic and epistemic success. The notion of semantic 
success is ambiguous. Using a well-known Fregean distinction, we can read "meaning" as 
either ''sense'' or "reference". It is thus useful to follow Ebert (2011) in distinguishing the 
following three dimensions of achievement: 
(Effectiveness) An implicit definition is effective if and only if, by virtue of the stip-
ulation, a sufficient pattern of use is fixed such that the hitherto undefined term is 
4IThe rules are taken from (Bostock 1997, p.388). 
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endowed with a unique Fregean sense (concept), and is thereby understood by whoever 
carried out the stipulation (Ebert 2011, p.IO). 
(Success) An implicit definition is successful if and only if it is effective and the stipu-
lation brings it about that the hitherto undefined term gets assigned a unique referent 
such that the stipulation is true I valid (Ebert 2011, p.9). 
(Epistemic Productiveness) An implicit definition is epistemically p1'Oductive if and 
only if, by virtue of making the stipulation, the epistemic agent can acquire apriori 
justification for the truth of the stipulated matrix or sentential pattern, and can even 
acquire apriori knowledge of it, in case the stipulation is successful (Ebert 2011, p.lO). 
The distinction between (Effectiveness) and (Success) can be further motivated by 
examples. For instance, Ebert (2011, pp.12f) argues that a stipulation of (BLV) is a 
case which cannot possibly be subject to (Success), but which might suffice to generate 
understanding of (and to uniquely fix a Fregean sense for) the extension operator. On such 
a view, a stipulation of (BLV) is subject to (Effectiveness), but not to (Success). 
However, there are implicit definitions which are not even subject to (Effectiveness). 
As an example, take the stipulation that "If the moon exists, then it is F" as an attempt to 
fix the meaning of F. It is impossible to understand F on this basis (Hale & Wright 2000, 
pp. 134). 
Another interesting example can be found in the rule case. To show that not every 
pair of introduction and elimination rules can be stipulated in order fix the meaning of a 
connective, Prior (1960) considers the following introduction and elimination rules, which 
are stipulated in order to fix the meaning of "1''' ("tonk"): 
(1'-1) ~ (1'-E) 1!f! 
The tonk rules allow for the derivation of any statement from any premise. Thus, the 
stipulation cannot be subject to (Success). Ebert (2011), thinks that it is not even subject 
to (Effectiveness). 
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2.3.3 Proposed conditions for semantic and epistemic success 
The above cases motivate looking for conditions that a stipulation has to meet in order 
for being subject to the above-mentioned dimensions of success. Without such conditions. 
the neo-Fregean does not possess a complete account of implicit definition. In particular, 
the neo-Fregean will not be able to respond to unspecific doubts to the effect that (HP) is 
really subject to the (Neo-Fregean Implicit Definition Thesis). In their major work 
on implicit definition (Hale & Wright 2000), Hale and Wright impose five such conditions: 
Generality In order for a definition to be subject to (Effectiveness), it must succeed in 
generating understanding. According to Hale and Wright (2000, pp.134f), a plausible 
necessary condition for understanding a term is that a version of Evan's Generality 
Constraint is met. That is: in order to understand t, one needs to understand all 
relevant contexts "4>[t]", where the matrix 4>[-] is already understood. A stipulation 
that is supposed to fix the meaning of t needs to bring it about that t is understood 
in all relevant contexts.44 Among other things, this criterion rules out stipulations 
that do not sufficiently contrain the meaning of the term to be defined, such as "If 
the moon exists, it is F". 
Consistency Inconsistent stipulations cannot possibly be true, so consistency is a nec-
essary condition for (Success) (Hale & Wright 2000, p.132). Note that whether 
a stipulation is regarded as being consistent may vary with the logical background 
system. For example, the condition will not rule out (BLV) if we restrict ourselves 
to predicative comprehension. However, Hale and Wright accept second-order logic 
with full comprehension, 80 they will rule out (BLV) for reasons of inconsistency. 
Harmony Consider a stipulation of introduction and elimination rules. It is important 
that both kinds of rules work well together. One way to make this precise is to 
demand that the introduction and elimination rules need to be in harmony, i.e. that 
the result of applying the elimination rule is not any stronger than the conditions for 
applying the corresponding introduction rule, and vice versa (Hale & Wright 2000, 
44The requirement can thus be seen as a weakened eJiminability criterion. The current condition is that 
we need to undtrltantl the new terms in a sufficient range of sentential contexts, and not that we need to 
be able to provide tnlnllation. to the old language. 
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p.136).45 Stipulations which are in disharmony cannot be subject to (Success), and 
presumably not even to (Effectiveness). The tonk rules will be ruled out by this 
constraint. 
Weak Conservativeness According to Hale and Wright, we still need some conserva-
tiveness criterion in order to rule out stipulations which say something substantial 
about the world and thus cannot be regarded as "epistemically innocent" (Hale &. 
Wright 2000, p.133). Consider the stipulation "Jack the Ripper is the perpetrator of 
all these crimes", laid down to fix the meaning of "Jack the Ripper". There is only 
an appropriate referent to be assigned to "Jack the Ripper" if there is a single person 
who is the perpetrator of all these crimes, and this claim should not be part of a def-
inition (Hale &. Wright 2000, p.134). Thus, although the definition might be subject 
to (Success), it cannot be subject to (Epistemic Productiveness), at least not 
without the subject doing substantial further aposteriori epistemic work. However, 
Hale and Wright cannot use the notion of conservativeness presented above, for it 
would rule out (HP). The notion they use is a bit weaker, so I call it "weak conser-
vativeness". An abstraction principle is weakly conservative just in case it does not 
generate any new consequences, in the old language, about any old domain - i.e. 
any domain of objects we might recognize before we introduced the abstraction prin-
ciple (Hale &. Wright 2000, p. 133). Note that every weakly conservative definition 
is also consistent, 80 the consistency condition is - strictly speaking - redundant. 
Non-arrogance There is another condition for (Epistemic Productiveness) which 
looks redundant, at least at first glance: the non-arrogance constraint. A stipulation 
is arrogant just in case its truth "cannot justifiably be affirmed without collateral 
(a posteriori) epistemic work" (Hale &. Wright 2000, p. 128). Consider again the 
case of Jack the Ripper. It is arrogant according to Hale's and Wright's definition. 
However, such stipulations are already ruled out by the conservativeness criterion. 
So is the non-arrogance constraint redundant? It does not seem so. For although 
Hale and Wright define non-arrogance as applying to cases of where one needs to do 
further aposterion epistemic work, they later also apply it to cases where they think 
nIt is a dif6cult question of how the notion of harmony should be spelled out in full detail. Hale and 
Wright do not say anything about how they think the notion should be explicated. 
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that further apriori epistemic work needs to be done in order to justifiably assert 
the proposed definition. For example: a direct stipulation of the truth of the Peano 
axioms. Hale and Wright explicitly rule out this stipulation for the reason that it is 
a direct stipulation of existence, and thus arrogant (Hale & Wright 2000, p.147; Hale 
& Wright 2007, section 2). Unfortunately, it remains unclear what exactly makes a 
stipulation arrogant. More work is required here. In particular, Hale's and Wright's 
characterization is trivial because it is trivial that we cannot obtain knowledge just 
by virtue of a stipulation if the stipulation requires further collateral epistemic work. 
Thus, the constraint does not provide any guidance for deciding which stipulations 
are subject to (Epistemic Productiveness) that goes beyond our pre-theoretic 
intuitions. It is certainly not an easy task to find a precise and independently mo-
tivated condition that rules out the Peano axioms but is met by (HP), but it is a 
task that the neo-Fregeans cannot avoid. I will come back to this issue. 
Determining a proper collection of conditions is a research project on its own. In fact, 
the set of conditions for (Success) cannot possibly be complete, because some of the 
principles meeting the conditions will be jointly unsatisfiable and thus cannot all be true. 
In particular I there are consistent and conservative but mutually unsatisfiable abstraction 
principles. I will discuss this problem further in 2.4. Let us assume, for the sake of the 
argument, that the neo-Fregeans have found a set of conditions whose obtaining guarantees 
that a stipulation is subject to (Success), and that the relevant stipulations - including 
(HP)- tum out to meet these conditions. 
2.3.4 The epistemology of implicit definition 
It is still a pressing question how we should conceive of the epistemological process in 
individual cases. How exactly can an epistemic agent acquire apriori knowledge, by virtue 
of making a stipulation that meets all the conditions? It does not suffice to claim that this 
is possible as soon as the constraints are met. We need an explanation of how this can 
happen. Here is what Hale and Wright have to offer: 
How, just by stipulating that a certain sentence, '#f', it true ( ... ) is it supposed 
to be possible to arrive at an a priori justified belief that if? Well, the route 
seems relatively clear provided two points are granted: first that a stipulation 
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of the truth of the particular 'if' is so much as properly possible- that the 
truth of the sentence is indeed something we can settle at will; and second 
that the stipulation somehow determines a meaning for 'f'. If both provisos are 
good, it will follow that the meaning bestowed on 'f' by the stipulation cannot 
be anything other than one which ( ... ) results in the truth of the sentence in 
question. ( ... ) Moreover, if the stipulation has the effect that 'f' and hence 
'if' are fully understood ( ... ) then nothing will stand in the way of intelligent 
disquotation: the knowledge that 'if' is true will extend to knowledge that 
#f. In other words: to know both that a meaning is indeed determined by 
an implicit definition, and what that meaning is, ought to suffice for a priori 
knowledge of the proposition thereby expressed. (Hale & Wright 2000, pp. 
126f) 
That a stipulation of the truth of a particular matrix is "so much as properly possi-
ble" and that a meaning is determined is meant to be ensured by the conditions above. 
According to Hale and Wright, an epistemic agent making the stipulation will then know 
apriori that it is true. On the basis of such knowledge, so the thought goes, one can then 
acquire knowledge of the stipulation itself by applying a disquotational step, given that 
the sentential matrix is understood. 
This raises a couple of issues. Firstly, Hale's and Wright's route to apriori knowledge 
of the matrix whose truth is stipulated turns out to be inferential, since it requires making 
a disquotational step (for such a reading of this paragraph, see also Ebert 2005b, section 
VI; Ebert 2011, pp.22f). This is in tension with the (Neo-Fregean Implicit Definition 
Thesis), which is about non-inferential apriori knowledge. 
Maybe the claim is only meant to apply to knowledge of the truth of stipulations: 
nothing said so far rules out that this knowledge is non-inferential. However, secondly, it 
is entirely unclear how exactly a successful act of stipulating a sentential matrix generates 
knowledge of the truth of the stipulation in question. Hale and Wright contend that: 
a thinker who is party to the stipulative acceptance of a satisfactory implicit 
definition is in a position to recognize both that the sentences involved are true 
- precisely because stipulated to be so - and what they say. (Hale & Wright 
2000, p. 138) 
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This suggests that the route to knowledge of the truth of a stipulation goes via a further line 
of reasoning, involving a reflection on the stipulation and its content. So maybe Hale and 
Wright cannot maintain the claim that such apriori knowledge is non-inferential and should 
only endorse the weaker (Implicit Definition Thesis), which also allows for inferential 
apriori knowledge of the truth of stipulations. In what follows, I will only talk about this 
weaker claim for this reason. 
In any case, the details of the knowledge generating process are left open. And, as I 
will show in 7.1.4, the details matter. I take this to be a major gap in the neo-Fregean 
proposal, which I close in chapter 7. 
Let us ignore this gap for now, and discuss an argument purporting to show that -
regardless of how the gap is filled - the neo-Fregeau faces a dilemma. The dilemma is due 
to Shapiro and Ebert (2009). 
In their paper, Shapiro and Ebert discuss the question of what the relation between 
the stipulating epistemic agent and the conditions for semantic success must be in order 
for the agent to acquire knowledge by virtue of making the stipulation (Ebert & Shapiro 
2009, p.ll). On the one hand, 80 the thought goes, one might hold that the conditions just 
have to be true, whether or not the epistemic agent has access to this fact. On the other 
hand, one could demand that the fact that these conditions are met must be reflectively 
available to the agent. Prima facie, these two options may seem to be exhaustive. If this 
is correct, then the neo-Fregean must either hold: 
(Externalism) The conditions must be true. 
Or: 
(Internallsm) That the conditions are met must be reflectively available to the agent. 
Thus, either the stipulating agent needs to show that the conditions hold, or that the 
conditions hold must be self-evident. 
Given this dichotomy, Ebert and Shapiro (2009) argue that the neo-Fregeans face a 
dilemma. In particular, they argue that both options are problematic even in the central 
case of (UP). 
To see why (Internallsm) is problematic, consider the consistency condition. Surely, 
the consistency of (UP) is not self-evident. And this is especially so in the light of incon-
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sistent abstraction principles such as (BLV). So we should demand that the agent needs 
to show that (HP) is consistent. However, in this context, this plausibly amounts to the 
requirement that the agent needs to prove that (HP) is consistent. And because of Godel's 
second incompleteness theorem, a proof of the consistency of (HP) cannot be carried out 
in any weaker (and safer) system than the one that (HP) is meant to deliver. We face an 
epistemic regress problem (Ebert &, Shapiro 2009, p. 426). 
Is (Externalism) any better? Initially, it is hard to see how the mere truth of the 
conditions could ensure that the stipulating agent is epistemically responsible in any sense 
of epistemic responsibility required for the possession of knowledge of the truth of the 
respective stipulations. This worry affects externalistic construals of knowledge in general 
and has been contested. In any case, it requires a deeper investigation of the issue of 
externalism and internalism about knowledge. I come back to this issue in the next chapter. 
There is a related, more specific worry. Suppose that (HP) meets all the conditions. 
Then a whole class of further a.bstraction principles allowing for easy proofs of very complex 
mathematical theorems will also meet all the conditions. For as we know from Richard 
Heck (1992), an abstraction principle can be designed to imply every statement whatsoever, 
by exploiting the "inconsistency" of the equivalence relation of co-extensionality. Consider 
the following scheme of abstraction principles: 
( ( 
3R(B" (R F G» 1\ )) (HP+P) YFVG #F = #G ++ 'tJ " 
(~P -+ ("Ix (Fx ++ Gx») 
H P is a consequence of (HP), then this principle meets all the conditions for semantic 
success if (HP) does. Moreover, it is very easy to prove P on the basis of any such 
abstraction principle. This can be done ''by reductio": if P was not true, then (HP+P) 
would be equivalent to (BLV), but (BLV) can be shown to be false, exploiting Russell's 
paradox. 
Insert any complex arithmetical theorem for P, such as Fermat's last theorem (FLT):46 
(HP+FLT) VFVG (#F = #G ++ ( 3R (Bij (R, F, G» 1\ )) 
(~FLT -+ ("Ix (Fx ++ Gx») 
44IFLT says that there are DO integers a, b, and e such that an + bn = en, for any n ;::: 2. It has been 
conjectlU'ed by Fermat in 1637. Wiles published a proof in 1995. 
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An epistemic agent stipulating (HP+FLT) will then make a stipulation meeting all 
the conditions for semantic success. Hence, by (Externalism), the agent can come to 
know FLT just on the basis of stipulating (HP+P) and knowledge of Russell's paradox. 
Obviously, this should not be the case. Hence, (Externalism) needs to be rejected. 
Both (Internalism) and (Externalism) are unacceptable for the neo-Fregean. The 
moral is that the proper requirement must be that the agent possesses some kind of justi-
fication in-between (Internalism) and (Externalism). 
Hale and Wright accept this argument. Their response is that one possesses a right 
for stipulation by default, which can be undermined by specific reasons to doubt that the 
stipulation is successful (MacBride 2003, pp. 147f, Hale & Wright 2009, p. 192). This 
yields the following position: 
(Default Entitlement) If we do not possess a sufficient reason to doubt that the 
conditions for (Success) hold, we possess an epistemic warrant for the obtaining of the 
conditions without having done any prior epistemic work. 
The thought is that this suffices to warrantedly regard relevant stipulations as being 
successful, which suffices for knowledge of the truth of the stipulation in good cases (Le. in 
cases where all the conditions are actually met), whilst excluding cases of easy knowledge, 
because in such cases there are sufficient reasons to doubt that the conditions hold. 
One might interpret the above-mentioned non-arrogance condition as already contain-
ing this thought. A stipulation is non-arrogant, so the thought goes, if there is no sufficient 
reason committing the agent to further epistemic investigations. In the case of Jack the 
Ripper, for example, there is a sufficient reason to doubt that there is a single perpetrator, 
80 that one cannot responsibly make the stipulation without having made sure that there is 
a single perpetrator. And maybe one can say something similar in the case of (HP+ FLT). 
In the case of (HP), however, there is no sufficient reason to doubt that all relevant con-
ditions are met. First and foremost, the reasoning that leads to Russell's paradox does 
not apply here, 80 we have no sufficient reason to doubt that (HP) is consistent, or so the 
thought goes. 
So Hale and Wright already have the resources for two responses to the Shapiro-Ebert 
dilemma: they could either impose (Default Entitlement) as a further, individual con-
dition for (Epiatemic Productiveness), or interpret the non-arrogance constraint as 
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entailing (Default Entitlement) in relevant cases. 
However, this proposal raises many questions. What exactly counts as a sufficient rea-
son to doubt that a condition for (Success) is not met? For example: had Frege been 
justified in believing that (BLV) is true before he received Russell's letter, if he had re-
garded (BLV) as an implicit definition of the extension operator? And what considerations 
would provide a sufficient reason to doubt that (HP) is consistent? It is open questions 
like this that let Ebert and Shapiro conclude that the response is not satisfying (Ebert & 
Shapiro 2009, sections 6.3). 
More generally: postulating warrants by default that are sufficient to underlie the 
epistemic workings of the (Implicit Definition Thesis) is one thing. Providing a dear 
epistemological background picture that shows how such warrants work and that they are 
sufficiently strong for these purposes is another. Clearly, more needs to be said here. First 
and foremost, we need an explication of the very notion of a warrant by default. 
In sum, it transpires that there is substantial further work to be done on three fronts: 
1. We have just seen that we need a clear explication of the notion of a warrant by 
default. 
2. We need to find a set of precise and independently motivated conditions whose joint 
truth will ensure that a stipulation is subject to (Effectiveness) and (Success). 
3. We need to explicate how the process of knowledge-generation works in full detail. 
We need a story of (i) what conditions a stipulation needs to meet in order for it to be 
a candidate for (Epistemic Productiveness); in particular (ii) what the epistemic 
relation between the agent making the stipulation and the conditions of semantic 
success needs to be; (iii) how the knowledge-generating process works in full detail 
and what the structure of justification is to be. 
I will answer all three questions in the remainder of this thesis. As to question 1, in later 
work, Hale and Wright explicate the notion of warrant by default by Wright's notion of 
entitlement (Hale &: Wright 2009, p.192).47 The motivation, explication, and defense of 
an epistemic framework involving entitlements thus becomes very important for a neo-
Fregean. Providing such a framework is the aim of Part II of this thesis. In chapter 7, I 
4TThis move is anticipated and criticized by Ebert and Shapiro (2009, section 6.4). 
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will embed the nro-Fregean proposal into this epistemic framework, which yields a new, 
precise account of implicit definition. This account also provides answers to questions 2 
and 3. 
2.3.5 Hermeneutic reconstruction again 
Assume that it has been established that (i) (HP) is subject to the (Implicit Definition 
Thesis); (ii) that we can use logical reasoning to extend apriori knowledge; (iii) that 
the number operator can be interpreted as carrying ontological commitments to mind-
independent abstract objects. The nea-Fregean then still has to establish (Same Subject 
Matter), i.e. that he or she has really reconstruced knowledge of arithmetic. For this, it 
does not suffice just to note that FA relatively interprets second-order PA. In particular, it 
still needs to be argued that the meanings of the terms of FA are the same as the meanings 
of our ordinary arithmetical terms. First and foremost: that the referents of number terms 
of FA are the same objects as the referents of the number terms in ordinary mathematical 
discourse (i.e. mathematical, scientific, and everyday discourse of sufficiently competent 
speakers which involves number terms). Only if this can be established will the neo-
Fregean account meet the demands of (Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction) and the 
(Arithmetical Knowledge) constraint (for a definition of these constraints, see 1.2.2). 
The same holds at the level of definitions, and for (HP) in particular. Even if (HP) 
can count as a definition proper, the question is whether it is a definition that merely 
lets us latch onto an entirely new subject matter that behaves like numbers in relevant 
ways (this claim would amount to (Revolutionary Reconstruction», whether it is a 
means to talk about the numbers we all know and love (this claim would would amount to 
(Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction», or whether it is an explanation or explication 
of the ordinary concept of number (this claim would amount to (Strong Hermeneutic 
Reconstruction» . 
Hale and Wright often make a weak hermeneutic claim. It is implicit in their aim to 
vindicate our knowledge of the existence of numbers, where ''numbers'' is to be understood 
in a pre-theoretical sense, or to vindicate arithmetic, where arithmetic is the theory about 
the numbers we all know and love (Wright 1999, p.322). However, they also think that 
(HP) explains the nature of numbers (Wright 1999, p. 320). And they also say that it is 
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a central aspect of their proposal that "the concept of (cardinal) number can be explained 
( ... ) by Hume's Principle" (Hale & Wright 200la, p.l). This suggests that they might have 
in mind a strong hermeneutic claim as well (see also MacBride 2003, footnote 10). Be that 
as it may. How do Hale and Wright argue for hermeneutic reconstruction? 
Reference Supervenes on Use MacBride (2003) reconstructs a nea-Fregean argu-
ment for (Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction). Building on a remark in Wright's 
work (Wright 1999, p. 322), MacBride contends that the neo-Fregean argues for (Weak 
Hermeneutic Reconstruction) on the basis of the following principle (MacBride 2003, 
p.109): 
(Reference Supervenes on Use) Whenever two different terms (in two different 
theories) share the same pattern of use, the terms have the same referent. 
What would establish that the terms of FA share a pattern of use with relevant ordinary 
mathematical terms? The obvious thought is that a technical reconstruction theorem such 
as the claim that (second-order) PA is relatively interpreted by FA, suffices for a claim to 
the effect that the number terms of FA share a pattern of use with the number term!> of 
(second-order) PA, and we can assume that second-order PA is about the numbers we all 
know and love. However, there are problems with this approach: 
• Set theory interprets arithmetic but numbers are not sets. What is worse: there are 
many different interpretations of numbers as sets. And they cannot all have the same 
reference . 
• FA relatively interprets theories that it does not reconstruct in the relevant sense, 
such as the theories of real numbers (Walsh 2010, p. 16). 
Frege's Constraint and applicability Wright (1999) argues that one cannot decide 
the question of sameness of meaning just by considering pure theories, for similar reasons 
as those sketched above. Rather, so Wright: 
Any doubt on the point [of whether the terms of both reconstruction and 
reconstructed theory share the same pattern of use] has to concern whether the 
definition of the arithmetical primitives which Frege offers, based on Hume's 
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Principle and the logical notions, are adequate to the ordinary applications of 
arithmetic. (Wright 1999, p. 322) 
On this basis, Hale and Wright impose an additional condition that abstraction principles 
have to meet in order to be candidates for hermeneutic reconstruction - Frege 's Constmint. 
Wright (2000, section 2), extracts it from GG, §159: 
(Frege's Constraint) The epistemic and semantic foundations of reconstructed mathe-
matical theories must render their applications immediate by building their applications 
into their foundations. 
This is still pretty vague, but in the case of (HP), one can see how (Frege's Con-
straint) might be met. For (HP) makes it immediate that numbers are objects assigned to 
sortal concepts, whereas the same objects are assigned just in case the concepts are equinu-
merous. According to Frege, this captures the fundamental role of numbers in ordinary 
discourse (GL §46). 
A complication needs to be discussed here.48 The question arises whether (Frege's 
Constraint) is just a constraint on (HP), or on (HP) and the Frege definitions. I am 
inclined to say that the claim should be that stipulating (HP) alone enables us to refer to 
the numbers we all know and love, in the sense that it should not be the case that what 
(HP) refers to is indeterminate until we have laid down additional definitions. I am thus 
inclined to say that the constraint is primarily a constraint for the relevant axioms (e.g. 
(HP». However, it is of course also important that the right definitions are made. Only 
if we define the relevant terms properly, will we actually come to refer to the right objects. 
For example, if we define "0" as "#z (x ::f: x)", the term "0" will refer to the number 0 we 
all know and love.49 If we define "0" as "#z (x = x)", then "0" will not refer to a natural 
number, and relevant hermeneutic claims will fail. 
481 am indebted to Carrie JenkiDi and Andrew McGonigal for pressing this issue. 
40 Andrew McGonigal has pointed out to me that there are deviant definitions which are extension-
ally equivalent. For example, one might define "0" 88 "#'" (x :f: x" x = x)". We can prove in FA that 
"#" (x :f: x) = #. (x ¥ x 1\ x = x)", so both terms refer to the same object. I think that I have to (and 
can) take the point. There are aeveral co-exteD8ive definitions for O. In a weak hermeneutic project, getting 
the right referents is all that matters. However, someone concerned with a weak hermeneutic project can 
still take the Frege definitioDB 88 a canonical, natural, and sufficient way to get the right objects. When 
it comes to strong hermeneutic recoDitruction, however, deviant definitions are ruled out. The deviant 
definition of "0" above certainly does not capture the ordinary concept of O. The Frege definitions seem to 
be the best candidates for de1initioDi capturing our ordinary arithmetical concepts, and I assume that in 
what follows. 
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How does the (true) claim that (HP) meets (Frege's Constraint) deliver the herrneneu-
tic claim the neo-Fregean wants to establish? The Wright quote suggests extending 
MacBride's line of reasoning above: to use the (Reference Supervenes on Use) prin-
ciple to establish (Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction). The idea is that we do not 
just take into account the use facts of pure arithmetical theories, but also the use facts 
regarding applications of these theories. In particular, we ask: are the patterns of use 
of applied Frege Arithmetic identical to the use facts of ordinary arithmetical terms in 
applied contexts - i.e. in the sciences and in everyday reasoning? Wright thinks that it is 
plausible that (HP) does the job because it meets (Frege's Constraint) (Wright 1999, 
p.322), and I agree. Of course, more needs to be said here. A full argument requires a 
precisification of what the relevant contexts are, and how exactly the sameness of patterns 
of use is to be determined. This merits further research, but is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
A second line of argument rests on metaphysical premises. The claim is that, if (HP) 
meets (Frep's Constraint), then (HP) will sufficiently explain the nature of cardinal 
numbers. Neo-Fregeans clearly endorse this claim about (HP) (Wright 2000, pp. 319f). 
For example, the neo-Fregeans agree with Frege (GL §46) that numbers essentially belong 
to concepts. IT the nature of the objects introduced by (HP) is sufficiently like the nature 
of the numbers we all know and love, this presumably entails that relevant instances of 
"#" refer to these numbers. 
Thirdly, maybe it ca.n be argued that, since (HP) meets (Frege's Constraint), it 
provides a concepttuJl analysis of the concept of number. Heck (2000), for example, argues 
that a principle very similar to (HP) - a principle he calls HPJ - is a fundamental con-
ceptual truth about numbers, because of relations between the principle with the practical 
relevance of number ta1k.~ 
I am optimistic with respect to all three strategies of endorsing (Frege's Constraint) 
to establish a hermeneutic claim. However, all three arguments are in need of clarification, 
and merit further research. 
II°However, Heck does not think that HP has the same status as HPJ. 
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Two worries Two general worries need to be discussed here.51 Firstly, numbers are not 
only employed as cardinalities assigned to concepts, but also in counting. To what extend 
can (HP) account for this application of numbers? A fortiori, if this application is equally 
important, does (HP)'s focus on the cardinality aspect not threaten the claim that (HP) 
really meets (Frege's Constraint), let alone any hermeneutic claim? The response should 
be that the cardinality aspect is more fundamental to the ordinary concept of number.52 
One might object that in the process of acquiring the concept of number, counting 
comes before assigning cardinalities, and it must be the counting role which is conceptually 
prior (Heck 2000). However, I agree with Heck in that I do not think that such facts show 
what is conceptually prior. Young children can count without grasping the concept of 
number (Heck 2000, p. 197). However, one cannot possess the concept of number without 
understanding what it is for two concepts to be equinumerous (Heck 2000, pp. 199ff).53 
Note that I am only concerned with the ordinary concept of number that a fully competent 
user of number talk - in a sense that includes the reader of this thesis - possesses, and 
that I have assumed that there is only one such concept, so it is not a good reply to worry 
that there might be different concepts of number, and the made claims only apply to some 
of them. 
The second worry concerns the logical form of ordinary arithmetic, and our epistemic 
access to facts about it. Clearly, even the weak hermeneutic claim will only go through if 
the surface grammar of ordinary number talk can be taken at face value, i.e. if ordinary 
number talk is object talk and ordinary number terms are singular terms. One might worry 
that it has not been excluded that linguistic investigations reveal that number terms are 
not really singular terms. This also threatens the apriority of the claim that number terms 
are singular terms, and thus also the apriority of the claim that the reconstructed theory 
meets the demands of (Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction). 
I do not think, however, that the neo-Fregeans need to worry about this. Firstly, 
111 am indebted to Carrie Jenkins and Andrew McGonigal for pressing these issues. 
52Note that one can explain the practile of counting by appealing to equinumerosity and the Frege 
definitions. Suppose there are four forks on the table, and they are counted. The first fork is assigned the 
Dumber 1, the eecond fork is Ulliped the number 2, and 80 on. As 800n as one has assigned the number 4 
to the last fork, one knows that the number of the forks on the table is identical to the number of numbers 
from 1 to 4 - namely 4 - because both concepts are in one-one-conespondence (we have assigned exactly 
one number to each fork OD the table). 
5aHowever, Heck (2000, p.I99) also argues that one can possess a concept of equinumerosity without 
p08llell8ing the concept of one-one-correspondence, although the two concepts are extensionally equivalent. 
DiBcuIsing this complication is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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although I think it is an epistemic possibility that further linguistic investigation reveals 
that number terms are not singular terms, I think this claim is clearly false. Secondly, the 
mere empirical defeasibility of the claim that number terms are singular terms does not 
yet show that the claim cannot be justified apriori, if apriority is understood in a sense 
that allows for empirical defeasibility. In 1.2, I have made the plausible assumption that it 
is transparent to sufficiently competent subjects what the logical form of number talk is, 
in a sense that entails that claims about logical form are apriori justifiable. Here, apriority 
should be understood in a sense that allows for empirical defeasibility. Thirdly, even if 
it turns out that the hermeneutic claim cannot be justified apriori, this will not mean 
that the hermeneutic claim is false. It is true. Of course, it would be ideal if Hero could 
also come to know apriori that his reconstructed theory is about the numbers he talked 
about before, but this is not part of the hermeneutic claim, and it is also not a part of the 
(Arithmetical Knowledge) constraint. 
2.4 Three objections to neo-Fregeanism 
In addition to the question of how exactly the argument for hermeneutic reconstruction 
is to work, and the unclarities about its exact epistemological workings, neo-Fregeanism 
faces a bunch of specific objections. In this section, I briefly sketch the three most pressing 
ones, namely: 
• The Caesar problem. 
• The Bad Company objection. 
• (Global epistemic) rejectionism. 
I will leave it open whether the nea-Fregean responses are fully convincing. In the final 
chapter of this thesis, I come back to the objections and discuss them in a more general 
setting. 
2.4.1 The Caesar problem 
Frege dismissed (HP) as a definition of number because of the Caesar problem. To repeat: 
in Gnmdlagen, Frege complains that (HP) cannot be a proper definition of number because 
it only decides identity statements where both terms are of the form "#F', but does not 
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provide any guidance for deciding mixed identity statements such as (C) "The number of 
planets = Julius Caesar". 
Obviously, this also poses a challenge to the neo-Fregeans. Before I can discuss Hale's 
and Wright's response, however, the problem needs to be disambiguated. I already men-
tioned that the Caesar problem admits of more than one reading. In fact, at least four 
readings of the problem can be identified: 
• Epistemic: according to the epistemic reading, (HP) does not enable us to acquire 
knowledge of whether (C) is true or false. The question remains evidence-tmnscendent 
if all we can use to decide such questions is (HP), or so the thought goes. Why is 
this a problem? There is a fact about the matter, and we should be able to know 
it.54 In particular, one might think that one should be able to know all facts about 
numbers on the basis of the proposed foundations of arithmetic, and that (HP) 
cannot be a complete definition because it does not enable us to decide all questions 
regarding numbers. However, in the light of incompleteness, this is a very strong 
claim. A better way of putting the objection is that we have a strong intuition to the 
effect that the number of planets cannot possibly be identical to Julius Caesar (Heck 
19976, p.276). Thus, there is some knowledge of numbers that we cannot obtain on 
the basis of the proposed epistemological foundation. We thus might have to appeal 
to rational intuition, and this is unacceptable (Heck 2005, section 4) . 
• Semantic: (HP) does not fix the truth conditions of all identity statements involving 
number terms. Thus, it appears that (HP) cannot fully fix the meaning (reference) of 
"#". This raises issues with semantic indeterminacy. For example, it has been argued 
that this entails that the concept of cardinal number (defined by (Numbers) in 1.3.2) 
does not have a unique extension and is a pseudo concept (Schirn 2003, p.211) . 
• Cognitive: suppose that Evan's Generality Constraint is a condition for understand-
ing a term, i.e. that it is a necessary condition for understanding a term that one 
understands a range of relevant contexts containing it. Moreover, suppose that state-
ments like (C) count as relevant contexts. Under certain assumptions, it follows that 
(HP) cannot effect an understanding of "#". For example: if understanding (C) 
14This way of putting the Caesar problem has been suggested to me by Robert Williams. 
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requires knowing its truth-conditions. This is because (HP) does not fix the truth-
conditions of (C), or so the thought goes (Hale & Wright 2001b, pp. 341ft'). 
• Metaphysical: the definition does not fully determine the nature of numbers. If it 
did, both the epistemic and the semantic problem would not arise. 
These four problems are related. The Caesar problems have been discussed extensively, and 
I cannot repeat the discussion here. After briefly discussing two allegedly easy solutions of 
the problem, I present the official neo-Fregean solution that Hale and Wright propose in 
their (200lb), which I think is promising. 
Firstly, one might want to respond that no number can be identical to Caesar because 
numbers exist necessarily (assuming they exist at all) and Caesar does not, or because 
numbers are abstract objects (assuming they exist at all), and Caesar is a concrete object 
(for such lines of reasoning, see e.g. Hale & Wright 2001b, p. 366; Rosen 1993). Although 
this is no doubt correct, the problem also arises in cases where both kinds of objects are 
abstract, and exist necessarily. For example: is 0 (=#x[x 1= x]) identical to 0? How can 
(HP) help with deciding these questions? One constraint to any solution of the Caesar 
problem is that the solution generalizes to such cases. 
Secondly, one might want to respond that abstract-person identities are meaningless 
because they constitute category mistakes. Thus, so the thought goes, statements such 
as (C) are irrelevant, because there simply is no thought to grasp, or no fact to know. 
However, it is far from clear that statements like (C) are meaningless. To the contrary: I 
think we clearly understand (C), and there clearly is a fact about the matter. Moreover, 
the response raises the issue of separating bad cases from good cases. Is the statement 
#x[x '# xl = 0 meaningless as well? I assume that all mixed identity statements are 
meaningful, and turn to Hale's and Wright's official solution of the Caesar problem. 
Hale and Wright (200lb) build on Wright's proposal in Frege's Conception (Wright 
1983). According to Wright (1983), the root of the problem is that in order to introduce a 
new sortal concept - a concept of a sui generis kind of object - one does not only have 
to fix a criterion oj identity, but also a criterion oj application. Whereas the former only 
enables us to decide identities in which both sides are number terms, the latter enables us 
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to decide whether any given thing is a number. 55 
The basic idea in Frege's Conception, which Hale and Wright adopt in their (2001b), is 
that abstraction principles fix both criteria in relevant cases, because, given some plausible 
metaphysical background assumptions, criteria of application are determined by criteria of 
identity (Hale &, Wright 200lb, p.369). The idea is based on two thoughts. Firstly, although 
every sortal concept has its own specific criterion of identity, two different sorts of things 
can share a criterion 0/ identity. That two sorts of things F and G (with the specific 
criteria of identity eqF and eqG) share a criterion of identity means that the following is a 
necessary conceptual truth (Hale &, Wright 2001b, p. 391): 
(*) ('v'xy) (xeqFY ~ xeqGY) 
F and G will share a criterion of identity if F can be subsumed under G. For example, 
since all tigers are animals, tiger shares a criterion of identity with animal. Now, secondly, 
there are maximally inclusive sorts of things: categories. Categories are associated with a 
criterion of identity that all the sortals in this category share. Thus, if two sorts of things 
do not share a criterion of identity, they cannot belong to the same category. 
It can be difficult to determine whether two sorts of things share a criterion of identity. 
However, it is very plausible that numbers and people do not share such a criterion (Hale 
&, Wright 200lb, p. 393). Thus, they cannot belong to the same category. This yields 
a solution to the original Caesar problem, which takes the form of a dilemma. Either 
categories never overlap, or they sometimes overlap. In the former case, numbers cannot 
be persons, so the original Caesar problem is solved. In the latter case, the problem 
becomes a problem for singular terms in general, and thus the problem cannot be Utled as 
a specific objection against using abstraction principles to introduce new sorts of objects. 
For no matter how new kinds of things were introduced, cross-categorial identities would 
be indeterminate (Hale & Wright 200lb, p. 396). 
Hale's and Wright's solution is general enough to apply to various generalizations and 
complications of the Caesar problem. However, it does not provide a lot of guidance in 
particular cases. For example, what has been said does not help us when it comes to 
IIIThis naesta aD epiatemic: readiDg of "criterion of identity" aDd "criterion of application"; but note 
that just as there is aD epiatemic aDd a semantic version of the Caesar problem, there is an epistemic and 
a semantic reading of theae criteria. We could either conceive of them as criteria providing the means to 
decide certain que&tioDB, or as criteria that are in some sense fundamental to sortal concepts. 
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deciding whether 0 is identical to 0. For it does not help us with the question of whether 
sets and numbers belong to the same category. To answer this question, we need to be 
able to answer the question of whether numbers and sets share a criterion of identity. This 
problem generalizes. We need a procedure to decide whether the abstracts introduced by 
different abstraction principles belong to the same category or not. The neo-Fregean faces 
the following task: 
(Categorization of Abstracts) The neo-Fregean needs to find a principled and meta-
physically motivated partition into categories of all kinds of objects that can be intro-
duced by abstraction principles. 
This task is very difficult, at least if it is a constraint that the partition meets pre-
theoretic intuitions. There are cases in which it is plausible that two sorts of abstracts, 
introduced by different abstraction principles, belong to the same category or even are 
identical. For example: the numbers introduced by Hume's Principle and the numbers 
introduced by Heck's Finite Burne's Principle. 56 However, there are also cases in which it 
is plausible that two sorts of abstracts belong to different categories. For example, numbers 
and sets are too different to be in the same category. All conditions for identifying intra-
abstract identities proposed so far fail to accomodate one of these cases. 
As an example, consider the simple view that there are as many categories as equiv-
alence relations. This view cannot accomodate the intuition that the "natural number 
segments" of the numbers introduced by Hume's Principle and Finite Hume's Principle 
are the same (see also Cook & Ebert 2005, 2). On the other hand, views that accomo-
date this intuition will identify kinds of abstracts that should not be identified. As an 
example, consider the view that all the abstracts introduced by an abstraction principle 
P are identical to some of the abstracts introduced by another abstraction principle Q if 
Q relatively interprets P. This will identify the numbers introduced by (HP) and Finite 
Bume's Principle, but it will also imply that numbers are sets (where sets are introduced 
by a sufficiently strong abstraction principle for sets). Even if one thinks that Hale's and 
Wright's solution is acceptable in principle, these issues certainly require further work. 
&flFiDite Hume'. Principle is the abstraction principle that says that the number of the F'B is identical to 
the number of the 08 if F and G are infinite, or F and 0 can be put into one-one correspondence. This 
equivalence relation is DOt identical to simple one-one correspondence. A similar abstraction principle was 
introduced and discussed by Heck (1997/1). 
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2.4.2 The Bad Company objection 
The Bad Company objection can be stated as follows: there are many abstraction principles 
- statements having the same form as (HP) - which cannot have the special epistemic 
and semantic status that (HP) is supposed to have. This casts doubt on the neo-Fregeau 
justification of (HP), at least when this justification is to be based on the fact that (HP) 
is an abstraction principle. 
For example, Frege's (BLV) - a second-order abstraction principle just like (HP) -
is inconsistent. Thus, no appropriate function from concepts to objects can be assigned 
to the extension operator, and (BLV)' cannot possibly be true. The stipulatioIl canIlot 
be semantically successful, and it cannot be known on the basis of stipulation. So the 
nea-Fregean needs to be able to make it plausible that relevant abstraction principles such 
as (HP) are different. In general, the neo-Fregean needs to separate the good abstraction 
principles from the bad. This needs to be done in a principled, non ad-hoc way, which turns 
out to be a substantial task. For example, it is not enough to just demand consistency. For 
there are consistent, but mutually inconsistent abstraction principles (Boolos 1990, Wright 
1999). I discuss these problems in some more detail below. 
First, it makes sense to distinguish two programmes, and two corresponding Bad Com-
panyobjections. This will bring to light the full scope of the problem. 
Fine's programme Although Hale and Wright are somewhat opposed to such an inter-
pretation (Hale & Wright 2009, §4), neo-Fregeanism can be conceived of as some kind of 
maximalism. Consider the following meta-ontological view: 
(Maximalism) Whatever can exist does exist. 
Applied to abstraction principles, the idea becomes the following: 
(Maximalism about Abstraction) Every abstraction principle that can be true is 
true. 
This provides a setting for the Bad Company problem. What the objection shows, 
so the thought goes, is that not every abstraction principle can be true. Thus, the ab-
stractionist needs to sort out a maximal collection of abstraction principles which can be 
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jointly true. Every member of this collection can then be regarded as true, in accord with 
(Maximalism about Abstraction). 
To sort out such a maximal collection is Fine's agenda in his (2002), so let me dub thi::; 
task "Fine's programme": 
(Fine's Programme) Find a maximal collection of abstraction principles which can 
be jointly true. 
This is a difficult mathematical task. One does not only have to describe a collection 
of abstraction principles which could be true, but one has to describe a collection of ab-
straction principles which could be true together with all other true abstraction principle::;, 
and one also has to argue that the collection one has identified is maximal. It is not im-
mediately clear how such a criterion should look like, and even whether there is a single 
maximal set of abstraction principles. 
Moreover, it is important for the neo-Fregean to show that the collection will include 
enough abstraction principles to deliver a sufficient amount of mathematics (i.e. most of 
today's mathematics). Whether this is so remains an open (mathematical) question, and 
only carrying out (Fine's Programme) will deliver an answer. 
There are two branches of Fine's project: the nea-Fregean branch, and Fine's own 
branch. Here, I focus on the latter. So which abstraction principles are the good ones, and 
which are the bad ones? 
Let us begin with the famous infamous (BLV). In the nea-Fregean framework, it leads 
to Russell's Paradox. It is worth noting, however, that it only leads to inconsi::;tency given 
a sufficient amount of second-order comprehension. This is because the derivation rests 
on the existence of the Rus8ell Properly, i.e. the property of being a set which does not 
have itself as a member: this property includes both the notion of set, and quantifies over 
properties - 80 it is actually impredicative in two different ways.57 
Can we avoid the inconsistency by weakening second-order comprehension appropri-
ately? The answer is yes (Heck 1996}, but weakening comprehension in a way that blocks 
the derivation of the inConsistency also blocks Frege's proof of the Peano axioms from 
ITWitb the be1p of the RU&IIell Property, we can define the "Russell Set", i.e. the set of all sets which 
are not members of themaelwa. And now inconsistency looms: the Russell set is a member of itself if and 
only if it 18 not .. member of itself. 
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(HP) (Linnebo 2004).58 
So (BLV) remains a bad companion. The neo-Fregean needs to restrict the collection 
of good abstraction principles, and a first obvious criterion is consistency. However, this 
is not enough. It turns out that there are pairs of consistent, but mutually unsatisfiable 
abstraction principles. And mutually unsatisfiable principles can not both be tf'tJ,e. 
There are many examples of such pairs. We already encountered Heck's trick to COIl-
strue abstraction principles that imply every statement whatsoever, by exploiting the 
equivalence relation of co-extensionality. Consider the following scheme (where </> does 
not include any free occurrences of F or G): 
(AP+Phi) 'VFO (EF = EO ~ (tP V "Ix (Fx ~ Ox») 
It is easy to see that (AP+Phi) implies tP. This is because the abstraction principle 
is equivalent to (BLV) in case tP does not hold. 
How does that bear on the Bad Company problem? Well, pretty straightforwardly. 
Just choose two satisfiable but not jointly satisfiable second-order sentences </>1 and </>2, 
and use Heck's technique to obtain two consistent but mutually unsatisfiable abstraction 
principles. As an example, consider the second-order versions of "the domain is finite" and 
"the domain is infinite" .59 
Neo-Fregeans might want to rule out such paradox exploitative abstraction principles 
just because they are paradox exploitative. Wright suggested this move (Wright 1999, 
Appendix 1). However, there are examples which do not exploit paradoxes, so nothing 
rests on Heck's technique. 
For example: Frege's Theorem implies that (HP) is only satisfiable in infinite domains. 
However, there are consistent abstraction principles which are only satisfiable on finite 
domains. Two well-known examples are Boolos' Panty Principle (Boolos 1990, pp. 214f) 
and Wright's Nuisance Principle (Wright 1999, p. 318). Let me use the Nuisance Principle 
as an example. It is the following second-order abstraction principle (where Fin:;: (</>[x]) 
stands for the second-order sentence that Dedekind-infinitely many objects fall under 4> [x]) : 
III am aware of the fact that there are different approaches to abstraction which do not impose restrictions 
on abstraction prlnclpiea, but restrict what properties there are (Linnebo 2007). I cannot discuss such 
approaches here. 
59Tbat the doma.iD is (Dedekind-)infinite can be expressed as the statement saying there is a bijection 
from the domain to a proper subset of it. For a discuseion of the expressibility of notions of infinity in 
second-order logic, consult (Shapiro 1991, 5.1). 
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(NP) 
( 
Nuis (F) = Nuis (G) +-t) 
'tING 
(Finx ([Fx 1\ -,Gx]x) V Finx ([Gx 1\ -,Fx]x)) 
Model-theoretic reasoning shows that (NP) only has finite models (1999, pp. 318f). 
Thus, (HP) and (NP) cannot possibly be true together. One of these principles must be 
false. Thus, the nea-Fregean needs to say more about which abstraction principles are the 
good ones. 
It has been proposed that principles like (NP) should be ruled out on the ground that 
they limit the size of the domain. Surely, an abstraction principle should only introduce a 
new sort of abstract entity, and never imply anything about the objects already introduced 
or understood - at least no statements that are expressible in the language without the 
new abstraction operator. Any principle that implies that there are only finitely many 
objects violates this constraint. 
There is a technical notion capturing this idea: Field's notion of conservativeness (Field 
1989). To express the notion, we need to restrict quantifiers to the old domain - the 
domain minus the objects the newly introduced abstracts refer to. To do this, we can 
define a restriction of second-order formulas (Weir 2003, p. 21). For any first or second 
order formula q" and a predicate R (x), the restricted formula ¢R is the result of altering 
quantified statements as follows (q,R == tP if tP does not contain any quantifiers): 
• 'tIx (.,p (x))R is'tlx (R (x) -+ 1/.1 (x)R) 
• 3x (.,p (x))R is 3x (R (x) 1\ 1/.1 (x)R) 
• "'X (.,p (X»R becomes "'X ("'x (Xx -+ Rx» -+ 1/.1 (X)R) 
• Thus "'x (¢ (x))R becomes 3X ("'x (Xx -+ Rx)) 1\ 1/.1 (X)R) 
We then define a notion of conservativeness as follows: 
(Conservativeness) 
Let T be any theory in a language LT and AP be the abstraction principle for an 
abstraction operator E which is formulated in the language LT+AP, which is LT plus 
the abstraction operator. Let Abstr(x) == 3y (x = Ey) if AP is a first-order abstraction 
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principle, and Abstr(x) == ...,3F (x = EF) in the second-order case. Then AP is a 
conseflJative abstraction over T if and only if for every formula <p it holds that 
(T + A)""Abstr(x) 1= <p""Abstr(X») ~ (T 1= <p) 
Note that" 1=" stands for semantic consequence. Of course, we might also define COIl-
servativeness using a syntactic notion of consequence. However, for various reasons, the 
semantic notion is preferable (Weir 2003, pp. 22f; Cook 2009, p. 352) . 
There is another notion which is turns out to be equivalent to conservativeness in the 
case of abstraction principles - the notion of an abstraction principle being unbounded. 
An abstraction principle is unbounded just in case it meets the following condition: if it 
has a model with a domain of size It, it has a model with a domain of size f > It as well. 
Weir shows that all unbounded abstraction principle are conservative (Weir 2003, p. 23). 
Since (HP) has models in all infinite cardinalities (assuming ZFC, see Boolos 1987), (HP) 
is unbounded, hence conservative. Principles like (NP) and the parity principle, however, 
are not unbounded. 
Does this complete the task? No: Weir (2003) shows that there are conservative but 
mutually unsatisfiable abstraction principles. One reason to see this is to note that one 
can choose formulas for Heck's (AP+Phi) that imply that the universe is of a certain 
size type, but which does not impose an upper bound on the size of the domain. Since 
there are incompatible size types, there are unbounded (hence conservative), but mutually 
insatisfiable abstraction principles. Also, note that there are such principles which are not 
paradox-exploitative: Weir's "Distraction Principles" (Weir 2003, p.17): again, nothing 
substantial depends on Heck's technique. 
I focus on Heck's technique for simplicity. For 4>, we use "the domain is of the size of a 
successor cardinal" and "the domain is of the size of a limit cardinal" (both are expressible 
in second-order logic). No cardinal can be a successor cardinal and a limit cardinal, but for 
any successor cardinal or limit cardinal, there is a bigger one. Hence, the respective versions 
of (AP+Phi) can be shown to be unbounded and conservative. They are nevertheless 
incompatible. 
Weir suggests a solution on behalf of the neo-Fregeans, based on a new technical notion. 
One can intuitively arrive at it through reflecting on what the they might want in the end. 
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A natural proposal after what has been said is that the neo-Fregean looks for a maximal 
collection of jointly satisfiable, conservative abstraction principles. ~ow what if you simply 
demand that? The suggestion is that the collection of good abstraction principles just is 
the collection of those abstraction principles which are consistent with every conservative 
abstraction principle. Weir (2003) calls such abstraction principles irenic. 
Indeed, it turns out that this solution works for the size-type restricting principles 
and includes (HP). Moreover, it turns out that there is another, equivalent notion which 
expresses a constraint in terms of the cardinality of models. Sayan abstraction principle is 
stable if and only iffor some cardinal It, it is satisfiable in models of all and only cardinalities 
of size equal to or greater than It. Using ZFC, Weir shows that an abstraction principle is 
stable if and only if it is irenic (Weir 2003, pp. 32f). Using ZFC, (HP) can be shown to be 
stable, since it then can be shown to have models of every infinite cardinality. Thus, using 
ZFC, we can show that (HP) irenic. Moreover, the size-type restricting principles are of 
course not irenic. Finally, every set of irenic principles can be shown to be satisfiable and 
hence to be consistent as well (Cook 2009, pp. 354f). This is the status quo of at least one 
branch of the nea-Fregean version of (Fine's Programme). 
How much mathematics can we obtain with irenic / stable abstraction principles? Weir 
(2003) idenitifies stable sets of abstraction principles which deliver sets of numbers, sets of 
sets of numbers, etc. In fact, one can obtain most of mathematics with stable set theory. 
However, one cannot obtain full-fledged set theory, but only a "slice of the cumulative 
hierarchy" (Weir 2003, p. 26). For instance, it cannot be shown that for every object, 
there is a unit class which is distinct from this object. Moreover, Weir's theory does not 
allow for sets of urelements other than numbers. There are weak forms of set-theories with 
urelements which are stable. Uzquiano gives the example of the theory ZCU2, which is 
Zermelo set-theory with "countable replacement". This theory "might suffice to recapture 
real analysis, functional analysis, complex analysis and most of ordinary mathematics" 
(Uzquiano 2009, p. 14), so there is room for optimism. If suitable abstraction principles 
can be found, a lot of mathematics can be reconstructed. 
Still, there are many complications with the irenicity / stability criterion. There are 
arguments to the effect that it cannot be a necessary condition (Cook 2009; Linnebo & 
Uzquiano 2009; Weir 2003, p.3S). And what is worse, whether an abstraction principle 
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meets the criterion depends on one's meta-theory. This leads to the problem that, depend-
ing on one's initial choice of a meta-theory, one will accept different abstraction principles 
as good (Weir 2003, section 7). 
This points towards a more general problem: whatever the outcome of the current math-
ematical investigations will be, they cannot in principle do full justice to the programme 
of distinguishing good abstraction principles from the bad, because the neo-Fregean pro-
gramme is more than just a mathematical programme. Let me explain. 
The neo-Fregean programme The nea-Fregean claims that (good) abstraction princi-
ples have a special epistemic and semantic status, as opposed to some "special mathematical 
status". We should distinguish (Fine's Programme) from the following programme: 
(Neo-Fregean Programme) Find a collection of abstraction principles which fix the 
meaning of the respective abstraction operators, and which can be known apriori 011 the 
basis of meta-linguistic stipulation. 
At least prima facie, it is a different matter entirely to spell out the criteria an ab-
straction principle has to meet in order to be a member of this ''neo-Fregean collection" 
of good abstraction principles. Thus, we obtain two different projects of sorting out ab-
straction principles. Whereas (Fine's Programme) is first and foremost a mathematical 
project, the (Neo-Fregean Programme) is a philosophical project. To both projects, 
there corresponds a specific Bad Company objection. 
All bad companions for (Fine's Programme) will be bad companions for the (Neo-
Fregean Programme), because knowledge requires truth, and Fine's programme sorts 
out all true abstraction principles. However, there may be bad companions specific to the 
(Neo-Fregean Programme). In particular, there may be abstraction principles which 
are good from a mathematical point of view, but bad from a philosophical point of view. 
The criteria that Hale and Wright suggest for the (Neo-Fregean Programme) are 
just the conditions for the "'Ifaditional Connection" discussed in 2.3.3. We can see how 
they are motivated by different kinds of bad companions. Consider the non-arrogance 
constraint, for example. It is meant to rule out stipulations (and abstraction principles) 
that are epistemically irresponsible. Such abstraction principles might still be good from 
a mathematical point of view. 
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As an example, reconsider (HP+FLT) from 2.3.4. We know that FLT is true. So 
(HP+FLT) has exactly the same relevant mathematical properties as (HP): if (HP) is 
a good abstraction principle in the sense of (Fine's Programme), so is (HP+FLT). 
However, a stipulation of (HP+FLT) seems to be irresponsible. We cannot prove FLT 
that easily, or so the thought goes.60 So we have an example of a bad companion for the 
(Neo-Fregean Programme), which is not a bad companion for Fine's Programme. 
How do the programmes relate? The question arises of how both programmes relate. 
Presumably, the most desirable result for a neo-Fregean would be that the criteria of Fine's 
project can be regarded as a systematization of the criteria of the traditional connection 
for abstraction principles. 61 
Let me explain. Sayan abstraction principle is "tenable" just in case it is good in the 
sense of (Fine's Programme), and sayan abstraction principle is "stipulable" just in 
case it is good in the sense of the (Neo-Fregean Programme). I assume that the neo-
Fregean would like to get as much knowledge by abstraction as possible. The maximum is 
the collection of all the tenable abstractions. Thus, the optimal result for the neo-Fregean 
would be that the tenable abstractions are the knowable ones. 
Let us assume that tenability is irenicity. It would be a nice result if the single criterion 
of irenicity sufficed for stipulability. Unfortunately, in the light of counter-examples such 
as irresponsible but irenic stipulations, this result appears impossible. 
However, one might think that something similar but weaker can be achieved, namely 
that we can show that possessing a warrant for stability is sufficient for stipulability. I 
will come back to this question in 7.2, and it will become apparent that even this weaker 
connection is problematic. 
2.4.3 Eplstemlc rejectlonism 
Epistemic rejectionism is the third big objection to the nec-Fregean programme. The 
term "rejectionism" has been coined by MacBride (2003), but the objection itself has a 
long history. The upshot is that one cannot come to know (HP) as easily as Hale and 
Wright envisage, because a stipulation of (HP) makes substantial demands on the world, 
eo Another version of the objection would not be epistemic, but semantic: that we should not build it 
into our concept of number that FLT is true. 
811 owe this idea to a discussion with Robert Williams. 
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and one is epistemically irresponsible if one did not make sure that these demands can be 
met prior to making the stipulation.62 Here are two examples from the literature: 
• Satisfiability: Boolos complains that, before we can legitimately regard (HP) as 
being true by virtue of stipulation, we first need to make sure that HP is satisfiable, 
for ''what kind of guarantee do we have, why should we believe, that there is a function 
that maps concepts to objects in the way that the denotation of the octothorpe [# 1 
does if HP is true?" (Boolos 1997, p. 306) . 
• Conditionalization: Field (1984b, p.661) argues that (HP) cannot be a definition 
proper because it has existential commitments. What can be regarded as a definition 
proper, so the thought goes, is the following conditionalized version of (HP): if 
numbers exist, then (HP). However, this definition does not allow for a derivation 
of the Peano axioms. 
Both objections are intimately related. By conditionalizing the stipulation, so the thought 
goes, one removes the need to make sure that (HP) is satisfiable. However, one cannot 
infer the existence of numbers from the stipulation anymore. In order to do that, one first 
has to ensure that numbers exist, which amounts to ensuring that (HP) is satisfiable. 
Hale and Wright discuss these objections at length and at several occasions (Wright 
1990, 1999, Hale & Wright 2000, 2009). I cannot go through the whole dialectic here -
the responses are notoriously hard to assess - but just carve out what I take to be the 
most important points. Two responses are partiCUlarly important. 
"Ought impUes can" Suppose a non-defective epistemic agent (call him "Hero") does not 
yet have the concept of number and is about to stipulate (HP) to define "#". According 
to the rejectionist, Hero needs to make sure that "#" refers and that there are numbers 
before he can warrantedly regard the stipulation as true, or before Hero can infer (HP) 
from a conditiona1ized stipulation. 
However, how could Hero decide the question of whether numbers exist or not? It 
was (HP) which was supposed to provide sufficient conditions for numbers being identical 
(and hence for numbers to exist). It seems that the rejectionist presupposes that there are 
62There is also a "aemaDtic wraion" of rejectionism (Ebert 20050, section 4.1). I can only focus on the 
epistemic version here. 
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independent means to decide the question, and the neo-Fregean denies this (Wright 1999, 
pp. 31lf;Hale & Wright 2000, p.143;MacBride 2003, p.124). 
MacBride (2003, p.125) thinks that the rejectionist should not retreat. For example, so 
the thought goes, one might think that indispensability considerations provide independent 
means to decide the question of whether numbers exist or not. This branch of the dialectic 
seems to end up in a standoff. 
Content recarving The second response employs Frege's notion of content recarving, 
Le. the notorious idea, outlined in Grondlagen §64, that OIle can recarve the content of an 
equivalence relation as an identity, and thereby obtain a new sortal cOIlcept. 
Applied to the nea-Fregean case, the idea is that the states of affairs expressed by 
instances of the right-hand side (RHS) of (HP) are exactly the same as the states of 
affairs expressed by the corresponding to instances of the left-hand side (LHS) of (HP), 
only "carved up" (expressed) in different ways (Hale 1997). In other words: there is no 
substantial gap between both sides of the biconditional, and thus there cannot be any 
substantial further epistemic obligations when stipulating (HP). 
This involves two claims: a metaphysical claim, and an epistemological claim. 
The metaphysical claim is that, ceteris paribus, states of affairs underlying equivalence 
relations can also be expressed as identities. The ceteris paribus clause is crucial. Recarving 
is not possible in cases like (BLV). The idea must be that content can be recarved in all 
cases where this is as much as possible. The epistemological claim is that this shows that, 
as long as one does not have any reason to believe that a particular case is a bad case, 
one can warrantedly assume that content is recarved, and thus that the stipulation is true, 
without being irresponsible. 
There is much more to say, and in 7.2 I will discuss this idea further. Here, I close with 
some notes on the metaphysical claim. For prima facie, there seems to be a gap between 
the states of affairs expressed by instances of both sides of (HP). In particular, it appears 
that the truth of instances of the RHS does not require the existence of numbers. In other 
words: the state of affairs that instances of the RHS express do not seem to be identical 
to state of affairs that instances of the LHS express. 
If this was the case, then one would indeed need antecedent warrants that justify the 
transition from instances of the RHS to instances of the LHS. But that the states of affairs 
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are different is precisely what the neo-Fregeans deny. 
Of course, this imposes some constraints on the neo-Fregean conception of states of 
affairs. Since instances of the LHS can only be true if the number terms refer - remember 
that the nea-Fregean needs this linguistic priority thesis for their Platonism - instances 
of the RHS are already committed to numbers. Thus, it cannot be required that state of 
affairs are transparent in the sense that their ontological commitments are transparent. 
For example: Hero might grasp the concept of one-one correspondence, and know that a 
certain concept stands in one-one correspondence with another, without it thereby being 
transparent to Hero that the obtaining of this state of affairs also involves the identity of 
two numbers (and hence the existence of a number). Indeed, Hale and Wright reject a 
notion of states of affairs that meets such a transparency principle (Hale & Wright 2009, 
p.189). 
MacBride argues that this entails that the neo-Fregean has to hold that states of affairs 
are structured by language, as opposed to an external world, and that this commits Hale 
and Wright to some kind of anti-realism (MacBride 2003, pp.126f). Hale and Wright 
maintain the view that neo-Fregeanism is a kind of Platonism, and hence some kind of 
realism, but they also admit that the relationship between the (meta-)metaphysics of 
content recarving and anti-realism requires further research (Hale & Wright 2009, p.209). 
2.5 Intermediate conclusion 
Neo-Fregeanism is a very attractive programme, because it promises to meet all the desider-
ata laid down in the last chapter: 
• Neo-Fregeanism is designed to meet (Arithmetical Platonism), although there is 
the worry that the nee-Fregean response to the rejectionist worry might push the 
nee-Fregeau towards anti-realism. 
• Given the (Implicit Definition Thesis) withstands critical scrutiny, the Ileo-
Fregeau can accounts for (Arithmetical Knowledge), although the neo-Fregean 
use of (Frege'. Constraint) merits explication. Clearly, the neo-Fregean would also 
account for (Arithmetical Foundationalism) and the (Apriority Constraint). 
• The neo-Fregeaus have the resources to account for (Same Source), by applying 
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the (Implicit Definition Thesis) uniformly to mathematics and logic. However, 
it is not clear how it is to be applied to the logical case, so more work needs to be 
done here . 
• Presumably, the neo-Fregeans use abstraction principles that meet (Frege's Con-
straint), so one can be optimistic about the (Applicability Constraint) as well. 
IT the application of mathematical theories is immediate in the neo-Fregean founda-
tions, it will be possible to account for their applicability. 
The major obstacle is that it is unclear how exactly the (Implicit Definition Thesis) 
is to work. It is unclear what exactly the conditions for the semantic success of implicit 
definitions are, and what the structure of justification is to be. In any case, we need to be 
able to account for appropriate warrants for the conditions, whatever they are. A dilemma 
by Shapiro and Ebert shows that these warrants must be of a special kind: they Ileed to 
enable us to be epistemically responsible stipulators, but it cannot be a requirement that 
we are able to protJe them. A good candidate for warrants for these conditions might be 
Wright's "entitlements". However, this notion is embedded in a more general internalist 
epistemic framework, which needs motivation and investigation. Moreover, one needs to 
say how exactly the neo-Fregean proposal can be embedded in such a framework. 
To fill these gaps is the ultimate aim ofthis thesis. In Part II, I discuss a general epis-
temological framework which includes entitlements, and I come back to neo-Fregeanism in 
Part III. In the last chapter of the thesis, I will not only close the mentioned epistemo-
logical gaps, but my strategy to close these gaps will also shed light on the three major 
objections to neo-Fregeanism. 
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Part II 
An epistemological framework 
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3 Internalism 
In this chapter, I begin with sketching the epistemological framework in which I shall 
eventually embed my neo-Fregean account of implicit definition. The framework rests on 
three tenets - internalism, non-evidential warrant at the basic level, and transmissioll-
failure - which are to be discussed in the three chapters of this part of the thesis. I begin 
with internalism. 
3.1 Motivating the distinction 
In contemporary epistemology, there is a fundamental divide between so-called internal-
istic and externalistic conceptions of knowledge and justification. Whereas intemalists 
emphasize the contribution epistemic agents make to the epistemic value of their doxastic 
attitudes, externalists focus on the contribution the external world makes to them. The 
origin of the debate lies in the conceptual analysis of knowledge (and justification). How-
ever, in recent years, the divide has become increasingly important within discussions of 
scepticism. I begin by examining how both discussions give rise to the divide. After that, 
I draw some distinctions and argue for a particular version of intemalism. 
3.1.1 Analysing knowledge and justification 
Are there non-trivial conditions 0 1,02, ... such that, necessarily, S knows that p if and 
only if 01, 02, ... ? Surely, that S knows that p entails that S holds a true belief that p. 
Many believe that for a belief to be knowledgeable, it must also be justified, in a sense 
of justification which entails the possession of evidence (Gettier 1963, p.121). However, 
it is common ground that Gettier (1963) has shown that these three conditions are not 
sufficient for knowledge. 
Gettier CGBe8 are cases in which a subject S acquires a justified true belief that p, but 
in which we have the intuition that S does not know p. As an example, suppose Smith 
applies for a job that Jones applies for as well. During the time they are waiting for the 
final interview, Smith sees Jones counting the 10 coins in his pocket. Smith acquires a 
justified belief that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket. Moreover, suppose that Smith has 
good evidence to the effect that Jones will get the job (he might have overheard a relevant 
conversation). From this information, Smith infers that the person who gets the job has 
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10 coins in his pocket. Smith thereby acquires a justified belief. However, it turns out that 
Smith gets the job. Moreover, by sheer coincidence, Smith also has 10 coins in his pocket. 
Clearly, Smith has a justified, true belief that the person who gets the job has 10 coins in 
his pocket. However, intuitively, this belief cannot count as knowledge, because it is true 
by sheer luck. 
How does that bear on the internalism vs. externalism debate? According to Goldman 
(1967), Gettier cases show that it cannot only be the internal states of epistemic agents 
which render true belief justified (and hence knowledgeable). Rather, one has to add the 
condition that the belief is caused in an appropriate way.63 Clearly, so the thought goes, 
in the example above Smith's belief is not caused in the appropriate way. 
Unfortunately, causal theorists face problems with epistemic luck as well. Suppose that 
Hero travels around the countryside, happens to see a barn, and correctly forms the belief 
that there is a barn in front of him. The belief forming process is perfectly normal. Hero's 
belief is caused in an appropriate way. According to the causal account, this belief counts 
as knowledge. However, suppose it turns out that Hero just entered barn facade county, 
which almost entirely consists of fake barns, and that Hero looks at the only real barn in 
the area by sheer coincidence. In this case, our intuitive verdict is that Hero does not know 
that there is a barn in front of him, and this is in tension with what the causal account 
predicts (Goldman 1967, p.773). 
To be sure: there are externalist responses to such cases (see e.g. Goldman 1979; Nozick 
1988), but I cannot go into the dialectic here. In any case, many theories of knowledge have 
been proposed - extemalistic, internalistic, and mixed - each of them trying to handle 
new alleged counter-examples to the analysis of knowledge. Recently, Williamson (2000) 
argued that all this suggests that it is a mistake to think that the notion of knowledge can 
be analysed into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions at all. 
Goldman (2009, p. 309) points out that, although the origin of the internalism VS. 
externalism debate lies in the question of how to analyse knowledge, the debate quickly 
focused on the nature of (epistemic) justification in general: the question arose of whether 
the notion should be analysed in externalistic or internalistic terms (or both). For example, 
Goldman. (1979) suggested that our notion of justified belief should be analysed as having 
e30bviously, the phrase "caused in the appropriate way" is in need to clarification. However, for the 
purposes of this chapter, the informal characterization suffices. 
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purely externalist application conditions, namely that the belief has to be formed by a 
de facto reliable belief-forming method. This account of justification is known as process 
reliabilism. On the other end of the spectrum, there are purely internalist accounts. For 
example, it has been argued that justificatory status supertJenes on mental states (Conee 
& Feldman 2001). Chisholm (1977) even argued one needs to possess reflective access to 
the grounds of one's justification in order to count as justified. 
3.1.2 Scepticism 
Another epistemological debate in which a distinction between internalistic and external-
istic notions of justification has become particularly relevant is the debate on scepticism. 
Closure scepticism is a type of scepticism that purports to show that we cannot acquire 
(or possess) justification for ordinary external-world beliefs, such as the belief that one has 
two hands. One version of it rests on the following two premises: 
(Closure) If p and p ~ q are justifiable, then q is justifiable. 
And: 
(Impossibility) There are scenarios whose non-obtaining is entailed by ordinary ex-
ternal world beliefs, but whose non-obtaining is impossible to justify. 
(Closure) is very plausible. Assume that p and p ~ q are justifiable. This means that 
it is possible to acquire justified beliefs that p and p ~ q. On this basis, one can justifiably 
infer q by Modus Ponens. Thus, it is possible to acquire a justified belief that q. 
In order to establish (Impossibility), closure sceptics often make use of so-called 
Cartesian scenario8 - metaphysically or even physically possible setups of the world in 
which a subject S would have exactly the same experiential seemings, but in which these 
seemings are massively misleading. As an example, consider the brain-in-a-vat scenario 
(BIY scenario), in which S's brain is removed from its body by mad scientists, and then 
envatted to henceworth be fed with coherent inputs emulating a normal environment. 
Closure sceptics argue that it is impossible to acquire a justified belief that the BIV 
scenario does not obtain, because there is no possible evidence that could be used to 
distinguish the DIY scenario from the normal environment. After all, if we were in the 
BIY scenario, everything would still seem normal. 
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(Closure) and (Impossibility) entail that one cannot acquire a justified belief that 
one has two hands. Suppose, for reductio, that one can do this. One's having two hands 
entails that one is not a brain-in-a-vat, for it is a conceptual truth that brains in vats do 
not have hands. Thus, by (Closure), it is justifiable that the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis 
does not obtain. This contradicts (Impossibility). 
In general: let" J (P)" stand for "p is justifiable", and let 0 stand for any ordinary 
external world belief. By (Impossibility), there is a scenario 8 such that 0 -+ 8, but 
-.J(8). However, by (Closure) we obtain J (0) -+ J (8). Thus, by Modus Tollens, 
-.J(O). 
One way in which the internalism vs. externalism debate arises here is through the 
suspicion that the argument for (Impossibility) rests on contentious intemalist assump-
tions. To see this, consider the reliabilist picture again. On this picture, all that is required 
for justification is that the used belief-forming method is in fact a reliable guide to truth. 
Now, if S is in the good case - i.e. the world is as it seems to be - then nothing precludes 
S from reliably forming beliefs about the external world. In particular, so the thought goes, 
S can also reliably infer that he or she is not a brain-in-a-vat. Thus, the sceptic should 
not claim that we cannot justify the non-obtaining of the BIV scenario: (Impossibility) 
does not hold. Process reliabilism clearly undermines the sceptical argument above. 
Internalists reply that the externalist's responses to scepticism are intellectually dis-
satisfying. For example: that the externalist can only claim that we acquire justification 
if he already assumes that we are in the good case, and that this is problematic because 
a hypothetical sceptic would question this assumption. Moreover, internalists argue that 
externalist responses miss the point, because the most interesting sceptical challenges are 
directed against internalistic notions of justification in the first place (Bergmann 2000, p. 
164). In particular, 80 the thought goes, we want to be able to have reflective access to 
our knowledge, and this possibility is what sceptics purport to undermine (Pritchard 2005, 
Wright 20046, 20076, 2008). I think that the internalist's complaints are well-motivated 
and I will come back to these issues below. First, however, I need to draw some distinctions. 
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3.2 Epistemic warrant and the internalism vs. externalism debate 
What has been said above shows that we need to distinguish at least two types of iu-
ternalisms and corresponding externalisms: those which make a claim about our ordinary 
notions of knowledge and justification, and those which make a claim about what is at 
stake when it comes to scepticism. To render these distinctions clearer, it is useful to 
introduce a concept of (an epistemic) warrant. 
3.2.1 The notion of warrant 
A warrant for p is any state that renders a doxastic attitude towards p epistemically 
valuable.54 That a subject S possesses a warrant for p means that this state obtains 
(for S), but does not entail that S has the doxastic attitude in question. The notion of 
possessing a warrant is much wider than the notion of possessing justification, understood 
as the notion of possessing evidence. For example, under certain conditions, even the sheer 
truth of a proposition might count as a warrant for it. Of course, what precisely will count 
as a warrant will depend on what epistemic value is. Before I discuss this, some notes and 
distinctions are in order. 
I speak of doxastic attitudes in general- and do not restrict myself to belief - because 
we will also encounter cases in which the relevant attitude is not belief. However, in this 
chapter the focus will lie solely on belief, and in what follows, belief is the relevant attitude 
unless I explicitly say something to the contrary. 
I say that a warrant W for p is dozastic just in case W is a warrant for p that renders an 
actually possessed doxastic attitude epistemically valuable, and this attitude is based on 
W. In case the attitude is belief, I say that S possesses a warrant for believing P. Otherwise, 
I say that W is a propositional warrant for p, and, in case belief is the relevant attitude, I 
speak of a subject having a warrant to believe p. 
H S does not believe that p, then S cannot possess a (doxastic) warrant for believing 
p, but might still possess a (propositional) warrant to believe p. Moreover, there is the 
possibility that a subject S believes that p, but on some other basis or ground than W, in 
which case W also does not count as a (doxastic) warrant for believing p. 
Here is an example for the first case: suppose that Hero goes for a walk in Leeds, having 
64 Although in contemporary epistemology the terms "warrant" and '~ustification" are often used inter-
changeably, the latter term has some connotations which might lead to confusion. 
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the experience as of a unicorn walking around Hyde Park. There is indeed a unicorn walking 
around, and Hero's perceptual faculties are functioning properly. Presumably, this suffices 
for a warrant to believe that there are unicorns. However, Hero does not form the belief 
that there are unicorns because he suspects he is hallucinating. Thus, the warrant can only 
be a propositional one. However, if Hero had formed the belief that there are unicorns on 
the basis of his experience, then the (reliable) perception would be a doxastic warrant for 
Hero's belief.65 
Here is an example for the second case: suppose that Hero in fact holds the belief 
that there are unicorns, but not on the basis of his experience as of a unicorn. Rather, 
Hero believes that there are unicorns because they exist in possible worlds different from 
the actual world. Although Hero now does possess a warrant for believing that there 
are unicorns (assuming he has good reasons for believing in genuine modal realism), his 
experience as of a unicorn still only counts as a propositional warrant. 
A second relevant distinction is the distinction between prima facie and ultima fa-
cie ("all things considered") warrant. This distinction can be motivated by the observation 
that a proposition or attitude is always warranted against a complex cognitive background. 
Some types of warrants can be defeated b1l other warrants, which means that although a 
subject possesses a warrant of this type, the subject cannot count as warranted overall 
because of the presence of these other warrants. For example, one's justification for a 
belief can be defeated by new evidence undermining the antecedent jmstification (e.g. ev-
idence to the effect that the original evidence was misleading). Prima facie warrants are 
warrants which would render a doxastic attitude epistemically valuable, if we ignored any 
undermining warrants, but which can be defeated in the sense that they might not render 
possessing a doxastic attitude epistemically valuable, considering all other warrants the 
subject possesses. Warrants that are not so defeated I call ultima facie, or "all things 
considered" warrants. Ultima facie warrants are also prima facie warrants. 
As an example, consider again the case in which Hero sees a unicorn. It is plausible 
that Hero's perceptual warrant is defeated by Hero's background information. Everyone 
knows there are no unicorns, and this certainly undermines the perceptual warrant for the 
presence of a unicorn. All things considered, the perceptual warrant cannot render the 
IIIOf course, this warrant is probably defeated by other evidence Hero possesses. See below. 
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belief that there are unicorns epistemically valuable, so it is merely a prima facie warrant. 
Finally, note that my usage of the term "warrant" is quite different from the COIIllIlon 
usage of ''warrant'' as ''whatever has to be combined with true belief in order to yield 
knowledge". I call warrants which are sufficient for knowledge that p - when combined 
with true belief - full warrants. What full warrant consists in is a difficult question which 
I cannot answer. 
3.2.2 Warrant pluralism 
I endorse the following claim about warrant and epistemic value:66 
(Warrant Pluralism) There is a variety of types of warrant8, including different types 
of intemalistic and externalistic warrants. Although all these warrants render doxastic 
attitudes epistemically valuable in some way or other, they do so in different ways, and 
serve different purposes. 
Whether there are different types of warrant rests on the possibility of doxastic attitudes 
being epistemically valuable in different ways. Thus, (Warrant Pluralism) entails: 
(Multiplicity of Epistemic Value) There are different ways in which a doxastic 
attitude can be epistemically valuable. 
Note, however, that this claim is weaker than the following claim, which is not entailed 
by (Warrant Pluralism): 
(Epistemic Value Pluralism) There is more than one fundamental epistemic value. 
There might be a single epistemic value, which can be served in different ways. For 
example, Alston (2005, chapter 3) argues that there is a variety of very different "epistemic 
desiderata" that all serve, directly or indirectly, one single principal aim of cognition. 
Simply put, this aim is gathering true beliefs as opposed to false ones (Alston 2005, p. 30). 
-Later, it will become important that certaiD facts about epistemic value are available to relevant 
subjects, including the readers of this thesis. For the purposes of this project, I assume that these facts 
about epistemic value can be warranted apriori. In particular, I assume that they can be revealed by 
apriori philosophical reflection. Maybe they can even be known apriori, but this is not crucial for my 
purposes. or coune, in order to form warranted beliefs about warrant and epistemic value, ODe Deeds to 
p088e88 the concepts of warrant and epistemic value. However, since the readers of this thesis will possess 
these concepts, nothing hangs on this fact. 
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Alston's "desiderata" correspond to my "warrants". Thus, Alston accepts (Warrant 
Pluralism) without accepting (Epistemic Value Pluralism). I will remain neutral OIl 
the issue of (Epistemic Value Pluralism). 
What types of warrant does Alston recognize? Here are three examples: 
• The truth of a belief (Alston 2005, p.40). 
• That a belief is formed through a reliable process, for such beliefs are normally true 
(Alston 2005, p.43). 
• That the evidence for a belief is reflectively accessible. This indirectly serves the 
truth aim by enabling a subject to discriminate true and false beliefs (Alston 2005, 
p.43) 
Note that the first two warrants are externalistic, whereas the third is intemalistic, accord-
ing to the distinction drawn at the beginning of this chapter. 
Another warrant pluralist is Wright (2008), who acknowledges a variety of "epistemic 
norms", some of which are connected to the ''teleology of belief', and some of which are 
"constitutive of managing a system of beliefs" (Wright 2008, p. 501). Epistemic norms 
include ''truth, knowledge, justification, coherence, and the multi-faceted notion of ratio-
nality" (Wright 2008, p. 502). This clearly entails (Warrant Pluralism): every state 
entailing that a nonn of belief is met will count as a warrant, and the way these states 
render beliefs epistemica1ly valuable will be different for the different norms. For example: 
the truth of a belief and the presence of justification for a belief are very different things. 
Wright (2008, p. 505) is unsure about whether his view also entails (Epistemic Value 
Pluralism). 
It becomes apparent that there are different types of warrants serving different purposes. 
And this bears on the internalism vs. externalism debate. In particular, I agree with Wright 
in that we should be ''receptive to the possibility that externalist conceptions may promise 
best for some norms, and internalist conceptions for others" (Wright 2008, p. 501). 
3.2.3 The question of lnternalism V8. externalism 
The notion of warrant can be used to make explicit what is at stake in the two debates 
sketched above. 
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Question 1: analysing knowledge and justification We can approach the question 
regarding the analysis of the notion of knowledge in the following way: we examine what 
types of full warrant there are, and categorize them into internalistic and externalistic 
warrants. The extemalist (jinternalist) can be said to have won the debate if it turns out 
that all types of full warrant are extemalistic (jinternalistic) in character. 
However, especially in the light of (Warrant Pluralism), it seems unrealistic that all 
full warrants will be purely externaiistic or internalistic in character. Both characters of 
warrant will be relevant. There is a lot to be said in favour of externalism: 
• Sometimes externalism is the only viable option. For example, when it comes to 
animal knowledge (Sosa 2007). 
• Gettier cases show that ordinary external-world knowledge requires that certain ex-
ternal conditions are met, in addition to the truth of the proposition in question. 
• In perceptual cases, unreflective reliable belief-formation seems to be sufficient for 
knowledge. Ceteris paribus, a reliable perceiver of barns can acquire knowledge of 
the fact that there is a barn nearby just on the basis of a perception of a barn. 
However, there are also many instances of knowledge which seem to involve internalistic 
warrants. For example: knowledge of one's own internal states; mathematical knowledge 
which rests on having carried out and understood a mathematical proof in full detail. 
Thus, a more interesting question about the nature of full warrant is whether one type 
of warrant is the exception rather than the rule, i.e. whether the majority of full warrants 
are of extemalistic (or internalistic) character. The same issues arise for the ordinary 
notion of justification. For example, Goldman (2009) writes: 
Factors that (help to) fix justificational status are generally called justifiers, 
or J-factors .. So the central question is whether justifiers, or J-factors, have 
an internaliat or extema1ist character. ( ... ) One configuration of the terms of 
engagement is existential: externalism wins if there is at least one externalist 
type of J-factor. Intemalism wins only if all J-factors are internalist. A second 
possible configuration is majoritarian. That side wins that has a majority of 
types of J-factors of the kind it promotes. (Goldman 2009, p. 310) 
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Goldman's j-factors are what I call warrant. We can explicate Goldman's first option by 
the following two contradictory positions: 
(Exclusive Internalism) All warrants underlying our ordinary notion of justification 
are internalistic. 
And: 
(Existential Externalism) There is at least one externalistic warrant that suffices for 
being justified in the ordinary sense. 
I think that (Existential Externalism) is clearly correct. We just saw that there 
are some cases in which we can ascribe knowledge - and hence also justification - just 
on the basis of externalistic factors. Thus, a more interesting question concerning the 
nature of justification is Goldman's majoritarian configuration. It can be represented by 
the following two contradictory positions: 
(Majoritarian Internalism) The majority of warrants underlying our ordinary notion 
of justification are intemalistic. 
And: 
(Majoritarian Externalism) The majority of warrants underlying our ordinary no-
tion of justification are externalistic. 
Goldman (2009) argues for (Majoritarian Externalism). I remain neutral on this 
issue. 
Question 2: scepticism Most relevant for my purposes is the second debate - the 
debate on scepticism. We can precisify the issue of externalism vs. internalism as the fol-
lowing question: which types of warrant are the targets of interesting sceptical arguments? 
In particular: are such arguments directed against the (possibility of the) possession of 
internalistic or externalistic types of warrant (or both)? If it turns out that some inter-
esting sceptical arguments are directed against internalistic kinds of warrant, it cannot be 
satisfactory to have only externalist types of warrant in one's epistemological toolbox. 
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One might think, in any case, that the most interesting sceptical challenges are directed 
against the possibility of possessing justification and knowledge in the ordinary sense. If 
this was the case, then our answers to the first and the second question about externalism 
vs. internalism would coincide: for whatever the kinds of warrant underlying our ordinary 
notions of knowledge and justification are, they would also be the kinds of warrant the 
possession of which the sceptical arguments purports to undermine. However, it might just 
as well turn out that the best or most interesting sceptical arguments make use of notions 
of warrant that are not best regarded as underlying our ordinary notions of knowledge and 
justification. In this case, the two questions come apart. 
It is thus useful to explicitly distinguish the first issue - the itltlue of analysing our 
ordinary notions - from the second issue - the question of which type of warrant is most 
relevant when it comes to scepticism - by distinguishing (Exclusive Internalism) and 
(Majoritarian InternaUsm) from the following claim, which is entailed by the claim 
that some interesting sceptical challenges about relevant regions of thought R cannot be 
discharged by invoking externalist notions of warrant: 
(Relevance Internalism) For relevant regions of thought R, every good epistemology 
for R needs to explain how we can acquire full internalistic warrants for ordinary R-
truths - internalistic warrants sufficient for knowledge.67 
For the purposes of this thesis, the follOwing instance of (Relevance Internalism) is 
particularly relevant, which is equivalent to (Arithmetical Knowledge) from 1.2, with 
an added internalistic requirement:68 
(Relevance Internaliam for Arithmetic) Every satisfactory epistemology for arith-
metic needs to explain the possibility of possessing full internalistic apriori warrants for 
arithmetical truths. 
I defend (Relevance Internallsm) and (Relevance Internalism for Arithmetic) 
8TThls entails that 0118 needs to account for the p088ibility of possessing knowledge (in the ordinary 
&eDM). So aD anal,.. of the Dation of kaowledge is DOt eDtirely irrelevant here. However, accounting for 
the possibility of IICqUiriIlg knowledge of ordinary R-beliefs might not be enough: we need to account for 
the possibiHty of atqUiriag Ialowledp and for the fact that some of the warrants underlying this knowledge 
meet iatemaUatic cBiderata. . 
"It is equivalent, bec&W18 uithmetic is a body of truths, which can be believed. H we have established 
that we can pOII8e88 warrants sufBcient for knowledge, we have established that we can possess knowledge, 
and vice vena; 
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below, but I remain neutral about the ordinary notions of justification and knowledge. 
These questions are very interesting, but not directly relevant to my purposes. 
3.3 Relevance Internalism about the external world 
3.3.1 Accessible warrant 
So far, I have worked with an informal, intuitive characterization of the notions of inter-
nalistic and externalistic warrant. In what follows, the following internalistic property of 
warrant will be relevant: 
(Accessibility) A warrant W is (reflectively) accessible if and only if the following 
condition holds: whenever a subject S possesses W, S can - at least in principle --
determine that S possesses W, by means of apriori reasoning and self_knowledge69.7071 
Some notes are in order. First, one does not need to possel:ls the theoretical concept 
of a warrant in order possess an accessible warrant. However, one needs to possess the 
concepts to be able to possess the thought that one possesses some specific warrant W. 
Moreover, that one possesses an accessible warrant for p does not entail that one is certain 
that one possesses p, or that one is certain that p. 
Clearly, that p is reflectively accessible in the sense defined above entails that one 
possesses a propositional warrant for p. So, if S possesses an accessible warrant for p, S 
does not only possess a warrant for p, but also possesses a propositional warrant to believe 
that W is a warrant for p. The following principle holds: 
(Existential Iteration) Whenever S possesses W for p, and W is accessible, then 
there is a propositional warrant W', such that S possesses W' for the proposition that 
S possesses W. 
Note: a propositional warrant. It is not required that S actually believes that he or she 
possesses W for p. S merely needs to be in a position to find out that he or she possesses 
W for p. It is a plausible part of the picture that W' will be some kind of internalistic 
89Self.knowledp is meant to include knowledge by introspection. 
TOThis characterization of "reftectively accessible" in the context of intemalism is similar to Wright's (see 
Wript 2004., p.209). 
11 Formulated as above, the criterion does not imply that a subject can also determine - by means of 
apriori reflection and &eIf.knowledge - that it does not possess some warrant of the relevant type. 
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warrant, maybe even an accessible one. What is required for this is the assumption that, 
whenever a fact is accessible by (a suitable class of) introspective belief-forming methods 
and apriori reasoning, it is also accessible by such means that one possesses a warrant for 
it. This would entail: 
(Iteration of Accessibility) Whenever 8 possesses W for p, and W is accessible, then 
there is an accessible propositional warrant W', such that 8 possesses W' for the fact 
that he or she possesses W. 
80 accessible warrants would be subject to a WW principle in the sense that possessing 
an accessible warrant for p entails the possession of the same type of warrant for the 
claim that one possesses the warrant. That is: if "W (p)" stands for "8 possesses an 
accessible warrant for ri', it holds that: W (p) -+ W (W (p». I think that this property 
is desirable for the intemalist. However, that it holds would require an argument for the 
assumption that self-knowledge and apriori reasoning are reflectively justifiable. I think 
that the considerations in the final chapter of my thesis provide steps towards this daim, 
but I cannot say more about it here. 
Let" J (p)" stand for" S possesses justification for p in the ordinary sense" and" K (p)" 
stands for "S knows that p". It is important to note that the accessibility of J and K 
alone does not entail any JJ or KK principle of the form: (JJ) "J(p) -+ J(J(p»" or 
(KK) "K (p) -+ K (K (p»". 8uch principles require the additional assumption that the 
warrant provided by apriori reflection and self-knowledge (W) is sufficient for knowledge 
or sufficient for an ascription of our ordinary notion of justification. W might be too weak. 
For example: even if a certain bit of knowledge is accessible, the type of warrant that we 
obtain for the possession of knowledge might not be a full warrant. In such a situation we 
do obtain K (p) -+ W (K (p», but we do not obtain (KK), because W < K (Le. W is not 
sufficient for knowledge when combined with true belief). 
The notion of intemalistic warrant relevant in this thesis is the notion of an accessible 
warrant. This motivates the following definitions: 
(lnternallstlc Warrant) 8 possesses an intemalistic wafTant to believe p if and only 
if S possesses a reflectively accessible warrant W to believe p. 
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Secondly, although we already defined the notion of a full warrant, let me make the 
combination with internalistic warrant explicit as fullows: 
(Full internalistic warrant) S possesses a full internalistic warrant to believe p if and 
only if S possesses an internalistic warrant to believe p which is sufficient for knowledge 
when combined with true belief. 
My last definition is: 
(Internalistic Knowledge) Internalistic knowledge is fully internalistically warranted 
true belief. 
In what follows, (Relevance Internalism) should be understood along the lines of 
(Full Internalistic warrant): the aim is to explain how we can acquire full internalistic 
warrants in certain areas of cognitive enquiry. 
3.3.2 Arguing for Relevance Internallsm 
(Relevance Internalism) for full internalistic warrant can be motivated by three, inter-
connected, themes: 
• Independent considerations about the epistemic value of full internalistic warrant. 
For example: that possessing such warrant is conducive to managing a system of 
beliefs. 
• The willingness to engage in what has been called the Traditional Epistemic Project. 
• Considerations about scepticism. In particular: that relevant forms of sceptical ar-
guments are directed against intemalistic (accessible) warrant, and that externalist 
responses to relevant sceptical arguments are unsatisfactory. 
I will say more about the first line of thought in the next chapter (5.1.2), and focus on the 
latter two points here. My plan is as follows. First, I motivate the Traditional Epistemic 
Project, and argue that it is inextricably linked with (Relevance Internalism). I then 
motivate the claim that externalist responses to scepticism are unsatisfactory, assuming 
we want to engage in the Traditional Epistemic Project. Finally, I provide an independent 
reason for this claim, using Wright's Instability Aryument to the effect that externalists 
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cannot provide a dialectically stable response to a simple closure-based sceptical challenge. 
The dialectic can be displayed as follows: 
Considerations about 
epllteIIic vlllut! 
3.3.3 The Traditional Epistemic Project 
__ ....,.~ Relevance Internah!lT1 
My main motivation for endorsing (Relevance Internalism) is that I want to engage ill 
the: 
(Traditional Epistemic Project) 
The 7hlditional Epistemic Project is the project - famously initiated by Descartes 
- of vindicating from scratch and from the armchair our right to claim knowledge 
of most of the knowledge we pre-theoretically take ourselves to possess, bracketing all 
antecedently held beliefs about the external world . 
The project can be pursued by telling an epistemological Hero story: a story of a non-
defective epistemic agent - Hero - who goes through some canonical lines of reasoning, 
and realizes that he possesses warrants sufficient for knowledge for most of the beliefs 
he antecedently took to be knowledge. The project is motivated by the desire to give a 
tJindiC4ting explanation of all our external-world knowledge, i.e. to give an answer the 
question whether and how "I really know any of the things which I take myself to know 
about the world" (Leite 2005, p.514). 
Answering this question is subject to a constraint. It can be brought about by the 
following considerations. When we are challenged to explain whether and how we know a 
particular proposition. 1', we cannot appeal to p in our explanation, because of the "prag-
matics of assertion or explanation" (Leite 2005, p. 514). Consequently, if we want to 
explain whether and how we know anything about the world, our explanation cannot 
make (ine1imable) appeal to any external-world considerations. In other words, a vindi-
catingexplanation for all our external-world knowledge requires that, at the beginning, all 
antecedently held beliefs about the world are bracketed. 
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An attentive reader might discover some tension in this demand: in order to establish 
that we possess knowledge of p, so the thought goes, we certainly need to claim that p 
is true because it is a necessary condition for knowing that p, and many p will be claims 
about the external world. So is it trivially impossible to provide vindicating explanations 
for external-world knowledge? 
No. For one, it is not so clear that one always needs to cite p as a premise in order 
to establish that one knows that p. We will see examples for such arguments below. 
Secondly, the whole project should not be understood in a way which renders it impossible 
for this reason. If I have established that an antecedently held belief is warranted in a way 
that suffices for knowledge, when combined with true belief, then I can take this belief 
to be knowledge. What vindicating explanations really forbid is ineliminable appeal to 
considerations about the external world, when it comes to establishing that we possess 
such warrants. We can make this explicit by imposing the: 
(Cartesian Constraint) Our arguments for the possession of full warrants for releV'dnt 
propositions must not ineliminably appeal to any considerations about the (external) 
world. 72 
However, at first glance, this constraint still seems impossible to meet for full warrants 
which are subject to external conditions, and it is very plausible that at least some relevant 
full warrants are subject to external conditions because of Gettier cases. 
In general, it appears that the (Cartesian Constraint) is incompatible with external-
ism in any sense entailing that it is a necessary condition for the possession of knowledge 
that an external condition in addition to truth holds. For suppose there is such a condition. 
Then how are we to argue that we possess full warrants without citing these external con-
ditions as premises? Suppose, for example, that the reliability of perceptual belief-forming 
methods is a necessary condition for acquiring perceptual knowledge. We would not be able 
to establish that we possess such knowledge without appealing to external-world conditions 
to the effect that my perceptual faculties are reliable. Any argument for a particular item 
of perceptual knowledge will involve a reliability claim as a premise. 
Does this show that the (Cartesian Constraint) is incompatible with such external-
ism? This would be a bad result, for such externalism might well be correct. 
T2A aUghtly cWferent criterion with the same ll&Dle has been suggested by Leite (2005). 
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Fortunately, what has been said does not yet show that there is such incompatibility. 
For the (Cartesian Constraint) allows for an appeal to external-world conditions, as 
long as it is eliminable. So we need to argue that there is a notion of "making eliminable 
appeal to p", meeting the following two criteria: 
• It is possible to eliminate appeal to external-world conditions in our vindicating 
explanations . 
• Explanations making only eliminable appeal to external-world conditions are suitable 
for pursuing the (Traditional Epistemic Project). 
Leite (2005, p. 516) argues that this cannot be done. From the point of view of someone 
pursuing the (Traditional Epistemic Project), so the thought goes, an appeal to an 
external-world condition (e.g. reliability) in a particular vindicating explanation can only 
count as eliminated if we can already claim to possess a full warrant for the condition, 
because it is part of the collection of propositions knowledge of which we wanted to viu-
dicate. However, how are we to account for this warrant? It seems as if we will run into 
circularity at some point. It seems as if we cannot eliminate appeal to some external-world 
conditions if what is at stake is all our external-world knowledge. 
Leite (2005, p. 518) suggests that we should engage in a lighter epistemic project, in 
which one gives up the claim that appeal to external-world conditions must be eliminable, 
and in which one proceeds piecemeal, always assuming some external-world conditions. 
However, this amounts to giving up the (Traditional Epistemic Project), so it is not 
an option. 
One might want to respond that all this does not show that we cannot account for 
the possession of typeli of warrants that are not subject to external conditions. Maybe we 
should not aspire to give vindicating explanations for all our knowledge (full warrants), 
but just give vindicating explanations for the possession of types of warrants that are 
not subject to external conditions, or 80 the thought goes. However, anyone engaging 
in such a project can be accused of changing the subject. The initial motivation for the 
(Traditional Epistemic Project) was vindicating claims to knowledge (Leite 2005, p. 
517). 
So what are we to do? I think that the key to an answer is to observe that Leite's 
requirements for when an appeal counts as eliminated are too strict. Leite demands that an 
101 
appeal to an external-world condition can only count as eliminated if we already established 
that we possess a full warrant for it. However, what is really important when we cite an 
external-world condition is that we do not beg the question. And if we can establish that 
we are in a position to claim that this condition is met, and this claim does not rest on any 
considerations about the external world, we do not beg the question. What is important 
is that we can assure ourselves, from the inside, that we possess a warrant for it. And tliis 
warrant does not have to be sufficient for knowledge in the ordinary sense, or be subject 
to external conditions, contrary to what Leite assumes. 
In other words, my suggestion is that it is acceptable to cite external-world propositions 
as premises in our arguments for the possession of full warrants as long as we possess some 
purely intemalistic warrant for these premises. Note that this is not the cheap internalist 
response that we give up accounting for knowledge meeting externalist conditions. We still 
do that. However, we allow that the premises of our arguments for the possession of such 
knowledge are warranted internalistically (and in a way that might not be sufficient for 
knowledge in the ordinary sense). 
Suppose that we have to claim that our perceptual faculties are reliable (Rei), in order 
to claim that we possess a full warrant for the claim that we have two hands. I contend 
that our appeal to Rei is acceptable as long as we can establish, just on the basis of apriori 
reasoning and self-knowledge, that we possess a warrant for Rei. In this case, we can assure 
ourselves, from the inside, that we can (warrantedly) claim Rei, and we cannot be accused 
of begging the question. Although we have to cite an external-world condition, we can 
eliminate our appeal to it, by arguing that we are in a position to cite it, without making 
appeal to any external-world conditions.73 
In general, the thought is that our vindicating explanations must ultimately- at some 
level- be grounded in internalistic warrants - warrants accessible by apriori reasoning 
and self-knowledge. Maybe what is fundamentally at issue between the externalist and the 
intemalist is precisely whether justification should be, and can be ultimately grounded in 
this way.74 This picture implies that Leite is wrong and the success of the (Traditional 
Epistemic Project) is independent of the analysis of the ordinary notion of knowledge 
TaOf coune, this railes the queation how exactly Rei is warranted. I discuss such questions in the next 
chapter. 
T4For example, my respoDIJe usumea that there are genuinely epistemic types of warrants (and reasons) 
that are not subject to extemal conditions. Externalists might doubt that this is so. 
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in the sense that it will not pose a special problem if the warrants underlying knowledge 
in the ordinary sense are subject to external conditions. 
Note that if we meet (Relevance Internalism) in a certain area of cognitive enquiry, 
we will also be able to meet the (Cartesian Constraint) in this area. For (Relevance 
Internalism) requires that our knowledge is available on the basis of apriori reasoning 
and self-knowledge, and this entails that we can argue that we know relevant propositions, 
without making ineliminable appeal to external-world considerations. ~oreover, if we 
meet the (Cartesian Constraint) in a certain area of cognitive enquiry, then we also 
meet the requirements of (Relevance Internalism). For the existence of arguments for 
knowledge meeting the (Cartesian Constraint) show that the relevant knowledge claims 
are available just on the basis of apriori reasoning and self-knowledge. The constraints are 
necessarily equivalent. 
S.S.4 Scepticism 
Now reconsider the closure-based sceptical challenge from above. According to process 
reliabilist, it is simply not true that the non-obtaining of sceptical scenarios cannot be 
justified. In particular, so the thought goes, we can acquire justification for ordinary 
external-world beliefs, and for the non-obtaining of sceptical hypotheses, as long as the 
external cognitive environment allows for reliably forming these beliefs. 
In order to further examine this response, I put the closure-based argument in a more 
general setting. Let "w' be a template for a certain form of warrant ability for which a 
relevant closure principle holds, let "0" stand for an ordinary statement about the external 
world, and let "SH" stand for a proposition expressing a typical sceptical hypothesis such 
as the BIV scenario. I examine the following argument template: 
(CBI) 
(CB2) 
(CBS) 
...,W(...,SH) 
W (0) -+ W (-'SH) 
""W(O) 
Sceptical Premise 
Closure Principle 
(CBl), (CB2), Modus Tollens 
Again, the idea is that, for some reasons connected to our notion of warrant W and 
the subjective indistinguishability of the good case and SH, the non-obtaining of the 
sceptical hypothesis cannot be warranted, and that this undermines our warrants for the 
ordinary propolilitions because of a closure principle for W. Since 0 was chosen arbitrarily, 
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the argument - if sound - would establish that we do not possess W-warrants for any 
ordinary external-world proposition. 
We assumed closure. So the anti-sceptic needs to attack (CB1). How exactly the 
anti-sceptic will attack this premise will depend on the type of warrant in question. If the 
notion of warrant is a simple externalist notion, such as reliability, this seems relatively 
easy. The reliabilist can simply deny to assert (CB1), because this would be tantamount 
to the asserting that we are in a sceptical scenario, or so the thought goes. After all, in 
every non-sceptical scenario, we can clearly be warranted in believing that no sceptical 
scenario obtains, for such beliefs can be reliably formed. 
However, since this is all the externalist has to say, this response clearly violates the 
(Cartesian Constraint). The reliabilist cannot claim that our beliefs are actually reliably 
formed, without presupposing that we are in the good case, and he has nothing to say about 
how this appeal can be eliminated.75 Hence, the reliabilist cannot claim that we posseHS a 
warrant for ordinary external world beliefs, without (ineliminably) presupposing that we 
are in the good case. This problem generalizes to all externalist notions. 
We do not have to appeal to the (Cartesian Constraint) in order to see that there is 
something wrong with purely externalistic responses. Pritchard (2005, chapter 4) argues 
that the "heart of' the sceptical challenge is that we need to provide reasons of why our 
(internal) evidence favours one hypothesis about the external world over another: 
for isn't the concession that the [internal] 'evidence' one has in favour of one's 
everyday beliefs doesn't favour those beliefs over belief in known sceptical al-
ternatives simply the concession that one doesn't really have any evidence of 
substance in favour of one's everyday beliefs? (Pritchard 2005, p.112) 
One way to make this precise is to consider a hypothetical sceptic who believes that he is a 
BIV, and who reasons as follows: "I have an experience as of my two hands" - "Therefore, 
there is a computer designed by an evil scientist just emulating my two hands". We want 
to be able to say why an experience as of two hands favours the ordinary external-world 
1IIOf course, if the re1iabilist would be able to argue apriori that we are in the good case, without 
appealing to any exteraal-world CODSiderationa, things might look different. However, in this case the 
response becomes an interDalist ODe, in the sense of (Relevance Internalllm). The response would 
not be purely extenaaIistic. A more interesting case would be one where apriori knowledge is explained 
externalistically. I do not know what to say about such responses, but such a response seems to me 
to be subject to the same difficulty as the purely reliabilist response, because, at some point, appeal to 
external-world coDBiderationa is ineliminable. 
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belief over the analogue of the hypothetical sceptic. 
An argument by Wright (2007b, 2008) builds on similar intuitions. Wright argues that 
the externalist response to scepticism is in some important sense dialectically unstable, 
and that only recourse to accessible warrants can avoid such instability. 
3.3.5 Wright's Instability Argument 
Wright (2004b, 2007b, 2008) agrees with the advocate of the (Traditional Epistemic 
Project) in that he thinks that reliabilist responses to the closure-based challenge are 
not very interesting. Clearly, it is not enough for the anti-sceptic just to note that the 
possession of externalistic warrant - and knowledge - is possible. Rather, so the thought 
goes, we want to be in a position to claim that we possess such knowledge: 
To be sure, if the sceptical argument is taken to be to the effect that knowl-
edge of the material world is impossible, then it must founder if a reliabilist 
conception of knowledge is sound; for even the most skilful monger of para-
doxes cannot show that we are not as a matter of fact so situated in a material 
world that our cognitive faculties reliably generate mostly true beliefs about it. 
But the residual dissatisfaction with the externalist suggestion as a response 
to scepticism is that it merely points to a congenial possibility: nothing has 
been offered to put us in position to claim that it, rather than one of the many 
contrasting uncongenial sceptical scenarios, actually obtains. (Wright 2007b, 
p.7) 
According to Wright (20046, 20076, 2008), a harder (and more interesting) sceptical chal-
lenge arises. We need to argue that we can be in a position to rationally claim that we are 
warranted in believing ordinary external-world propositions. And, according to Wright, 
rational claimability is an intema1istic notion. 
However, two questions arise: 
1. Why should the externalist agree that we need a notion of being able to claim a 
warrant, in addition to whatever notion of warrant we use? 
2. Why should the externalist agree that this notion is to be construed internalistically? 
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As to the first question: the externalist has to rebut the sceptical argument - it is not 
enough just to remain silent. The externalist wants to be in a position to explain what is 
wrong with it. Assuming closure, the externalist needs to argue that something is wrong 
with the first premise (CBI). This could be done by arguing that the sceptic is not in a 
position to claim this premise because claiming it is tantamount to the assertion that we 
are in the bad case and the sceptic has provided no considerations at all of why we should 
be in the bad case. 
As to the second question, Wright (2007b, 2008) argues that it is impossible to construe 
this notion externalistically, on pain of dialectical instability. According to Wright, there 
are two constraints on what would count as an effective attack against the sceptic, and 
these constraints make it impossible to effectively respond to the sceptical argument if 
"W' is construed along 8imple externalist lines (e.g. along the lines of reliability). Let me 
explain. 
For one, assume that the anti-sceptic has established that the sceptic cannot properly 
claim (CDI). The anti-sceptic should not be happy with just that. The anti-sceptic also 
wants to be in a position to claim that a hypothetical sceptic who actually believes that 
he is in a sceptical scenario does not possess warrants for his deviant beliefs. In other 
words, the anti-sceptic wants to be able to claim the non-sceptical analogue of (CB I) 
which Wright (2008) dubs "**": 
Note that this is similar to Pritchard's intuition that we want to be able to claim that 
our evidence favours the ordinary beliefs, and not analogues of hypothetical sceptics. In 
general, the anti-sceptic wants to arrive at an asymmetric situation. This yields our first 
constraint: 
(Asymmetry) The anti-sceptic needs to be able to make positive claims about his 
epistemic situation which are in a better standing than the corresponding negative 
claims made by a (hypothetical) sceptic. 
This becomes problematic for the externalist if we add a second, plausible constraint 
to the effect that the debate between the (hypothetical) sceptic and the anti-sceptic is to 
take place on neutral ground, i.e. that the responses to the opponents arguments do not 
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assume any propositions which already entail that the subject is in either the good case or 
the bad case: 
(Neutrality) In the course of rebutting the opponent's arguments, neither the sceptic 
nor the anti-sceptic are allowed to make any assumptions that are not neutral with 
respect to the actual situation of the subject in the external world. 
Now consider the pair (CBI)/(**) = -.W (-.SH)/ ..... W (SH). Asymmetry demands 
that the anti-sceptic can establish that the former cannot be claimed without depriving 
himself of the possibility of being able to claim the latter. (Neutrality), however, makes 
it hard to see how the argument against the claim ability of the former does not also apply 
to the latter, if "W" is a simple externalist notion like reliability. 
Consider the reliabilist notion of warrant. The reliabilist's idea to undermine the scep-
tic's claim to (CBI) was that claiming it presupposes that we are not in the good case, 
and that there is no way the sceptic can argue, on neutral ground, that we do not actually 
form beliefs in a reliable way. By the sceptic's own lights, the good case and the bad case 
are subjectively indistinguishable. So the sceptic would need to appeal to considerations 
about the external world. Thus, the sceptic's ability to claim (CBI) is undermined by 
(Neutrality) . 
So far, so good. The problem for the anti-sceptic is that it is now hard to see how 
the anti-sceptic's ability to claim (**) is not similarly undermined by (Neutrality). To 
see this consider again a hypothetical sceptic who believes that he is a BIV reasoning as 
follows: 
1. I have, right now, the experience as of my two hands. 
2. Therefore, the big computer creates my experience as of a world in which I have two 
hands. 
3. Therefore, I am aBIV. 
IT the hypothetical sceptic was a BIV, the sceptic would obtain a warrant for (**) by this 
line of reasoning, since his beliefs would be reliably formed, and closure holds. Thus, the 
anti-sceptic's ability to claim (*.) is undermined by a line of reasoning exactly analogous 
to his own line of reasoning against (CDI). In particular: claiming (.*) presupposes that 
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we are not BIVs, and there is no way the anti-sceptic can argue, on neutral ground, that 
the hypothetical anti-sceptic does not actually form his beliefs in a reliable way. For the 
BIV case and the external world case are, by assumption, subjectively indistinguishable. 
Thus, the pair ...,W (-,sH)/-,W (SH) cannot be where where asymmetry is found. 
The extemalist might try to find other ways to distinguish both cases. Note that the 
reasoning above still relies on an intuitive notion of claimability. The exterualist might 
look for a way out by construing the notion in an extemalistic way. For example, the 
externalist anti-sceptic might construe claimability as (extemalistic) warrantability, and 
make the following claim (where both occurences of "W" stand for the externalistic notion 
of warrant in question): 
The problem is that, given some plausible assumptions - ("') entails( ...... ), which we 
have seen cannot be claimed without a violation of (Neutrality).76 Thus, ("') cannot be 
claimed by the anti-sceptic and the dialectical situation is still symmetric.77 
This is a serious problem for the stubborn extemalist. To be sure, it is not the case 
that the extemalist is forced into scepticism. The extemalist might simply uphold his or 
her beliefs. Rather, it means that there is no unproblematic way to reject even a very 
basic sceptical argument without violating either (Asymmetry) or (Neutrality). Call 
a response to the sceptic which meets both demands a stable response. The problem 
is that the externalist cannot find such a stahle response, and this seems to be deeply 
unsatisfactory.18 
"w (..,SH) entails ..,SH, if "W" is coDltrued externaiistically. Moreover, because "...,W...," is closed 
under logical couequence (this follows from the fact that "W" is 80 closed), -.W (-.W (...,SH» entails 
..,W (..,..,SH), which entaila ( •• ), 8881JJDiDg we have available the classical principle of double negation 
elimination. 
or, A seeond way to lee the dialectic iDstability is to realize that (.) leads to a Moorean instability in the 
sense that, for lOme P, the extemalist anti-sceptic has to assert both P and -.W (P). This was pointed 
out to me by Robert WiUiams. 
Think about. how the extema1ist anti-sceptic will argue for (.): the argument will be based on the 
thought that we might be in the good case, and in the good case we can become warranted in believing 
..,SH. However, exactly the lIUIle consideratioDS can be applied the "other way round": we might be in 
the bad case, iIIld in the bad case we can become warranted in believing SH. In other words, if we can 
argue for (.), then we can also argue for: ..,W (..,W (SH». Now set P = ...,W (SH). The anti-sceptic has 
to accept both P ad ..,W (P). 
"Of course, in order to avoid Wright'. argument, the externalist might still reject closure by going for 
a 118DSitivity-bued account. Moreover, the argument as stated only goes through in c1assicallogic because 
we need double neption in order to obtain ( •• ) from (.). 
lOS 
Any externalist? The argument above assumed closure and focused on process relia-
bilism, which provides the externalist with room for maneuvre. Assuming that closure for 
externalistic warrant is not negotiable, we still need to argue that similar considerations 
apply to all other externalist notions of warrant that obey closure. Wright (2008) shows 
that the argument also applies to safety accounts. This strengthens the argument. Al-
though it is still incomplete, I think what has been said at least shifts the burden of proof 
to the side of the externalist. 
Williamson (2000) rejects (Neutrality). His main strategy against scepticism is to 
note that: 
Nothing ( ... ) should convince someone who has given up ordinary beliefs that 
they did not in fact constitute knowledge, for nothing said here should convince 
her that they are true. The trick is never to give them up." (Williamson 2000, 
p.27) 
According to Williamson, the best strategy is never to be neutral. As long as we stick to our 
ordinary beliefs, we have plenty to say against the sceptic. On the other hand, Williamson 
seems to concede Wright's point that, as soon as we occupy the neutral standpoint, we 
cannot effectively respond to the sceptical arguments if we are externalists (otherwise we 
would not need a ''trick''). Thus, Wright and Williamson seem to agree that externalism, 
closure, and the two constraints are incompatible. 
I think that (Neutrality) captures what is so unsatisfying about externalist responses: 
they always assume something about the world, and ultimately leave us with the feeling 
that they might be false. Only endorsing an internalistic notion of warrant (or claimability) 
will enable us to meet (Neutrality). This is because the conditions for the possession of 
internalistic warrant will not depend on the state of the external world. The hope is that 
we will be able to argue against scepticism from a neutral standpoint on this basis. This 
provides further motivation for (Relevance Internalism) in the external-world case. 
The notion of an accessible warrant seems to be particularly suitable for Wright's 
purposes. Arguing that we can possess an accessible warrant for the non-obtaining of 
sceptical scenarios is tantamount to arguing that we can stably affirm that we possess such 
a warrant, for, by definition, an accessible warrant is available by apriori reasoning and 
self-knowledge, and thus promises to preserve (Neutrality). 
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Wright's idea is just that, although he uses a different terminology. Wright (2004b, 
2004a) employs an internalistic notion of claimable warrant in order to be able to stably 
affirm that we are in a position to rationally claim that we possess a warrant for the 
non-obtaining of sceptical scenarios. We will see in the next chapter how this works. I 
now examine Wright's notion of claimable warrant, and argue that possessing a claimable 
warrant in Wright's sense is equivalent to possessing an accessible warrant. We thus obtain 
a unified internalist notion of warrant, which I will employ in my further investigations. 
3.4 Wright's notion of being in a position to claim a warrant 
Wright (Wright 20046,a, 20076, 2008) draws a distinction between possessing a warrant 
and being in a position to (rationally) claim79 a warrant. Moreover, he argues that it is 
our right to rationally claim warrants that is under attack by the most interesting sceptical 
arguments: 
I want to contrast the idea of possessing a warrant for P with another idea, 
viz. that of a thinker's being in position to claim possession of a warrant for P. 
And by this, I do intend something with internalist resonances. I want to un-
derstand the claimability of a warrant to be what is at issue when, for example, 
a philosopher feels that one has not been given everything one needs to address 
scepticism about the external world, say, merely by impressive arguments - if 
any such there be - that knowledge can be constituted by reliably generated 
true belief. (Wright 20076, p. 30) 
Thus, the notion of claimable warrant is also the notion that Wright thinks can be used 
to provide a stable response to the closure-based sceptical challenge (2004b). How should 
this notion be understood? 
That an agent is in a position claim a warrant for p could be interpreted to mean that 
the agent is in a position to claim that he possesses some warrant or other. However, this 
usage of the notion is not very illuminating. Wright endorses the notion in contexts like 
"Hero can claim that he is justified in believing p" or "Hero is in a position to claim that 
he knows that ti'. So we should construe the notion as one of being in a position that one 
T9Wright 1IIeI "bebag in a position to claim" and "being in a position to rationally claim" interchangeably. 
So do I. The latter may be used to indicate more clearly that Wright has an internalist notion in mind. 
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possesses a particular warrant W for p. So what does it mean that an agent is in a position 
to claim that he possesses W for p? 
A simple answer is that the conditions for properly asserting that one possesses W 
must be met. However, this just raises the further question of what these conditions are. 
In any case, note that being in a position to claim a warrant is tantamount to the 
possession of a higher-order warrant: for however the notion is analysed, being in a position 
to claim that q will make a doxastic attitude towards q epistemically valuable in some way 
or other, so being able to rationally claim q entails the possession of a warrant for q. Thus, 
being in a position to claim W for p entails possessing a propositional warrant for the claim 
that one possesses a warrant for p. Note: a propositional warrant. To be in a position to 
claim a warrant neither entails that one believes that one possesses the warrant, nor that 
one actually claims the warrant. 
Two questions arise with respect to the question of how to construe the higher-order 
warrant. Firstly: is it factive in the sense that being in a position to claim a warrant 
W entails that one possesses W? And secondly, can we not construe the higher-order 
warrants - the warrant for the claim that one possesses a warrant - externalistically? As 
to the first question, I think that the notion should not be construed as a factive notion. 
For example, it has become apparent that truth might be a warrant, and, clearly, Wright 
thinks that one can be in a position to claim that a statement is true without the statement 
being true. However, in most cases where I use the notion it is assumed that the subject 
actually possesses the warrant in question. As to the second question, given what has been 
said above, it should be clear that Wright must hold: 
(Equivalence) For any warrant W a subject S possesses for p, W is rationally claimable 
by S if and only if its pOBBession is reflectively accessible by S, i.e. available by apriori 
reasoning and self-knowledge. 
For this is crucial for his claims about internalism and scepticism. As we saw above, 
Wright thinks that an extema1istic construal of claimability precludes us from giving a 
satisfying account of scepticism. Using this notion of rational claimability, we can define 
the following property of warrants: 
(Wright Accessibility) A warrant W is Wright-accessible if and only if whenever S 
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possesses W, S is in a position to rationally claim that he or she possesses W. 
By (Equivalence), it follows that (Wright Accessibility) is equivalent to the ear-
lier (Accessibility). This equivalence motivates introducing a single, unified notion of 
internalistic warrant and knowledge. We could just as well have defined the notion of 
internalistic warrant as follows: 
(Internalistic Warrant·) S possesses an intemalistic warrant to believe p if and only 
if S possesses a warrant W to believe p and S is in a position to claim that he or she 
possesses W. 80 
And: 
(Full Intemalistic warrant·) S possesses a full intemalistic warrant to believe p 
if and only if S possesses an internalistic warrant to believe p which is sufficient for 
knowledge when combined with true belief. 
Using Wright's notion, intemalistic knowledge should be defined as follows: 
(Intemalistic Knowledge·) S possesses internalistic knowledge of p if S possesses 
knowledge of p and S is in a position to rationally claim this knowledge.81 
The notion of (Internalistic Knowledge·) is equivalent to the above-defined notion 
of (Internallstic Knowledge), given some plausible assumptions (which I shall assume 
in what follows):82 
• "(Internalistic Knowledge·)-t(Internalistic Knowledge)" is is trivial. For to 
be in a position to rationally claim that one knows that p entails that one is in a 
position to rationally claim that one possesses a full warrant for p, which entail" that 
one's full warrant is reflectively accessible . 
• "(Internallstic Knowledge)-t{Internalistic Knowledge·)" requires three as-
sumptions. First, assume that the following two conditions are sufficient for being in 
IOBecause of (Eqlllw1aee), we could just as well have used an accessibility criterion as the crucial 
property for iDternaliatic wan'ut. 
slMoreovw, becauIe of (Equivalence), we could just 88 wen have defined internalistic knowledge as 
knowledge whose poIII8I8ion is reflectively accesaible. 
S2Pritchard (2005, section 3.4) argues for a similar claim, namely that it is plausible that knowledge 
meeting an iDtemalistic (accesslbilist) justification condition and knowledge which can be properly asserted 
coincide. The former corresponds to the first definition, the latter to the second definition. 
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a position to rationally claim that p: (i) one believes that p; (ii) one is in a position 
to rationally claim a full warrant for p. Second, assume that believing p suffices 
for being in a position to claim that one believes p. Third, assume that being in a 
position to rationally claim a full warrant entails being in a position to claim that it 
is a full warrant. Given the three (plausible) assumptions, the agent who possesses a 
fully internalistically warranted true belief is in a position to claim that all conditions 
for knowledge are met, and hence in a position to claim this knowledge. 
Above, I defended (Relevance Internalism), where internalistic warrant was understood 
along the lines of (Accessibility). We can define a version of (Relevance Internalism) 
using Wright's notion of claimable warrant: 
(Wright Internalism for R) Every satisfactory epistemology for R has to explain 
how we can possess claimable knowledge of ordinary R-truths. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue for: 
(Wright Internalism about Arithmetic) Every satisfactory epistemology for arith-
metic needs to explain how we can possess claimable apriori knowledge of ordinary 
arithmetical truths. 
3.5 Wright Internalism about Arithmetic 
I first examine an argument for (Wright Internalism about Arithmetic) that I find 
wanting. Although it might provide some motivation for the claim, it cannot be used to 
establish it. 
3.5.1 The argument from mathematical practice 
One might think that actual mathematical practice is in favour of internalism, because 
proof is considered to be the gold standard of justification in the discipline. The best 
explanation of this fact, so the thought goes, is that mathematicians aim at being in a 
position to claim that they possess knowledge and justification. And since mathematicians 
aim at claimable knowledge, our epistemology should account for it. 
In fact, it might look as if mathematicians engaged in arithmetic can live up to this 
aim, because the following principle is initially plausible: 
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(Claimable Knowledge by Proof) If one believes that p on the basis of a correct 
mathematical proof from arithmetical axioms, then one is in a position to claim apriori 
knowledge of p. 
Unfortunately, if "being in a position to claim knowledge" is Wright's internalistic notion 
presented above, then (Claimable Knowledge by Proof) is far from obvious, and 
probably false in many cases. It presupposes that the axioms can also be claimed to be 
known apriori, because one cannot claim to know p apriori on the basis of a proof from some 
other statement q unless one is also in a position to claim apriori knowledge of q. However, 
if proof is our best candidate for the means by which claimable knowledge i8 generated in 
mathematics, then the story is incomplete. For at least some axioms cannot be established 
by any further proof. Thus, proof cannot be the gold standard for the justification of all 
mathematical beliefs. The crucial question is whether the gold standard for the axioms, 
whatever it is, is sufficient for claimable apriori knowledge in Wright's sense. 
It might turn out that it is not. For example, it might turn out that mathematicians 
do not possess claimable apriori knowledge of the axioms, but just some externalistic type 
of apriori knowledge. In this case, the lower epistemic status of the axioms (whatever it is 
exactly) willleacb upwards to the theorems one proves from them. Although the warrant 
we obtain for the theorems would be inferential and apriori, it would not be intemalistic 
in the required sense. And it is not obvious at all that apriori knowledge of axioms must 
be internalistic. One might think that apriori knowledge of necessary truths must be 
internalistic. However, there are externalistic accounts of such knowledge. For example, 
Jenkins (20086) argues for an extemalistic epistemology of mathematical axioms, based on 
the idea that mathematical knowledge can be based on reflection on our concepts. 
An externalistic picture is perfectly compatible with the fact that mathematical justi-
fication involves proof. For example, one might regard proofs as the most reliable belief-
forming method, and thus the best way to expand mathematical knowledge, externalisti-
cally conceived. That mathematicians regard proof as the gold standard of justification 
can neither be used to show that internalistic knowledge is actually possessed, nor that 
mathematicians actually aim at internalistic knowledge. This makes it much more difficult 
to construct an argument to the effect that every satisfactory epistemology of mathematics 
should account for internalistic knowledge, on the basis of actual mathematical practice. 
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Of course, the kind of reflection we discover in actual mathematical practice certainly 
suffices to initially motivate the claim that an internalistic treatment of the whole discipline 
is required. But to establish this claim on this basis is a different matter entirely. 
3.5.2 The Argument from Analogy 
I believe that Wright's considerations for (Relevance Internalism) can also be applied 
to arithmetic, assuming the semantic component of (Arithmetical Platonism), i.e. that 
the role of number terms is to refer to mind-independent abstract objects. I shall t:aU 
the ensuing argument the Aryument from Analogy. This argument is not only interesting 
because it is an argument for internalism, but also because it sheds light on a connet:tion 
between closure-based external-world scepticism and similar challenges in mathematics. 
Such connections have not been discussed to a great extent. To my knowledge, the first 
to uncover such connections was Pedersen (2006), who discusses a Moorean argument for 
arithmetic. 
It transpired that at least simple externalist notions of warrant cannot be endorsed 
to stably rebut the simple closure-based sceptical challenge in the external-world case. I 
now construct an analogous argument for the arithmetical case, assuming that the role of 
number terms is to refer to mind-independent abstract objects. The upshot is that we can 
construct a closure-based challenge for arithmetic, and mirror Wright's reasoning above. 
In order to construe such a challenge, we need to find analogues for 0 and SH above. 
Analogues for 0 are easily found. We just pick an ordinary arithmetical belief, such as 
"1 + 1 = 2" (O[Math». What is the analogue for the sceptical hypothesis SH? The 
scenario needs to be such that our ordinary arithmetical beliefs were false although our 
inner cognitive situation remains the same. 
If the role of number terms is to refer to numbers - mind-independent abstract objects 
- it appears plausible that there is such an hypothesis. For then we can make sense of a 
situation in which numbers do not exist, but in which our inner cognitive situation remains 
the same. That.we can make sense of such a situation, so the thought goes, is also one of 
the intuitions underlying Benaceraff's and Field's challenges from 1.1. Thus, I suggest the 
following sceptical hypothesis: 
(SHM) There is no mind-independent realm of abstract mathematical objects. 
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Clearly, the negation of (SHM) follows from O[MathJ, given that O[Math] is inter-
preted as being about a mind-independent realm of abstract mathematical objects. We 
thus obtain the following closure-based sceptical challenge for mathematics: 
(SHM) ...,W (...,SH M) Sceptical Premise 
(CBM2) W (O[Math]) ~ W (...,SHM) Closure Principle 
(CBMS) ...,W (O[Math]) (CBM1), (CBM1), Modus Tollens 
A hypothetical sceptic, so the thought goes, might argue for (SHM) in a similar 
way as for the corresponding premise in the external-world case: we cannot subjectively 
distinguish the good case (the case in which there is a realm of mind-independent abstract 
objects) from the bad case (the case in which everything appears normal but there is 
no realm of mind-independent abstract objects), so we cannot be warranted in believing 
that we are in the good case, for some interesting notion of warrant. And now we just 
mirror Wright's argument above. The externalist might want to counter this move by 
invoking an externalist notion. But this leads to dialectic instability, as long as we make 
the sceptical assumption (shared by the externalist) that we cannot subjectively distinguish 
the good case from the bad case. In sum: assuming that the role of number terms is to 
refer to numbers, we obtain an Instability Argument against simple externalism, which 
shows that we can only effectively rebut the sceptical argument using an internalistic 
notion of warrant. This strongly motivates (Relevance Internalism) for the arithmetical 
case, and, equivalently, (Wright InternaUsm for Arithmethic). For arguing that we 
can possess accessible warrants for the existence of a mind-independent realm of abstract 
objects would provide us with a stable response to the closure-based sceptical challenge. 
An objection I envisage is that there is an important difference between the mathemat-
ical case and the external-world case, because numbers are supposed to be pure abstracts. 
Thus, if numbers exist, they exist necessarily. This creates a disanalogy to the external-
world case, so the thought goes, because in the external-world case, both the good case 
and the bad case were possible, which allowed for a standoff. 
Why can there be no standoff in the number case? The thought must be that it 
must be apriori detectable whether numbers exist or not. And if this is the case, we have 
an asymmetric situation. However, either this apriori justification is internalistic or it is 
externalistic. If it is extemalistic, then the Instability Argument is not avoided. If it is 
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internalistic, then we do not need the Instability Argument, because we already establi:,;hed 
that justification in mathematics is internalistic justification. 
Thus, if we do not already assume internalism, we have to allow for the :,;ceptic arguing 
for the claim that we are not warranted in believing that numbers exist nece:,;sarily, and 
that our inner situation does not allow to distinguish the case in which numbers exi:,;t 
necessarily from the case in which numbers necessarily don't exist. 
3.5.3 Arithmetic and the Traditional Epistemic Project 
Be that as it may, my primary motivation for (Relevance Internalism about Arith-
metic) rests on the desire to engage in the (Traditional Epistemic Project). I think 
that the (Traditional Epistemic Project) should be pursued wherever possible. Thus, 
it should also be pursued in the logico-mathematical case, and in the arithmetical case in 
particular. Moreover, the possession of accessible warrant generates additional epi:,;temic 
value. Clearly, we should account for as much epistemic value as possible. 
Of course, the question arises of how the (Cartesian Constraint) is to be interpreted 
in the logico-mathematical case. The constraint prevents us from making ineliminable 
appeal to external-world propositions in our second-level justifications, but what are these 
propositions in the logico-mathematical case? I think that the best way to interpret the 
constraint is that we have to avoid making ineliminable appeal to logico-mathematical 
basic principles in our second-level justifications in these areas. For example: we should 
not make ineliminable appeal to a validity claim for a rule R in the course of arguing 
for the claim that we are justified in believing that R is valid, and we should not make 
ineliminable appeal to an arithmetical claim in the course of arguing for the claim that we 
are justified in believing that arithmetical axioms are true. It will become apparent that 
we can meet this constraint because we can establish logico-mathematical basic principles 
on the basis of self-knowledge of our own meaning-fixing commands. 
3.6 Intermediate CQDciusioD 
Let me sum up: I sketched two ways in which debates between internalists and externalists 
might emerge in epistemology. After that, I introduced a general concept of warrant and 
rephrased both debates using this concept. I introduced (Relevance Internalism), and 
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argued for two instances of it. I argued for (Wright Internalism about R), for R-"the 
external-world" and R= "Arithmetic". 
These are very strong demands. Many have argued that such demands lead to scepti-
cism. I now begin to argue how scepticism can be avoided. I engage in the (Traditional 
Epistemic Project). In the next two chapters, I focus on the external-world case and 
the logical case, to point out certain features of my epistemological framework. In the last 
part of this thesis, I focus on the logico-mathematical case. 
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4 Scepticism and non-evidential warrant 
In the last chapter, I committed myself to the (Traditional Epistemic Project), and 
argued that we need to explain how we can acquire rationally claimable knowledge of 
propositions we ordinarily think we possess knowledge of. The (Traditional Epistemic 
Project) is most naturally combined with a certain form of foundationalism - that 
relevant areas of knowledge rest on a small class of basic beliefs and belief-forming methods, 
which can be used to acquire all the knowledge in the area by a finite, step-by-step process. 
For any foundationalist, the question arises of what the basic beliefs and belief-forming 
methods are, and under what conditions they generate knowledge. I adopt conservativism, 
i.e. the claim that it is a precondition for the generation of evidential warrant that the 
subject possesses certain supporting warrants. This makes it hard to see how the internalist 
can avoid certain radical forms of scepticism. I argue that, in order to avoid scepticism, 
every access internalist needs to invoke a notion of an internalistic warrant by default, 
i.e. a notion of an internalistic warrant one can possess without having done any prior 
evidential work. I then render this response to scepticism explicit by endorsing Wright's 
notion of entitlement of cognitive project. 
4.1 Cognitive projects, belief-forming methods, and foundationalism 
4.1.1 Cognitive projects and their belief-forming methods 
I begin by drawing some relevant distinctions. An area of cognitive enquiry is a piece of 
reality one can acquire knowledge of. A cognitive project is an epistemic agent's project of 
acquiring knowledge in a certain area of cognitive enquiry.83 Three cognitive projects are 
relevant in what follows: 
• The external-world project - the project of discovering ordinary external-world facts, 
i.e. facts about medium-sized objects in our usual cognitive environment. For ex-
ample: that there is a table in front of me, that I have two hands, etc. We are all 
engaged in this project, and the possibility of successfully executing this project is 
essential to our lives. 
UIt is not clear to me whether Wright would accept this formulation, because it sometimes seems as if 
knowledge is not the most important notion for him, but rather "full justification" (see e.g. Wright 1991, 
p.88). 
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• The arithmetical project - the project of discovering the arithmetical facts. For 
example: solving the question of how many primes there are between 100 and 200, 
what the product of 123 and 234 is, and whether Fermat's Last Theorem is true. 
This project is not only interesting on its own (Le. for those with an interest in 
pure mathematics), but also because it is importantly entangled with everyday tasks 
such as determining whether one carries enough money for one's purchase, and Illore 
sophisticated projects of finding out about the external-world, such as astrophysics . 
• The logical project - the project of discovering the logical facts, Le. the facts of 
what, in general, deductively follows from what. For example: that a certain basic 
deductive rule of inference such as Modus Ponens (MP) is va,lid; that a certain longer 
deductive argument is valid; tautologies. Just as the mathematical project, the logical 
project is not only pursued for its own sake, by those with an interest in formal logic. 
The logical project is important for everyone. The possibility of successfully engaging 
in the logical project is a precondition of the complete success of all projects in which 
deductive inference plays a role in extending knowledge. 
These cognitive projects can be canonically pursued by the successive application of a finite 
number of suitable basic belief-forming methods. A belief-forming method (BFM) is any 
procedure or method a subject can carry out to form new beliefs.84 For example: 
• The perceptual BFM of fonning the belief that p whilst undergoing a visual experi-
ence as of p. 
• The deductive BFM of forming the belief that q on the basis of the belief that p and 
the belief that p ~ q (for any p, q), or - in other words - the method of drawing 
inferences in accordance with MP. 
BFMs can be executed consciously and unconsciously. When I speak of belief-formation 
below, I always mean conscious belief-formation. I call a belief resulting from applying a 
BFM in a certain situation the target belief of the BFM. BFMs also have characteristic 
sources: states on which the bellef-forming process is based, and which bear on the content 
of the belief to be formed. For example: 
"This piece of terminology is due to Enoch and Schechter (2008). 
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• The experience as of p is a source for the BFM of forming a belief that p on the 
basis of an experience as of p. 
• The beliefs featuring as premises of deductive inferences are sources of these infer-
ences. 
An inferential BFM (or: inference) is a BFM whose sources are only beliefs. For example: 
applying MP. A non-inferential BFM is any BFM that is not inferential. For example: 
forming the belief that p on the basis of a visual experience as of p. 
Of course, the proper aim of a BFM is not only the formation of a target belief, but the 
formation of a fully warranted target belief. For a cognitive project can only succeed if the 
relevant target· beliefs can become warranted in a way that renders them knowledegable. 
Every cognitive project has characteristic BFMs - BFMs which are such that the 
project in question would be radically impaired if the BFM in question would not normally 
deliver fully warranted beliefs. In this sense, forming simple external-world beliefs on the 
basis of visual experiences is a characteristic BFM of the external-world project. Drawing 
inferences in accordance with MP is not only a characteristic BFM of the logical project, but 
also of the mathematical project. Moreover, a BFM is basic if and only if it is not reducible 
to a chain of other BFMs. Presumably, all basic BFMs of a project are characteristic of 
the project. 
I say that a BFM M confers a warrant W on S's belief that p if and only if S acquires 
W for the belief that p in virtue of properly executing M. In case M is based on a source 
S, any warrant conferred by M will called an evidential warrant, and S may be called 
(M-) evidence for p. 
A special case is warrant-transmiBBion. An inference from Pl'''',Pn to Q transmits a 
warrant W for a subject S just in case S acquires a warrant for the belief that Q by virtue 
of drawing the inference from W-warranted Pl, ... , Pn . An inference from Pl, ... , Pn to Q 
transmits a warrant oj type T for a subject S just in case S acquires a warrant of type T 
for the belief that Q by virtue of drawing the inference from T-warranted Pll ... , Pn . A 
transmitted warrant maybe called an inferential warrant. A warrant that is only conferred, 
but not transmitted, may be called a non-inferential warrant. 
The concept of transmission of warrant is first introduced in (Wright 2003). It differs 
substantially from the well-known concept of closure of warrant, which we already encoun-
121 
tered in 3.1.2. If a warrant is transmissible over a certain inference, a subject can leam 
of the conclusion by drawing the inference (Wright 2003, p. 57). For a warrant of type T 
being closed over a certain consequence relation, it is not required that the warrant one pos-
sesses for the conclusion can be generated by virtue of drawing the inference. It is merely 
required that there is some warrant of type T for the conclusion. The transmissibility of 
warrant over an inference entails closure, but not vice versa: 
Closure will hold but transmission may fail in question-begging cases-cases 
where there is warrant for the premises in the first place only because the 
conclusion is antecedently warranted. (Wright 2003, p. 57, author's emphasis) 
We will encounter such cases below. Note that the concept of conferring warrant and the 
concept of transmission of warrant are subject to a two-fold relativization. The relativiza-
tion to types of warrant is motivated by the (Warrant Pluralism) principle from 3.2.2. It 
is plausible that the conditions for transmission or conferral of warrant are sensitive to the 
type of warrant in question. For example, it is plausible that basic perceptual BFMs con-
fer simple externalistic warrants in every non-sceptical scenario, whereas we will see below 
that additional conditions have to obtain for such BFMs to confer reflectively accessible 
warrant. 
The re1ativization to subjects is required because abilities and circumstances matter. 
For example, simple deductive inferences might always transmit inferential warrant for 
unsophisticated subjects, but some kind of reflective access might be required for such 
inferences to transmit inferential warrant for more sophisticated subjects (Boghossian 2001, 
p.25; Wright 2001, p.70). 
Another important feature of warrant-conferral and warrant-transmission is that BFMs 
cannot only be used to acquire first warrants for a newly formed belief, but also to upgrade 
or further support one's warrants for a pre-existing belief. For example, Hero might not 
have left the flat yet, but have acquired a warranted belief that it is cloudy on the basis 
of testimony. When S leaves the fiat a little bit later, S might look up at the sky and see 
that it is indeed cloudy. No new belief is formed here. However, the doxastic warrant Hero 
acquired on the basis of testimony is enhanced by a further, perceptual warrant. 
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4.1.2 Foundationalism 
I return to the question of how to pursue the (Traditional Epistemic Project) when 
it comes to the three projects specified above. How can we explain that we can acquire 
full internalistic warrants for the beliefs belonging to them? My explanation rests on the 
following tenet: 
(Foundationalism) For all true propositions p that belong to a relevant cognitive 
project X and that are candidates for justification in the first place, a non-defective 
epistemic agent can obtain a full warrant for p on the basis of a finite step-by-step 
application of a small class of warrant-conferring or warrant-transmitting basic X-BFMs. 
This idealization reduces the explanation to the question of how basic beliefs can be fully 
internalistically warranted and how basic-belief forming-methods confer or transmit full 
internalistic warrant. The restriction to propositions that are candidates for justification 
in the first place is meant to exclude cases like undecidable propositions. 
Moreover, note that I am not interested in actual justification, but just in canonical 
justification. For example, I ignore the possibility of acquiring knowledge by testimony 
because we can - in principle - do without it. 
I do not have a general argument to the effect that the belief-forming processes un-
derlying the projects above are systematizable in accordance with (Foundationalism). I 
think that this claim can be made plausible by examples. 
4.1.3 Two basic belief-forming methods 
Two basic BFMs are relevant in this chapter. 
Visual perception A lot of ordinary external-world knowledge in the sense above can 
be canonically based on perceptual experience. This makes it relatively easy to determine 
candidates for the basic BFMs of the external-world project: basic perceptual BFMs. For 
example: the BFM of forming the belief that P whilst undergoing a visual experience as of 
P. Using this BFM,·an epistemic agent will be able to form a large variety of beliefs about 
the external world,assuming the agent possesses relevant concepts. However, there are two 
ways to conceive of this BFM. In particular, we can conceive of the belief-forming process 
as a one-step or a two-step process. According to the first model, an external-world belief 
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is formed directly on the basis of a visual experience. According to the second model, a 
visual experience first gives rise to a belief about the existence of a certain experiential 
seeming, from which an external-world belief is then inferred. In the latter case, two basic 
BFMs are required: a non-inferential introspective BFM of forming a belief that one has a 
visual experience as of p, whose source is an experiential seeming, and another, inferential 
BFM that allows us to infer p from "I have a visual experience as of p". For example: "I 
am, right now, undergoing a visual experience as of my two hands. Therefore, I have two 
hands". All examples involving perceptual experience below should be understood as being 
about visual perception. 
Modus Ponens Modus Ponens (MP) is the inferential BFM of forming the belief that q 
on the basis of the beliefs that p and that p -+ q. I do not want to engage in complications 
with ordinary language and thus regard "-+" as the material conditional, as opposed to 
the English ''if''. MP is plausibly regarded as a basic deductive (or basic logical) BFM. 
4.2 Conservativism 
Tha.t basic perceptual BFMs generate or transmit warrant is subject to certain conditions. 
Let me explain. 
4.2.1 Conservativism about Perception 
Wright (2007b) argues that, in order for an epistemic agent to acquire an evidential warrant 
by virtue of properly executing a basic perceptual BFM, the agent already needs to be in a 
conducive informational contezt. This means that the agent already needs to be warranted 
to accept a range of propositions ensuring the good standing of the BFM, where acceptance 
is an attitude excluding both doubt and agnosticism (Wright 2007b, p. 27). 
Here is why. According to Wright (2007b) , one of Quine'S important insights is that 
evidence is information-dependent in the sense that evidential achievement takes place in a 
certain "informational context" - a context of background acceptances determining what 
counts as evidence for what in the first place. 
This is very plausible. Clearly, experiences can support all sorts of (different) propo-
sitions in the context of different background acceptances. The darkness of a room can 
indicate nighttime, but also the closed state of the window shutters. In case I just entered 
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the building in full daylight I will not regard (and should not regard) the darkness as evi-
dence for the former, but for the latter. If I know that the windows in this house do not 
have shutters, I will take (and should take) the darkness as evidence for the former, and 
not the latter. Depending on my geographical location and the time of the year, the sound 
of gunfire can indicate nearby fighting, but it could just as well indicate that Oktoberfest 
begins. What I take the sound to indicate (and what I should take the sound to indicate) 
will depend on my background beliefs about my current situation in the wider world. 
This dependence generalizes. Even my warrant for drawing the inference from "I have, 
right now, an experience as of a table in front of me" to "There is a table in front of me" 
depends on my current background information. If I am certain that there is no table in 
this room, then I will rather take the experience to show that I hallucinate - maybe I infer 
that the glass of water I just drank contains psychoactive substances. Similarly, I might 
possess evidence to the effect that I have recently been envatted. In this case, I will rather 
infer that the computer simulates a vat-world in which I vat-face a vat-table. This shows 
that the evidence relation itself - what is evidence for what for an epistemic agent -
depends on the agent's current background acceptances. And this suggests that in order 
for perceptual BFMs to generate evidential warrant for external-world propositions, we 
need to warrantedly accept propositions that make up an informational context in which 
we can regard an experience as of p as evidence for p. 
Note that this is compatible with externalism. An externalist might hold that one 
needs to possess externalistic warrants for relevant background acceptances. In fact, our 
wide notion of warrant enables us to even incorporate reliabilism into this picture. For 
one might contend that our warrant to accept all the relevant background information just 
consists in the reliability of the BFM.85 
Call the propositions which need to be in an agent's informational context in order for 
a BFM M to deliver an internalistic warrant for its target beliefs the presuppositions of M. 
According to Wright, the presuppositions of basic perceptual BFMs include: 
• "the conditions articulating the general co-operativeness of the prevailing cognitive 
environment" (Wright 2004a, p. 164) 
IliThis might imply tbat the COII8eI'vative position and what has been called liberalism (Pryor 2004) 
collapse when it comes to crude extemalistlc warrant. I do not think that this is a bad result. 
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• ''the proper functioning of the relevant cognitive capacities" and 
• "[the good standing o~ the very concepts involved" (Wright 2004b, p. 189) 
An example for the first type of presupposition is the non-obtaining of the possibility that 
the agent in question is a BIV. I will use this presupposition as my primary example for a 
presupposition of perceptual BFMs. 
It is an interesting question what exactly a complete set of presuppositions is, and 
in what sense it depends on the sophistication of the agent. For example, if an agent 
does not have the concept of a brain-in-a-vat, we cannot demand that the agent needs to 
possess a warrant to accept the presupposition without precluding the agent from acquiring 
perceptual warrants, because the agent cannot possibly possess such a warrant to accept 
it without possessing the relevant concepts, or so the thought goes. Moreover, it seems 
plausible that presuppositions expand in the sense that a relevant collection of consequences 
of a presupposition are also presuppositions. For example: if it is a presupposition that 
the agent is not a brain-in-a-vat, then it is also a presupposition that the agent is not a 
brain-in-a-vat wearing a hat. I do not know how the relevant notion of consequence should 
be spelled out, and Wright does not say anything about it, but I will briefly return to this 
issue later in this thesis. Finally, note that the warrants to accept the presuppositions are 
propositional warrants. It is very implausible that an agent needs to have entertained all 
presuppositions. The emerging position can be summarized as follows: 
(Conservatlvlsm about Perception) It is a necessary condition for perceptual BFMs 
to confer evidential warrants on their target beliefs, that the agent in question already 
possesses (propositional) warrants to accept all of their specific presuppositions. 
Corresponding to the inferential version of liberalism about perception, there is also an 
inferential version of conservativism about perception: 
(Inferential Conservativism about Perception) It is a necessary condition for 
inferences from "I have an experience as 0/ p" to p to transmit evidential warrant, 
that the agent in question already possesses warrants to accept all of their specific 
presuppositions. 
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Let propositions in boxes stand for propositions that are proposition ally warranted, 
and let "-.BIV" stand for the proposition that the agent is not a brain-in-a-vat. We can 
display the proposed structure of justification as follows: 
ConsertJatitJiSffl about perception ConsertiatitJisffl about perception (inferential) 
The inferential version includes the application of an additional, non-inferential BFM, 
generating the belief that there is an experiential seeming as of the agent's two hands. 
Wright does not say anything to the effect of whether he believes that this BFM also has 
presuppositions, but it is very plausible that it does. For example: the coherence of the 
concepts used to describe the experience, and the reliability of introspection. 
I accept both versions of conservativism about perception, and I will assume them 
throughout this thesis. In addition to the (Quinean) motivation above, there is a whole 
variety of arguments for conservativism that I cannot discuss here. Wright (2007b) presents 
five such arguments. I will come back to one of these arguments in the next chapter: that 
only conservativism provides us with a good diagnosis of what is wrong with Moorean 
arguments (and other question-begging arguments). 
4.2.2 Deduction 
Consider a particular instance of MP. Considerations similar to those above suggest that 
in order for it to transmit evidential warrant to its conclusion, a sufficiently sophisticated 
agent already needs to be in a proper informational context, including the proposition that 
the MP step is tJoliti." The validity of a deductive inference is among its presuppositions. 
Wright (2001, 20040, 20076) also seems to hold this position.87 We can summarize it as 
follows: 
"The reader taD tbiDk of validity 81 necessary truth-preservation here. 
&TIn any case, he holds c:oDIerVativism for intemalistic warrant. The considerations from the next chapter 
onwards just require this less general conservative claim. 
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(Conservativism about Deduction) It is a necessary condition for a logical inference 
to transmit evidential warrant to its target belief, that the agent already possesses a 
warrant to accept the validity of the inferential step in question. 
As I said, one motivating argument for this position is analogous to the argument in the 
perceptual case. Surely, we cannot claim the conclusion of an inference to be warranted 
without also claiming that the inferential step is warranted - Le. without being able to 
claim that there is some warrant for the goodness of the inferential step - and this suggests 
that it must be a condition for an inference to transmit warrant that we already possess a 
warrant for validity. Of course, the question arises of what "validity" means here. In what 
follows, I assume a version of (Conservativism about Deduction) where "validity" is 
read as ''necessary truth-preservation".88 
Again, the position is compatible with externalism. An externalist might hold that the 
warrant in question just consists in the de facto validity of the inferential step. We can 
depict the envisaged structure of justification for the case of MP as follows, where "Good" 
stands for what one takes to be the correct statement of the goodness of the rule (e.g. 
necessary truth-preservation): 
? 
Goad(p.p -q J q) 
ConsenJatitJism about deduction 
4.3 Scepticism, circularity, and non-evidential warrant 
Everyone endorsing (Relevance Internalism) and conservativism needs to appeal to a 
notion of an internalistic warrant by default - an internalistic warrant one does not have 
to earn by doing any evidential work - for the presuppositions of basic BFMs. 
"Oue might tbiak that it is too much to demand a warrant for anything stronger than truth-preservation. 
For a particular iDferenc:efrom true premises to serve the aim of extending true belief, nothing more than 
truth-preaervaUOQ is requiNd, or 80 the thought gGel. This motivates the fonowing weaker position: 
(Weak COlUl8l"\'atlviam about Deduction.) It is a necessary condition for a logical inference to 
tranamit iDternalistic warrant to ita target beliefs, that the agent already possesses a warrant to accept 
that the inferential step in questiOQ is truth-preserving. 
This iuue is tricky, and merits further research. One reason why it is difficult to endorse this version of 
cOlUl81'V&tivism about deduction is that it becomes problematic in contexts including suppositions. 
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I first present two arguments for the claim that every conservative needs to endorse a 
notion of warrant by default. The first argument shows that without such a notion, we face 
(first-order) scepticism.89 The second argument establishes that, in the course of arguing 
that we possess warrants for the target beliefs of basic perceptual and logical BFMs, we 
need to appeal to the possession of a non-evidential notion of warrant, because otherwise 
the argument will be premise circular. 
Mter that, I argue that everyone endorsing (Relevance Internalism) needs to hold 
that the possession of this non-evidential notion of warrant is claimable on the basis of 
apriori reasoning and self-reflection, i.e. that it is an internalistic notion of warrant, because 
otherwise the (Cartesian Constraint) is violated. 
4.3.1 A sceptical challenge 
For the conservative, the question arises of how to avoid scepticism: for in relevant cases 
it is hard to see how a subject S can ever enter the informational contexts required for the 
generation of evidential warrant. 
Consider the case of perception. How could S acquire a first warrant for the non-
obtaining of the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis? Prima facie, there seem to be two options: 
firstly, the warrant could be acquired by perception (or some line of reasoning based on 
perception). Secondly, it could be acquired by some line of apriori reasoning. However, 
both options are problematic. The first option leads to plain epistemic circularity: if 
the conservative diagnosis is correct, we already needed a warrant for the non-obtaining 
of sceptical scenarios in order to be able to acquire a warrant for the non-obtaining of 
sceptical scenarios by perception. The second option, on the other hand, would require 
initial motivation as well as a sustained defence. What is at issue is that there are certain 
lines of apriori reasoning - such as inferences to the best explanation or considerations 
about the apriori likelihood of being in the good case which can serve the refutation of all 
relevant sceptical scenarios. The burden of proof lies on the side of the anti-sceptic. 
The situation in the basic logical case is similar. How could S acquire a first warrant 
for the validity of MP? Assuming that rational intuition is not an option, we seem to be 
forced to justify MP inferentially. However, we can safely assume here - without loss of 
I'Thia argument is very similar to Wright's presentation of "Humean scepticism" in (Wright 2004b). 
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generality - that every inferential justification of the validity of MP will make use of MP.90 
However, since making epistemically effective use of MP already requires an antecedent 
warrant for its validity, we are stuck again: given our assumptions, the evidential route 
seems blocked. 
Thus, in both cases there does not seem to be an evidential route to first warrants for 
presuppositions. Now, given this predicament, how can the conservative avoid scepticism? 
The crucial observation made in (Wright 2004b) is that a further assumption is needed 
in order to move from the tentative conclusion that there is no evidential warrant for 
the relevant presuppositions to the sceptical conclusion that there is no warrant for them 
at all, namely that evidential warrants are the only plausible candidates for warrants for 
presuppositions. Wright (2004b) argues that this assumption has to be rejected because the 
relevant presuppositions can be warranted non-evidentially. If this is correct, the sceptical 
argument as stated is unsound. It only shows that we cannot possess evidential warrants 
for the presuppositions. 
4.3.2 Circularity at the second-level 
There is a related argument that applies to the second-level of justification. We begin by 
noting that it is desirable to be able to provide second-order justifications - arguments to 
the effect that we are justified in believing certain propositions. In the context of (Foun-
dationalism), this requires arguments to the effect that basic BFMs confer justification 
upon their target beliefs. I consider the perceptual and the deductive case in turn, and 
argue that the possibility of providing such justification rests on the possibility to claim 
that we possess non-evidential warrants at the basic level. 
Perception Consider the case of Hero having formed the belief that he has two hands 
(Hands), on the basis of the corresponding visual perception. How could Hero justify 
that he acquired a warrant for Hands? It is plausible enough that Hero's argument will 
proceed from two premises: that Hero has the relevant perceptual seeming, and that Hero 
possesses a warrant for the presuppositions of visual perception. Now, it is unproblematic 
for Hero to claim that he has the relevant perceptual seeming. This will be an instance of 
self-knowledge. However, the question arises on what basis Hero can claim a warrant for 
80ID &DY cue, there will be some basic rule of inference for which the circularity problem arises. 
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the presuppositions. Let us use the non-obtaining of the BIV hypothesis as an example 
(-,BIV). On what basis can Hero claim an evidential warrant for it? That is: on what 
basis can Hero claim W (-,BIV), where "W (P)" stands for "I possess an evidential warrant 
to accept p''? 
The warrant for -,BIV could either be acquired by some apriori line of reasoning, or on 
the basis of experience. We can ignore the former possibility for the same reasons as above. 
Because of (Foundationalism), this means that Hero needs to argue for W (-,BIV) by 
arguing that he acquired this warrant by a belief-forming process that included basic per-
ceptual BFMs. However, in order to do so he needs to be able to claim, among other things, 
that he already possesses warrants for their presuppositions, including -,BIV. Thus, Hero 
needs to cite W (-,BIV) as a premise in his argument for W (-,BIV). The argument is 
premise circular. The envisaged higher-order justification is useless: it cannot possibly 
generate a warrant for W (-,BIV). 
Now, one might save Hero's argument for W (-,BIV) by claiming that the notion of 
warrant whose possession is claimed by the conclusion of the argument - call it We -
is a different notion than the one whose possession is claimed by the premise W p. In 
particular, Wp (P) must not entail We (P). And prima facie, there are two possibilities of 
what W p could be, if We is evidential warrant: it could either be an externalitstic warrant 
or an internalistic warrant one can possess without having done any prior evidential work. 
For example: Wp (P) might be the simplest type of externalistic warrant - that p is true. 
No evidential work is required for one to possess this warrant, so the argument would not 
be circular anymore. 
Deduction The same problem arises in the case of deduction. On what basis can Hero 
claim an evidential warrant for the conclusion of any inference, i.e. on what basis can Hero 
argue for W (q) if he has carried out an MP step with warranted premises p and p ~ q, 
where" W (P)" stands for "I possess an evidential warrant to accept p''? 
Clearly, in order to be able to argue for W (q), Hero needs to be in a position to claim 
two things. Firstly: that he possesses (evidential) warrants for the premises. And secolldly: 
that he possesses a warrant for the claim that the inference is good in some sellse (e.g. 
necessarily truth-preserving). Let G stand for the proposition that the inference is good 
in the relevant sense. On what basis can Hero claim a warrant for G? 
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Suppose that the warrant that Hero needs to claim here is an evidential warrant, i.e. 
a warrant that has been acquired (or can be acquired) by some other BFMs. Prima facie, 
there are three possibilities of how Hero's warrant for G could be acquired: 
• By means of empirical BFMs. 
• By using rational intuition. 
• By means of deductive reasoning. 
The first and the second option are implausible from the start. In any case, the burden of 
proofs lies on the side of someone who wants to endorse these options. The third optioIl, 
however, leads to a circularity problem again. 
In particular, we can safely assume here that the argument for G will be rule-circular, 
Le. it will make use of at least one MP-step. Now, in order to argue that he acquires 
W for G by virtue of going through this argument, Hero needs to claim, among other 
things, that he already possesses warrants for the presuppositions of all the argument's 
inferential steps, including the MP steps. Thus, Hero needs to cite W (G) as a premise in 
his argument for W (G). The argument is premise circular. The envisaged higher-order 
justification is useless: it cannot possibly generate a warrant for W (G). 
Just as in the perceptual case, one might try to save Hero's argument for W (G) by 
claiming that the notion of warrant whose possession is claimed by the conclusion of the 
argument - call it We - is a different notion than the one whose possession is claimed by 
the premise - call it Wp. In particular, Wp (P) must not entail We (P). So Prima facie, 
there are two possibilities of what Wp could be, if We is evidential warrant: it could either 
be an extemalistic or an intemalistic warrant one can possess without having done any 
prior evidential work. For example: W p (G) might be the simplest type of externallstic 
warrant - that G is true (Le. that the rule is de facto necessarily truth-preserving). No 
evidential work is required for one to acquire this ''warrant'', so the argument is not circular 
anymore. 
4.3.3 Internalistic warrant by default 
However, saving the second-order arguments from premise circularity by just appealing 
to extemallstic warrants is unsatisfactory. For this is tantamount to making ineliminable 
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appeal to external-world conditions in our second-order arguments, which is in tension 
with the (Cartesian Constraint). Rather, at some point we need to appeal to IlOIl-
evidential warrants whose possession is available jUl!it on the basis of apriori reasoning and 
introspection. We need to be able to appeal to internalistic warrants by default. 
Consider the perceptual case. If we have to claim, at some point, that W (-,BIV), and 
"W' denotes an externalistic notion of warrant, then the claim involves a substantial claim 
about the external-world. According to the externalist, this is all we can do. In particular, 
we cannot eliminate such appeal to external-world propositions (here, "eliminate" is of 
course to be understood as in 3.3.3). Thus, the (Cartesian Constraint) is violated. 
Consider the logical case. If, at some point, we need to claim that W (G), and "W' de-
notes an externalistic notion of warrant, then the claim involves a substantial claim about 
the external-world. Because of the (Cartesian Constraint), we need to eliminate this 
claim. However, this means that we either need to be able to establish W (G) by some 
apriori line of reasoning, without making ineliminable appeal to external-world considera-
tions (which amounts to the possession of an evidential internalistic warrant), or we need 
to possess a non-evidential intemalistic warrant for W (G). As to the first option, it is 
hard to see how there could be such an argument that does not lead to circularity at some 
point. Consider, for example, the radical extemalist proposal that W (G) is idential to G. 
In this case, we need to justify G before we can run the original second-level argument, i.e. 
justify our argument for G. Appeal to G would not be ineliminable, and the (Cartesian 
Constraint) would be violated. The second option is just conceding my main point: that 
we need to appeal to an intemalistic notion of warrant by default. 
Ergo: in both cases we need to appeal to a non-evidential notion of internalistic warrant 
(or: intemalistic warrant by default). Suppose there is a non-evidential type of warrant 
E that can be claiIned just on the basis of apriori reasoning and self-reflection. Then we 
can solve the problem of higher-order justification by claiming E for the presuppositions 
of relevant BFMs. For example: Hero could claim W (Hands) on the basis of the claims 
that he has the relevant experience and E (-.BIV). The question of how to acquire a 
warrant for -,BIV does not arise, since E is non-evidential. We just have to claim that the 
conditions for E are met, but, by assumption, these will be available on apriori reasoning 
and self-reflection. 
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Appealing to such a notion will not only solve the problem of second-order justification 
outlined in 4.3.2, but also solve the simple sceptical problem outlined in 4.3.1. I now turn 
to an explication of such a notion which I will endorse in this thesis - Wright's notion of 
entitlement of cognitive project. 
4.4 Entitlement of cognitive project 
Providing an epistemology in accordance with (Relevance Internalism) requires arguing 
for the following two claims: 
• That there is a non-evidential, reflectively available type of warrant which is such 
that possession of this type of warrant for the presuppositions of a BFM enables one 
to acquire fully internalistically warranted beliefs. 91 
• That we (can) actually possess such warrants for the presuppositions ofrelevant basic 
BFMs.92 
Wright (2004b) attempts to establish both claims for his notion of (epistemic) entitlement. 
Entitlements are construed as non-evidential but genuinely epistemic types of warrants 
to trust in a proposition.93 The conditions for a propmlition to be an entitlement are 
construed in such a way that they are available on apriori reasoning and introspection, 
and that the conditions are met for the presuppositions of basic perceptual and deductive 
BFMs. Most important for the two cases at hand is the notion of entitlement of cognitive 
project. Let me explain. 
Call a proposition P a Wright-presupposition of a cognitive project if and only if "to 
doubt P (in advance) would rationally commit one to doubting the significance or compe-
tence of the project" (Wright 20046, p.191). It is very plausible that the presuppositions 
of basic BFMs of cognitive projects - in the sense of presupposition defined in 4.2 - are 
also Wright-presuppositions of these projects. For these presuppositions are the conditions 
ensuring the good standing of the relevant BFMs, including their reliability. Doubting 
1I1That we explaiD how we can acquire such warrants is required by (Relevance IDterDalilm). Note 
that COJUI8l'V&tiviam oaly impolM!B a nece,,,,'11 conditions for warrant-generation, so arguing that there are 
suitable warrants oDIy rebuts scepticism, but does not yet deliver an explanation. 
112 At leaat for thole presuppositions to which the circularity considerations above apply. There might 
some presuppositioDl that can be justified, and for which we do not have to endorse warrants by default. 
"Maybe also to trust in a nile. Wright is not entirely clear here. I will only make use of entitlements 
to propositions in this th.is, 80 I can ignore this case. 
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that such a condition obtains rationally commits one to doubting that these BFMs can 
be used to extend knowledge. So doubting that they are met commits us to doubting the 
significance of the project. For example: 
• Doubting that I am not a BIV commits me to doubting that (basic) perceptual BFMs 
can be used to extend ordinary external-world knowledge, and hence commits me to 
doubting the significance of the external-world project, since the project cannot be 
seriously pursued without such methods. So that I am not a BIV is both a presuppo-
sition of basic perceptual BFMs and a Wright-presupposition of the external-world 
project . 
• Doubting that MP is valid commits me to doubting the significance of extending 
knowledge by using MP.94 So it commits me to doubting the significance of any 
project in which MP is an essential means to extend knowledge. Because logic is 
used everywhere, that a certain basic logical rule is valid is both a presupposition 
of (projects of extending knowledge using) the respective BFMs, and also a Wright 
presupposition of (substantial parts of) almost every cognitive project. 
Now, it appears that eve", cognitive project has (Wright-)presuppositions which cannot 
be justified without invoking further (Wright-)presuppositions which are in no better epis-
temic standing than the (Wright-)presupposition to be justified. Consider the case of 
forming ordinary external-world beliefs on the basis of visual perception. Assuming there 
is no apriori argument for the non-obtaining of Cartesian scenarios, we will have to use 
other perceptual BFMs to justify them. But the project of justifying the non-obtaining of 
Cartesian scenarios again has (Wright-)presuppositions which are in no better epistemic 
standing: in fact, we saw above (4.3.1) that it is plausible that any project of justifying the 
non-obtaining of Cartesian scenarios has the same (Wright-) presuppositions as the project 
of forming ordinary external-world beliefs. Thus, no epistemic progress is possible with 
respect to such (Wright-)presuppositions. This point generalizes. We saw that the same 
holds for the logical case. It is to be expected that this generalizes to all cognitive projects. 
"One might think that it does not· yet commit me to doubting the significance of extending knowledge 
by using MP, becauae I might stut have a warrant for the claim that MP is truth-preserving. As a response, 
one might say that validity is the best explanation for logical rules being truth-preserving, and doubting 
that MP is valid also commits me to doubting that MP is truth-preserving for this reason. I owe this point 
to Robert Wi1U&1III. 
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We already saw that this yields a pressing sceptical challenge to which we have to 
respond. Wright's suggestion is that the key to a response lies in the fact that this challenge 
tells us something important about the nature of (internalistic) warrant and the structure 
of justification, which, once we got it right, avoids scepticism. For: 
If there is no such thing as a process of warrant acquisition for each of whose 
specific presuppositions warrant has already been earned, it should not be reck-
oned to be part of the proper concept of an acquired warrant that it somehow 
aspire to this-incoherent-ideal. Rather, we should view each and every cog-
nitive project as irreducibly involving elements of adventure-I have, as it were, 
to take a risk on the reliability of my senses, the conduciveness of the circum-
stances, etc., much as I take a risk on the continuing reliability of the steering, 
and the stability of the road surface every time I ride my bicycle. ( ... ) warrant 
is acquired whenever investigation is undertaken in a fully responsible man-
ner, and what the [sceptical] paradox shows is that full epistemic responsibility 
cannot, per impossibile, involve an investigation of every presupposition whose 
falsity would defeat the claim to have acquired a warrant. (Wright 2004b, pp. 
190£) 
One way to extract a general anti-sceptical strategy from this paragraph is as follows: we 
can read Wright as conceiving of the sceptical conclusion as being paradoxical - in the 
sense that it is a highly undesired conclusion which is arrived at on the basis of prima facie 
plausible assumptions - and taking this as a reason to reject the (prima facie plausible) 
assumptions about our requirements with regard to the warrantability of presuppositions.95 
In particular, ''it should not be reckoned to be part of the proper concept of an acquired 
warrant" that a warrant for such presuppositions has to be evidential. 
There are at least two ways of understanding the phrase "not to reckon X to be part 
of the proper concept of an acquired warrant". We can read it as a meta-epistemological 
demand to revise or construct our concept of an acquired warrant in such a way that the 
possession of such a warrant does not require X, and we can read it as an epistemological 
insight about our actual, ordinary concept of an acquired warrant: namely that the posses-
95 Another case is the ao-caJled naive conception of truth. Maybe it is another "incoherent ideal" which 
leads undesired conclusions - in this case: contradictions. And maybe the right reaction is just to reject 
some of the prima facie plausible assumption, e.g. the so-called naive T -rules. 
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sion of such a warrant does not require X (see also Jenkins 2007, p. 30). Which option is 
the better one? Since I am not sure whether there is anything like a pre-theoretic concept 
of warrant - and this also makes it somewhat problematic to conceive of the situation as 
a genuine paradox - I shall read the passage as a suggestion of how to construct one's 
notion of warrant in the first place. Jenkins (2007, p. 30) deems this way of reading the 
passage to be problematic, because there is a risk of "changing the subject". However, since 
I do not believe that there is anything like a pre-theoretic concept of warrant, I do not 
think that there is any prior subject we could change. The crucial question, I believe, is 
what we should say about the pre-theoretic notion of knowledge, because the aim of the 
(Traditional Epistemic Project) is not just the vindication of some claimable warrant, 
but of full warrant and claimable knowledge. I come back to this question. It will turn out 
that it is not too important how exactly the notion of knowledge looks like, but whether 
there is a notion of warrant that allows us to rationally claim knowledge on the basis of 
entitled presuppositions (or, in other words: a notion of warrant that allows us to possess 
intemalistic warrants for knowledge claims). 
The argument suggests that we should include a non-evidential notion of warrant in 
our epistemological framework, which applies to Wright-presuppositions for which the ev-
idential route is closed, i.e. where presuppositions of valuable projects cannot be justified 
without invoking further presuppositions which have an epistemic status no better than 
those of the original presuppositions. These warrants are Wright's entitlements of cognitive 
project. They are construed as follows: 
If a cognitive project is indispensable, or anyway sufficiently valuable to us-in 
particular, if its failure would at least be no worse than the costs of not execu t-
ing it, and its success would be better-and if the attempt to vindicate (some 
of) its presuppositions would raise presuppositions of its own of no more secure 
an antecedent status, and so on ad infinitum, then we are entitled to-may 
help ourselves to, take for granted-the original presuppositions without spe-
cific evidence in their favour. ( ... ) 
wherever we need to carry through a type of project, or anyway cannot lose and 
may gain by doing so, and where we cannot satisfy ourselves that the presup-
positions of a successful execution are met except at the cost of making further 
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presuppositions whose status is no more secure, we should-are rationally en-
titled to-just go ahead and trust that the former are met. (Wright 2004b, p. 
192, own emphasis) 
Trust will rule out doubt and agnosticism. It is a positive attitude: 
it follows immediately that if acceptance of such a presupposition is to be 
capable of underwriting rational belief in the things to which execution of 
the project leads, it has to be an attitude which excludes doubt. If there is 
entitlement of cognitive project, it has to be an entitlement not merely to act 
on the assumption that suitable presuppositions hold good, but to place trust 
in their doing so. (Wright 2004b, p. 193) 
Thus, putting trust in P is stronger than merely acting on the assumption that P. This 
is important, because doubting the presuppositions would commit us to doubting the 
relevance of relevant projects, and agnosticism presumably leads to agnosticism about 
their relevance. 
Why is the relevant doxastic attitude trust, and not belief? Wright's reason for this 
is that the concept of belief might be too tightly connected to the possession of evidence. 
For the reasons sketched above, the possession of evidence is impossible in the releV'dJlt 
cases (Wright 2004b, II). Thus, trust is a doxastic attitude stronger than "acting on the 
assumption that", but a doxastic attitude weaker than belief. I will come back to issues 
surrounding belief and evidence in the next chapter. 
Wright eventually arrives at the following conditions for entitlement of cognitive project. 
A proposition P is an entitlement of some cognitive project if P is a Wright-presupposition 
of the project and: 
(i) We have no sufficient reason to believe that P is untrue 
And (il) the attempt to justify P would involve further [Wright-]presuppositions 
in turn of no more secure a prior standing. .. and so on without limit; so 
that someone pursuing the relevant enquiry who accepted that there is nev-
ertheless an onus to justify P would implicitly undertake a commitment to 
an infinite regress of justificatory projects, each concerned to vindicate the 
[Wright-]presuppositions of its predecessor (Wright 2004b, pp. 191£). 
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Presuppositions of basic BFMs are Wright-presuppositions in which condition (ii) is met. 
In order to know whether condition (i) is met as well, we need to know what sufficient 
reasons are. Most importantly, "reasons" could be read as external or internal reasons. 
For example, Pedersen (2009b, section 5) distinguishes between metaphysical reasons and 
epistemic reasons. 
Whether there are metaphysical reasons to believe something is determined by the 
external world. Even the falsity of P might be a metaphysical reason not to put trust in P. 
On an epistemic conception of reasons, a subject needs to possess at least some (internal) 
evidence against P in order to have a sufficient reason to believe that P is untrue. Wright 
must have the epistemic conception of reasons in mind, because entitlements are supposed 
to be internalistic warrants in the sense defined in 3.4: 
entitlements, it appears, in contrast with any broadly externalist conception 
of warrant, are essentially recognisable by means of traditionally internalist re-
sources-a priori reflection and self-knowledge-and are generally independent 
of the character of our actual cognitive situation in the wider world. (Wright 
2004b, p. 210) 
Wright claims that both the non-obtaining of Cartesian scenarios (Wright 2004b, XI), and 
the validity of basic logical rules (Wright 2004a, IV) are entitlements of cognitive project 
because the conditions are fulfilled. We already saw that the non-obtaining of sceptical 
scenarios are Wright-presuppositions. Assuming that validity is the proper pretmpposition 
of logical inferential steps, it is implicit in the sceptical considerations above (4.3.1) that 
condition (il) is met for validity. It is also implicit in the sceptical considerations above 
that condition (ii) is met for Cartesian scenarios. 
Finally, it seems clear that we do not possess any evidence whatsoever for the obtaining 
of any Cartesian scenario. And although arguments against the validity of basic logical 
rules of inference such as Modus Ponens have been articulated (see e.g. McGee 1985), 
Wright does not take them to be sufficient to doubt the validity of such rules. ~ote, 
however, that I am not interested in ordinary MP, i.e. MP for the English "if', but only 
in MP for the material conditional ("-+"). And we clearly do not have any evidence to the 
effect that MP for "-+" is not valid. So, clearly, condition (i) is fulfilled in the relevant 
cases as well. 
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In the logical case, so the thought goes, entitlements for validity ensure that COllser-
vativism about deduction does not lead to the sceptical problems above. And in the 
external-world case, entitlements for all presuppositions of basic perceptual BFMs ensure 
that conservativism about perception does not lead to the sceptical problems above. 
However, Wright makes a stronger claim. Wright claims that, since the validity of the 
usual basic logical laws is an entitlement, the respective inferences can be used - ceteris 
paribus - to extend intemalistic knowledge (Wright 2004b, VIII). The same is claimed for 
the perceptual case: as long as we possess entitlements for all the relevant presuppositions 
- which we do - we can obtain intemalistic knowledge of ordinary statements about the 
external world by basic perceptual BFMs (see Wright 2004b, p. 208). 
H this is correct, then entitlements can be endorsed, at least in some cases, to accom-
plish both tasks required for the (Traditional Epistemic Project). That entitlements 
of cognitive project are strong enough for these purposes does of course require further ar-
gument. First and foremost, we need to explain how exactly the possession of entitlement 
can serve the acquisition of intemalistic knowledge - knowledge we can rationally claim 
on the basis of apriori reasoning and self-reflection. 
4.5 Leaching and Justification Generation 
4.5.1 The Leaching Worry 
Even if one accepts Wright's argument that we possess a non-evidential warrant as soon 
as the conditions of entitlement of cognitive project are met, one might still wonder of 
whether the entitlement theorist can also defend the following claim, which is essential to 
endorse entitlements in any non-sceptical epistemology: 
(Justification Generation) BFMs with entitled presuppositions ceteris paribus confer 
or transmit full internalistic warrant to their target beliefs. 
The worry that this claim is false - the so-called Leaching Worry - poses a major 
challenge to the entitlement theorist. For example: can Hero really claim knowledge on 
the basis of his experience as of his two hands, if he (only) possesses entitlements for the 
presuppositions of this BFM? 
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Consider the case of Hero. The Leaching Worry is based on the suspicion that the 
non-evidential status of the presuppositions of perceptual BFMs will affect the epistemic 
status of their target beliefs. If the Wright-presuppositions of a project have entitled 
presuppositions, so the thought goes, then the epistemic status of all beliefs in the region 
will be (negatively) affected. All we can do, so the thought goes, is to put rational trust 
in the beliefs the project generates, because this weak status of mere entitlement "leaches" 
upwards from the presuppositions to all our beliefs. In particular, so the thought goes, 
entitled true belief does not amount to (evidential) justification, and knowledge. So the 
generated beliefs cannot be claimed to be justified, or to be known,96 
Remember Jenkins's worry that Wright's proposal might just change the subject. The 
question arises for the notion of knowledge in particular. Maybe the ordinary notion of 
knowledge does not work in a way that allows for (Justification Generation), and the 
best we can do is to adopt a new notion - schmowledge - which has the desired property 
built in. But this would surely be changing the subject. 
What can be said in favour of (Justification Generation)? First, note that pre-
suppositions are not premises of the respective BFMs. And whereas it is very plausible 
that the epistemic status of the conclusion of an argument cannot be stronger than that 
of its weakest premise, it is not immediate that the epistemic status of the target beliefs 
of a BFM cannot be any stronger than the epistemic status of its epistemically weakest 
presupposition. This is to say that, although the following principle is very plausible: 
(Limit Principle) The epistemic status of the target belief of a BFM cannot be any 
stronger than that of its epistemically weakest propositional source. 
Or I equivalently: 
(Limit Principle') The epistemic status of the conclusion of an argument (or inference) 
cannot be any stronger than that of its epistemically weakest premise. 
The following, stronger principle is in need of further argument: 
(Strong Limit Principle) The epistemic status of the target belief of a BFM cannot 
be any stronger than that of its epistemicaily weakest propositional source or presup-
position. 
HIt should not be excluded that some kind of externallstic knowledge is acquired. Wright seems to think 
that as well (Wright 20046, p.206, fn. 23). But we were interested in knowledge we can (rationally) claim. 
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As an example for how the (Limit Principle) works, consider Hero, who infers "There 
is no evil scientist who recently envatted me", on the basis of the entitled premise "I am 
not a BIV", using the conceptual truth "If there is an evil scientist who recently envatted 
me, I am a BIV" as an auxiliary premise. This argument is not capable of generating an 
epistemic status any stronger than entitlement for its conclusion. The conclusion cannot 
count as (evidentially) justified, or known. The former assertion might seem a bit puzzling. 
Surely, beliefs for which we have provided an argument are justified in some sense or other. 
For this reason, it makes sense to introduce the following notion: 
(Inferential Entitlement) Any proposition based on an argument using one or more 
entitled premises is called an inferential entitlement. 
If Hero possesses an inferential entitlement for p, he can provide some backup for p, in 
the sense that he can show that he can put trust in the proposition. So "backup" has to be 
read in a stronger sense than the kind of backup one acquires by a conditional proof based 
on mere assumptions, but in a weaker sense than justification on the basis of evidentially 
warranted premises. 
Entitlement theorists need to reject the (Strong Limit Principle), without rejecting 
the weaker (Limit Principle). How can this be done? 
I think the best way to reject the (Strong Limit Principle) is to straightforwardly 
defend (Justification Generation), by giving an explanation of how a warrant for the 
claims that we possess justification and knowledge can be generated in relevant cases (where 
the notions of knowledge and justification are the ordinary notions). If this strategy fails, 
we could adopt the schmoledge strategy. I do not think, however, that we need to endorse 
this strategy, and will not say more about it. 
4.5.2 Two models of Justification Generation 
We need to explain how exactly entitlements for presuppositions can render the respective 
BFMs apt to confer or transmit full intemallstic warrant. One strategy is to argue directly 
for the claim that Hero possesses a propositional warrant for the higher-order claim by 
virtue of having applied the BFM in question. Another strategy is to describe how Hero 
might actually arrive at a claim to knowledge in simple cases, or how Hero might actually 
find out that he possesses knowledge. If we establish that this can happen, we will have 
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shown that Hero is in a position to claim knowledge, and thus that he possesses a full 
internalistic warrant. I propose two models for both strategies in the perceptual case, 
building up on a remark by Wright (2004b). 
Modell - Externalism The first model endorses an externalist picture about the 
ordinary notion of knowledge. Wright writes: 
to be entitled to trust that, for example, my eyes are right now functioning 
effectively enough in conditions broadly conducive to visual recognition of local 
situations and objects is to be entitled to claim that my vision is right now a 
source of reliable information about the local perceptible environment and is 
hence at the service of the gathering of perceptual knowledge. (Wright 2004b, 
pp. 207f) 
Suppose Hero undergoes an experience as of his two hands, possesses entitlements for all 
relevant presuppositions, and forms the belief that he has two hands. Using the Hero 
metaphor, we can extract the following argument: 
1. The obtaining of all relevant presuppositions conceptually entails that Hero's current 
visual experiences are a reliable guide to the truth. 
2. (Rellabillsm about Knowledge) That Hero's current visual experiences are a 
reliable guide to the truth conceptually entails that a true belief currently acquired 
by visual perception counts as knowledge. 
3. (Local Closure) Ceteris paribus, if a set of premises P conceptually entails q, and 
all pEP are entitlements, then q is an entitlement.97 
4. By 1, 2, and 3, we can infer that, since all the presuppositions are warranted by 
means of entitlement, Hero also possesses an entitlement for the claim that his belief 
that he has two hands cOunts as knowledge, if it is true. 
5. If Hero has formed the belief that he has two hands on the basis of visual perception, 
and possesses an entitlement for the claim that his belief counts as knowledge, if it 
• ., Given Hero po8It!IIII!8 all the relevant concept.. Other reasons for the ceteris paribus clause will become 
apparent in the foDowing chapt8l'li. 
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is true, then he possesses an entitlement for the claim that his belief that he has two 
hands counts as knOWledge. 
6. (Claimability) Entitled propositions can be rationally claimed on the basis of apriori 
reasoning and introspection. 
7. By 5 and 6, Hero can rationally claim that he knows that he has two hands just on 
the basis of apriori reasoning and intropection. 
8. By definition, knowledge that is claimable just on the basis of apriori reasoning and 
introspection is internalistic knowledge. So Hero acquires internalistic knowledge of 
the proposition that he has two hands by virtue of forming the belief that he has 
two hands on the basis of a visual experience as of two hands, assuming he possesses 
entitlements for all the presuppositions. 
Note that the availability of this argument shows that (Relevance Internalism) is fully 
compatible with the claim that the ordinary notion of knowledge is an externalistic no-
tion. Moreover, the resulting position will be compatible with (Conservativism about 
Perception), assuming our notion of warrant is wide enough. For we might claim that 
the warrant Hero needs to possess in order to acquire knowledge by visual perception just 
consists in the reliability of the BFM in question (i.e. the de facto reliability of Hero's 
current visual experiences). 
My reading of Wright's explanation can also be formulated as a line of reasoning that 
Hero can go through to realize that he possesses knowledge of the fact that he has two 
hands - where "realize" means "acquire an inferential entitlement". This provides a first 
step towards vindicating the (Traditional Epistemlc Project) in the perceptual case, 
and brings to light further features of the proposal. 
I introduce some shortcuts for convenience: 
• "Hands" stands for the proposition that Hero has two hands. 
• "BE%JI (P)" stands for "I have formed the belief that p on the basis of my current 
experience as of p." 
• "GO" stands for the proposition that Hero is in the good case, i.e. the conjunction 
of all relevant presuppositions of visual perception. 
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• "ReI" stands for "My current experiences of as of </J are reliable" . 
• "K (</J)" stands for "I know that </J" 
Hero can go though the following line of reasoning, all of whose premi:;es are warranted (at 
least one by means of entitlement of cognitive project), in order to acquire an inferential 
entitlement for the proposition that he knows that he has two hands: 
1 BEzp (Hands) Self-knowledge 
2 GC Hero rationally takes this for granted 
3 GC~Rel Facts about the world 
4 BEzp (P) /\ ReI ~ K (P) Epistemic facts 
5 K(p) 1, 2, 3, 4, logic 
Hero's entitled reflection on the process of visual perception brings two light two poten-
tial problems for the approach. Firstly, the argument requires some logical and conceptual 
- indeed, epistemological - competence on the side of Hero. So the whole approach 
faces an exclusive club problem. We only established that conceptually and epistemically 
competent subjects can possess intemalistic knowledge. I think, however, that this bullet 
is not hard to bite. After all, my aim was merely to establish that the readers of this thesis 
possess intema1istic knowledge, and the readers of this thesis clearly have the required 
competence. 
Secondly, one might worry that the argument cannot be carried out just on the basis of 
apriori reasoning and self-knowledge. For, although 1,3, and 4 might be available on this 
basis, is not GO an external-world condition? How does this argument fit together with 
the (Traditional Epistemic Project)? 
If the central point I made in 3.3.3 is correct - namely, that we can eliminate appeal 
to exterJl8l..world propositions by being able to establish that we possess a warrant for 
th~ propositions just on the basis of &priori reflection and introspection - then there is 
no problem. For we are able to establish, just on the basis of apriori reasoning and self-
knowledge, that GO is an entitlement of cognitive project. Once again, we see the central 
importance of the reflective accessibility of entitlements in the context of the (Traditional 
Epiatemic Project). 
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To sum up: I showed that (Justification Generation) holds in a paradigmatic case. 
I thus take (Justification Generation) as explained, although I will come back to par-
ticular instances of it. Note that Wright wants to apply the same line of thought in the 
logical case as well, for he writes: 
( ... ) to be entitled to trust in the soundness of a basic inferential apparatus 
( ... ) is to be entitled to regard its correct deployment as serving the generation 
of proofs and hence, since what is proved is known, to be entitled to claim 
knowledge of the products of reasoning in accordance with it. (Wright 2004b, 
p. 208) 
A small modification of the argument above establishes (Justification Generation) for 
deductive rules whose presuppositions are entitled. Just replace reliability with validity. 
Hero can then use the conditional that, if the premise is known, and the inference is valid, 
the conclusion will be known. 
Model 2 - Internallsm Suppose that reliabilist conditions are not sufficient for knowl-
edge in the relevant cases. Then one cannot establish that one knows just on the basis 
of the claim that one is undergoing a reliable experience. Because of (Conservativism 
about Perception), one then also needs to be able to claim that one possesses a warrant 
for the obtaining of the presuppositions of perception, and these warrants cannot be un-
derstood as being identical to the obtaining of the presuppositions anymore. This holds 
for intemalistic notions of warrant in particular. Let us assume that it is sufficient for 
knowledge in the relevant cases that one undergoes the experience and that one possesses 
an entitlement for the presuppositions. We can still explain (Justification Generation). 
Here is how. 
Again, suppose that Hero undergoes an experience as of his two hands, possesses en-
titlements for all relevant presuppositions, and forms the belief that he has two hands. 
Using the Hero metaphor, we can extract the following argument: 
1. (InternaUstlc Dotlon oCknowledge) That the presuppositions of visual perception 
hold, and that Hero possesses an entitlement for them conceptually entails that a 
true belief currently acquired by visual perception counts as knowledge. 
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2. (Local Closure) Ceteris paribus, if a set of premises P conceptually entails q, and 
all pEP are internalistically warranted, some of them by means of entitlement, then 
q is an entitlement.98 
3. By 1, 2, and 3, we can infer that, since all the presuppositions are warranted by 
means of entitlement, and these entitlements are accessible to Hero on the basis of 
self-knowledge and apriori reasoning (which entails that Hero possess an internalistie 
warrant to believe them), Hero also possesses an entitlement for the claim that his 
belief that he has two hands counts as knowledge, if it is true. 
4 .... 
The remainder of the argument is identical to the argument above. Just as above, the 
explanation can also be formulated as a line of reasoning that Hero can go through to 
realize that he possesses knowledge of the fact that he has two hands. I use the shortcuts 
introduced above. In addition, let "E (4))'' stand for "1 possess an entitlement for ¢". 
1 BBzp (Hands) Self-knowledge 
2 GC Hero rationally takes this for granted 
3 E(GC) Accessibility of entitlements 
4 BBzp (p) 1\ GC 1\ E (GC) -+ K (p) Epistemic facts 
5 K(p) 1, 2, 3, 4, logic 
1 think both models are suitable for the entitlement theorist. Note that both models 
only explain how we can possess entitlements for knowledge claims, and how we can ratio-
nally claim knowledge; they do not establish that we can know that we know. In the next 
chapter, 1 argue that we cannot claim to know p if we possess an entitlement for p. Thus, 
both models entail that we cannot claim to know that we know that we have two hands. 
4.6 Pragmatism and epistemic consequentialism 
Both models of (Justification Generation) depend on the fact that entitlement is an 
(epistemic) warrant. If entitlement was not to count as such a warrant, the above expla-
118Given Hero pOll8ell888 all the relevant concepts. Other reasons for the ceteris paribus clause will become 
apparent in the following chapters. 
147 
nations of (Justification Generation) would break down. Most importantly, possessing 
an entitlement to claim knowledge would not suffice to rationally claim this knowledge in 
a sense strong enough to allow for the possession of internalistic knowledge in the sense 
defined in 3.3.1. In other words: if entitlement was not an epistemic warrant, then the 
proposed lines of second-order justification cannot count as epistemic justifications in the 
first place. 
It is one thing to claim that we can account for (Justification Generation) as soon 
as our epistemological toolbox includes a non-evidential notion of warrant. It is another 
thing to claim that the conditions for entitlement suffice for warrant ability in the required 
sense. This opens the door to an objection. Why should we obtain an epistemic warrant 
for putting trust in a presupposition p just because p is indispensable and unjustifiable in 
the sense required by the definition of entitlement of cognitive project? Even assuming 
that we will be able to argue that we should put trust in p because we cannot do otherwise 
(without falling into the abyss of sceptical doubt), the "should" is most plausibly read as 
carrying pragmatic force, as opposed to epistemic force (Pritchard 2005, p. 241). 
A classical example for pragmatic warrant is provided by so-called Reichenbach cases. 
Suppose Hero is marooned on a small island, unable to escape. At some point, Hero needs 
to eat. There is only one type of food to be found on the island: a fruit which Hero has 
never seen before, and of which he does not know whether it's edible. It seems clear that 
the rational thing to do in this situation is to assume that the fruit is edible and to eat 
it. If the fruit is not edible, Hero might die. But Hero will also die if he does not eat the 
fruit. Making the assumption cannot be any worse than not making the assumption, and 
potentially saves lives. So Hero should make the assumption. It is a dominant strategy 
with respect to survival. 
However, Hero does not have any epistemic warrant to assume that the fruit is edible. 
He possesses a pragmatic warrant. And one might think that Wright's entitlements are to 
be conceived in a similar way. Consider the following passage: 
If a cognitive project is indispensable, or anyway sufficiently valuable to us -
in particular I if its failure would at least be no worse than the costs of not 
executing it, and its success would be better ... then we are entitled to - may 
help ourselves to, take for granted - the original presuppositions without any 
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specific evidence in their favour. (Wright 2004, p. 192) 
The cases look sufficiently parallel. In both cases, assuming something false is no worse than 
not making the assumption at all, or so the thought goes. So are entitlements pragmatic 
warrants? 
I think that the entitlement theorist should take up this challenge head on and argue 
that entitled trust in relevant presuppositions is epistemically valuable. That we have 
pragmatic reasons to believe that sceptical scenarios do not obtain is obvious. And giving 
up the claim that we can account for epistemic warrants at the basic level is tantamount 
to giving up the (Traditional Epistemic Project). 
How could entitlements be epistemically valuable? Remember the definition of epis-
temic warrant from 3.2.1. In order to determine whether entitlements can count as epis-
temic warrants, we need to know what epistemic value is. This gives the entitlement 
theorist room for manoeuvre. 
For Wright's case differs from the Reichenbach case in that the assumption is made 
to pursue a major objective of cognition: gathering true beliefs. If we pursue a cognitive 
project on the basis of entitled trust, we have the chance to gather a lot of true beliefs 
(namely in the case in which the assumptions turn out to be true). If we do not put trust in 
Wright-presuppositions, we will not gather any beliefs in the first place (at least as long as 
we are rational). So putting trust in relevant Wright-presuppositions might be a dominant 
strategy with respect to the promotion of something of epistemic value. 
Now suppose we are able to defend the following conception of epistemic value: 
(Simple Epistemic Consequentialism) Possessing a doxastic attitude is epistemi-
cally valuable if possessing it promotes the epistemic aim of cognition. 
Further, suppose that the following principle is true, which might be motivated by a 
position that Pedersen (20090) calls tlentie monism, Le. the position that truth is the only 
thing of epistemic value: 
(True Bellefs) The epistemic aim of cognition is gathering true beliefs. 
If "promotes" in (Simple Epistemic Consequentialism) is understood in a way 
that dominant strategies for a certain goal count as promoting that goal, we can infer that 
entitled assumptions are epistemically valuable. 
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(Simple Epistemic Consequentialism) can be made plausible by appealing to sim-
ilar considerations in ethics. Consequentialism - that the moral value of an act depends 
on it promoting the moral good (e.g. happiness) - is a position that should be taken 
seriously. Why not also in epistemology? 
Unfortunately, there are (at least) two reasons of why the position is problematic, which 
can be carved out by invoking comparisons with the most straightforward consequentialist 
position: utilitarianism. Firstly, for utilitarians it is not just the promotion of happiness 
that counts, but also the avoidance of pain. Similarly, one might think, it is not just the 
promotion of true beliefs that counts, but also the avoidance of false beliefs. Thus, the 
(True Beliefs) principle is too simple. However, suppose we replace it with: 
(True Beliefs Without False Beliefs) The epistemic aim of cognition is gathering 
true beliefs, and avoiding false beliefs. 
Then the assuming presuppositions is not a dominant strategy with respect to the 
epistemic aim of cognition, and thus not epistemically valuable. For if the presupposition 
is false, all the beliefs that rest on it will be false as well. Thus, although there still is the 
possibility of acquiring a lot of true beliefs, there is also the possibility of gathering a lot 
of false beliefs, and in this context both possibilities have to be regarded as equally likely 
(Pedersen 20090, p. 450). 
Maybe the problem is that it is an external factor whether the assumption leads to 
a lot of true or a lot of false beliefs. Pedersen (20090, p. 447) suggests an internalistic 
notion of epistemic value to save the entitlement theorist. Say that a doxastic attitude is of 
teleological value if its bearer aims at something of epistemic value by taking the attitude, 
regardless of whether this aim is realized or not. The idea is that entitled assumptions 
possess such value since· they are made with the aim of gathering true beliefs. Consider 
an analogy in ethics: in some cases, it makes sense to say that an act was good if it has 
been pursued with a good aim, regardless of whether it has really promoted it. Pedersen 
gives the example of donating to a charity with the aim to help people, although it turns 
out that the charity is a hoax, and its members use all the donation money for themselves. 
This fact does not seem to render the original action bad (at least in some sense). 
However, this internalistic version of epistemic consequentialism is still problematic. 
There is a more general objection to both the extemalistic proposal and the teleological 
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proposal, which can again be brought to light by a comparison with utilitarianism. It is a 
well-known problem for utilitarianism that an act can be a dominant strategy with respect 
to happiness, or taken to be so, but still be wrong. Take the notorious case in which one 
person is killed just to use the organs to save five other persons. A similar problem arises 
in the epistemological case. There are assumptions which lead to many true beliefs, or 
which are made with this intention, but which are epistemically irresponsible, and thus 
appear to lack epistemic value. Consider the following case: 
suppose that some quirky goddess has so arranged things that if I believe 
P-some proposition which I have no other reason to accept and which is in 
fact false-then she will arrange for the rest of my life to go so fortunately 
that all the other cognitive acts I ever perform will be absolutely brimming 
over with all the features that generate epistemic value (whatever they are). 
However epistemically valuable this consequence of believing P might be, and 
even if I knew all about the goddess's intentions, the acceptance of P would 
still be epistemically irrational. (Jenkins 2007, p. 37) 
There are many things to say about this case. First and foremost, I think that the epistemic 
consequentiallst (or teleological theorist) could bite the bullet and claim that believing P 
is not epistemically irrational after all. Of course, one might think, this means giving up 
the analogy to the ethical case. Clearly, we cannot bite the bullet in the case where one 
person is killed to save five. However, what if we increase the number of saved people to 
a couple of billion (or the human race in general)? In this case, intuitions might fade, and 
one might want to bite the bullet as well. Maybe some cognitive projects are so valuable 
that the situations become similar . 
The utilitarian is most likely to argue either (i) that the action is not really superior in 
terms of its consequences, or (li) that we should not focus on what action promotes most 
happiness in a single situation, but what promotes most happiness in a range of similar 
situations. In other words: the question is whether the action can be justified by appeal 
to general rules about whim actions promote happiness in general (this position has been 
called role utilitarianism). 
I do not think that an analogue of (i) is available in the Goddess case. For it is built into 
the setup of the case that the consequences of accepting P are "absolutely brimming over 
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with all the features that generate epistemic value". However, an analogue of (ii) might be 
available. In unpublished work, Daniel Elstein has suggested that the entitlement theorist 
accept an analogy to rule consequentialism in ethics. What counts are not only the direct 
consequences of a doxastic act, so the thought goes, but whether the kind of act has good 
epistemic consequences in similar cases (i.e. in a lot of situations in which someone promises 
to provide epistemic goods in abundance). And surely, accepting a proposition just because 
someone promises to arrange things is highly problematic as a general strategy. Clearly, 
this needs to be spelled out in much more detail. These issues merit further research. 
Jenkins (2007) is pessimistic about consequentialist (and teleological) accounts in gen-
eral. She insists that the conditions for entitlement cannot suffice for epistemic value, 
simply because the conditions do not render it more likely that the entitled proposition is 
true. Her critique rests on the following principle: 
"C: If we are epistemic consequentialists, we ought to think that the epistemic 
value of a cognitive act depends upon its promotion of those aims which it has 
in virtue of its being the kind of cognitive act it is." (Jenkins 2007, p.37) 
Consider the following auxiliary premise: 
(Single Aim Of Acceptance) The single aim of an act of acceptance that it has in 
virtue of being an act of acceptance is truth. 
If both C and (Single Aim Of Acceptance) were true, the Goddess case could be 
explained as a case in which an acceptance of P does not have epistemic value. However, 
this would also entail that entitled acceptances do not have epistemic value: for nothing 
about entitlements makes it more likely that the entitled acceptance is true. 
Why should we accept (Single Aim Of Acceptance)? Jenkins (2007, p. 43) mentions 
the obvious complaint that acts of acceptance might also have the aim of enabling the 
serious pursuit of cognitive projects, in which case entitled acceptances would count as 
being epistemica1ly valuable. However, she rejects this move as being ad hoc. 
I do not think it is obviously ad hoc. The act of ''taking something for granted in order 
to seriously pursue a cognitive project" has the aim of enabling the serious pursuit of a 
cognitive project. If this is an act of acceptance, and there are other kinds of acceptance 
with different aims, we would have explained why the aim of acceptance is disjunctive. 
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As to the act of taking something for granted in order to pursue a cognitive project, 
Jenkins (2007, p. 43) writes: ''1 am not aware that I perform cognitive acts like this". Well 
- what has been said above shows that we have to (or have to be able to) perform such 
acts. However, this does of course not yet show that such acts are epistemically valuable. 
Maybe this is what Jenkins means when she continues writing that "it hard to see any 
motivation for thinking that I do other than that generated by a desire to rescue the claim 
that we have entitlement of cognitive project in respect of these propositions" (Jenkins 
2007, p. 43). 
So Jenkins's objection can be evaluated by asking the following meta-epistemological 
question: do we have to construe our notions of warrant and epistemic value independently 
of any considerations about what properties these notions need to have in order to enable us 
to respond to scepticism? If the former is the case, then Jenkins might be right, although I 
think that optimism is warranted because the considerations above point towards modified 
consequentialist responses that avoid counter-examples like the Goddess case. If the latter 
is the case, then we can respond that the considerations about scepticism above already 
show that epistemologists should not accept both C and (Single Aim Of Acceptance). 
For this would be an expression of an incoherent ideal of the notion of (epistemic) warrant 
that Wright urges us to avoid. 
4.7 Intermediate conclusion 
To repeat: I have argued that every conservative has to endorse a notion of non-evidential 
warrant at the basic level, and every intemalist has to endorse an intemalistic notion 
of non-evidential warrant at the basic level. I explained how Wright's entitlements of 
cognitive project can be endorsed to enable to intemalists to account for (J ustiftcation 
Generation), which provides a solid starting point for our anti-sceptical internalist foun-
dationalism. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, the proposal also comes with 
a certain cost, that needs to he avoided by carefully construing the proposed structure of 
justification. 
Before I proceed with my investigation, one note is in order about notions of non-
evidential warrant. In this thesis, I will solely be concerned with Wright's notion of en-
titlement, and with the notion of entitlement cognitive project in particular. I set aside 
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Burge's (1993), Dretske's (2000) and Peacocke's (2000) notions of entitlement (for a good 
overview, see Altschul 2011). I do think that Wright's notion is most suitable for my 
purposes, but a discussion of different notions of entitlement and their suitability for the 
current project is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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5 Transmission-failure 
The key results of the last chapter were that we have to endorse non-evidential internalistic 
warrants at the basic level in order to avoid scepticism, and that there is such a notion: 
entitlement of cognitive project. 
In this chapter, I argue that, although endorsing entitlements for presuppositions en-
ables us to respond to radical scepticism, the response is still concessive in all important 
sense. Entitlements have a weak epistemic status. First and foremost, they are not suf-
ficient for claimable knowledge, when combined with true belief. So we cannot claim 
knowledge of merely entitled presuppositions. 
However, it is not obvious that initial entitlements for presuppositions cannot be epis-
temically upgraded. So far, we have seen no reason why (Justification Generation) 
should not also apply to bootstrapping arguments. Since it is desirable to claim knowledge 
of presuppositions, it is worth examining this possibility. 
In this chapter, I argue that such bootstrapping fails. The reason for this is that there 
are cases where (Justification Generation) is defeated because its ceteris paribus clause 
is violated. The underlying principled reason is a phenomenon that Wright calls failure of 
warrant-transmission. It occurs precisely in cases where we encounter the sort of implicit 
circularity immanent in bootstrapping cases. Wright argues for this result when it comes 
to Moorean arguments. I extend it to rule-circular bootstrapping. 
So it is indeed impossible to claim knowledge of the presuppositions of basic BFMs. We 
can only claim entitlement here. Thus, it becomes very important what exactly the presup-
positions of relevant cognitive projects are. If the presuppositions include propositions we 
ordinarily claim to know, our epistemology will yield revisionary sceptical consequences. 
This sets the stage for the third part of the thesis. What the presuppositions are depends 
on what our basic BFMs are. Thus, a change in the postulated structure of justification 
might give rise to different presuppositions, and thus enable us to avoid revisionary claims. 
In the last part of this chapter, I show how the structure of justification that Wright 
proposes in recent work - which is based on entitlement for validity claims as well as on 
rule-circular arguments - would have the consequence that the validity of basic logical laws 
has to remain an entitlement and cannot be claimed to be known. In the next chapter, 
I discuss a similar problem for Wright's newest epistemology of arithmetic. In the last 
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chapter, I argue that we can avoid these problems by changing the proposed structure of 
justification. 
5.1 The weak status of entitlement 
I argue that entitlements are weak warrants. In particular, I argue that possessing an 
entitlement for p is incompatible with possessing a full internalistic warrant for p, given 
that we cannot upgrade entitlements to full internalistic warrants. I then argue that it 
is desirable that our epistemology predicts as few entitlements as possible (and as much 
internalistic knowledge as possible). 
5.1.1 Entitlement, evidence, and knowledge 
In what sense are entitlements weak warrants? What underlies their weak status is that 
they are non-evidential, i.e. that one does not have to do any evidential work to possess 
them. That one does not have to possess any evidence is essential, for condition (ii) for 
entitlement of cognitive project entails that we cannot possess any (initial) evidence for the 
proposition in question, at least for any notion of evidence that is not crudely externalistic. 
The default clause (i) of the conditions tells us that this does not matter that we cannot 
possess any such evidence: it is enough that the subject does not possess any sufficient 
reasons to think that P is untrue. 
Wright plays with the thought that this might entail that entitlements cannot be con-
strued as warrants to believe, for possessing an entitlement for P implies that one does 
not possess any evidence for P, and ''it can seem impossible to understand how it can be 
rational to believe a proposition for which one has absolutely no evidence, whether empir-
ical or a priori" (Wright 2004b, p. 176). Note that this also excludes that the proposition 
is self-evident or that the proposition seems to be true. All this cannot count as evidence 
for entitled propositions, 80 the thought goes, because taking it as evidence would raise 
further presuppositions in no more secure a prior epistemic standing. It does indeed seem 
odd to me to say that such a proposition could be rationally believed. 
To avoid this worry from the start, Wright construes entitlement as warrants to trust 
(Wright 20Mb, II). However, the doxastic attitude underlying presuppositions is not really 
important for my purposes here. What is important is that entitlement would still be 
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a weak epistemic status, even if entitlement was construed as a type of non-evidential 
warrant to believe. 
Most importantly, it seems that entitled propositions cannot in principle be rationally 
claimed to be known. For this requires that the subject can rationally claim that it 
possesses some evidence for the proposition in question, which is impmlsible because of 
condition (ii) for entitlement of cognitive project (and the impossibility to upgrade initial 
entitlements). Let me explain. 
Clearly the conditions for entitlement of cognitive project are remote from all the 
conditions for knowledge which have been proposed so far. How can a de facto true belief 
ever amount to knowledge just because doubting it would commit one to doubting the 
significance of important projects, it is not justifiable without relying on presuppositions 
in no more secure a prior epistemic standing, and we do not have sufficient reason to 
believe it to be untrue? Of course, one might construe a notion of schmowledge that 
includes entitled true beliefs (or acceptances). This might be a fallback position. But it 
certainly is a revisionary one. 
In any case, nothing said so far shows that entitlement is incompatible with the pos-
session of knowledge. This is a much stronger claim than that entitled true belief does not 
entail the possession of knowledge. 
In fact, possessing an entitlement for P might be compatible with the possession of 
externalistic knowledge of P. Note that it is not obviously excluded by the conditions for 
entitlement that the subject pOBSe8Ses such knowledge of relevant Wright-presuppositions. 
For example, suppose Hero possesses a de facto reliable faculty of intuition about how the 
world is like. If Hero has the intuition that he is not a BIV, he might count as knowing 
that. 
However, I can ignore this complication here. Remember that the aim is to engage 
in the (Traditional Epistemic Project). And the possession of entitlement indeed 
seems to exclude the possession of accessible justification, in any sense of justification that 
requires the possession of evidence. Let us assume that knowledge requires the possession 
of evidence, either intemalistically or extemalistically construed. Clearly, possessing an 
entitlement for P is not yet to be in a position to rationally claim that one possesses such 
evidence for P. A fortiori, one might think that this is indeed excluded by the regress clause 
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(ii) for entitlement of cognitive project: for how could we ever be in a position to mtionaUy 
claim that we possess evidence for P if any justification for P must rest on presuppositions 
in no more secure a prior epistemic standing, i.e. if any attempt to justify P leads to 
epistemic regress? This is just the point of the two sceptical challenges of the last chapter. 
Ergo: if we possess an entitlement for P, then it seems impossible to internalistically know 
that P (or to rationally claim that one knows that P). 
However, this argument is too quick. For the situation we encountered in the sceptical 
arguments above has changed. We now possess a notion of non-evidential warrant in our 
epistemological toolbox. Once we possess an entitlement for P, P is warranted. Thus, at 
least one type of justificatory regress is blocked: we do not have to earn a warrant for 
P anymore, which would commit us to further presuppositions in no more secure a prior 
epistemic standing. 
A fortiori, according to (Justification Generation), once the presuppositions of a 
basic BFM are entitled, we can use this BFM to acquire internalistic knowledge. The 
question naturally arises of whether we upgrade initial entitlements for presuppositions 
to full internalistic knowledge o/tenJJords, using the very BFMs whose presuppositions are 
entitled. That is: whether there is evidence for a proposition, part of which presupposes 
or relies on entitlement to the very same proposition.99 
For example, one might try to upgrade a previously entitled validity claim by a rule-
circular argument. Nothing said SO far excludes this possibility. However, if such upgrading 
was possible, then it would not be the case tha.t entitlement is incompatible with the pos-
session of internalistic knowledge. The incompa.tibility argument thus rests on the assump-
tion that one cannot epistemically upgrade initial entitlements to internalistic knowledge 
by bootstrapping arguments, such as rule-circular reasoning.100 
I think that bootstrapping is impossible because of a phenomenon Wright calls failure 
of WOfTOnt transmission. According to Wright's transmission-failure diagnosis, the ceteris 
paribus clause of the (Justiftcation Generation) principle is violated in bootstrapping 
cases. In this chapter, I examine Wright's diagnosis and evaluate some of its consequences. 
"This fOl1lluJation bas heeD suggested to me by Robert Williams. 
l00Pedenen (Pedenen 2007, p. 19) argues that clause (ii) of entitlement of cognitive project can be taken 
to imply - with "a bit of unpacldng" - that it is impossible to improve the epistemic standing of an entitled 
proposition. However, I think that Pedersen's argument also ignores the possibility of using a combination 
of bootstrapping and (Justlftcatlon Generation). He does not even consider this possibility. 
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First, I will provide some additional considerations to the effect that claimable knowledge 
and evidence is valuable, and that it is thus desirable to avoid the postulation of enti-
tlements wherever possible. Secondly, I present Wright's diagnosis and argue that it is 
correct. After that, I use these results to show that this has revisionary sceptical con-
sequences for Wright's epistemology, because he postulates a structure of justification in 
which the soundness of basic logical laws and mathematical basic rules are initial entitle-
ments. 
5.1.2 The epistemic value of claimable knowledge (and evidence) 
Below, I will complete my argument that entitlement is incompatible with claiming knowl-
edge and evidence. Full internalistic warrant is strictly stronger than entitlement. But 
why should this bother us? 
The reason cannot be that only full internalistic warrant has intrinsic epistemic value. 
For this would render our response to scepticism even more concessive: I argued in the 
last chapter that this would preclude us from rationally claiming knowledge (and the 
possession of evidence) in the first place, and suggested epistemic consequentialism to the 
rescue. Entitlement has intrinsic epistemic value. 
However, although both entitlement and full internalistic warrant have intrinsic epis-
temic value, I think the latter has more epistemic value. This provides the basis for a 
meta-epistemological argument to the effect that it is desirable to be able to claim full 
warrant wherever possible. 
I go through one epistemically valuable feature of full internalistic warrant, and argue 
that entitlement does not promote the same value. After that, I sketch further features 
for which I am confident that the same argument can be made. I leave these for further 
research. 
Intellectual stability Being in a position to claim a full warrant for p entails being in 
a position to claim that one possesses evidence for p. And being in a position to claim 
evidence for p is more valuable than being in a position to claim an entitlement for p 
because, if we are in a position to claim that we possess evidence for p, it is more likely 
that we can uphold our positive attitude towards p in the light of doubt. 
Suppose Hero believes that p and that Anti-Hero provides some reason to doubt p. 
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If Hero can only claim an entitlement for p, then whether or not Hero has to give up 
his positive attitude towards p depends on whether Anti-Hero's reasons to doubt p are 
sufficient reasons to believe that p is untrue, because this would undermine Hero's (claim 
to) entitlement. 
If Hero can claim to possess evidence E for p, Hero can cite this evidence in response. 
Now, it becomes an interesting issue whether Hero's evidence for E is stronger than what-
ever the grounds for Anti-Hero's doubts are. In particular, Hero might rationally uphold 
the belief that p even if Anti-Hero's reason to doubt p was a sufficient to believe that p is 
untrue, when taken on its own. For Hero might be able to see that his own evidence for p 
is stronger than Anti-Hero's reasons to the effect that p is untrue. 
In this sense, being in a position to claim the possession of evidence promotes intel-
lectual stability. Of course, more needs to be said here. First and foremost, one would 
need to explicate the notion of intellectual stability, and argue that intellectual stability is 
epistemically valuable. I cannot do that here, but, all other things being equal, the daim 
that intellectual stability is epistemically valuable is intuitively correct. 
Other considerations There are at least two more considerations that merit further 
research. The first is mentioned in (Wright 2008), but not explicated in detail. Wright 
points out that intemalistic (evidential) warrant is valuable when it comes to managing a 
system of beliefs: only if one is aware of what is evidence for what - how one's beliefs 
hang together - will one be able to keep holding a sufficiently consistent set of beliefs, 
which might be constitutive of possessing a system of beliefs in the first place. ~ote that 
entitlements might also be valuable in such a project, but, just as above, evidential relations 
might have a special role to play. 
The second kind of consideration is implicit in both (Wright 2008) and (Alston 2005). 
The point is that one might be able to argue that reflective justification is indirectly truth-
conducive (Alston 2005, p.43), just as following norms of coherence, rationality etc. are 
indirectly truth-conducive. That is: if I follow these norms - and I can only do so if I 
possess intemalistic justification - I will, ceteris paribus, gather more true beliefs than 
someone who does not follow these norms. 
I agree with Wright (2008, p. 507) that these considerations can also be used as con-
siderations in favour of (Relevance Internalism), because the specific kinds of epistemic 
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value mentioned here are best promoted by reflectively accessible justification. Completing 
the argument for the value of internalistic evidential warrant presumably also completes 
the argument for (Relevance Internalism) sketched in 3.3.3. However, this claim also 
requires further research. 
5.1.3 We should prefer internalistic knowledge over entitlement 
It is a reasonable aim for any epistemology to allow for as much epistemic value as possible. 
In particular, one should try to find a canonical structure of justification that can be used 
to acquire as much internalistic knowledge as possible. The underlying thought is that 
every philosophical theory is subject to cost-benefit considerations. Of course, we also 
have to take into account the costs. This yields the following principle: 
(Greater Meta-Epistemological Evil Principle) Other things being equal, we 
should prefer an epistemology that accounts for as much epistemic Value as possible, 
without sacrificing something of comparable philosophical worth. 
Since the possession of internalistic knowledge is epistemicallY valuable, and more valu-
able than the possession of other internalistic warrant (entitlement), we should prefer an 
epistemology that account for as much internalistic knowledge as possible, without sacrific-
ing something of comparable philosophical worth. This principle will be applied in chapter 
7. I will argue that this principle delivers a reason to postulate a BFM that generates 
internalistic knowledge of basic logico-mathematical principles, since the ensuing structure 
of justification allows for more internalistic knowledge than a structure of justification that 
uses entitlements for logico-mathematical basic principles. 
Secondly, our epistemology should not be revisionary. It should not yield the conse-
quence that we cannot claim knowledge of propositions in paradigmatic cases of knowledge. 
For example: ordinary claims about the external-world; the validity of basic logical laws; 
mathematical axioms. Of course, one needs to be careful here: it might be unavoidable 
to give up certain claims to knowledge. However, such a radical divergence casts at least 
some doubt upon our epistemological framework. 
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5.2 Transmission-failure 
The above considerations show that it is desirable to account for more than mere enti-
tlement wherever possible. According to (Justification Generation), one can acquire 
internalistic knowledge on the basis of BFMs with entitled presuppositions. Thus, the 
question arises of whether we can acquire more than mere entitlement for the presuppo-
sitions themselves by means of bootstrapping arguments. I now examine bootstrapping 
arguments in two relevant cases and argue that they fail because they are subject to a 
phenomenon Wright calls failure of warrant-transmission. 
5.2.1 Moorean upgrading 
I begin with the perceptual case. The most prominent argument for bootstrapping in the 
perceptual case is an argument by Moore (1959).101 Here is an argument of the same 
type. Assume that a subject S has a veridical experience as of his or her two hands. Let 
"AsOfHands" stand for "I have, right now, and experience as of my two hands", let "Hands" 
stand for "I have two hands", and let "-.BIV" stand for "I am not a brain-in-a-vat"). 
According to Moore, S can reason as follows: 
1 AsOfHands Introspection 
2 Hands From 1 
3 -.BIV 2, conceptual entailment 
The argument's inferential steps seem acceptable. If this is so, then S should be able 
to acquire knowledge of the non-obtaining of the brain-in-a-vat scenario just on the basis 
of a perceptual seeming. This would be an odd result. It seems to be too easy to dismiss 
Cartesian scepticism in this manner. 
Fortunately, (Conservativism about Perception) provides the resources to explain 
at least one aspect of our dissatisfaction with the argument. According to conserV'd.tivism, 
it a necessary condition for the step from 1 to 2 to transmit evidential warrant that S 
already possesses a warrant for 3. Thus, no first warrant can be obtained for 3 by means 
of the argument. 
lOlpryor (2004) a.Iso thinks that Moorean arguments transmit warrant, although he also thinks they are 
dialecticaUy ineJfective. 
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Note: no first warrant. But what if S already possesses an entitlement for 3? In 
this case, the step from 1 to 2 transmits full internalistic warrant, in accordance with 
(Justification Generation). And then, if 2 conceptually entails 3, why should S not 
acquire a full internalistic warrant (and internalistic knowledge) for 3 in turn? 
This cuts both ways. On the one hand, this would be a good result, since it would 
show that we can obtain internalistic knowledge of Cartesian presuppositions after all. On 
the other hand, however, this result seems counterintuitive. In fact, the claim that such 
upgrading is possible appears just as dissatisfying as the claim that we can acquire a first 
warrant for 3 by means of such reasoning. 
5.2.2 Wright's diagnosis 
Fortunately (or unfortunately), there is a general phenomenon Wright calls failure of 
wamlnt-transmission which precludes such upgrading. Let me explain. 
What could we say against the possibility of upgrading by means of the argument 
above? First, it is important to note that (Justification Generation) by no means 
entails that we can upgrade initial entitlements by an argument as the one above. For it 
includes a ceteris paribus clause which might be defeated in special circumstances. Thus, 
everyone having the intuition that warrant cannot be transmitted in Moorean cases should 
look for a principled reason why the ceteris paribus clause is violated in the relevant cases. 
One might think that upgrading is impossible, for the same reason that no first warrant 
can be acquired. One already needs to possess a warrant for 3 in order to obtain a warrant 
for the final premise 2, from which a warrant for the conclusion 3 should be obtained in 
turn, and this is a bad form of epistemic circularity, or so the thought goes. 
However, this is not obvious. There is no epistemic circularity in the sense that one 
needs to possess a warrant of type T for 3 in order to obtain a warrant of type T for 3. 
The thought is only that one can rely on a type of warrant T' weaker than T in order to 
upgrade one's warrant for 3 to T. In particular: that we can rely on an initial entitlement 
for P to acquire a full internalistic warrant for P by means of the Moorean argument. 
There is certainly Borne circularity in here - in a pre-theoretic sense of circularity - but 
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it is not clear that it is vicious. 102 103 We clearly need an argument against the possibility 
of upgrading. 
Wright (2007b, p.36) argues as follows: 
• The acquired warrant for the conclusion of an inference cannot be any stronger than 
the warrant one possesses for the premise. 
• Thus, one's acquired warrant for 3 cannot be any stronger than the warrant for 2. 
• By (Conservativism about Perception) it is an enabling condition to acquire a 
warrant for 2 that one possesses an antecedent warrant for 3. 
• If it is an enabling condition to acquire a warrant for 2 that one possesses an an-
tecedent warrant for 3, then one's warrant for 2 cannot be any stronger than one's 
antecedent warrant for 3. 
• Therefore, one's acquired warrant for 3 cannot be any stronger than one's antecedent 
warrant for 3. 
If this is right, then we can neither acquire a first warrant for 3, nor upgrade an antecedent 
warrant for 3 by the Moorean argument. This phenomenon Wright calls failure of warrant 
transmission (Wright 2007b, p. 36): 
(Transmission Failure) An argument or inferential step fails to transmit warrant (of 
type T) if and only if it is impossible to acquire a first warrant (of type T), or to upgrade 
an antecedent warrant of type T'<T to a warrant of type T, by virtue of carrying out 
the argument or the inferential step. 
It is important to restrict failure of warrant transmission to certain types of warrant. 
For upgrading might be possible for some warrants, but not for others. In particular, I think 
that Wright's argument for transmission-failure is flawed, but there is a good argument 
for transmission-failure for the specific case of upgrading entitlements to full internalistic 
warrant. 
1021 am indebted to Tobias WilIc:h here for a IUBta.ined discussion of this issue, and to Philip Ebert, who 
independently made me aware of it. 
1GaNichoias SiliDs (2OOi) argues that the general argument for the impossibility to upgrade one's warrant 
by Moorean reasoning rests on a confusion of several notions of possession of warrant. Note, however, 
that even if his arpment against general transmission-failure goes through, there might still be room for 
tra.nsmission-failure of full internalistic warrant. Indeed, I think that Silins' arguments fail for this notion 
of warrant. But I cannot discuss Silins' argument any further here. 
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As to the first point, note that Wright's penultimate premise is incompatible with 
(Justification Generation). If it really is the case that the strength of the warrant for 
2 is bound by the strength of 3, then, if 3 is an initial entitlement, the epistemic status of 
2 cannot be any stronger than entitlement. This is the (Strong Limit Principle) from 
4.5.1, which contradicts (Justification Generation). I argued that we should reject this 
principle, and Wright argues for (Justification Generation) elsewhere (Wright 2004b). 
However, Wright (2003, p. 59) sketches another argument for transmission-failure for 
the specific case of upgrading an antecedent entitlement for 3 to a full internalistic warrant, 
which I think is sound. That we can acquire a full internalistic warrant for 3 by going 
through the argument above requires that the subject in question can rationally regard 2 
as evidence for 3. However, given the conservative diagnosis, the subject can rationally 
regard 2 as warranted and thus as evidence at all only because it is antecedently entitled to 
trust in 3, and this undermines the subject's ability to rationally regard 2 as evidence for 3. 
This is because of the general fact that one cannot rationally claim that p is evidence for q 
if p's status as evidence is conditional on q being antecedently warranted. It is the violation 
of principles of rationality at the second-level, and not the (Strong Limit Principle), 
that leads to transmission-failure. 
Wright (2007b) extracts two templates of when he thinks that warrant fails to transmit 
in the external-world project. Here is the template that applies to the case at hand: 
(Information Dependence Template) 
For all propositions e, P, and I, if 
• (a) the transmission of intemalistic warrant from e to P requires that the subject 
possesses an antecedent warrant for I, and 
• (b) P and other warranted premises logically entail I, 
then, if P is obtained from e, a subsequent inference from P to I will fail to transmit 
internalistic warrant. 
The Moorean argument meets these conditions. Thus, according to the (Information 
Dependence Template), it is not a means to acquire a first warrant for 3, and also no 
means to strengthen one's warrant for 3. (Justification Generation) is not applying to 
these cases, because its ceteris paribus clause is violated. 
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This is a correct diagnosis. The template applies only if the argument for transmission-
failure of internalistic warrant applies. 104 In the Moorean case, it can be displayed as 
follows: 
The (Information Dependence Template) severely constrains our response to 
external-world scepticism. Presuppositions such as 3 are entitlements, and condition (ii) 
for entitlement of cognitive project entails that there is no course of justification for them 
that does not lead to an epistemic regress, or circularity. Moorean upgrading was our 
only chance to acquire full internalistic knowledge of 3. 105 3 has to remain an entitlement 
forever. 
Thus, although our epistemological framework can account for internalistic knowledge 
of ordinary external-world propositions, it predicts that we are unable to acquire internalis-
tic knowledge of the presuppositions of perceptual BFMs. It seems as if the presuppositions 
must remain entitlements. We can only claim that we can put rational trust into them, 
but not that we possess evidence for, or knowledge of them. Wright is of course aware 
of this consequence for his own framework, and call his response to external-world scepti-
cism concessive for this reason (Wright 2004b, p. 206). We saw above in what sense this 
consequence might be relevant and undesired. 
In any case, these points are not restricted to the external-world project. There is 
no reason why these considerations should not generalize to all BFMs with entitled pre-
suppositions. Neither the argument for transmission-failure, nor Wright's (Information 
Dependence Template) depended on the specifics of visual perception or Cartesian 
lO4However, the template might Dot apply to all cases. It is designed for cues in which the conclusion 
follows by a deductive aqument. 
l05Philip Ebert aDd Tobias Wdsch independently made me aware of the fact that coherentists might deny 
this. I will ignore coherentist approaches here and 888ume that there is no other route to full internalistic 
warrant. In fact, I think that coherentism is incompatible with the (Traditional EpiBtemic Project), 
but I C&DJlot argue for that claim here. 
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scenarios. Both are motivated by quite general considerations about the structure of jus-
tification. The following principle holds: 
(No Upgrade) The epistemic status of entitled presuppositions of a BFM M cannot be 
upgraded from mere entitlement to full internalistic knowledge by any line of reasoning 
using M. 
Moreover, such upgrading is our only chance to improve the epistemic standing of 
entitled presuppositions, for it follows from condition (ii) for entitlement of cognitive project 
that there is no M-independent route to justifying them that does not lead to an infinite 
regress. Thus, the following principle holds as well: 
(No Knowledge Claims) Entitled presuppositions of our BFMs cannot become items 
of internalistic knowledge at all. 
5.2.3 Consequences 
In the remainder of this chapter, I apply this result to the logical case. In the next 
chapter, I discuss the mathematical case. This will eventually lead to an application of the 
(Greater Meta-Epistemological Evil Principle): I argue that changing the structure 
of justification a.voids some of the sceptical consequences in the logico-mathematical case. 
How do our results bear on the logical case? Note we also endorsed (CoDservativism 
about Deduction). From what has been said above, the following table for the trans-
mission of full internalistic warrant can be extracted, comparing the perceptual and the 
logical cases: 
Perception Deduction 
Liberalism 
? 
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Conservativism 
? 
Good{p.p - q I q) 
Transmission-failure 
? 
Transmission-failure will affect every argument for the goodness of a deductive rule of 
inference which uses that very rule. In short: it affects rule-circular arguments. 
This has consequences for Wright's own epistemology. In his latest work on the episte-
mology of logic, Wright drops his earlier suggestion that we acquire basic logical knowledge 
on the basis of implicit definition. lOti Wright (2004a, IV) argues for the claim that the va-
lidity of basic deductive BFMs is an entitlement of cognitive project. However, claims to 
knowledge of validity are paradigmatic claims to knowledge. Every epistemology that does 
not account for the possibility to claim such knowledge is revisionary. To avoid the conse-
quence that we can only claim entitlements for validity, Wright suggests using rule-circular 
arguments to upgrade these initial entitlements (Wright 2004a, VIII). However, since rule-
circular arguments are attempts to upgrade the epistemic status of the validity claim for 
a deductive rule M by reasoning using M, they cannot be used for epistemic upgrading 
in Wright's framework because of (No Upgrade). In fact, because of (No Knowledge 
Claims), Wright's epistemology has the consequence that validity claims have to remain 
10flHe does not give up the claim that there is a strong connection between the good standing of a 
definition of introduction and elimination rules and the good standing of logical concepts. However, he 
does give up the claim that implicit definition can playa justifying role. I discuss this a little bit more in 
6.1.3. 
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entitlements forever and cannot become items of claimable knowledge at all. This is rel-
evant and undesired for the reasons sketched at the beginning of this chapter. First and 
foremost, this is a revisionary claim. Claims to knowledge of validity are paradigmatic 
claims to knowledge. 
5.3 Rule-circular arguments 
At first glance, rule-circular arguments might look like the best option to justify validity 
claims. 107 For how can we justify apriori that basic logical laws are valid? We must 
either justify their validity inferentially - i.e. through some line of apriori reasoning -
or non-inferentially. How could their validity be justified non-inferentially? On the face of 
it, the basis for a non-inferentially justified belief must be experiential states (Boghossian 
2001, p.6). This plausibly amounts to the claim that we can acquire justification through 
some faculty of rational intuition (Bonjour 1998). However, no plausible account of the 
exact epistemological workings of rational intuition has been produced (Boghossian 2001, 
p.6j Wright 2004a, p. 156). This leaves us with the option that validity can be justified 
inferentially. And prima facie, the following looks plausible: 
(Logicality of Inference) Every inferential justification of a validity claim makes use 
of logical reasoning. 
Such a justification would be rule-circular in relevant cases. So rule-circular arguments 
are unavoidable, or 80 the thought goes. 
5.3.1 Transmission-failure 
An argument is rule-circular just in case its last line expresses the goodness of a rule of 
inference used in the argument. An initially plausible candidate for goodness in the logical 
case is validity. In what follows, I assume that validity is necessary truth-preservation. 
I can focus on the case of MP here without loss of generality. The following "boxed" 
universal generalization is a plausible candidate for a validity claim - where the box ("0") 
expresses necessity, x and 11 are variables ranging over propositions (not linguistic entities), 
10?Note: not to warrant validity. Validity claims might be warranted non-evidentially by means of 
entitlement. 
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and "r x ~ y 1" stands for a function mapping the propositions x and y to the proposition 
x~y: 
(MPV) V'xy (0 «T (x) 1\ T <r x ~ y 1» ~ T (y») 
However, in what follows, I will distinguish between particular validity statements and 
general validity statements. Whereas a general validity statement entails the goodness of all 
instances, a particular validity statement expresses the goodness of a particular inferential 
step. The validity of a particular MP step is plausibly expressed by the following (where 
p and q stand for the relevant particular propositions): 
(MPV-Iostance) 0 «T (P) 1\ T (rp -+ q 1» -+ T (q» 
The distinction between particular and general validity claims is in order because COII-
servativism about deduction might be formulated in terms of particular or general validity: 
the particular validity or the general validity of a particular inference might be claimed 
to be among its presuppositions. Presumably, Wright holds that it is particular V'dlidity 
claims which feature as presuppositions of particular inferential steps. Firstly, his discus-
sion of Carroll's regresslOS in (Wright 2001, pp. 73f) at least suggests that it is a warrant 
for the validity of a particular inference that enables this inference to transmit warrant. 
Secondly, Wright's formulation of the presuppositions of deductive inferences in (Wright 
2007b, p. 30) also seems to focus on the validity of particular inferences, rather than on 
the validity of the underlying inference type. 
Thirdly, someone might understand goodness as (mere) truth-preserV'dtion. Again, 
there is a particular and a general version. We can focus on particular truth-preserV'dtion 
without los8 of generality: 
(MPT-lDstance) (T(P) 1\ Tap -+ q1)) ~ T (q) 
I show that rule-circular arguments for the validity of a rule R display transmission-
failure in all cases, i.e. no matter of whether we take (MPV), (MPV -Instance), or 
(MPT-Instance) to express goodness. 
10lThis refers to the weD-known problem of justifying logical inferential steps presented in (Carroll 1895). 
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Without loss of generality, we can focus on the following argument for (MPV), which 
does not rest on any premises (only discharged assumptions), and which contains a partic-
ular109 MP step from 4 to 5: 
1 T(P) Ass. 
2 T(fp~ql) Ass. 
3 p 1, T-Elim 
4 p~q 2, T-Elim 
5 q 3,4, MP 
6 T(q) 5, T-Intro 
7 (=(MPT» T(P) ~ (T(fp ~ ql) ~ T(q)) 6, 2x CP 
8 (=(MPV-Instance» O{T(P) ~ (T(fp ~ ql) ~ T(q))) 7, ~ec.110 
9 (=(MPV» 'v'x'v'y{O(T{x) ~ (T(fx ~ yl) ~ T(y»» 8, UGlll 
Even ignoring complications about the availability of the required inferential steps -
such as the T-rules - we must conclude that the above argument is no means to upgrade 
the epistemic status of (MPV) from mere entitlement to full internalistic warrant, because 
it exhibits the (Information Dependence Template). Here is why: 
If the general validity of MP is a presupposition of MP steps, then the above argument 
will instantiate the information-dependence template because its last line (9) expresses the 
general validity of MP. An initially entitled (MPV) will remain a mere entitlement by 
(No Knowledge Claims). 
On the other hand, if it is just particular validity statements which feature as pre8Up-
positions - as Wright presumably thinks - then the sub-argument from line 1 to line 8 
will instantiate the (Information Dependence Template) because line 8 expresses the 
particular validity of the MP step from 4 to 5. Thus warrant cannot be transmitted to 
line 8, and the previously entitled particular validity statement will remain a mere entitle-
ment by (No Knowledge Claims). A fortiori, everything we derive from merely entitled 
premises cannot have an epistemic status above mere entitlement, for the epistemic 8ta-
tus of the conclusion of a warranted inference cannot be any stronger than the epistemic 
lO9The step is meant to be non·,chemanc. p and q stand for arbitrary, but particular propositions. 
ll°"Nec." stands for "Neceuitation". 
l11"UG" stands for "Universal Generalization" 
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status of its epistemically weakest premise - this is just the (Limit Principle) from 
4.5.1.112 Therefore, subsequent lines of the argument - including (MPV) - will remain 
entitlements as well.1l3 
Hence, if either particular or general validity is among the presuppositions of MP 
inferences, (MPV) has to remain an entitlement. Finally, taking only the unboxed 
"T (P) ~ (T Up ~ ql) ~ T (q»" (=(MPT» to be a presupposition of the MP step does 
not help, for there would then be transmission-failure in the sub-argument ending with line 
7. Other combinations of presuppositions and arguments fail as well, for the same reasons. 
For example, the schematic argument Wright uses in (Wright 2004a). 
The weaker the presuppositions are, the worse the situation becomes from an epis-
temological point of view. For example: we have seen above that, if particular validity 
statements are the proper presuppositions of deductive inferences, both particular validity 
statements and general validity statements cannot be claimed to be known. In addition 
to not being able to claim that we know that all instances of MP are necessarily truth-
preserving, we could not even claim to know that it is necessarily so that if it is true that 
it rains, and it is true that if it rains, then there are clouds, then it is true that there are 
clouds. 
H, on the other hand, general validity statements are the proper presuppositions, then it 
might at least be possible to derive particular validity statements without creating instances 
of the (Information Dependence Template). Thus, we might be able to acquire full 
internalistic warrants for particular validity claims, although the general claims have to 
remain mere entitlements. 
5.3.2 The failure of Justification Generation 
Interestingly, Wright (2004a) nevertheless seriously considers using rule-circular arguments 
to upgrade the epistemic status of validity claims from entitlement to full internalistic 
knowledge: 
l12Note that Wright explicitly endorses this claim (Wright 2004b, p. 191). 
113There is UlOthw step in the argument above which is problematic with respect to warrant transmission. 
If we use a pGrlicular inteGnce of MP in our argument for the general validity of MP, the we put epistemic 
load into the UG step. 1 agree with Dogramaci (2010) in that the UG step then presupposes an antecedent 
warrant for the general validity of MP. Thus, there is transmission-failure at the UG step at the latest. 
However, note that my worry is independent of, and more general than Dogramaci's. Most importantly, 
it also affects U'gwneIlts for particular validity claiDIB and arguments for truth-preservation. 
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if we are entitled to claim knowledge of a statement which we have recognised 
to follow from known premises by inference in accordance with entitled rules, 
then we are surely entitled to claim knowledge of a statement which we have 
recognised to follow from an empty set of premises by inference in accordance 
with entitled rules. But - assuming an entitlement to MPP and conditional 
proof - that is just what a rule-circular derivation of MPP provides for. (Wright 
2004a, p. 173) 
This is the same line of thought that we used to establish the (Justification Generation) 
principle. Wright suggests that it might also apply to rule-circular arguments. However, 
we have seen that (Justification Generation) must be restricted by a ceteris paribus 
clause, if we accept the transmission-failure diagnosis for full internalistic warrant. Wright 
argues for transmission-failure at many occasions. It is odd that Wright simply ignores 
this phenomenon at this point. 
However, the question arises of why (Justification Generation) is subject to a ceteris 
paribus clause. Mter all, our argument for this claim appeared to be entirely general. We 
need to be able to explain why the argument does not apply in cases of transmission-failure. 
In 4.5, I considered two arguments for (Justification Generation) - one for an 
extemalistic notion of knowledge, and one for an internalistic notion of knowledge. Both 
arguments must be unsound in cases of transmission-failure. What makes them unsound? 
I said above that transmission-failure occurs because we cannot rationally claim knowl-
edge of p on the basis of an argument that includes the premise that we possess an en-
titlement for p. However, the argument for (Justification Generation) rests on the 
thought that Hero can acquire an (inferential) entitlement for the claim that he knows the 
target belief of some BFM (or a chain of BFMs), by realizing that he has appropriate epis-
temic access to the sources of the BFM, and its presuppositions. In rule-circular cases (or 
Moorean cases), the presuppositions are the same as the target beliefs. And this generates 
a problem for Hero's second-order argument. It is useful to briefly consider both versions 
of the second-order argument in the Moorean case to see how exactly they fail. For an 
externalistic notion of knowledge, the argument is very simple - Hero tries to acquire an 
inferential entitlement for the relevant knowledge claim by applying a closure principle for 
externalistic knowledge to the entitled knowledge claim that he has two hands: 
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1 K (Hands) The second-order argument from 4.5.2 
2 K (Hands) -t K (...,BIV) Closure of externalistic knowledge 
3 K (...,BIV) Accessibility of epistemic facts 
Because of transmission-failure, Hero cannot rationally claim 3 on the basis of apriori 
reasoning and self-reflection (although he can rationally claim 1 on this basis). 
It is problematic to give up closure, because the Instability Argument for (Relevance 
Internalism) assumed that externalists should not give up closure. What this brings to 
light is that rational claimability cannot be closed under (recognized) logical consequence. 
A fortiori, since the argument for (Justification Generation) rests on the thought that 
we can claim knowledge of p because we can acquire an inferential entitlement for the 
claim that we know p, inferential entitlement (and hence, entitlement) is not closed under 
logical consequence. Presumably, Wright would not want to accept this consequence. I 
cannot see, however, how we can avoid this consequence if we want to uphold our model for 
(Justification Generation) and allow for transmission-failure without giving up closure. 
Since both the transmission-failure diagnosis and (Justification Generation) must be 
right, I am willing to bite the bullet here. 
A different diagnosis will be available if we hold that the notion of knowledge is an 
internalistic notion. In this case, we can give up closure without undermining our argument 
for (Relevance Internallsm). Closure will fail in all cases of transmission-failure. Thus, 
Hero cannot rationally claim (is not entitled to claim) the conditional "K (Hands) -t 
K(-,BIV)". 
5.4 Two responses 
Let us return to Wright's epistemology. Wright either has to give up the transmission-
failure diagnosis, or he has to concede that his strategy to vindicate rule-circular argu-
ments fails. I think that the transmission-failure diagnosis is correct. The principles (No 
Upgrade) and (No Knowledge Claims) apply. By (No Upgrade), rule-circular argu-
ments cannot be used to upgrade initial mere entitlements to full internalistic knowledge. 
A fortiori, by (No Knowledge Claims), we obtain the revisionary sceptical consequence 
that in Wright's epistemology the validity of basic logical rules cannot be claimed to be 
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known at all. Since he thinks that it is particular validity claims that feature as presup-
positions, even particular validity statements cannot be claimed to be known. 
The only way to avoid these sceptical consequences is to find or construct a disa.ualogy 
between the Moorean case and the rule-circular case. That is: one needs to argue that 
the (Information Dependence Template) does not apply to the logical case, but just 
applies to the external world case. 
However, it is hard to see how such an argument would look like. The argument 
for transmission-failure in the perceptual case is based on entirely general considerations 
about the structure of justification, and maybe also on entirely general considerations about 
rational claimability. The underlying considerations, if they are correct in the perceptual 
case, will also be correct in the logical case and indeed in any conservatively treated area 
of cognitive inquiry, or so it seems. Nevertheless, there are some peculiaritie8 about the 
rule-circular case that one might want to use to argue that there is a disanalogy. I close 
with rebutting two such arguments. 
5.4.1 Discharged assumptions 
The reader will have noticed that there is a structural disanalogy between the Moorean 
argument and the rule-circular argument. The rule-circular argument above rests 011 dis-
charged assumptions, whereas the premises of Moore's proof are not assumptions. Amollg 
other things, one might wonder whether one can speak of warrant being transmitted ill 
the former case at all: after all, the assumptions are merely assumptions, and as such not 
really warranted. We can assume whatever we want to assume. 
Firstly, the disanalogy can be removed by changing the rule-circular argument. One 
might attempt to acquire intemalistic knowledge of 5 by means of using an axiomatic 
calculus which includes MP as its only rule of inference. We can assume that the proof 
will be based on axioms different than 5, which are intemalistically known. 114 There is no 
structural disanalogy anymore. The situation is just as in the Moorean case: we have a 
proof of p on the basis of internalistically known premises, where at least one inferential 
step presupposes p. The (Information Dependence Template) applies. Now, it is 
114If the axioms are not internalistically known, there is no way we can acquire internalistic knowledge 
of the conclusion in the first place. If I) is an axiom, we beg the question because 5 would Dot have to be 
justified. 
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very implausible that we can justify the validity of MP by using rules and discharged 
assumptions, but that we cannot do so if we use an axiomatic calculus. We should conclude 
that warrant cannot be transmitted in both cases. 
Secondly, there is a way to use the transmission-metaphor even in the case of discharged 
assumptions. We might regard discharged assumptions as temporarily warranted, and 
ask whether temporary warrant can be transmitted. I just cannot see any reason why 
temporary warrant can be transmitted in the relevant cases, given that we accept the 
transmission-failure diagnosis for non-temporary warrant. 
5.4.2 Entitlement for rules 
The second strategy concerns a possible distinction between entitlement for propositions 
and entitlement for rules. Suppose we have a notion of an entitlement to apply a rule. 
Perhaps, we can also defend the following principle: 
(Justification Generation for Rules) Deductive inferences we are entitled to apply 
transmit internalistic knowledge from their premises to their conclusion. 
The proposal is similar to Wright's in that we need to possess an antecedent entitlement 
in order for deductive rules to extent internalistic knowledge. However - and this is the 
crux - we would not need to possess an antecedent entitlement for a proposition. Thus, so 
the thought goes, Wright's arguments for transmission-failure do not apply to the logical 
case: there is simply no antecedently entitled proposition whose epistemic status we desire 
to upgrade. 
However, firstly, one would have to spell out what an entitlement to apply a rule 
consists in, in such a way that it does not consist in an entitlement for a proposition. On 
the face of it, it seems natural to say that an entitlement for a rule just consists in an 
entitlement for the goodness of the rule. Whatever proposition expresses goodness, there 
would be transmission-failure again: we would not be able to upgrade our entitlement by 
a rule-circular argument. 
Secondly, one might worry that the whole dialectic can simply be replicated for entitled 
rules.us That we are merely entitled to apply a rule would be a sceptical result, just as 
the result that we possess only entitlements for validity. Of course, one might attempt to 
11111 owe this point to Robert Williams. 
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upgrade our entitlement such that we become fully justified in applying a rule. However, 
if this upgrading requires making use of the rules in question, it is plausible that we face 
transmission-failure worries again. If we cannot epistemically upgrade entitled propositions 
using a line of reasoning including this proposition as a presupposition, then how could it 
be possible to epistemically upgrade entitled rules using a line of reasoning including this 
rule? 
5.5 Intermediate conclusion: unavoidable sceptical consequences? 
In the last chapter, the question has been raised of how presuppositions of basic BFMs can 
be warranted. A sceptical argument showed us that, if they are warranted at all, they are 
warranted non-evidentially. We endorsed Wright's notion of entitlement to avoid sceptical 
consequences. We saw that many propositions can be internalistically known because 
BFMs with entitled presuppositions ceteris paribus confer and transmit full internalistic 
warrant. This chapter revealed that the ceteris paribus clause is crucial. The epistemic 
status of antecedently entitled presuppositions cannot be epistemically upgraded above 
entitlement because of the phenomenon of failure of warrant transmission. 
This consequence is significant because entitlement is a weak epistemic status and it is 
desirable to obtain more than entitlement. I provided some considerations to this effect. 
However, there might be a difference among cases. Some presuppositions might be too 
remote to generate the problem that our epistemology is revisionary. Other presuppositions 
might be such that the result that we cannot claim knowledge of them has to count as a 
revisionary sceptical consequence. 
I do not know to what extent the result that we cannot claim knowledge of the non-
obtaining of the BIV scenario is a revisionary claim. It might be, but this result is unavoid-
able. In any case, I think that the result that we cannot claim knowledge of the validity 
of basic logical laws is a revisionary claim. 
It becomes apparent that Wright's epistemology cannot avoid such revision. This raises 
the question of whether this consequence is devastating for Wright's epistemology - or 
whether Wright could just bite the bullet: after all, he bites the bullet in the external 
world case as well. Maybe it is just unavoidable that we do not possess more than mere 
entitlement for validity, just as it is unavoidable that we cannot claim to know that we 
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are not BIVs. In the next chapter, I will argue that Wright's philosophy of mathematics 
faces similar problems. Again, the question arises of whether we can bite the bullet that 
we cannot claim more than entitlement. 
In the next chapter I argue that there is the possibility to bite the bullet in the logico-
mathematical cases. This is because the resulting framework would still achieve a lot 
because of what has been called (Justification Generation) above: except for cases of 
transmission-failure, proceeding in accordance with BFMs with entitled presuppositions 
- including basic logical rules and basic mathematical rules - delivers full iuternalistic 
warrant. 
So far, so good. However, I also think that we should not bite the bullet ill logico-
mathematical cases. This is for a methodological, meta-epistemological reason I briefly 
discussed above: the (Greater Meta-Epistemological Evil Principle). 
Ask what the aims of Wright's and our framework were in the first place. Wright accepts 
conservativism for general reasons concerning the nature of evidence. He accepts the 
transmission-failure diagnosis in order to explain the intuition that Moorean arguments are 
unsatisfactory. And he has to postulate entitlements because internalist foundationalism is 
a non-starter without non-evidential warrants at the basic level. Apart from that, I think 
that Wright aims at getting as much as possible. In particular, I think that Wright would 
agree that it is desirable to account for as much intemalistic knowledge as possible. 
Now it seems that Wright only suggests making use of rule-circular arguments because 
he lacks alternatives. For example, in his (Wright 2004 a) , Wright considers using rule-
circular arguments because he seems to think that the only alternative way to account for 
evidential warrants for validity is postulating a faculty of rational intuition, and that this 
position faces insunnountable objections. 
However, nothing precludes us from using a defensible alternative course of justifi-
cation once it is available. Thus, we obtain the following conditional: if we can find a 
defensible structure of justification 5J which, combined with the conservative diagnosis, 
the transmission-failure diagnosis, and the entitlement proposal leads to more intemalistic 
knowledge than the use of rule-circular arguments, then we should postulate SJ instead. 
In the last chapter, I shall examine such an alternative structure of justification for logic 
and mathematics. The idea is to (re)consider the proposal that basic logico-mathematical 
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knowledge can be obtained by means of implicit definition. The hope is that suitably em-
bedding Hale's and Wright's earlier (Implicit Definition Thesis) in the current frame-
work yields more intemalistic knowledge than postulating entitlements for basic principles 
directly. 
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Part III 
New solutions to old problems 
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6 Entitled mathematics 
In this chapter, I examine the possibility that (HP) is an entitlement of cognitive project. 
After motivating the claim that mathematical basic principles are entitlements, I discuss 
Wright's explication of a position based on this claim. It transpires that Wright's po-
sition yields revisionary sceptical consequences, because of the weak epistemic status of 
entitlement, and the transmission-failure diagnosis. However, the situation is not quite 
as bad as it may first seem. In the second part of this chapter, I argue that even the 
worst case - that all of arithmetic is a mere entitlement - is not devastating to our 
epistemology overall. A concessive position emerges as a fallback position, which I call 
semi-sceptical Joundationalism. It can be endorsed in case both Wright's position and the 
position defended in the next chapter prove to founder. 
6.1 Entitlement and arithmetic 
In Part II, I have argued that intemalist foundationalists have to regard certain presuppo-
sitions as being warranted non-evidentially, and I have endorsed Wright'S entitlements as 
an explication of the notion of non-evidential intemalistic warrant. With this tool at hand, 
we can now finally reconsider the problems we started oft' with. First and foremost: how 
are our beliefs in mathematical axioms - qua basic principles about realms of abstract 
objects - warranted apriori? 
My focus lies on arithmetic, but note that the arguments in this chapter generalize. 
In 1.1.1, I presented a general puzzle about the justification of axioms. The second-order 
Peano axioms are mathematical basic principles. In actual mathematical practice, they 
are simply postulated as being true without any explicit justification. 
In chapter 2, we have seen that the nea-Fregean complicates the story by proving these 
axioms from (HP). According to the nea-Fregean, we can acquire apriori knowledge of 
(HP) because it is an implicit definition of the number operator, and we can warrantedly 
assume the definitional success of (HP) bfl default. With the notion of entitlement, we 
now possess a precise notion of warrant by default. However, there are at least two options 
as to what exactly is warranted by default. We could apply the idea of default entitlement 
at the level of presuppositions, and we could apply it to (HP) directly. In this chapter, 
I examine three positions according to which it is (the truth of) (HP) itself which is 
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warranted by default. Although all of these positions have the consequence that (HP) has 
a weak epistemic status, they differ with respect to their predictions as to the epi!;temie 
status of the following two classes of relevant truths: 
• (A) The theorems of pure arithmetic (i.e. the theorems of second-order PAl . 
• (B) The truths of applied arithmetic. That is: true mixed statements such as "The 
number of planets = 8". 
The three positions are: 
1. Wright's newest epistemology of arithmetic, outlined in (Wright 2009). It aims at 
vindicating knowledge claims of both (A) and (B). 
2. A position I call semi-sceptical/o'l.mdationalism, without a phenomenon I call ex-
tended leaching. It vindicates knowledge claims of (B), but not of (A). 
3. Semi-sceptical foundationalism with extended leaching. It concedes that both (A) 
and (B) are merely entitled. 
I will argue that, under certain conditions, even the most concessive position (3) is not 
devastating to our epistemology overall. 
6.1.1 Axioms as entitlements 
At first glance, it appears that (HP) meets all the conditions for entitlement of cognitive 
project. In fact, every proposition we take to be an axiom of a pure Inathematical theory 
seems to meet these conditions. The first condition for a proposition to be an entitlement 
of cognitive project is that it is a Wright-presupposition of a relevant cognitive project, 
and the following princple is very plausible: 
(Axiomatic Presupposition) Whatever we take to be the axioms of a pure math-
ematical theoryT, they are Wright-presuppositions of the cognitive project of finding 
out about the subject matter of T, for doubting the truth of the axioms would rationally 
commit one to doubting the significance of this project. 
As an example, consider the project of finding out about the world of natural num-
bers. (HP) isa Wright-presuppositions of this project, because doubting its truth would 
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rationally commit us to doubting the significance of this project (Pedersen 2009b, section 
4). 
Moreover, most axioms of pure mathematical theories also appear to meet condition 
(i) for entitlement of cognitive project: for in most cases we simply do not seem to have 
sufficient reason to believe that the relevant axioms or abstraction principles are untrue. 1 16 
Consider the case of (HP) again. On the face of it, we can identify two ways of casting 
doubt upon its truth: 
• Option 1 (mathematical doubt): mathematicians have cast doubt upon its truth 
by casting doubt on the consistency of PA. However, so far all attempts to provide 
sufficient reason to believe that PA is inconsistent have failed. Consider, for example, 
the recent discussion of Nelson's claim that PA is inconsistent (Nelson 2011) . 
• Option 2 (metaphysical doubt): nominalists have cast doubt upon the truth of math-
ematical basic principles on the basis of the conviction that there are no abstract 
objects. For example, nominalists might argue that numbers would be queer entities 
because they would not existent space and time, because there would be infinitely 
many of them, etc. One possible reaction to such worries is that such cOIlsidera-
tions fail to provide a sufficient reason to believe that pure mathematical theories 
are untrue for Moorean reasons. That is: our antecedent warrants for the truth of 
mathematical theories are stronger than the warrants we might possess for the philo-
sophical premises that lead to the denial of their truth. 1l7 Of course, a stubborn 
nominalist will not be satisfied. What exactly counts as a sufficient reason to believe 
that a proposition is untrue remains to be clarified (see also Pedersen 2009b).1l8 
I conclude that it is at least initially plausible that condition (i) is met by (HP). 
lHIThere might be lOme exceptiou: e.g. axioma postulating the existence of certain large cardinals. 
11 'Note that the current question ill whether we have sufticient reason to believe that mathematical 
theories are untrue. It is another matter entirely to explain how we can warrantedly believe that pure 
mathematical theories are true. 
lllMaybe we can aIao respond that the worries of the stubborn nominaliBtll are irrelevant, because their 
world view is so cWrerent that their doubts do not matter to those who do not share this worldview. 
Consider the analogous case of someone who is an idealist, and already convinced that there is no external 
world. The idealist will not acree that the existence of an external world is an entitlement, but this should 
not worry the realist too much: the realiIIt is concerned with the question of what can make hil claims 
to knowledge rational, ""uming a realist world view. Maybe there are fundamentally different ways of 
conceiving of the world, and doubts arising from BUch deep disagreement are irrelevant. These issues are 
very dif6cult to .... , and I cannot even begin to address them in this thesis. Note that this response 
might be in tensioll with the InatabUity Argument for (Relevance Int8l'naUsm), which is based on the 
desire to arrive at an aaymmetric intemal epistemic situation. 
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6.1.2 A regress argument 
So the claim that axioms are entitlements rests on condition (ii) - that the axioms canIlot 
be justified without relying on other Wright-presuppositions in no more secure a prior 
epistemic standing. Again, I focus on the case of (HP). 
How can we justify (HP)? Either it is justified inferentially or not. In mathematics, 
inferential justification arguably means proof on the basis of other, more basic propositioIls. 
Let us assume that this is so: 
(Logicality of Inference in Mathematics) Every inferential justification in mathe-
matics is deductive, i.e. by means of logic.1l9 
Given this assumption, justifying (HP) inferentially requires deductively inferring it 
from other propositions which are in a more secure, prior epistemic standing. However, it 
seems that there are no such propositions. (HP) cannot be derived from (second-order) 
logic alone. One needs an additional non-logical premise (or collection of premises). How-
ever, this premise needs to be proof-theoretically at least as strong as (HP). In this partic-
ular case, this renders it doubtful that this proposition can be in any better prior epistemic 
standing. A fortiori, consider any proposition X that entails (HP) in the background logie. 
The question would arise of how X is justified. After all, X entails second-order arithmetic. 
So we have to appeal to another premise (or collection of premises) that entails X. 
We thus enter an epistemic regress (or end up in a circle) - unless, of course, at some 
point we do not have to justify the relevant basic proposition inferentially. But what are 
the non-inferential alternatives? And if there is such a way, then why can we not justify 
(HP) non-inferentially in the first place? 
Is there a way to justify (HP) non-inferentially? Firstly, one might refer to some kind 
of rational intuition. But apart from the question whether such a proposal is tenable at all 
- and we have seen in 1.3.1 that this option is not very promising - the use of rational 
intuition (implicitly) relies on the presupposition that it is reliable. And how are we to 
justify this presupposition?l20 Let us leave the swamps of rational intuition then, and 
consider alternatives. 
119Thia is a mathematical analogue of the (LoKlcaUty of Inference) assumption from 5.3. 
1200£ course, ODe miaht think that the reliability of rational intuition is warranted by means of entitlement: 
this might be a poeition worth exploring for someone who thinks that rational intuition is an option, but 
it is not a position to be exploI'8d in this thesis. 
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Secondly, one might think that one can improve (HP)'s epistemic standing indirectly 
by justifying its consistency or satisfiability. Hilbert, in a letter to Frege, can be interpreted 
as defending such a view: 
If the arbitrarily posited axioms together with all their consequences do not 
contradict one another, then they are true and the things defined by these 
axioms exist. For me, this is the criterion of truth and existence. (Hilbert to 
Frege 1899, in Frege 1980, pp. 39f) 
However, even if the position were correct in general,121 we would still have to justify 
(HP)'s consistency. Assuming that this justification needs to be inferential, this proof 
needs to be carried out in some background system. For example, Boolos (1990) has 
shown that Frege Arithmetic is consistent relative to second-order arithmetic. Huwever, 
in showing FA consistent relative to analysis [=second-order arithmetic] the 
consistency of FA is held hostage to the consistency of analysis. Whatever 
its merits, the relative consistency proof does nothing to establish that. Due 
to Gijdel's second incompleteness theorem, the best one can do with respect 
to the consistency of analysis - indeed, any theory strong enough to express 
elementary arithmetic - is to establish it relative to some other theory T of 
consistency strength greater than that of analysis itself. Thus, the consistency 
of analysis will be held hostage to that of T. The pattern repeats itself, and a 
regress of relative consistency proofs involving stronger and stronger theories 
results. (Pedersen 200gb, p. 23) 
Thus, we cannot justify (HP)'s consistency without relying on something in no more secure 
a prior epistemic standing, and enter an epistemic regress again. It should be clear enough 
that the same argument applies to satisfiability (Pedersen 2007). 
Neither Pedersen (nor Hilbert, of course) consider the option of justifying couHistency 
by non-logical means.l22 For example, one might think one can argue for the consistency of 
(HP) on the basis of the fact that no one has yet observed an inconsistency. However, one 
might think that such kinds of establishing consistency are inadequate for mathematics. In 
particular, there is a risk that our justification of consistency turns out to be aposteriori. 
mIt ii, of coune, POther matter entirely whether this train of thought is conducive to a Platonistic 
interpretation of the axioma. 
1221 owe this point to Robert WiUiams. 
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Since these three options - proof on the basis of further, more basic premises, rational 
intuition, and indirect justification - are exhaustive, so the thought goes, (HP) cannot 
be justified without relying on something in no more secure a prior epistemic standing. 
In the next chapter, I argue that these options are not exhaustive, and that we should 
reject (Logicality of Inference in Mathematics). But let us assume, for the sake of 
the argument, that they are. 
Two notes are in order. Firstly, one might think that one can still justify some mathe-
matical theories on the basis of other, more basic theories. Maybe all mathematical theories 
rest on set theory. Of course, the discussed regress would then arise for the axioms of set 
theory, and it might well turn out that the axioms of set theory are entitlements. Sec-
ondly, as I mentioned above, the same argument can be applied to the conjunction of the 
second-order Peano axioms. This raises the question of why we should focus on (HP), as 
opposed to these axioms. Does it really matter which axiomatization we choose? 
We need to keep both questions in mind, because they suggest that the positions dis-
cussed in this chapter have nothing to do with neo-Fregeanism. In the course of this 
chapter, it will become apparent that it does make sense to focus on (HP) (and on ab-
straction principles). 
6.1.3 Wright on entitlement and arithmetic 
In his most recent work on the epistemology of mathematics (Wright 2009), Wright aims 
at vindicating a form of neo-Fregeanism by arguing that (HP) is an entitlement. 
Wright's argument for (UP) being an entitlement diverges from the simple train of 
thought above. One way to interpret Wright (2009, §6) is, roughly, this: firstly, the good 
standing of a project's concepts is a Wright-presupposition of this project. Thus, it is also a 
Wright-presupposition of this project that the means of fixing these concepts are Imccessful. 
Now, the concept of number is implicitly defined by (HP): "#" means whatever renden; 
(HP) true. Thus, (HP) must be true in order for the arithmetical concepts to be in good 
standing. Therefore, (the truth of) (UP) is a Wright-presupposition of the arithmetical 
project. It is also an entitlement of cognitive project, because the other conditions for 
entitlement are met as well. 
According to this interpretation of Wright, (UP) is a Wright-presupposition of the 
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arithmetical project - the project of finding out about the world of (natural) numbers -
because doubting (HP)'s truth would rationally commit one to doubting that the concept 
of number is in good standing, and thus rationally commit one to doubting the significance 
of finding out about numbers. 
However, there is a second project of which (HP) might be a Wright-presupposition. 123 
Wright can also be read as expressing the thought that there are projects of ensuring that 
our concepts are in good standing, and that such projects rest on entitlements for the sue-
cess of our meaning-fixing devices, and thus on the truth of meaning-fixing principles. For 
example: ensuring that the concept of number is in good standing rests on the possibility 
of rationally regarding (HP) as being true, because its truth is required to successfully fix 
the concept of number. This thought can be summarized as follows: 
(Metasemantic Presupposition) Abstraction principles are Wright-presuppositions 
of the project of ensuring that our mathematical concepts are in good standing. 124 
It does not matter here which interpretation we take. Let us assume that (HP) is a 
Wright-presupposition of some significant cognitive project, and let us consider condition 
(i) for (HP) being an entitlement. Do we have sufficient reason to believe that (HP) is 
untrue? Of course, Wright does not think so. But Wright does not think the issue is settled 
by just considering mathematical doubts and metaphysical doubts as above. According to 
Wright (2009, §7), more needs to be done here. In particular, he thinks that the classical 
worries concerning (HP)'s status as a definition become relevant. For example: the Bad 
Company objection (see 2.4.2). Since (BLV) has the same form as (HP), so the thought 
goes, we need to possess reasons for the cases being different, in order to be able to claim an 
entitlement. Wright discusses rejectionist worries as well, but I cannot discuss this here. 
What has been said suffices to make the following point: regarding (HP) as implicitly 
defining the concept of number opens up space for relevant sceptical alternatives which 
need to be considered as potentially sufficient reasons to doubt (HP)'s truth. 
Of course, we should not set the standard too high if we want to avoid sceptical results. 
123For a similar obeervatiOtl,aee (Pedereen 2009", section 4). 
124Pedereen (20096) auaesta a similar interpretation. However, his observation is importantly different 
in that he SU8pect1 that (HP) might be a presupposition of the project of fiang a concept of number in 
good standing. Pedersen overlooks the fact that cognitive projects are projects of finding out about the 
world. Fixing meaning is a very different kind of project, although there certainly are intimate connections 
between the two projects. 
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I agree with Pedersen (2009b, p.15) in that only known alternatives should be relevant. 
For example, Bad Company considerations should only become relevant as soou as bad 
companions are known. Only in the light of examples such as Russell's Paradox and (BLV) 
do we have to rule out that (HP) is not such a case. The entitlement proposal should 
be interpreted as predicting that Frege possessed an entitlement for regarding (BLV) as 
successfully fixing the concept of extension, and thus an entitlement for (BLV) being true, 
before he received Russell's letter. I take this to be a constraint on what exactly sufficient 
reasons to doubt are. 
In what follows, I assume that condition (i) is met. It has already become apparent 
that condition (ii) requires further work. In his paper, Wright just makes the general 
observation that: 
it would be fanciful to suppose that final assurances might be achieved that 
any particular concept was in definitive good standing. The most that one 
might hope to do would be to address specific grounds for doubt. And in any 
case-more important-any investigation of the matter would presuppose--
or ancestrally presuppose-an antecedent conceptual apparatus whose good 
standing would have to be taken for granted. (Wright 2009, p. 9) 
Much more needs to be said here. Although it is certainly true that no final assurance 
can be achieved as to the good standing of any particular concept - just as one can110t 
achieve final assurance about anything - I do not think one can dismiSli the pOSliibility 
so quickly that one can justify the good standing of at least some concepts without falling 
into regress. For example, we have seen that we can come to know of the existence of 
ordinary objects around us on the basis of sense perception. Suppot!e that we come to 
know of the existence of a certain dog and decide to call it "Fido". Using my knowledge of 
the existence of Fido, I will be able to acquire knowledge of the fact that the concept of 
(being) Fido is in good standing. There is no regress here. 
However, we have seen above that there is a prima facie compelling case to be made 
for the regress clause being met in the mathematical case. If the argument above Wat! 
correct, then condition (ii) for (HP) being an entitlement would be met at! well. It would 
follow that (HP) is an entitlement of cognitive project in accord with the (Metasemantic 
Presupposition) principle. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that this is so. 
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Above, I raised the question of whether there is any special role for (HP). ~ote that 
Wright's argument (and the (Metasemantic Presupposition) principle in particular) 
not only assigns a special role to (HP), but also connects the proposal to classical lleO-
Fregeanism. (HP) is regarded as fixing the concept of number, and the classical objections 
to neo-Fregeanism become relevant again. 
6.1.4 Wright on avoiding a leaching worry for arithmetic 
Very well then. Suppose that (HP) is an entitlement. Can this result serve as the basis 
for a satisfying epistemology of arithmetic? Unfortunately, some reflection seems to reveal 
that the position yields revisionary sceptical consequences. 
The basic problem is this: Wright accepts the (Limit) principle125 which says that the 
epistemic status of the conclusion of a warrantedly drawn inference cannot be any stronger 
than the epistemic status of its epistemically weakest premise. Thus, the epistemic status 
of inferences drawn from (HP) cannot be any stronger than the epistemic status of (HP). 
which is an entitlement. As a consequence, we cannot acquire intemalistic knowledge of 
p by virtue of proving p from (HP): we can only acquire inferential entitlements (in the 
sense defined in 4.5.1). 
Assuming that our warrants for the second-order Peano axioms - and our warrants 
for all theorems of pure arithmetic - are canonically based on proofs from (HP), this 
has the consequence that we cannot claim to know any arithmetical truth, but only claim 
(inferential) entitlements. Our epistemology would massively violate the (Arithmetical 
Knowledge) constraint. 
Wright deems this to be an unacceptable sceptical consequence which he has to avoid 
(Wright 2009, §S). However, he also thinks he can avoid this consequence by tweaking 
the suggested structure of justification. His argument proceeds in four steps (Wright 2009, 
p. lS). Firstly, he suggests that the biconditional (HP) can also be conceived of as a 
pair of basic rules corresponding to both directions of the biconditional, because they are 
proof-theoretically equivalent to (HP) in our background logic: 
(Hume Rules) 
jf(F)=#(G) (H P ... ) 3R(Bij(R,F,G» 
12lSee also (Wright 2009, §8). 
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Secondly, Wright assumes that, if we can argue that the statement (BP) is an entitle-
ment, then we will also be able to argue that the soundness of the (Burne Rules) is au 
entitlement. Read soundness as truth-presertJation. Then the assumption is correct. Ou 
the face of it, (HP) just is a statement of the soundness of the (Burne Rules) in this 
sense. 
Thirdly, Frege's proof of the second-order Peano axioms from (BP) can be carried 
out using the (Hume Rules) instead of the axiom (HP). The new proof does not have 
any premises - only discharged assumptions - and only makes use of rules with entitled 
presuppositions: for both the (Burne Rules), and the used logical rules are entitlements. 
Now, the (Justification Generation) principle implies that we can acquire internal-
istic knowledge of the conclusion of a proof with only internalistically known premises, all 
of whose presuppositions are entitlements. If a proof has no premises (only discharged 
assumptions), all its premises are trivially internalistically known. Thus, fourthly, the 
(Justification Generation) principle applies and we are able to acquire internalistic 
knowledge of the proof's conclusion. l26 Wright would have provided a route to internalis-
tic knowledge of the second-order Peano axioms and their deductive consequences. 
6.1.5 Transmission-failure 
However, Wright's trick leaves us in an odd situation. The following question becomes 
pressing: can our right to claim knowledge really depend on such a small modification of 
the underlying deductive system? It seems odd that endorsing the (Hume Rules) yields 
intemalistic knowledge of the second-order Peano axioms, whereas endorsing the statement 
(HP) leaves us with merely entitled arithmetic. On the other hand, this odd situation 
seems to be a straightforward consequence of (Justification Generation). I will come 
back to this issue. 
First, I argue that Wright's proposal is more concessive than one might expect, even if 
we overlook this odd situation for Ii moment. This is because transmission-failure consid-
erations imply that the statement (HP), and maybe even its instances, cannot be claimed 
to be known. My argument rests on two assumptions: 
1. Conservativism holds for the (Burne Rules), i.e. it is a necessary condition for 
1HNote thattbiB it the same thought that led to an investigation of rule-circular arguments in the last 
chapter. 
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being able to use the (Hume Rules) to extend internalistic knowledge that one 
possesses an antecedent warrant for the proposition that they are truth-preserving. 
2. (HP) expresses the proposition that the (Hume Rules) are truth-preserving. 
Both assumptions seem very plausible, and Wright seems to be committed to them. As 
to assumption 1, it is hard to see why the arguments for conservativism should not a.pply 
to the mathematical case. As to assumption 2, Wright directly moves from the claim that 
we possess an entitlement for (HP) to the claim that we possess an entitlement for the 
soundness of the (Hume Rules).127 
However, assumption 1 is in need of clarification, because we have to distinguish be-
tween particular and general soundness claims. Whereas (HP) plausibly expresses the 
fact that both (Hume Rules) are truth-preserving in general (this is assumption 2), the 
truth-preservation of particular instances of the (Hume Rules) is plausibly expressed by 
the following two claims (note that F and G are not variables here, but terms standing for 
particular concepts): 
(HP->Sound) # (F) = # (G) ~ 3R(Bij(R,F,G)), 
(HP<-Sound) 3R (Bij (R, F, G» ~ # (F) = # (G) 
Corresponding to the logical case, there are two versions of conservativism about the 
(Hume Rules): 
• Firstly, op.e might claim that it is the truth-preservation of particular instances that 
feature as presuppositions of particular Hume Rule steps. 
• Secondly, one might hold that it is the general soundness claim that is the proper 
presupposition of all Hume Rule steps, i.e. (HP) (by assumption 2). 
In both cases, the respective soundness claims have to remain entitlements. This is because 
the only way to upgrade their epistemic status would be via rule-circular reasoning, and 
rule-circular arguments fail to transmit warrant because they exhibit the (Information 
Dependence Template). 
mIn 8!lY case, Wright is committed to the claim that (HP) directly entails that the (Hume Rules) 
are truth-pl't!ll8r'YiDl. ThUl, he will not be able to avoid the worry by denying assumption 2, because of 
the phenomenon of presupposition ex.pa.nmon (lee 6.1.6). 
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Consider the following argument for (HP) in the system arising from adding the 
(Burne Rules) to a standard second-order deductive system. 
1 #F=#G Ass. 
2 3R (Bij (R, F, G)) 1, HP-+ 
3 #F = #G ~ 3R(Bij (R,F,G)) 1,2, CP 
4 3R (Bij (R, F, G» A!!!!. 
5 #F=#G 4, HP+-
6 3R (Bij (R, F, G)) ~ #F = #G 4,5, CP 
7 #F = #G +-+ 3R(Bij (R,F,G» 2,5, H-Intro. 
8 (=HP) VNG (#F = #G +-+ 3R (Bij (R, F, G))) 7, UG 
H (HP) is a presupposition of Hume Rule steps, then the argument instantiates the 
(Information Dependence Template) because its last line (8) is (HP), and the argu-
ment contains Hume Rule steps. A previously entitled (HP) will have to remain a IIlere 
entitlement by (No Knowledge Claims). 
On the other hand, if it is instances of (HP->Sound) and (HP<-Sound) which 
feature as presuppositions, then both sub-arguments (the step from 2 to 3; the step from 
6 to 7) will instantiate the (Information Dependence Template) because lines 3 and 
7 are the relevant instances of (HP->Sound) and (HP<-Sound). Warrant cannot 
be transmitted to lines 3 and 7, and previously entitled instances of (HP->Sound) and 
(HP<-Sound) will have to remain entitlements by (No Knowledge Claims). A fortiori, 
because of the (Limit) principle, subsequent lines of the argument - including (HP) -
must remain entitlements as well. 
Hence, regardless of whether it is general truth-preservation, or the truth-preservation 
of instances that feature as presuppositions of Hume Rule steps, (HP) has to remain all 
entitlement. Thus, Wright's epistemology of arithmetic is concessive just as his epistemol-
ogy of logic and his epistemology of perception are concessive: the presuppositions of the 
basic belief-forming methods have to remain entitlements. Unfortunately, one of our aims 
was to explain how we can claim knowledge of (HP). We would have to give up thi!i aim. 
Note that, just as in the logical case, the situation looks worse if it is the truth-
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preservation of instances that feature as presuppositions. If this is the case, then it cannot 
even be claimed that instances of (HP->Sound) and (HP<-Sound) are known. For 
example, we would not be able to claim to know the following: 
(Concrete Equinumerosity) If the number of knives on the table is identical to the 
number of forks on the table, then the knives and the forks are in one-one correspoll-
dence. 
For the conditional is of the form (HP-> Val), and as such expresses the claim that a 
particular instance of (H P~) is truth-preserving. This certainly is a revisionary sceptical 
consequence. It seems entirely appropriate to make a claim to knowledge of (Concrete 
Equinumerosity) in an ordinary conversation. 
6.1.6 Presupposition expansion and extended leaching 
If everything goes well, the account will still enable us to claim knowledge of the seeond-
order Peano axioms and its theorems. For example, we can claim to know that every 
number has a successor, and that there are infinitely many prime numbers. A lot would 
have been achieved. 
Note, however, how odd the consequences of the proposal are. We would be able to 
claim knowledge of the Peano axioms, but could not claim knowledge of (HP), and maybe 
could not even claim knowledge of (Concrete Equinumerosity). And does it not look 
suspicious that such a small change in the underlying deductive system can enable us 
to claim to know that every number has a successor, whereas we could only claim an 
(inferential) entitlement before we made this change? I think this suggests that liomething 
mU8t be wrong with Wright's argument. In particular, it seems as if Wright's position 
should either yield knowledge claims to (HP) and (Concrete Equinumerosity) as well, 
or imply that we only possess entitlement across the board. 
On the other hand, it looks as if (Limit), (Justification Generation), and the 
(Information Dependence Template) just imply this huge epistemological difference 
between endorsing the (Hume Rules) and endorsing (HP) as an entitled axiom. And 
these principles are not negotiable here, because they form a crucial part of our epistemo-
logical framework. 
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I close my discussion of Wright's position by sketching the outlines of au argument 
to the effect that Wright's argument is flawed after all, and which might avoid the odd 
situation. The key to a resolution of the situation is that there can be hidden cases of 
transmission-failure. 
According to the transmission-failure diagnosis, we can only acquire claimable knowl-
edge of p by virtue of proving it on the basis of the (Burne Rules) and second-order logic 
if p is not already an entitled presupposition of the (Burne Rules). Thus, if the second-
order Peano axioms were entitled presuppositions of the (Hurne Rules), they could not 
be claimed to be known on the basis of such a proof. 
I sketch the outlines of an argument to the effect that the second-order Peano axioms 
will indeed be entitled presuppositions of the (Burne Rules), if (BP) is. First, note that 
it is plausible that certain consequences of entitled presuppositions also count as entitled 
presuppositions. Consider the case of visual perception. If it is an entitled presupposition 
of perceptual BFMs that there is no Cartesian demon, then it is certainly also an entitled 
presupposition of perceptual BFMs that there is no Cartesian demon who likes playing 
chess. Ca.ll this phenomenon presuppoBition expansion. 
The thought is that there is presupposition expansion in the mathematical case as well. 
Suppose there is a consequence relation - call it R-consequence - such that: 
1. The R-consequences of an entitled presupposition are also entitled presuppositions. 
2. The second-order Peano axioms are R-consequences of (BP). 
Suppose further that (BP) is an entitled presupposition of the Fregean proof. Then 1 and 2 
imply that the second-order Peano axioms are entitled presuppositions of the Fregean proof 
as well. If this was correct, then because of the transmission-failure diagnosis, we could 
not upgrade the epistemic status of these axioms by virtue of deriving them on the basis 
of the Fregean proof. This suggests that it is not possible to upgrade the epistemic status 
of these axioms on the basis of any proof that rests on the (Burne Rules) and logical 
reasoning, for it is plausible that any proof on this basis will display transmission-failure, 
if the Fregeau proof does. 
This would resolve the incredulous stare that comes with the result that reconceiving 
of a biconditiona1as a pair of rules makes such a huge epistemological difference. However, 
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this also means that Wright's proposal yields much more severe sceptical consequences 
than he envisages. In fact, it would yield the revisionary sceptical consequence that not 
only (HP), but also the second-order Peano axioms, and all of second-order arithmetic 1:.!8 
cannot have an epistemic status above (inferential) entitlement. 
I think it is plausible that (HP) is a presupposition of the modified Fregean proof. 
Even if it is not a presupposition of instances of the (Hume Rules), both directions of 
(HP) will be presuppositions of relevant universal generalization steps - namely those 
steps that generalize particular applications of the (Hume Rules). The crucial question 
is whether there is a consequence relation with properties 1 and 2. Clearly, there is a 
phenomenon of presupposition expansion in the perceptual case. However, the inferential 
gap between (HP) and the second-order Peano axioms is relatively wide. So the notion 
of R-consequence needs to be relatively wide as well. 
The thought that the notion of R-consequence is that wide is reminis(:ent of the rejec-
tionist objection to neo-Fregeamsm discussed in 2.4.3. Wright might respond in the same 
way he earlier responded to rejectionism. For example, he might respond that conceiving 
of the axioms of arithmetic as presupposition of the Fregean proof just gets the epistemic 
order wrong. Both the objection and the response to it merit further investigation. 
In any case, if the notion of R-consequence was wide enough, Wright's suggestion to 
base arithmetic on entitled (Rume Rules)129 would imply that not only (HP) and its 
instances, but all of arithmetic cannot be claimed to be known. And this would be a 
pretty strong revisionary sceptical consequence. Claims to arithmetical knowledge are 
paradigmatic claims to knowledge. 
6.2 Semi-sceptical foundationaUsm 
Be that as it may. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that it would not be devastating 
to our epistemology overall if no statement of pure arithmetic could be claimed to be known. 
This motivates a different position, which does not rest on any tricks in the first place, 
but straightforwardly concedes that all of arithmetic is a mere entitlement. I call it semi-
sceptical foundationalism (SSF). It rests on the thoughts that (i) the primary epistemic 
128That aU of &eCOnd-order arithmetic is affected follows from the (Limit) principle, and the 888umption 
that pure arithmetical truths are canODic:ally justified on the basis of the second-order Peano axioms. 
129Entitled in tile aenae that aD ita preeuppoaitlons are entitled. 
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role of pure arithmetic is that it generates inference rules that can be applied to extend 
knowledge in non-mathematical projects, such as physics or everyday reasoning, and (ii) 
that this role would not be qualified if all of pure arithmetic was merely entitled. 
6.2.1 The idea 
According to SSF, (HP) is an entitled presuppositions for a different reason thau those 
expressed by the principles (Axiomatic Presupposition) and (Metasemantic Pre-
supposition) : 
(Presupposition of Application) The basic principles of our mathematical theories 
are presuppositions of all non-mathematical projects in which these theories are applied 
to extend knowledge, and in which these knowledge-extending applications are essential. 
For doubting the relevant mathematical basic principles would rationally commit us to 
doubting the significance of these non-mathematical projects. 
This is the fundamental difference to Wright's proposal. There are non-mathematical 
projects in which arithmetic is applied as a means to extend knowledge, and in which 
these applications are essential. (HP) is a presupposition of such projects because it is 
the basic principle underlying arithmetic. Because the other conditions of entitlement are 
met as well, 80 the thought goes, (HP) is an entitled presupposition of such projects. For 
example: 
• Arithmetic and everyday reasoning: arithmetical reasoning is required in cognitive 
projects of everyday life. For example: the project of calculating whether I have 
enough money to buy a certain number of sweets, or the project of finding out how 
to equitably divide a certain number of sweets. We successfully pursue such projects 
by applying arithmetical lines of reasoning. Doubting the truth of (HP) would 
rationally commit us to doubting the significance of these projects, for it undermines 
the goodness of the used mathematical inferences. Thus, (HP) is a presupposition of 
such projects, and, because the other conditions for entitlement are met, an entitled 
presupposition. 
• Arithmetic and biology: in biology, there are genuinely mathematical explanations 
making use of arithmetical reasoning. For example, biologists explain the prime 
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lifecycle of certain cicada types by noting that prime lifecycles minimize interst)(:tion 
with the lifecycles of other species, and that this is evolutionary advantageous (Baker 
2005). Doubting the truth of (HP) would rationally commit one to doubting the 
significance of the project of explaining prime lifecycles. Thus, (HP) is a presuppo-
sition of such explanatory projects, and, because the other conditions for entitlement 
are met as well, an entitled presupposition. 
All this requires a lot more work, but I hope it suffices to initially motivate the (Presup-
position of Application) principle. The principle is significant because it makes it look 
far less devastating if all of pure arithmetic is an entitlement. The thought is that (a) 
the central role of mathematical theories is knowledge-extending application, (b) that our 
epistemology of mathematics can be regarded as satisfactory as long as it accounts for this 
role, and (c) that merely entitled pure theories do not undermine this role because of the 
(J ustlftcation Generation) principle. 
Note that Wright has all the resources to account for (a), (b), and (c). However, 
he seems to regard pure mathematics as a cognitive project of its own, i.e. a project 
of extending mathematical knowledge. This conception of mathematics makes it look 
devastating if pure mathematical theories cannot be claimed to be known. If there is 
another role for pure mathematical theories that is not undermined by our epistemological 
concessions, the situation looks less problematic. 
So far, 80 good. But how exactly can entitled mathematical theories be used to extend 
knowledge in other projects? Suppose we base pure arithmetic on an entitled (HP) or 011 
entitled (Hurne Rules), and let us concede that leaching occurs in the sense that no pure 
arithmetical statements can be claimed to be known.130 The idea is that we can extract 
deductive rules from our pure arithmetical theory which can be used to expand knowledge 
in other areas. For example: in the sciences or in everyday reasoning. 
Here is how. First, we can use our pure theory to infer conditionals. These conditionals 
are inferential entitlements. Secondly, we can conceive of these conditionals as rules with 
entitled presuppositions. For their presuppositions just are these conditionals. Thirdly, 
because the presuppositions of these rules are entitled, we can use them to extend inter-
nalistic knowledge in other cognitive projects, because of (Justification Generation). 
1SOWe might also remain neutral about .uch leacbinJ - the point is that it does Dot matter whether 
there is leaching or not. 
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In short: 
(Extraction Principle) Conditionals we obtain on the basis of entitled axioms or rules 
in a pure mathematical theory can be used to extend internalistic knowledge in other 
projects. 
Since the (Extraction Principle) is sufficient for accounting for the central role of 
mathematical reasoning, so the thought goes, it does not matter whether pure theories 
are merely entitled. According to SSF, pure mathematics should be conceived of as the 
enterprise of generating new inferences we can rely on to extend claimable knowledge in 
other areas. 
6.2.2 A toy example 
Let me go through a toy example of how the (Extraction Principle) is supposed to work. 
Consider the following theorem of pure arithmetic: 
(Sample Theorem) For any two prime numbers n and m, the least common mUltiple 
of n and m is the product of n and m. 
In Frege Arithmetic, we can formalize this as follows: 
(Sample Theorem') (Prime (#F) " Prime (#G)) -+ 
Vx(WM(x,#F,#G) +-+ x = #F#G) 
(Sample Theorem') is a universally quantified conditional. Suppose that (Sample 
Theorem') cannot be claimed to be known, but only be claimed to be an (inferential) 
entitlement. We can conceive of this (entitled) conditional as an (entitled) rule we can 
endorse to extend internalistic knowledge in other projects as follows (note that F and G 
are variables here): 
( 1 E R) Prim.e(#F)APrime( #G) Samp extracted ule "Ix(LCM(x,#F,#G)+-+x-#F#G) 
The reason is that (Sample Theorem') is the entitled presupposition of the (Sample 
Extracted Rule). 
Now, how can this rule be put to work to extend internalistic knowledge? We need a 
case in which a subject S already possesses internalistic knowledge of the premise of a.u 
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instance of the rule. And this generates a worry. The premise will include arithmetical 
terms. If all of arithmetic is a mere entitlement, then how can S come to possess interualistic 
knowledge of such a premise? 
First, note that, although the premise will include arithmetical terms (namely" #" and 
"Prime"), it does not have to be a pure arithmetical statement, such as "Prime (13) 1\ 
Prime (17)". Indeed: such a statement cannot be intemalistically known (by assumption). 
However, nothing said so far entails that mixed arithmetical statements such as the "The 
number of knives on the table is prime and the number of forks on the table is prime" 
cannot be intemalistically known. In fact, it seems we can acquire internalistic knowledge 
of such statements by cleverly using the (Extraction Principle). Let me explain. 
Our pure arithmetical theory (Frege Arithmetic) proves the following conditionals (note 
that F is a variable): 
(Thirteenfold Existence) 31SX (F (x)) -+ #F = 13 
And: 
(Primeness of 1S) #F = 13 -+ Prime (#F) 
By logic, we obtain: 
(Primeness of Thirteenfold· Existence) 313X (F (x» -+ Prime (#F) 
Now suppose that an epistemic agent Hero faces a table with 13 knives on it. Our episte-
mological framework allows for Hero acquiring internalistic knowledge of 313X (K ni f e (F) .131 
By the (Extraction Principle) and (Juatiflcation Generation), Hero can then acquire 
intemalistic knowledge of the fact that Prime (#zKnife (x» - i.e. that the number of 
knives on the table is prime - by virtue of inferring it from 313X (Knife (F», using the 
rule extracted from (Primeness of Thlrieenfold Existence). 
Now suppose that a biologist already possesses internalistic knowledge of the fact that 
the length of the lifecycles of two clcadatypes in years are 13 and 17, and thus prime. 
According to the (Extraction Principle), he or she can use the (Sample Extracted 
Rule) to acquire internalisticknowledge of the fact that the least common multiple of the 
length of their lifeCycles - and bence the length of the period after which they will "meet 
1S1 By a suc:ceaahe applic&tioD of entitled perceptual belief-forming methods &ad entitled logical rules. 
199 
again" - is the first number multiplied by the second number. The biologist can now use 
further extracted rules132 to come to possess internalistic knowledge of the fact that the 
length of the sought period is 221. On this basis, the biologist can make further inferences, 
use this newly obtained information in explanations, etc. 
This completes my toy example. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss some 
features of the proposal, consider some objections, and examine which of the constraints 
laid out in 1.2 the proposal meets, and which it fails to meet. 
6.2.3 SSF beyond arithmetic 
The idea generalizes beyond arithmetic. As an example, consider the following instance of 
the (Presupposition of AppUcatlon) principle: 
• Analysis and Newtonian physics: the standard way of doing ~ewtonian physics makes 
heavy use of analysis. Not only are its concepts intertwined with mathematical con-
cepts: analysis is also used to make predictions and explanations. Both predictions 
and explanations rest on the possibility of using analysis in inferences extending em-
pirical knowledge - inferences that would otherwise be impossible or a lot more 
difficult to make.133 Moreover, doubting the axioms of analysis would rationally 
commit one to doubting the significance of the standard (analysis-endorsing) way 
of doing Newtonian mechanics, for it would rationally commit one to doubting the 
goodness of the used mathematical inferences, or the good standing of some physical 
concepts. 
Thus, the axioms of analysis are Wright-presuppositions of (the standard way of doing) 
Newtonian physics. 1M 
There are examples beyond physics. However, the mature state of physics as a scientific 
discipline,and the heavy use of mathematical concepts in this discipline make it easier to 
find suitable examples. In any case, the claims made here require further argument and a 
1121 omit the detalJa, becaWle, by &ow, the reader wiD be able to see how this can happen. 
lUThis is of courae Compatible with the claim that there are nominalistic ways of doing Newtonian 
physics. 1 come back to the iIInle ofdiapeuability below. 
lUThe above ,.... briDp to light that there are two ways in which mathematical basic principles can 
be Wright-pnlInlppoaitiou ill ~ with the (PNluppo.ition of Application) principle. First, 
they can be Wript-preauppoaitiolUl becaue they are required in certain lines of reasoning. Second, they 
can be Wright-pnlInlppoaitiODB hecaue the c:onc:epts of scientific theories rest on the good standing of 
mathematical concepts, and doubting the relevant mathematical basic principles would rationally commit 
us to doubtiq that these concepts are in good standiq. 
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detailed invMtigation of examplM. This is beyond the scope of this thesis. But it is worth 
mentioning that the applicability of mathematics has been a recent focus of attention in 
the philosophy of mathematics, and some of these investigations fit well together with 
the picture I am sketching here. For example, Bueno and Colyvan argue that the central 
role of mathematics is to facilitate inferences in the sciences, in the context of predictioll, 
explanation, and unification (Bueno & Colyvan 2011). 
SSF fits well together with an important component of neo-Fregeallism. This becomes 
apparent by asking the qUMtion of how we can ensure that, in general, our reconstructed 
mathematical theoriM are conducive to their application. One answer is: (Frege's Con-
straint). If we follow Frege's advice and make the application of our mathematical theories 
immediate in their foundatioDS, we eDSure that we can apply these theories as intended. 
This providM a reason to focus on (HP) as opposed the second-order Peano axioms. For 
(HP) makes the application of cardinal numbers immediate. At least SSF for arithmetic 
is naturally combined with the use of abstraction principles. 
6.2.4 Inapplicable theories 
One might worry that the proposal is not relevant to pure theories that are not designed to 
be applied, have never been applied, or will never be applied. For example: large cardinal 
arithmetic. However, to generate an objection to SSF on thiti basiti, one needs to extract 
undesired consequences from this fact. 
One might think that SSF entails that these theories are not even warranted by means 
of entitlement, because there is no suitable presuppositional role for their basic principles. 
However, someone endorsing SSF is not committed to this claim: pure theories can still be 
entitled because they are presuppositions in accordance with the (Axiomatic Presup-
position) principle, or the (Metasemantic Presupposition) principle, or both. 
This might raise the worry that the friend of SSF cannot argue that the concession 
that the pure theories are mere entitlements is not devastating in these cases. For the 
argument was based on the thought that there is another role for mathematical enquiry 
than to extend mathematical knowledge: namely extending knowledge in other areas. In 
the case of inapplicable theories, so the thought goes, the proposal is still unacceptably 
sceptical because there is no such further role. 
201 
I respond that nothing said so far excludes that merely entitled unapplied theories 
indirectly bear on scientific reasoning and everyday reasoning. They might do so because 
pure mathematical enquiry helps with developing better mathematical theories that can 
eventually be applied, or because it helps with unifying mathematical theories, which in 
turn yields new applicable mathematical theories. 
6.2.5 Mixed statements 
Another objection to the current proposal is that mixed propositions such as "The length 
of the lifecycle of these cicadas in years:::: 13" - propositions including both mathematical 
and other concepts - cannot be internalisticaUy known, if no pure arithmetical statement 
can be internalistically known. One way to argue for this claim is this: a mixed proposition 
certainly entails the existence of a number, which is a pure arithmetical !!tatement and 
thus - by assumption - merely entitled. Thus, the above sketched route to internalistie 
knowledge of suell statements must be blocked somewhere. 
There are at least three things to say in response to this worry. The first two response!! 
are based on the epistemological framework outlined in Part II of this thesis; the third 
response is that there is a fallback position that is still interesting. 
Firstly, the framework allows for cases in which p can be internalistically known al-
though an immediate consequence of p cannot be internalistically known. For example: 
Moorean reasoning. We can internalistically know that we have two hands, although an 
immediate consequence of this statement - that there is an external world - cannot be 
more than an entitlement. 
Secondly, we already tacitly allowed for internaiistically known mixed statements in 
the logical case. Wright's framework would be radically sceptical if it would not allow 
for the possibility of acquiring internalistic knowledge of mixed logical statements - i.e. 
statements including logical vocabulary (e.g. "There is a table in front of me " I have two 
hands"). Now, why should mixed mathematical statements be any more problematic than 
mixed logical statements? Everyone who accepts Wright's response to scepticism in the 
logical case needs to provide additional principled reasons for why this should be so. 
A third . response is to retreat to an even more concessive fallback position. Let us 
call the possibility that mixed mathematical statements cannot be claimed to be known 
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extended leaching. Even if extended leaching occurs, nothing said so far precludes the 
possibility to use mathematical reasoning to come to possess internalistic knowledge of 
propositions which do not contain any mathematical vocabulary. For example, if some 
mathematical reasoning about the growth of populations allows us to infer that some 
population of Fs now consist of at least 2000 individuals, then even if" #F ~ 2000" has to 
remain a "mere entitlement" and cannot be internalistically known on this basis, we might 
come to internalistically know "32000X (Fx)" on this basis. Thus, conceding extended 
leaching still does not have to amount to full-blown scepticism about projects of acquiring 
knowledge in other areas. 
However, whether this response is available depends on the possibility of nominalizing 
relevant discourses using mathematical vocabulary - i.e. the possibility of rewriting such 
discourses in a way that does not make use of mathematical concepts. First and foremost, 
we would have to assess whether we can nominalize relevant scientific theories. Only if 
we can dispense with mathema.tical concepts in the sciences will it be possible to acquire 
scientific knowledge despite extended leaching. There is work in this direction - most 
notably are Field's efforts (Field 1980) - but it remains an open question whether all 
relevant theories can be nominalized. 
Suppose that relevant theories can be reformulated. Then a different issue might be 
raised: how does SSF with extended leaching compare to instrumentalist proposals such 
as Field's? In this context1 we should not assume that we have to provide an epistemol-
ogy that is compatible with Platonism. Are there any other reasons to prefer SSF to 
instrumentalism? 
The answer is yes. SSF potentially does better in that Field's proposal requires the 
possibility of providing nominalistic reformulations of scientific theories, and the conserva-
tiveness of relevant mathematical theories over scientific theories. SSF - with or without 
extended leaching - just requires the former. Thus, SSF can avoid certain objections that 
arise in conjunction with Field's notion of conservativeness. 
For example, Shapiro (1983) argues that Field should not use a semantic notion of 
conservativeness because it rests on mathematical concepts which cannot be presupposed 
in a nominalist setting, whereas endorsing a syntactical notion of conserV'dtiveness is not 
available to Field for technical reasons. Field (1985) accepts Shapiro's technical point and 
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responds by construing a modal notion of semantic consequence. I cannot assess here 
whether Field's response is a good one. But the need to give such a respoIlse can be 
avoided in the first place, by accepting SSF instead of Field's position. 
6.2.6 Indispensability 
SSF with extended leaching requires that mathematical theories are dispensable in the 
sense that relevant scientific theories can be reformulated in a nomiualistically acceptable 
way. One might think that this produces an irresolvable tension. For, so the thought goes, 
the possibility of success of SSF - whether with extended leaching or not -- requires the 
indispensability of mathematical concepts and reasoning. What if mathematical reasoning 
was dispensable? Would we not have grossly overestimated the importance of mathematical 
theories, and does this not undermine the special role that SSF assigned to them? In 
particular, so the thought goes, dispensability would cast doubt on the (Presupposition 
of Application) principle: if there is a way of doing science without mathematiclS, the 
troth of relevant mathematical theories will not be important enough for the scientific 
enterprise, and thus loses its presuppositional role. If mathematics is dispensable, we might 
obtain other entitlements, e.g. an entitlement for the consistency of mathematical theories, 
but SSF was meant to be a Platonist theory (or at least compatible with Platonism). Would 
the ispensability not heavily favour instrumentalism in the end? 
Note, however, that although there might be way of doing science without mathematics, 
there would still be a way of doing science with mathematics (Platonistically construed). 
And mathematical basic principles will still be presuppositions of these specific projects. 
Of course, one would then still haVe to argue for the relevance of these specific projects. 
A related response that might also provide the resources to argue for the relevance of 
doing science with mathematics can be extracted from the literature on the indisperu;ability 
argument. A mathematical theory T can be indispensable to science in at least two different 
ways: 
• T can be indispensable in the sense that there are no nominalistic reformulations of 
all scientific theories endorsing T which have the same empirical consequences . 
• T can be indispensable in that we need to make use of T in order to provide simple 
and unified (mathematical) explanations of empirical phenomena. 
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Baker (2005) argues that indispensability in the first sense does not entail indispensability 
in the second sense: there are cases of genuinely mathematical explanation where it is hard 
to see how we can provide a similarly good and unifying explanation without making use of 
mathematical concepts and reasoning (and without reference to mathematical structures). 
If this is right, then - modulo weaseling strategies135 and other complications -- indis-
pensability in the first sense does not undermine the (Presupposition of Application) 
principle. For example, we might possess an entitlement for the truth of (UP) on the 
basis of its being a presupposition of projects providing simple and unified explanations in 
biology. 
Note that this response is compatible with Bangu's worry (Bangu 2008) that the ex-
plananda of genuinely mathematical explanations presuppOHe the existence of mathemat-
ical entities and thus beg the question against the nominalist. But the worse this is for 
the friend of the indispensability argument, the better it is for the friend of SSF: for the 
existence of such explanations shows just how much mathematics is actually prelmpposed 
in vital projects of providing simple and unified explanations in areas different from math-
ematics. Also note, that if the indispensability argument succeeded, then SSF would not 
be needed: mathematics would not have to be an entitlement, because the regress clause 
would be violated: there would be a way of establishing the truth of mathematical theories 
without relying on something in no more secure a prior epistemic standing. 
6.2.7 Meeting the desiderata 
How do the sketched positions do with respect to the desiderata from 1.2? Clearly, SSF 
is compatible with (Arithmetical Platonmm). In fact, SSF is meant to be a Platonist 
position. The entitlements are entitlements for the truth of mathematical theories, qua 
theories about abstract objects. There is no reason, and no need for modesty here.136 
The motivation for (Field's· Constraint) is undermined. If mathematical theories 
are entitlements, they will be warranted non-evidentially. (Field's Constraint) is best 
understood asa constraint on evidential warrant. If we concede that we do not possess 
proper evidence for the truth of mathematical theories, there will be no need to explain 
1a6See (MeJia 2000). 
lIelt is an interesting question whether accounting for a Platonist position requires invoking Wright's 
entitlement. 0/ "fonce, for Wright (2004") thinks that entitlements of cognitive project cannot serve 
ontological purpoee8. This complication cannot be discussed in this thesis. 
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how our mathematical beliefs are reliably formed. 
The (Arithmetical Knowlege) desideratum, however, is violated (at lea-'lt for any 
notion of knowledge requiring the possession of evidence). This is the downside of any 
proposal endorsing entitlements for mathematical basic principles. However, I have argued 
that we can bite this bullet, because a violation of this principle does not preclude us froUl 
using mathematics to acquire (claimable) knowledge elsewhere. We might be able to bite 
the bullet, even if extended leaching occurs and mixed mathematical statements have to 
remain entitlements. 
As a consequence, the (Apriority Constraint) and (Arithmetical Foundational-
ism) are violated as well. However, they are only violated because they are claims about 
knowledge. SSF still accounts for mathematical theories and axioms being warranted apri-
ori. 
The (Applicability Constraint) is met head-on. SSF identifies a central role of 
mathematical theories in that they are applicable in the sciences and in everyday rea.o.;oll-
ing. This role is supported by regarding abstraction principles as the proper foundations 
of relevant theories. Firstly, because of their biconditional form, they are suitable for ex-
tracting rules. Secondly, if Frege and the abstractionists are right, abstraction principles 
such as (HP) will meet (Frege'. Constraint), and thus make the applications of the 
theories based on them immediate. 
Finally, since (Frege's Constralnt) is met in relevant cases, there is a good chance that 
the proposal vindicates at least (Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction), i.e. that the 
terms of the theories based on the relevant abstraction principles refer to the mathematical 
objects we all know and love. This is because the nea-Fregean argument for this claim can 
be repeated for SSF .131 
6.3 Intermediate conclusion 
In the course of this chapter, I carved out several positions arising from a direct application 
of our epistemological framework to the mathematical case. We can order these positions 
by their concessiveness, i.e. by the ratio of entitled mathematical truths to iuternalistically 
knowable mathematical truths. All these positions can be considered as fallback positions, 
117For a discussion of the relevance of (J'rese'. CODltraint) to (Weak Hermeneutic Reconltruc-
tlon), see 2.3.5. 
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in case the less concessive positions fail. In the arithmetical case, these positions are: 
• Wright's proposal (assuming Wright's response to leaching works after all): the rull~ 
capturing both sides of (HP) are entitlements, but the second-order Peallo axioms 
can be claimed to be known on the basis of a modified version of Frege's proof. In 
fact, with the exception of cases of transmission-failure, all of Frege Arithmetic can 
be claimed to be known. Transmission-failure affects the epistemic status of (HP) 
itself, and possibly its instances. If it affects instances of (HP), the proposal yields 
some revisionary sceptical consequences . 
• SSF: in case Wright's trick to avoid leaching fails, all of arithmetic is a mere enti-
tlement. This is a revisionary consequence. However, it is not devdStatillg because 
entitled rules extracted from second-order arithmetic can be used to extend internal-
istic knowledge in other areas without qualifications. 
• SSF with "extended leaching": maybe there is extended leaching to the efl'ec::t that tilt:' 
weak epistemic status of pure arithmetic negatively affects the epistemi<: status of 
mixed arithmetical statements. In this case, all statements containing arithmetical 
terms are at best entitlements. But the strategy of SSF still delivers knowlec:lge 
claims for purely empirical consequences of the conjunction of our non-mathematical 
theories and arithmetic (assuming that we can vindicate knowledge claim!! for the 
non-mathematical parts of these theories). 
Unfortunately, all these options fall short of some of the aims set out in 1.2. Do we have to 
accept these consequences? No: for everything that has been said rests OIl the lU!8umption 
that mathematical basic principles can be (or have to be) regarded as entitlementH. In the 
next chapter, I will argue that they aren't entitlements, because they can be warranted 
evidentially without epistemic regress, and condition (U) of entitlement of cognitive projec::t 
is not met. In particular, I will reject the (Logicality of Inference in Mathematics) 
principle. 
Note that the reason why I reject the proposals presented in this chapter iH not that 
they are concessive, or that they yield revisionary sceptical consequences. The reason 
is that they get the structure of justification wrong. If the reason was that they yield 
revisionary sceptical consequences, they could not be used as fallback positions. 
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7 Knowledge by meta-linguistic stipulation 
In the last chapter, I examined positions that rest on the claim that abstraction principles 
are entitlements of cognitive project. Such positions assume that the conditions for enti-
tlement of cognitive project are met for relevant abstraction principles. In particular: that 
we cannot justify certain abstraction principles without falling into epil>temic regress. 
I now reject this assumption. In 7.1, I argue that meta-linguistic stipulations success-
fully fix meaning given that certain preconditions are in place, and that one can at:quire 
internalistic apriori knowledge of the content of these stipulations by a line of reasoning 
that makes use of a non-logical inferential step, in case one possesses warrants for thp 
obtaining of these preconditions. This provides a route to justify (HP) and the Peano 
axioms on something in a more secure a prior epistemic standing: knowledge of our own 
meaning-fixing commands. 
In 7.2, I examine the relevant preconditions in detail, and argue that they are war-
ranted, some of them by means of entitlement of cognitive project. In the course of these 
investigations, I show that my proposal sheds new light on the three big objections to 
neo-Fregeanism discussed in 2.4. Together with the first part of this chapter, these inves-
tigations also close the epistemological gaps of the neo-Fregean proposal I carved out in 
2.3.4. 
I then argue that my proposal generalizes. In 7.3, I argue that my proposal can be 
extended to the logical case, and sketch how it can be extended to implicit definition ill 
general. In 7.4, I outline how my proposal vindicates the good standing of something close 
to the notion of epistemic analyticity. 
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7.1 Abstractionism reconsidered 
7.1.1 The basic idea 
Suppose a non-defective138 epistemic agent mastering second-order logic - to keep up 
the tradition, call him Hero - sits in his armchair and decides to introduce a new terIIl-
forming type-lowering operator "#F' (''the number of the Fs"). To do this, he consciously 
and explicitly stipulates that "#" is to be assigned a meaning such that the Hume Rules 
are sound (i.e. necessarily truth-preserving)139: 
(Burne Rules) 
This leads to: 
#(F)=#~G) (HP .... )3R(Bij(R, ,G)) 
(Cognitive Success) By virtue of making the stipulation, Hero comes to understand 
the new operator" #". 
And, more importantly: 
(Semantic Success) By virtue of making the stipulation, a meaning140 is assigned to 
"#" such that the (Bume Rules) are sound. 
Moreover, Hero knows what he has just done. So he is able to reflect on his stipulation 
as follows: I stipulated that "#" is to be assigned a meaning such that the (Hurne Rules) 
are sound. So - Psst! Unless something went wrong, but I can assume that nothing went 
wrong - (HP .... ) and (HP+-) are sound. 
I contend that, by virtue of this simple inference, Hero can acquire internalistic apriori 
knowledge of the soundness of the (Rume Rules): 
188 A non-defective ep"temic GgenC is an agent with properly working cognitive faculties, who is competent 
in English aDd poII8ae8 the relmmt conc:epta. 
139There is a meta-language reading IUld an object-Iangu88e reading of soundness. In what follows, I 
always mean the former. The stipulation is a meto-'ingu .. Cic stipulation: it is about terms and inferential 
patterns. However, I do not think that a lot bangs on this distinction when it comes to the conclwion 
of the infemlc:e 1 deW in this chapter. I think that it could also be construed as an inference to a 
object-language venion of the claim. If a aubject understands the rules in question, the object-lanSU88e 
version can a1waya be inferred &om the meta-langu88e version (and vice versa). Ebert (200M) and Jenkins 
(20080) argue that inferriq object laquap soundness claims from meta-language soundness claims are 
problematic in the current context. I disagree, but I cannot discU88 this issue in this section. However, I 
will briefly come back to it below (lee 7.4.6). 
1401 come back to bow meaning should be UDderstood here in section 7.2. 
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(Epistemic Success) The described inference transmits internalistic apriori knowl-
edge. Hero can acquire such knowledge of its conclusion - the soundness of the (Burne 
Rules) - by virtue of inferring it from instances of apriori self-knowledge -- that he 
stipulated that "#" is to be assigned a meaning such that the (Burne Rules) are 
sound - given he possesses warrants for the claim that nothing went wrong with his 
stipulation. 
The restrictive clause at the end captures the Psst-part of the intuitive idea. Hero's 
acquisition of internalistic knowledge of the soundness of the (Burne Rules) will effect 
an unconditional (and rational) acceptance of the (Burne Rules) on the side of Hero. 
In the course of this chapter, it will become apparent that the structure of justifil'ation 
is analogous to the structure of justification in the following case which we encountered 
in 4.2.1: Hero looks around and observes his two hands. On the basis of this experience, 
he acquires internalistic knowledge of the fact that he has, right now, an experience as of 
his two hands. He then reasons as follows: I have, right now, an experience as of my two 
hands. So - Psst! Unless something went wrong, e.g. if I was a brain-in-a-vat, but I can 
assume that nothing went wrong - I have two hands. By virtue of this inference, Hero 
can acquire internalistic knowledge of the fact that he has two hands. 
This requires much more argument. In this section, I provide an argument for the 
existence of the inference underlying (Epistemic Success), and some details about its 
workings. In 7.2, I argue that Hero can warrantedly assume that nothing went wrong. 
7.1.2 An argument for the basic idea 
My proposal rests on a metasemantic, and an epistemic principle. The metasemantie 
principle, which implies both (Cognitive Success) and (Semantic Success), is this: 
(Metasemantic Inferentiallsm) By virtue of stipulating that certain logico-mathematical 
terms are to be assigned a meaning141 such that their introduction and elimination rulet; 
are sound, we can (i) come to understand these terms, and (ii) bring it about that they 
get assigned a meaning such that their introduction and elimination rules are sound. 
The epiStemic principle is this: 
141Again, 1 wish" to remain .utral as to how meaning should be understood here. I come back to this 
question in aection 7.2. 
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(Implicit Definition Inference) There is a primitive type of inference alluwing IlOI1-
defective epistemic agents to acquire full internalistic apriori warrants for believing that 
our explicit meaning-fixing stipulations are in good standing, on the basis uf internal-
istic knowledge of what these meaning-fixing stipulations are, in case we also pussess 
antecedent warrants for certain conditions ensuring that nothing went wrong with the 
stipulation in question. First and foremost: that no scenarios obtain that undermine 
the claim that the inference is truth-preserving 142 . 
Since the rules corresponding to both directions of abstraction principles (:all be CUIl-
ceived of as introduction and elimination rules of the respective abstraction operator, these 
two principles yield the following principle: 
(Abstractionist Inference) There is a primitive type of inference allowing non-
defective epistemic agents to acquire full intemalistic apriori warrants for believing 
that rules corresponding to both directions of good abstraction principles are neces-
sarily truth-preserving, on the basis of internalistic knowledge of our explicit meaning-
fixing stipulations of these rules, in case we also possess antecedent warrants for certain 
conditions ensuring that nothing went wrong with the stipulation in question. First 
and foremost: that no scenarios obtain that would undermine the inference's truth-
preservation. 143 
It implies (Epistemic Success). Since the stipulation of the (Hume Rules) is 
semantically successful, the (Bume Rules) are sound. Thus, the full internalistic warrant 
for their soundness acquired by the (Abstractlonist Inference) amounts to internalistic 
knowledge. 
Presumably, the semantic part of my proposal - (Metasemantlc Inferentialism) 
- is less contentious than its epistemic part. For the time being, I assume its truth 
without a defense, and come back to it in the next section. Note, however, that the 
principle is relatively weak: it is the claim that meaning of new operators can be fixed by 
explicit meaning-fixing stipulations of non-defective agents, and how an understanding of 
new terms can be generated. It is.not a claim about how the meaning of English terms is 
142That is: the material conditional encoding the inference is true. 
lUI focus on rules here. However, the proposal can be extended to sentential stipulations. Hero could 
also stipulate the (necessary) truth of (HP). I cotne back to this in 7.4.1. 
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actually fixed, or how English terms actually become understood.144 
In any case, the epistemic part of my proposal is rather unorthodox. The claim is 
that there is a primitive type of inference that does the described job, and this is meant 
to imply that there is only one inferential step. Two questions arise immediately: firstly, 
why should there be a one-step inference from facts about actual stipulations of inferential 
patterns to the soundness of these patterns? Secondly, if there is such an inference, how 
exactly are we to conceive of its epistemic workings? 
As to the first question, there are at least three considerations motivating the claim 
that there is a belief-forming method of the kind described in the (Implicit Definition 
Inference) principle: 
• We have seen above that an important part of our cognitive lives conshits in the 
successful pursuit of cognitive projects, i.e. projects of finding out about the world 
- ideally by acquiring knowledge of it. The good standing of certain concepts is 
a precondition of the successful execution of any cognitive project. And the good 
standing of our concepts rests on the good standing of our meaning-fixing devices. For 
example: the soundness of meaning-fixing rules. The good standing of thelie devices 
will be an entitlement, if there is no route to justifying them without engaging in 
epistemic regress. However, we might regard establishing the good standing of our 
meaning-fixing devices as a cognitive project of its own: a project in which we aim at 
acquiring knowledge of their good standing. After all, it is the aim of any reasonable 
epistemology to account for as much knowledge as possible. Because such a projed 
would be very basic, we can expect that it has its own primitive belief-forming 
methods. The (Implicit Definition Inference) is a good candidate. Below, I 
argue that our epistemological framework predicts that every attempt to reduce this 
belief-forming method to other, more basic inferences - such as conceiving of it as all 
enthymeme - fails. So, if there is Ii project of acquiring internalistic knowledge of the 
good standing of our meaning-fixing devices, it must include a basic belief-forming 
method along the lines of the (Implicit Definition Inference). 
144This limitation makea the priDdple much harder to attack. On the other hand, it generates the worry 
that the propoaal O1lly applies to artificially iatrocluced operators, which would limit its epistemic potential 
CODSiderably. In the end, 80 the thought goes, it might turn out that we can only establish the soundness 
of the (Hume llulel) for an artificial operator - "*F" - and not for the Bngl"h operator ''the number 
of the Fa", or 10 the thought goes. I brie8y return to this worry in 7.1.8. 
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• We can find out which basic belief-forming methods we can take as basic by examining 
(i) how certain beliefs are canonically formed, and (ii) which of the belief-forming 
methods underlying canonical bellef-formation cannot be reduced to a combination 
of others. As to (i), when we make an explicit stipulation to fix meaning, other things 
being equal, we come to believe the soundness, validity, or truth of the Iltipulation145 
without making any use of additional reasoning. For example, mathematicians write 
down a definition on the board, and after that, in most cases, the truth of the 
definition is believed. So there must be a belief-forming method which is based 
on something grounded in our stipulations, and which leads to beliefs ill the good-
standing of these stipulations. As I said, I will show that this belief-forming met.hod 
cannot be reduced to other, more basic belief-forming methods. It must work along 
the lines of the (Implicit Definition Inference). 
One might think that what has been said could also be said in favour of postulating 
primitive rational insights: a faculty of rational intuition. However, there is a further 
general point to be made that allows us to respond to this worry: 
• At some point, every epistemologist has to make choices as to what he or she regards 
as basic belief-forming methods. These choices depend in part (!) on cost-benefit 
considerations. Call a set of basic belief-forming methods an epistemic frnmework. 
Other things being equal, we should prefer an epistemic framework accounting for 
as much internalistic knowledge as possible, without sacrificing something of com-
parable philosophical worth. In particular: if postulating the (Implicit Definition 
Inference) is a means to explain the possibility of claiming knowledge of certain 
important propositions, and the framework does not have any unacceptable philo-
sophical consequences, then we should postulate the existence of such an inference. 
The argument rests on a meta-epistemological principle we already encountered in 5.1.3, 
namely the: 
(Greater Meta-Epistemological Evil Principle) Other things being equal, we 
14liNote that I also call the stipulated patteI'D a stipulation. So there is lOme ambiguity here between 
stipulation .. Aft ACt and etipulation ., G ,t"tement or inJerenti,,1 ""teem (corresponding to a similar 
ambiguity of the term "definition,,). However, it is always easy to determine which of the two senses of 
stipulation I WIe, 80 I do not introduce artificial terms to distinguish the two. 
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should prefer an epistemological framework accounting for as much internalistic knowl-
edge as possible, without sacrificing something of comparable philosophical worth. 
The principle applies to the postulated structure of justification in particular. It. ell-
abIes us to rule out the postulation of a faculty of rational intuition: the considerations 
against rational insight in 1.3.1 show that postulating a faculty of rational intuitioIl meaIlS 
sacrificing something of comparable philosophical worth. However, it allows us to postulate 
the (Implicit Definition Inference). Among other things, it is not as unclear as the 
rational intuition proposal.146 
Assuming that the proposed basic belief-forming method exists, the (Implicit Defi-
nition Inference) principle can be obtained if two principles hold. Firstly: 
(Default Entitlement) Presuppositions of basic belief-forming methods of fundamen-
tal cognitive projects, which cannot be warranted evidentially without falling into epis-
temic regress, are warranted by default. 
Presuppositions are to be understood here in the way I defined the term in 4.2. They 
are propositions that need to be in the informational context of a subject - i.e. the 
subject needs to possess antecedent propositional warrants for them - in order for the 
respective belief-forming method to deliver evidential warrants for its conclusion. The 
second principle is: 
(Anti-Leaching) Basic belief-forming methods of such projects, whose presuppolSi-
tions are warranted by default, generate internalistic knowledge, if no relevant sceptical 
scenario obtains. 
We obtain the (Implicit Deftnition Inference) principle as follows: there is a bask 
belief-forming method allowing us to infer the good standing of our stipulations. We can 
assume here that the presuppositions of this inference are propositions to the effect that 
146Note that a full defeaae of my proponl requires a comparison with other approaches on the market 
place. In particular, the reader miIht havetbe WOrry that it wiD not suftice to set aside the naive rational 
intuition proposal without c:oD8ldering more sophisticated rationalist theories such as Bealer's (2000) and 
Peacocke's (2000). This ill correct. Although I agree with Jenkins as to some of the objections against 
these theories (Jenldna200U, 2;5), I cannot diIIcuBs these theories in this thesis and I will simply set them 
aside. I am indebted to Carrie Jeakitla and· Andrew McGonigal for making me aware of this gap in my 
argument. 
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scenarios undermining the truth-preservation of the inference do not obtain. 147 The non-
obtaining of these scenarios cannot be warranted evidentially without falling into epistemie 
regress. Thus, they are warranted by default (Default Entitlement). And uecam,e of 
(Anti-Leaching), the belief-forming method in question generates internalistic knowl-
edge, if no relevant sceptical scenario obtains. 
My epistemological framework meets both principles. Entitlement of cognitive project 
can play the role of warrants by default demanded by (Default Entitlement), and (J us-
tiftcation Generation) is an (Anti-Leaching)-principle for entitlement. What remains 
to be established is that the proposed inference is the best way to model the canonical 
belief-forming process in question. This is the only way to make sure that it is tlUbject to 
the (Greater Meta-Epistemological Evil Principle). In particular, we need to argue 
that the current account does better than other accounts of knowledge by stipulation. such 
as Boghossian's. I argue for this claim by simultaneously clarifying the (Abstraction-
ist Inference) by means of examples, and arguing for the made choices regarding the 
structure of justification. 
7.1.3 The Abstractionist Inference 
Consider again our non-defective epistemic agent - Hero - who already masters second-
order logic, and who sincerely makes the following stipulation: 
(Meaning-Fixing Stipulation) "#" is to be assigned a meaning such that the (Hume 
Rules) are necessarily truth-preserving.l48 
Making a stipulation can be conceived of as a command of Hero to himself, which 
immediately brings it about that a pattern of use is fixed for "#", and Hero becomes 
disposed to reason in accordance with this pattern of use. By virtue of this process, Hero 
comes to understand "#". 
However, making such a command does not have to effect an actual uncolldition ac-
ceptance of the rules. Consider the case in which Hero stipulates that "f" is to be assigned 
1411 diacuss IIODl8 poteIltial exc:ept40DB in T.'. 
148Hero might aI&o ltipula.te that "'''''' is to be usiped a meaning such that the Hume Rules are truth-
preserving. CoDBideratiODB of eligibility ngest that the usiped referent will be the same. In both cues 
the stipulation .-igna the function from concepts to objects that maps conceptI to their cardinalities. 
However, building it into the ltipulation that the rul. are to be necessarily truth-preserving increues the 
immediate epistemlc payoff. . 
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a meaning that renders the rules belonging to both directions of BLV sound: 
(BLV Rules) 
Hero might be willing to seriously make this stipulation in order to undert;tand "f", 
or to obtain a concept of extension, but not be willing to use these rules, because he 
knows that BLV is inconsistent. This knowledge can override the generated disposition to 
reason in accordance with these rules.149 Full acceptance is not ensured by having made a 
stipulation. 
This case shows that I need a notion of stipulation such that one can t;eriously make a 
stipulation to the effect that a certain meaning should be assigned without it being (fully) 
successful, and even if one knows that it cannot be (fully) successful. Since I l:Ollceive 
of the stipulation as a command, this claim is not particularly problematic. 15o Ceteri", 
paribus, that one has sincerely made a command does not depend on (the po~ibi1ity of) 
its success, and one can sincerely make a command even if one knows that it eanIlot be 
succesful. A general can command his troops to advance, knowing that they wou't. 
As an example which is even more like the meaning-fixing case, consider a world ill 
which there are several demigods, which have the power to stipulate or command that 
the world is to be in a certain way, and that these commands are successful unless God 
intervenes because he does not like the world to be as the command says. Clearly, a 
demigod can sincerely command that the moon is to consist of green chee!ie, although 
God intervenes and the command is not successful. And clearly, a demigod can make the 
command although he knows that God does not like the moon to be made of green cheese. 
The demigod might just be interested in provoking an argument with God. 
The premises of the (Abatractionist Inference) are propositions to the effect that a 
meaning-fixing command has been sincerely made. For example: 
(Premise) I sincerely made the (Meaning-Fixing Stipulation). 
1491 say a little bit more about this in.1.2.1. 
1SOIt would be problematic ~hold that .• c:erely making a meaning-fixing stipulation comes with the 
intentWra to fix meaDiDg in all cueI. If one knows meaning cannot be fixed, one might not be able to 
have this iDteotiou. On my view, _ intention to fix meaning (reference) is not required. Of course, it 
is required that tJaere is an intention to malce the command itself. And some weaker intentions might be 
required in addition, such .. the intention to come to understand the term on the basis of the stipulation. 
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I call such premises stipulation facts. My proposal is that, from the stipulation facts, 
the good standing of meaning-fixing devices - e.g. the soundness of the (Hume Rules) 
- can be inferred in a single step. 
It better turns out that (Premise) can be known internalistically, and apriori. For 
otherwise, Hero cannot acquire internalistic apriori knowledge of the conclusion of the 
inference. I think that Hero can acquire internalistic apriori knowledge of (Premise): 
everyone who sincerely made a meaning-fixing command knows apriori that he made this 
command sincerely, and has access to the fact that he knows that. Why? It is an instance of 
what has been called maker's knowledge - it is an instance of self-knowledge of one's own 
intentional actions - the kind of knowledge for which Anscombe (1957) argues. Ceteris 
paribus, if Hero knows that he intended to make the meaning-fixing command, he knows 
that he made the command. And this knowledge is apriori. It is not based 011 perceptual 
experience.151152153 
The idea underlying the (Abstractionist Inference) is that it is truth-prel!ierving in 
relevant good cases, because in these cases making the meaning-fixing command brings 
about (Semantic Success). We need to have a closer look at the metasemantic part of 
the proposal. It involves two claims: (i) that Hero comes to understand the undefined 
operator and (ii) that meaning is fixed appropriately. Applied to our example, the claim 
is that, by virtue of making the command, "#" becomes understood and gets assigned a 
meaning such that the (Hume Rules) are sound. 
To establish it, we just have to choose a suitable metasemantics. As to (i), I contend 
that sincerely making the meaning-fixing command brings it about that a pattern of use 
is fixed for "#" and accepted by Hero, i.e. that Hero becomes disposed to reason ill 
1111 Although this Imowledp isapriQri, it it Jmowledae of a contingent proposition. I do not think that 
thls generates any problem for the propoul. 
1113 Alternafu!ely, one milht deacribe ilae proc:a of coming to p088e881nternaliatlc knowledge of (PremlH) 
&8 follows. Hero's coJDJDalld comes with a certain phenomenology of understanding the command and 
obeying it, and thiI phenomeaolOlY I8l'WI U a source for forming the belief that (Premiae) holds. On 
thls basis, (P ....... ) can be known interDaliltially and apriori by introspection, or 10 the thought goes. 
Of COIU8e, our notioa of a~ty needs to be wic:h enoUSh to allow for knowledge by introspection to count 
&8 apriori knowledge. 
lUI thus endoree a rela\iwly wide. DOtloa of apriority. The reader might worry that thls wider notion 
of apriority allowa for apriori Imowledae of aubttautial external facta on the basia of knowledge of one's 
own meatalltatea, if one aIBO MIUmeI ~. externaliam. Consider, for example, Putnam's famous 
argument that we cannot be B1Vsbecauae we can think of water and we can only think of water if we are 
not BlVs (Putnam 1M1, chapter 1). I rej«lt such arcumentll. It is my view, however, that one can possess 
apriori .,.manU for (DOte: not apriori j1uC1Jicotion for or apriori knowledge of) substantial claims about 
the extenaal world. FOr aample,. OM C&Il POIIe8a such a warrant for the claim that the BIV hypothesis 
does not obtain, becaUle it is an entitlement. 
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accordance with the rules. Assuming a metasemantics according to which understandins 
consists in accepting a pattern of use, "#" can become understood by virtue of sincerely 
making the command. Note that the command fixes the logical form of the stipulation. 
Consider the (Bume Rules). That "#" is a term-forming operator is settled, for this is 
part of the content of the meaning-fixing command. 
As to (ii), we need a metasemantics allowing for meaning to be fixed by the stipulation 
of introduction and elimination rules. For now, we can assume that there is a plausible 
metasemantics delivering the desired result in the case of the (Bume Rules). However, 
there are numerous examples where meaning-fixing commands of introduction and elimina-
tion rules fail. Certain preconditions have to be in place in order for the (Abstractionist 
Inference) to be truth-preserving. 
We can focus on the bad companions of (BP) discussed in 2.4.2. The problematic 
abstraction principles, taken as pairs of rules, will be examples for bad companions of the 
(Bume Rules). As an example, consider again the (BLV Rules). Assuming unretitricted 
comprehension, these rules cannot be sound, because they lead to Russell's Paradox. 1M 
This suggest consistency as a minimal precondition. 
There is much more to say. However, let us assume for now that we found the appropri-
ate preconditions (and the relevant abstraction principles turn out to meet them). We then 
still face an epistemological problem: if not all stipula.tions can fix meaning in accordance 
with the stipulation, then how caD Hero responsibly infer that a certain stipulation is in 
good standing, just on the basis of the claim that he made it? After all, the stipulation 
could be a bad case. 
My suggestion, which is implicit in the (Abstractionist Inference), is that we apply 
the epistemological framework carved out in Part II, and draw parallels to other cases of 
belief-forming methods that can go wrong in some way or other. 
I regard the situation as being analoguous to the case of Hero forming the belief that he 
has two hands on the basis of having the experience as of his two hands. The existence of 
sceptical scenarios shows that this belief-forming method can go wrong. However, I argued 
in Part II that aU this shows is that whether the experience can count as evidence depends 
on Hero's prior information to the effect that sceptical scenarios do not obtain. If Hero 
154 Just replace the MP steps in ICCOrdallce with instances of BLV by the respective BLV -rule steps. 
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possesses such information, Hero can acquire a full internalistic warrant for there being a 
table by virtue of executing this belief-forming method, because he can rationally regard 
the experience as evidence for the external-world belief. 
Here is how this bears on the mathematical case: bad companions show that the fact 
that a certain stipulation has been made cannot already be rationally regarded a.'l evidence 
for the claim that the respective meaning-fixing devices are in good standing. Whether 
it can be regarded as evidence depends on the subject's prior information to the effect 
that the stipulation is not a bad case, which includes that the stipulation in question is 
not a bad companion. However, in the context of such prior information, knowledge that 
the respective stipulation has been made is evidence for the good standing of its meanillg-
fixing devices - e.g. the soundness of rules corresponding to both directions of abstraction 
principles. 
In chapter 4, I examined how we can handle information-dependent evidence in gen-
eral. The upshot is this: we endorse a conservative interpretation of the belief-forming 
method in question - i.e. the claim that we need to possess antecedent warrants to accept 
certain presuppositions ensuring the non-obtaining of undermining (sceptical) scenarios··-
and argue that the presuppositions of these belief-forming methods are warranted. If th(l 
belief-forming method is sufficiently basic, we will need to endorse non-evidential warrants 
for the presuppositions: entitlements of cognitive project. However, because of the (Justi-
fication Generation) principle, this does not preclude us from using these belief-forming 
methods to acquire interna1istic knowledge, for it tells us that belief-forming methods all 
of whose presuppositions are entitlements ceteris paribus generate or transmit interualistic 
knowledge. 
I conceive of the (Abstractloniat Inference) as a basic belief-forming method which 
is treated conservatively. It has characteristic presuppositions, ensuring its good standing 
in particular cases. Suppose that ali presuppositions are met. Then meaning is fixed in 
the appropriate way, the inference is truth-preserving, and the conclusion is true. If the 
presuppositions are also warranted - maybe by means of entitlement of cogllitive project 
- the subject can acquire internalistic knowledge of its conclusion - the soundness of the 
relevant rules - because of the (Justlftcation Generation) principle. This is precisely 
the suggestion expressed by the (Abstractionist Inference) principle. 
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What are the relevant presuppositions in the case of the (Hume Rules)? One might 
simply say that the presupposition is one of the following: 
• Nothing went wrong with this stipulation (that would undermine the inference's 
tru th-preservation) . 
• This inference is truth-preserving. 
• H I make this stipulation, then the stipulated rules will be sound. 
All these entail that the stipulation in question is not a bad companion (e.g. that it is 
consistent). However, although it is very plausible that some of these are presuppositions, 
claiming that these are the only presuppositions, and leaving it at that, would not be very 
illuminating. 
Firstly, we need to know what exactly constitutes the conduciveness of the environ-
ment, and we need examples for bad cases. Only then can we examine how eXa<:tly the 
presuppositions are warranted in relevant cases. Consider the perceptual case again: after 
noting that it is a presupposition of perceptual belief-forming methods that the cognitive 
environment is conducive, Wright provides concrete examples of what might go wrong. 
Secondly, as we shall see below, knowing what the presuppositions are is important to 
evaluate the epistemological consequences of the proposal, because of transmission-failure 
considerations. 
Thirdly, simple presupposition such as those above won 't do for more sophisticated 
subjects. H Hero has a firm grasp of logic and knows about the inconsistency of the 
(BLV Rules), he cannot simply assume that nothing went wrong in order to regard his 
stipulation as evidence fur the soundness of the (Hume Rules). Hero needs to assume 
that the (Hume Rules) do notfaU short of the same difficulty as the (BLV Rules). 
That is: he needs to assume that the (Hume Rules) are consistent. Consistency is a 
presupposition of the inference in this case.l55 
1&5 An altemati'¥9 is to say that it iaiadgea oaly one of the simple propoaitioDS above that features 
&8 the preauppoaittoo, 8\IeSl for more aophiaticated subjects, and to say that specific conditions BUch as 
CODSistency an relevant DOt becauae they are proper preluppoaitions, but because having a reason to doubt 
tbem is a rnd&cieat re8IIOIl to believe tllat &he limple presupposition is untrue. ThUl, having a reason to 
doubt that specific condltioDs such as coDli8tency are met would defeat our entitlement for the 8imple 
presuppositiou. Something timilar could be said about perceptual belief-forming methods, but I cannot 
diecuas this alteraati'¥9 picture ia this thesis. 
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So we need to say more. We need to extract appropriate presuppositions, and argue that 
they can all be warranted in relevant cases. Given the regress argument of the last chapter, 
we should expect that some presuppositions - such as consistency - will be warranted 
by means of entitlement. In the remainder of this subsection, I will simply assume that 
the consistency of the (Burne Rules) is among the presuppositions of a stipulation of 
the (Bume Rules), that it is an entitlement, and that all other presuppositions of a 
stipulation of the (Burne Rules) - whatever they are - are likewise warranted. I thus 
obtain a picture I can work with in the remainder of this section. However, I will discuss 
the presuppositions in much more detail in 7.2. 
1.1.4 Defending the proposed structure of justification (1) 
For a stipulation of a pair of abstractionist rules Rlntro and RElim, I denote the stipu-
lation facts by "8tip (Rlntro, RElim)", and the conditions that feature as presuppOl;itious 
by "C[Rlntro, RElim]". The soundness of a rule R will be denoted by "800nd (R)". ~ow 
consider the case of the (Bume Rules). We can display the relevant instaJll~e of the 
(Abstractionist Inference) as follows: 
(Abstractionist Inference - D1acram) 
The suggestion is that, given that the relevant presuppositions are warranted, Hero 
can acquire internalistic knowledge of Sound (H P -+) and 800M (H p .... ) by virtue of going 
through the following simple line of reasoning: 
(1) Stip(HP-+,HP ... )(= (Premise» 
(2) 8ound(HP-+) and Sound (HP .... ) (I), (Abstractionist Inference) 
And this leads to the following objection to my proposal: why should Hero be able to 
infer (2) directlf/ from (1)1 Is it not a much better explanation that he goes through a 
metasemantic line of reasoning directly mirroring the claim that the stipulation is seman-
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tically successful, citing (Metasemantic Inferentialism)? Is my envisaged (Abstrac-
tionist Inference) not just an enthymeme for a sustained reflection on stipulations along 
the following lines? 
(2') 
(3') 
Stip(HP-t,HP+-) 1\ C(HP-t,HP+-) -t 
Sound (HP-t) 1\ Sound (HP+-) 
Sound (H P -t) 1\ Sound (H P+-) 
We can summarize this idea as follows: 
By (Metasemantic Inferentialism) 
1',2', MP 
(Metasemantic Reasoning Model) The canonical belief-forming method underlying 
the process of acquiring knowledge of the good standing of meaning-fixing devices 011 
the basis of knowledge of meta-linguistic stipulations is best described by a deductive, 
metasemantic line of reasoning using (Metasemantic Inferentialism) as a premise. 
The problem with this proposal is that it is subject to leaching, and thus fails the 
(Greater Meta-Epistemological Evil Principle). Suppose it turns out that "orne 
presuppositions will only be warranted by means of entitlement. We already saw that 
this is very plausible,and I will argue for the claim in full detail below. In this case, 
the second conjunct of the argument's premise (1 ') will at best be an (inferential) entitle-
ment. l56 But if an argument's premise is only an (inferential) entitlement, then - by the 
(Limit Principle) from section 4.5,1 - its conclusion cannot have an epistemic status 
above (inferential) entitlemellt.Thus,the soundness of the (Hume Rules) canuot be 
intemalistically known by virtue of going through the argument. 
The proposal would be just as sceptical 88 Wright's position (see 6.1.3). However, 
the aim of the current proposal is to vindicate the possibility of possessing internalistic 
knowledge of propositions such 88(3') .. If the canonical structure of justification is displayed 
by an explicit argument using the COIlditions for semantic success as a premise, we cannot 
achieve this aim. 
lHThis result is o})taiD.ed by the (LJ.st Pl'laciple) from section 4.5.1. Since some of the presupposi-
tioD8 are entitlements -by tlie (Ltmit Prtslclple)- C (HP ... , HP .... ) it will (at best) be an inferential 
entitlement bec&1I8e it is a CODjuDction one Qf. whose cosYunct. is a mere entitlement. For the same rea-
1IOtlS, (1') will (at best) be an infenmti.a entitlemeiat since it haa to be inferred from both conjuncts -
Stip(HP ... ,HP .... ) and C(HP ... ,HP .... ). . 
This is just another instance of the leaching worry, and we already know a strategy to 
avoid it. In particular, although I accepted the (Limit Principle), I rejected what I called 
the (Strong Limit Principle): that entitled presuppositions preclude an inference from 
transmitting internalistic knowledge. Thus, if we can regard the preconditions for semantic 
success - and C (H P -+, H P ~) in particular - as presuppositions of the abstractionist's 
line of reasoning, as opposed to premises, we will avoid the leaching worry. 
This is precisely my suggestion. The (Abstractionist Inference) principle construes 
the conditions for semantic success as presuppositions. It does not matter that some 
of them are entitlements. By (Justification Generation), we can acquire illterualistic 
knowledge of the conclusion of the inference from (1) to (2) by virtue of driiwing the 
inference on the basis of intemalistically known premises. As I mentioned above. I think 
the stipulation facts can be regarded as items of self-knowledge in the relewnt caseH. and 
self-knowledge is intemalistic knowledge. Thus, we can acquire internalistic knowledge of 
(2). 
At this point, the reader might still worry (i) that we cannot construe the structure of 
justification as we please, and (ii) that my proposal cannot be correct, because the proposed 
change in the structure of justification cannot account for internalistic knowledge, if the 
(Metaaemantic Reasoning Model) cannot account for internalistic knowledge; in short: 
that my proposal pulls the internalistic knowledge rabbit out oj the entitlement hat. 
AB to (ii), the worry amounts to the claim that (Justification Generation) crumot 
be correct. However, I already argued at length for the entitlement proposal and the 
(Justification Generation) principle. I explained how internalistic knowledge eM be 
generated on the basis of belief-fomling methods with entitled presuppositions, and I will 
explain how exactly it works in the case at hand in the next subsection. There are no 
magic tricks here at all. 
As to (i), note first that I am engaging in a reconstructive project. And it is not clear 
whether the complaint really has force in this context. I am not claiming to track the 
actual structure of justification. 
Be that as it may. If the reader feels there is the need for an argument, here is 
an argument. Because of the (Greater Meta-Epistemological Evil Principle), we 
should postulate the structure of justification delivering as much internalistic knowledge as 
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possible, without sacrificing something of comparable philosophical worth. Construing the 
(Abstractionist Inference) as I do looks as if it can deliver more internaiistic knowledge 
than all the other proposals we have seen so far, such as the (Metasemantic Reasoning 
Model). Since I am able to clearly explain how the belief-forming process works, and I 
am able to defend the proposal against objections, the (Greater Meta-Epistemological 
Evil Principle) applies, and delivers justification for the postulation of the described 
primitive inference. 
7.1.5 The generation of internalistic justification 
I complete the model by explicating how (Justification Generation) is to work ill the 
case of the (Abstractionist Inference). Consider the case of Hero. The basic thought is 
this: because Hero possesses warrants for all presuppositions - let us assume that all thel!!e 
warrants are entitlements - Hero possesses an entitlement for the claim that the stipulation 
facts constitute evidence for the soundness of the (Burne Rules), and thus that he can 
extend knowledge by virtue of the (Abstractionlst Inference). Since Hero can also daim 
that he possesses knowledge of the stipulation facts - they are internalistically known -
he can acquire an inferential entitlement for the claim that he possesses knowledge of the 
conclusion. 
In 4.5.2, I presented two models for (Justification Generation). Both models can 
be applied here, but I just consider the first for the sake of simplicity. Let" Soun(/' stand 
for "Sound (HP-+) A Sound (HP+-)", let "K (Sound)" stand for "I know that Soun(/', and 
let "B IDI (P)" stand for "I formed the belief that p on the basis of drawing the appropriate 
instance of the implicit definition inference". According to our first model, Hero can acquire 
an (inferential) entitlement for K (Sound) by going through the following argument: 
1 K (Stip(HP-+, HP ... » Accessibility of self-knowledge 
2 BIDI (Sound) Self-knowledge 
3 C(HP ... ,HP ... ) Hero rationally takes this for granted 
4 BID1 (Sound) A C (HP .... ,HP ... ) -+ Metasemantics and epistemology. 
(K (Stip(HP-+, HP+-» ~ K;(Sound) 
5 K (Stip(HP .... ,HP ... » -+ K (Sound) 2,3,4, MP 
6 K(Sound) 4,1, MP 
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Two notes are in order. Firstly, Hero's entitlement for the claim that the stipulation 
facts constitute evidence for the conclusion (line 4) will rest on the availability of an 
argument similar to the (Metasemantic Reasoning Model). The crucial difference 
is that it is applied at the second-level. Second-level considerations are merely entitled 
because they rest on entitled premises, but the first-level argument - the argument for 
Saund - does not. 
Secondly, the argument above involves citing conditions like consistency, which is to be 
understood as a formal concept. Does the current proposal not exclude subjects that do 
not possess the relevant concepts? Does it not, so to speak, face an exclusive club problem? 
I do not think this is so. For a less sophisticated Hero might begin his second-order 
refiection with lines 1 and 4. It is not always required that one realizes just how the 
entitlement for the conditional in line 4 is canonically grounded. A less sophisticated Hero 
- or Hero who has no reason to consider conditions like consistency because he never 
realized that there are bad companions - will be directly entitled to take it for granted 
that nothing went wrong, or that the (Abstractionist Inference) is truth-preserving. 
Thus, he will also be able to acquire an inferential entitlement for the claim that the 
(Abstractionist Inference) extends knowledge. 
What has been said enables us to reconsider the abstractionist position. For the (Ab-
stractionist Inference) precisifies the epistemic workings of the neo-Fregean (Implicit 
Definition Thesis). Let me retell the neo-Fregean Hero story using the (Abstractionist 
Inference) . 
1.1.6 A reftned Hero story 
The story again begins with Hero, a non..defective epistemic agent who grasps second-
order logic, and can use it to extend intemalistic knowledge. Hero stipulates the (Hume 
Rules) to fix the meaning of "#?', He does 80 by sincerely making the (Meaning-Fixing 
Stipulation) - that "iI" is to be assigned a meaning such that the (Burne Rules) are 
sound. 
By virtue of tbis,Hero comes to Understand "#", and the meaning that is assigned 
to it renders the (Hume RuIes)soUnd~ I argue below that the assigned meaning is the 
number operator that maps concepts to their cardinalities. 
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Moreover, Hero can acquire intemalistic knowledge of the fact that he has just made the 
appropriate meta-linguistic stipulation. On the basis of this knowledge, Hero infers t.hat the 
(Burne Rules) are sound, by drawing the appropriate instance of the (Abstractionist 
Inference). Note that Hero acquired knowledge by an inferential, but uon-deductive 
route. The (Logicality of Inference in Mathematics) assumption which underlied the 
mere entitlement proposals from chapter 6, needs to be rejected. 
Because Hero possesses entitlements for the presupposition of this inference -- in par-
ticular, he does not possess a sufficient reason to believe that the (Burne Rules) are 
not consistent, etc. - intemalistic justification (and knowledge) is transmitted in accor-
dance with the (Justification Generation) principle. Hero thus acquires internalistic 
knowledge of the soundness of the (Burne Rules). 
Furthermore, either the soundness of the (Burne Rules) is the only presupposition 
of reasoning in accordance with them, or Hero can acquire an internalistic warrant for 
the presupposition on the basis of his intemalistic knowledge of soundness.167 Thus. we 
can assume that Hero possesses a warrant for whatever the presupposition of reasoning in 
accordance with instances of the (BUrne Rules) is. Also, Hero now unconditionally (and 
rationally) accepts the (Bume Rul.), and is willing to make inferences in accordance 
with these rules. Thus, Hero can use the (Burne Rules) to extend intemalistic knowledge, 
because of the (Justification Generation) principle. 
Hero can now go through Frege's proof: after having made the necessary explicit def-
initions, he can use the modified, rule-based version of Frege's Proof to infer versions of 
the second-order Peano axioms, just using second-order logic and the (Burne Rules). 
We assumed that Hero can use second-order logic to extend internalistic knowledge. So 
all the used inferential steps transmit intemalistic knowledge. Hero thus comes to POtlSess 
intemalistic knowledge of the second-order Dedekind-Peano axioms. From this, Hero can 
make further inferences and acquire knowledge of further, specific properties of the natural 
lII'1Note that there is • question here of whether the preeuppoeition of the rules ia a meta.-language, or an 
object-luaguap venioD ofth. claim that they an lOund (or truth-preserving), and whu kind of claim the 
(AbltractloDiat 1DfereDee) deli ... ~Iy, the preeuppoaitions are not couched in meta-linguistic 
terms. Thus, the current argum.eut either requireI thl.t the (Abltractlonlst IDfereDce) directly delivers 
an object laaguap venioa of the IIOUIldDeIa ~ or Hero Deeds to disquote, i.e. infer an object language 
version of the 1OWldae8a claim - • venion of tbe claim in which "#" is used, and not only mentioned -
from the met.la.npap claim .. 1 do llOt think that such a dlsquotational step is problematic, since Hero 
already fully understands "#to. However, Dote that such steps have been problematized by Ebert (2005b) 
and Jenkius (20086). -
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numbers. Moreover, as sketched in the last section, Hero will be able to apply arithmetical 
rules in other contexts. This time, however, Hero not only pOStlt!ti8et! ellt.itil'Ult'lIts for tlw 
soundness of the arithmetical rules, but internalistic knowledge. 
7.1. 7 Transmission-failure and the justification of consistency 
Hero can acquire a lot of intemalistic knowledge on this basis. However, there art' limitt', 
They come with transmission-failure. 
The general lesson of transmission-failure considerations C8Il be put like this: entitlt·d 
presuppositions remain entitlements, and can never be claimed to be known. Thutl, what-
ever the entitled presuppositions of the (Abstractlonlst Inference) are, thetic proposi-
tions will remain entitlements, and can never be claimed to be known. 
For example: since the consistency of (HP) is an entitled presupposition of the (Ab-
stractionist Inference) for (HP), Hero will not be able to acquire internalistk kllowll'(lge 
of its consistency. The following argument displays transmission-failure, bec.:ause the stt!}> 
from (1) to (2) presupposes its conclusion: 
(1) Stip(HP~,HP+-)(= (Premise) above) 
(2) K (Sound) (1), Abstmctionut Inference 
(3) If K (Sound), then HP is consistent. Sound rules do not 
generate contraditiolUl 
(4) HP is consistent. (2), (3), MP 
One might think that this is ,a revisionary sceptical consequence, because knowledge of 
the consistency of arithmetic is a PJlra4lgmatic claim to knowledge. I all1 not sure whether 
it is. But it is certainly wo11hex~inl whether we can somehow avoid this consequt!m:e. 
Can we avoid it by recourse to~ theories? Suppose Hero not only stipulatetol 
the (RumeR.ules), buttha~ lie~~pu1ates abstraction principles which yield tbtJO. 
des with a strouger consist~cy~sth than Frege Arithmetic (FA). Suppose there is a 
pair of rules conespondingtoa consistent abstraction principle for sets, which delivers l\ 
theory as strong as ZF. Callthe co~esponding abstraction principle Magic Law V, call 
the corresponding rules the Magic Law V Rules, and call the sY8tem fuge Sr.t Th"()f1l 
(FST).158 Prima facie, we should be able to tell a Hero story about thh; Hystt·m. If this is 
correct, then Hero will be able to prove a statement expressing the consistency of FA 
and hence the consistency of the (Hume Rules) - in FST. Thu8, Hero will Ill' ablt· t.o 
acquire internalistic knowledge of its consistency after all, or so the thought goes. 1M 
But this does not really help with avoiding sceptical consequences, given that wnHis-
tency claims for mathematical theories are paradigmatic claims to knowledge. For IIOW 
the consistency of FST will be an entitlement. Of course, one might hope to find allotht!r. 
even stronger theory that proves the consistency of this theory in turn. But this d()l~ not. 
avoid the problem, for then the stronger theory's consistency will be an entitlement. 
Moreover, on closer consideration it is not at all clear that the availability of Ii proof 
in FST establishing a claim that can be taken to express the consistency of FA "hows t.hat 
the consistency of FA cannot be an entitlement. First of all, what exactly can we show ill 
FST? We could use Godel's technique to construct a statement Can(F A) that is provablt' 
in FST and of which we can show, in Bome meta-theory, that Can(F A) holdt; if aud only 
if FA is consistent. But we can only show this as long as we assume, in the met.a-tlU'ory. 
that FST is consistent. We will have to use the consistency of FST IU:I a premiHe in uur 
proof of the consistency of FA and HP. And if this premise is, as we assumed. ollly Illl 
entitlement, we cannot obtain more than an (inferential) entitlement for the conduliion of 
the meta-theoretic argument, Le. the ~aim that FA and HP are consistent. l60 
In other words: a proof of the consistency of FA in FST relies on presuPPOIiitiullN lIf 
the same kind as the consistency of FA, and in no more secure a prior epilrtemic stauding 
than the consistency of FA. ThecoDaistency of FA remains an entitlement. 
Consistency claims for abstractionist theories are entitlements, and have to remain 
entitlements, if they are presupposjtions of the (Abatractionist Inference). This is a 
bullet I have to bite. It is. a coll8equence of the epistemic framework presented in Part 11. 
1581 am grateful to Filippo Ferrari and aobert WUliama for maIdDg me aware of thla nne of rt!UOning. 
and the potential com.pIlcaticma thia briDlfwltJt·lt. 
11i9Robert Williams hu pointed GUHo me that t~ mipt lead to a potentially devutatiq objection to 
the proposal. Suppoae we can w .~·_a .... ~. eadl of wbieb prcMII the II&tidabUity of 
the weaker ones. One might think that in thta CUt no aatiafiabUity claim II an entitlement, bec:auae tbertl 
is always an argument ava.Uable wlaida." _nat OIl the IUD8 preluppoiltloDl u the wubr theory. But 
how does tile abatractioDiat projeCt pt 0« tbe IfOWld tbeD? It aeema we are caUlht in a repelli. bec&UIt\ 
we always have to pro1Ie coDBisteney by.ulq • NoDpr theory. The followiJas U'gumeot .bOWl how to 
rebut this objection. 
looTbia is becauIe of the (LImit PrllaClple) &om 4.5.1. 
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7.1.8 Hermeneutic abstractionism 
How does the generated knowledge relate to ordinary arithmetical kllowlt!(lgt·'? CIlIl lilt' 
described route enable Hero to possess internalistic knowledge of the propertit~s of tlw 
numbers we all know and love? In other words: can my propoHal provide for lwrlllt'ueutk 
reconstruction? 
Fortunately, at least in the arithmetical case, we can build on the arguImmtlS provitit'tl 
by the neo-Fregeans. In particular, we can build on the idea that (HP) met~ts (Frege's 
Constraint) - that the primary applications of cardinal numbers are rendered imuwdiatt' 
by (HP) - and that this implies that Hero will come to refer to and acquire kuowlt,<lge 
of the (properties of the) numbers we all know and love, i.e, the numbers every sufficiently 
sophisticated user of ordinary number talk refers to: 1, 2, 3, and so on. 
According to one line of reasoning (and this is the line of reasoning I want to emlorSt')' 
this is because the fact that (HP) meets (Frega's Constraint), and the definition:; of 
the other terms of FA, entails that the terms of FA displays the same pattern of Ulit~ Wi or-
dinary arithmetical terms (see 2.3.5). Thus, by the neo-Fregean (Reference Supervenes 
on Use) principle, the terms of our reconstruction and our ordinary arithmetkal tt~rm!i 
have the same meanings (referents). The reconstructed knowledge really is arithnU'tkal 
knowledge: the subject matter is the same. Moreover, we have established that the mllth-
ematicians, the scientists, and sufficiently competent users of mathematiUl in ewryday 
discourse have true arithmeticai belier8. This is because the truth values of relevaut ordi-
nary arithmetical propositions are the same as the truth values of corresponding theorems 
of our reconstructed theory. In other Words, the proposal promises to vindicate at leWit 
(Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction).· All this of course depends on whether !lOme 
objections, discussed in 2.3.5, can be met. 
Ideally, Hero (and hence the reader of this thesis) can come to know the hermetleutk 
claim apriori. If this is the case, tnenHero will not only be able to acquire claimabltl 
knowledge of arithmetical facts, but a180 be able to claim, on the basis of his re(:oru;tru(~ti()n, 
that he possesses knowledge oithe oidiDary arithmetical statements he made before hl~ 
stipulated (HP) (and that these statements are true). 
Can Hero come to know apriorithat the terms of his reconstructed theory have the 
same reference as the terms of ordinary number ta1k? I think it is plausible that he can, 
for the neo-Fregean argument for (Weak Hermeneutic Reconstruction) is available 
to Hero apriori, given that it apriori what the logical form of ordinary number talk is, 
and that Hero possesses relevant mathematical and philosophical concepts and skills. In 
1.2, I assumed that a relevant transparency principle holds, and in 2.3.5, I argued that it 
might hold even if it is an epistemic possibility that further linguistic research reveals that 
ordinary number terms are not really singular terms. Of course, the assumption merits 
further research. 
Be that as it may. As I said in 2.3.5, that Hero's knowledge meets the demand of (Weak 
Hermeneutic Reconstruction), and hence that my account meets the (Arithmetical 
Knowledge) constraint, would still be true even if the argument for it was aposteriori. 
So this result would not be devastating. 
Moreover, if the neo-Fregean strategy for (Strong Hermeneutic Reconstruction) 
can be vindicated, then it is probably also available to my proposal. However, the question 
of how to establish strong hermeneutic claims, and whether such claims are available 
apriori, is wide open, and I want to remain neutral on this issue. 
7.1.9 Meeting the constraints 
I complete my exposition of the new abstractionist position by examining how it fares with 
respect to the constraints I imposed in 1.2. 
The first constraint is (Arithmetical Platonism). It should be clear through my dis-
cussion of the hermeneutic aspect of my proposal that my aim is to account for knowledge 
of mathematical theories, Platonistically construed. The idea is that we can acquire knowl-
edge of (HP) with its apparent logical form taken at face value. In particular: once we 
come to possess internalistic knowledge of the existence of certain bijections - even trivial 
ones as e.g. 3R(Bij(R,[x=xJ,{x = x))) - we can use (HP+-) to acquire internalistic 
knowledge of a number identity - e.g. #z[x = xl = #z[x = xl- and acquire internalistic 
knowledge of the existence of a certain number in turn - e.g. 3y (y = #z[x = xl). This 
claim is meant to be interpreted as a claim about what there is. It is meant to carry 
a genuine ontological commitment. This commitment is one to abstract objects. I have 
not explicitly argued for this claim yet, but I think that it is not hard to provide such an 
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argument. (UP) can only be necessarily true if the objects it is about necessarily exist. ltil 
This might raise rejectionist complaints. I think that my proposal enables us to reCOIl-
sider this objection in a new light: namely as a challenge to identify suitable presupposi-
tions for stipulations with heavyweight ontological impact. I discuss the objectioIl and Illy 
response below. 
My proposal provides the resources to meet (Field's Constraint). For we can extract 
an account of how our practise of stipulation and corresponding belief-formation can be 
reliable. 162 
The upshot is that in most cases of meta-linguistic stipulation, nothing goes wrong, and 
that bad cases are such that responsible epistemic agents realize, sooner or later, that they 
are bad, which effects giving up their false beliefs and also raises the standards for further 
stipulations. Consider (BLV), for example. Once the inconsistency is brought to Hero's 
attention, he looses his warrant for the presupposition that the stipulation is consistent 
and for the claim that nothing went wrong. Thus, he will give up the belief that (BLV) is 
true. Moreover, once such cases are known, the epistemic standards for further stipulations 
are raised. From this moment onwards, it needs to be excluded that new stipulations fall 
short of the same difficulty, for otherwise the agent has sufficient reason to doubt that the 
relevant presuppositions are met, and they will not be entitlements. 
The postulated structure of justification ensures that stipulations are made responsibly, 
in a way which is conducive to reliability. Only if a subject does not have sufficient reasons 
to doubt that nothing goes wrong - i.e. that none of the relevant bad scenarios obtains 
- does a subject acquire an internalistic warrant for the conclusion of relevant instances 
of the (Implicit Definition Inference). This ensures that full internalistic warrant is 
generated, first and foremost, in good cases. 
Moreover, in order to be fully responsible, a subject needs to check that he or she 
possesses entitlements for the claim that nothing goes wrong, i.e. that he or she possesses 
entitlements for all relevant presuppositions. This will uncover risky stipulations and effect 
an examination to the effect whether the stipulation can really be made. Specific pitfalls 
of identified bad cases will be avoided by fully responsible epistemic agents. I have dis-
1.1See also the CODSideratiOUll ill 7.2.3. I am also sympathetic to Rosen's arguments in (Rosen 1993). 
1621 am indebted to Carrie Jenkias aDd Andrew McGonigal for a very interesting and helpful discussion 
of this issue. 
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cussed above what the essential presuppositions of the (Abstractionist Inference) are. 
Someone who makes sure that he or she possesses entitlements for these presuppositions 
will avoid all known pitfalls. And, for all we know, avoiding these pitfalls means that the 
stipulation in question is successful. 
I have already discussed how I intend to account for (Weak Hermeneutic Recon-
struction). Although the proposal endorsing (Frege's Constraint) merits further re-
search, we have reason to believe that the account meets the (Arithmetical Knowledge) 
desideratum. 
It also meets the (Arithmetical Foundationalism) constraint, and the (Apriority 
Constraint). Knowledge of the stipulation facts will be apriori, because it is makers 
knowledge, and both the (Abstractionist Inference) and logical rules preserve apriority. 
The (Applicability Constraint) is met in the same way as in the case of the proposals 
discussed in the last chapter. Because of (Frege's Constraint), the applicability of 
arithmetic is built into the foundations of our reconstructed theory. 
The epistemic payoff of the proposal is limited by cases of transmission-failure. I have to 
bite this bullet. Such cases are rare, and in any case the proposal does much better than the 
proposals discussed in the last section. However, it might still yield some moderate sceptical 
consequences. For example: if consistency claims about mathematical theories count as 
ordinary mathematical claims (and they probably do), then some ordinary mathematical 
truths cannot be claimed to be known. 
The general idea underlying my proposal motivates reconsidering the (Same Source) 
desideratum. If basic mathematical rules can be justified by means of the (Abstraction-
ist Inference), why should we not say something similar about logical rules? Can we 
extend the proposal in such a way that we obtain an instance of the (Implicit Definition 
Inference) for logic? A positive answer would be most welcome for at least two reasons: 
• We would awid the revisionary sceptical consequence that the validity of basic log-
icallaws is warranted only by means of entitlement. In fact, if the proposal can be 
extended to the logical case, validity claims could be internalistically known apri-
ori, and inferentially so, on the basis of self-knowledge of our own meta-linguistic 
stipulations . 
• Moreover, we would obtain the result that the (Same Source) constraint is met and 
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thus vindicate genuine logicism. Mathematics and logic would be canonically based 
on the same belief-forming method: the (Implicit Definition Inference). 
I argue for a positive answer below. First, however, I need to examine in more detail the 
presuppositions of the (Abstractionist Inference). 
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7.2 The presuppositions of the Abstractionist Inference 
To complete the argument that has emerged in the last sections, it needs to be established 
(i) that all presuppositions of relevant instances of the (Abstractionist Inference) can 
be (intemalistically) warranted, and (ii) that at least some of the warrants for these presup-
positions are entitlements. Establishing (i) will enable us to appeal to the (Justification 
Generation) principle to establish that one can acquire intemalistic knowledge by virtue 
of the (Abstractionist Inference). Establishing (ii) is required as a premise in the moti-
vation for endorsing the (Abstractionist Inference): if all conditions could be justified 
without regress, our argument against the (Metasemantic Reasoning Model) would 
be undermined, because there would be no leaching problem. 
This requires a detailed investigation of the question of what the presuppositions of 
the (Abstractionist Inference) are. Above, I worked with the example of consistency. 
But consistency cannot possibly be the only presupposition. We saw in 2.4.2 that there 
are consistent, but mutually inconsistent abstraction principles. This shows that not all 
consistent abstraction principles can be true. Thus, the (Abstractionist Inference) is 
not truth-preserving for some consistent abstraction principles. And everything that is 
relevant to ensure the truth-preservation of this inference is a candidate for a presuppo-
sition: if the inference is not truth-preserving, something must have gone wrong, and the 
presuppositions - by definition - are the conditions ensuring that nothing went wrong. 
I am not interested in any presuppositions whatoever. The aim is to identify a col-
lection of presuppositions of the (Abstractionist Inference) which delivers a complete 
and informative account of what can go wrong with stipulations of abstraction princi-
ples, such that someone who knows of all these presuppositions, and who has made sure 
that he possesses warrants for them, can be called a maximally informed and responsible 
stipulator. 163 
In particular, the identified collection of presuppositions should be maximal in the sense 
that its members entail all other propositions that could be identified as presuppositions. 
In particular, they should entail the trivial presuppositions such as the propositions that 
lUI am sympathetic to the idea that logico-mathematical sophistication UP' the ante, i.e. that only 
UDaOphisticated atipuJaton c:aa claial bowledp solely on the basis of being able to claim entitlements to 
simple pnnppoeitioDS ncb IS "NothiDs went wrong". More sophisticated subjects need to be able to claim 
entitlements for more specific pnnppollittcma (such as consistency). By making sure that we can claim 
entitlements for all the 8I8eIltial pte8Upp08itiou, we establish that even the most sophisticated subjects 
c:aa ratiouaUy claim knowledge OIl the basis of the (Abatractioniat Inference). 
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nothing goes wrong, or that the (Abstractionist Inference) is truth-preserving. 
Call the collection of presuppositions meeting these conditions the essential pf'esuppo-
sitions of the (Abstractionist Inference) .164 
7.2.1 Three presuppositions of success 
A satisfying account of what the essential presuppositions are can only be given in the 
light of an appropriate semantic and metasemantic background theory which tells us (a) 
what meaning is, and (b) how it can be brought about that meaning is fixed. I65 
Let us assume that we have available a suitable metasemantic theory. It will reveal 
what the relevant conditions are that need to be in place such that a stipulation of a certaiu 
abstraction principle brings it about that a suitable meaning is assigned to the relevant 
abstraction operator. Call these conditions the presuppositions of metasemantic success. 
Whatever these are, some of them will be essential presuppositions of the (Abstractionist 
Inference) . 
Are these all the presuppositions? I'm afraid not! It turns out that there are also 
presuppositions of cognitive success and epistemic presuppositions. This is because there 
is more that can go wrong with drawing the (Abstractionist Inference) than that no 
meaning can be assigned that renders the stipulated rules sound: the stipulation might not 
be able to generate understanding, and the stipulation might be epistemically ineffective. 166 
Let me explain. 
Metasemantic success VB. cognitive success Remember that the stipulation not only 
has to bring it about that meaning is assigned, but also has to effect an unde"standing of 
the abstraction operator - and the relevant rules - on the part of the stipulating sub-
1"1 U8\UIle that there is only ODe collection of easential presuppositions. I do not have an argument for 
this claim. 
1esOne way to draw the diatiDc:tion between ,emonnc. and metlllemGntic8 is this: whereas a semantic 
theory for a lauguage explains how the meaning of complex linguistic expressions of this language depends 
on the meaning of their CODBtituenta and the way they are put together, a metasemantic theory explains by 
virtue ofwbat a _tic theory is se1eeted for a giwu.laDguage, how linguistic expressions acquire meaning 
in the first place, what CODIItitUte& JDNDilll, etc. Compare the case of ethics: ethics is the discipline of 
determining which actions are the pod ones, UIin.g an ethical theory, and meta-ethics is the discipline in 
which ODe tries to explain. how we should select ethical theories, how an action can be good or bad in the 
first place, what coutitutea podn.eas, etc. Iutead of metasemantics, one might also use the expressions 
"fo1llldatioaal aem&Dtic:s", "theory of meaniJlc" or "the philosophy of linguistic representation" (Williams 
2008, p. 603). 
l"These three kinck of preauppoaitious of C01Il'88 correspond to Ebert's three dimensions of achievement: 
effectiveoess, succ:eea, and epistemic productiveness (see Ebert 2011). 
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ject. Otherwise, the abstraction operator could not be used by the subject in any project 
of extending knowledge, but at best be mentioned. 167 For example, without understanding 
"#", Hero could not come to understand Frege Arithmetic, and this is a necessary con-
dition to acquire knowledge of its axioms and theorems. Note that the (Metasemantic 
Inferentialism) principle also involves both dimensions of success. 
We should not conceive of the process of coming to understand the abstraction operator 
as a process of grasping the meaning that is assigned, if ''meaning'' is read in a certain way. 
Draw the Fregean distinction between sense and reference and consider the (BLV Rules). 
It is very plausible that the extension operator can be understood by virtue of a stipulation 
of these rules,168 but there is no referent to be assigned that renders the (BLV Rules) 
sound, because they are inconsistent. Thus, understanding the extension operator cannot 
consist in grasping the assigned referent. If we want to talk of meaning being assigned and 
grasped here, we must read "meaning" as "Fregean sense" (or "concept"), the thought being 
that a stipulation of the (BLV Rules) still assigns a sense (concept) to the extension 
operator, which is grasped. 
This raises an interesting question. If we make the Fregean distinction, should we 
read the meaning-fixing command as being about sense and reference, or only about one 
of them? It might be interesting to explore different options, but I think that someone 
endorsing the Fregeau distinction could just make something like the following stipulation: 
(Meaning-Fixing Stipulation') "#" is to be assigned a referent such that the (Hume 
Rules) are sound, and the sense determined by accepting the (Hume Rules) as the 
device to fix the meaning of "#". 
In this thesis, I will not complicate the picture by talking about senses being assigned 
as well. In particular, I cannot discuss issues concerning concept acquisition and concept 
possession. I focus on the understanding question: the question how the number operator 
is understood by virtue of making the meaning-fixing command. I think there are at 
least two plausible answers, corresponding to two views of what understanding consists 
in: what Heck (20(6) calls the Use Theory and the Cognitive Conception. These can be 
characterized, very roughly, as follows: 
16Tror a related critique of arpIIleDtII hued on meta-liDguistic stipulation, see (Ebert 2005b). 
188For &Il exteDIiw di&cusioD and &Il argument that BLV provides at least some understanding, see 
(Ebert 20050, pp. 125ft). 
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• The Use Theory (see Horwich 1998; Heck 2006): understanding consists in using 
a term appropriately, and this can be brought about by accepting a fundamental 
pattern of use for the term, i.e. by becoming disposed to reason in accordance with 
it. Applied to our case, the idea is that the (Hume Rules) express a fundamental 
pattern of use for "#". By virtue of making the (Meaning-Fixing StipUlation), 
so the thought goes, one becomes disposed to reason in accordance with these rules, 
and this suffices to effect an understanding of"#" on the part of the subject . 
• The Cognitive Conception (see e.g. Heck 2006): understanding a term t consists in 
tacitly having knowledge of, or at least beliefs about relevant semantic properties of t. 
One way to make this explicit is in terms of beliefs about truth conditions. Williams 
(2012) points out that cognitive conceptions come in different strengths. According 
to the weak version, one only needs to hold appropriate beliefs about the truth 
conditions of sentences containing the term. According to the strong version, one 
needs to hold beliefs about the reference of the term. According to the ultra-strong 
version, one needs to have a complete semantic theory about the term. Regardlesl3 
of the particular version of the cognitive conception one might defend, the thought 
must be that sincerely making the (Meaning-Fixing Stipulation) brings it about 
that one holds the relevant beliefs. 
I think my proposal is compatible with both theories of understanding. I endorse the Use 
Theory here, because it is simpler. Thus, my claim regarding cognitive l3uccess is that, 
given certain preconditions are in place, sincerely making the meaning-fixing command 
brings it about that one becomes disposed to reason in accordance with the rules which 
are stipulated to be valid, and that this suffices for understanding. 
The reader might worry that I need to endorse a version of the Use Theory which 
renders it possible to understand meaning-fixing rules without being willing to actually 
use the rules. For I think that one can stipulate the (BLV Rules) to be valid, and come 
to understand them on this basis, although one knows that they are inconsistent. And 
someone knowing that these rules are inconsistent will not be willing to use them (at 
least not unconditionally). How can it be possible to understand "E" although one does 
not actually endorse the rules, if understanding consists in being disposed to reason in 
accordance with these rules? 
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I think that one can understand "E" by virtue of being disposed to reason in accordance 
with the (BLV Rules), without these dispositions ever being active (or only active in some 
rare cases). Dispositions can be overridden in various ways. Such cases are COIlllIlon ground 
in the literature. In particular, dispositions can be masked, i.e. an existing disposition 
cannot be manifested because this is prevented by another disposition (for an overview, 
see Choi & Fara 2012). I contend that knowledge of the inconsistency of the (BLV Rules) 
brings with it other dispositions that mask the disposition to reason in accordance with 
these rules. There is more to say here, but I think this is a plausible response, and I will 
assume that it is a good response in what followS. 169 
One might want to make it explicit that the term is to be understood by grasping a 
pattern of use and prefer the following formulation of the (Meaning-Fixing Stipulation): 
(Meaning-Fixing Stipulation") Let "#" get assigned a meaning such that the (Burne 
Rules) are sound, and "#" should be understood by virtue of accepting the (Hurne 
Rules) as the fundamental pattern of use for "#". 
At least in the mathematical case, I have nothing against such more sophisticated 
commands. But it is desirable to keep the stipulation as simple as possible. The official 
view thus is that the way understanding is generated is implicit in the stipulation, and that 
the stipulation invokes a grasp of a pattern of use without this being explicitly stipulated, 
because sincerely making the meaning-fixing command automatically effects an acceptance 
of the stipulated rules as determining a pattern of use. 
Now, there are ways in which fixing a pattern of use can go wrong. And the nOll-
obtaining of such scenarios may be called the presuppositions of cognitive success. Some of 
these will be essential presuppositions of the (Abstractionist Inference). 
The reader might have a worry at this point. The worry is that the presuppositions 
of cognitive success should not be regarded as presuppositions of the (Abstractionist 
Inference). For one might think that all that matters is the truth-preservation of the 
(Abstractionist Inference). If a suitable meaning is assigned, so the thought goes, the 
1·0ne iune here is that the muk would be intrinsic, i.e. other dispositions 0/ the agent would mask the 
agent'. diapositioDB. There is a debate of whether intriuic masking is possible. For an argument for the 
possibility of iDtriDsic: masks, see (Ashwell 2010). For an argument against, see (Handfield & Bird 2008). 
Note that WiUillJllOD (2007, c:bapter 4) aIaovgues extensively against the outlined idea. Unfortunately, 
I cannot pursue the ialue aay further here. 
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relevant instance of the (Abstractionist Inference) will be truth-preserving, no matter 
of whether the abstraction operator is understood or not. 
However, the presuppositions of a belief-forming method are, by definition, the propo-
sitions which need to be in a subject's informational context in order for the inference to 
deliver an intemalistic warrant for its target beliefs. And a lack of warrant for whatever 
the presuppositions of cognitive success are certainly undermines the subject's warrant to 
regard the stipulation facts as evidence for the soundness of the rules in question. This 
is because a lack of warrant for a precondition of cognitive success entails a lack of war-
rant for the claim that the stipulation assigns any meaning. After all, the term is meant 
to be introduced into the language of the stipulator, and from the point of view of the 
stipulating subject, if the term is not even understood, it does not have any meaning. 
Ergo: the presuppositions of cognitive success are presuppositions of the (Abstractionist 
Inference) . 
Epistemic presuppositions The abstractionist might have to recognize a further type 
of presuppositions: epistemic presuppositions. Even if all presuppositions concerning the 
generation of understanding and the assignment of meanings (referents) are met (and en-
titled), drawing the (Abstractionist Inference) can still be bad from an epistemological 
point of view. For it might be such that a move from the stipulation facts to the conclu-
sion of the (Abstractionlst Inference) is epistemically irresponsible in such a way that 
one cannot warrantedly regard the stipulation facts as evidence for the soundness of the 
relevant rules by default. I have in mind some stipulations that Hale and Wright (2000) 
want to handle with their non-arrogance constraint. I come back to this below. 
I now go through all three kinds of presuppositions in tum, and extract essential pre-
suppositions. I argue that all essential presuppositions are warranted in the case of the 
(Burne Rules), at least some of them by means of entitlement of cognitive project. 
1.2.2 Presuppositions of cognitive success 
We can find out what the presuppositions of cognitive success are by considering cases in 
which no pattern of use can be grasped. However, at first glance, all the stipulations we 
considered 80 far were good cases in this sense. 
We can easily generate at least one bad case, namely a case in which some terms other 
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than the abstraction operator are not already understood. For example: 
(Nonsense) 'VFG (0 (F) = 0 (G) f-t xzyjd (F, G)) 
Such cases are not particularly interesting. One might think that in such cases the 
meaning-fixing command cannot be made in the first place, and the question about pre-
suppositions does not arise.l70 
However, one might also want to cover such cases by invoking the presupposition that 
all terms except for the abstraction operator are already understood. Would this be an 
essential presupposition? No. For there is a more fundamental presupposition that entails 
it. 
The more fundamental presupposition is that a version of Evan's Generality Constraint 
is met for the abstraction operator. The Generality Constraint can be put as follows (Hale 
& Wright 2000, p. 22; Evans 1982, pp. 1()()'105): 
(Generality Constraint) In order to understand t, one needs to understand all rele-
vant contexts t/>[tj, where the matrix t/>[-j is already understood. 
The relevant presupposition can be put as follows: 
(Generality Presupposition) Accepting the rules in question as a fundamental pat-
tern of use for the abstraction operator 0 can bring it about that one understands all 
relevant contexts t/>[Oj, where the matrix t/>[-J is already understood. 
Two question arise. Firstly: do the (Hume Rules) meet this constraint? And, sec-
ondly: what kind of warrant can Hero possess for this presupposition? 
The first question brings us back to classical objections to neo-Fregeanism. One might 
construe the Caesar problem as the worry that this presupposition is not met. One version 
of the argument goes as follows: 
1. The term "Julius Caesar", the predicate ''x is a planet", and "=" are already under-
stood. 
2. Thus, the matrix" _(x is a planet)=Julius Caesar" is already understood. 
110It ill my view that 0Qe caD. aimultaaeoualy ~. the meaning of several terms, but note that the command 
ill suppoaed to be ODe that baa the ... e"ainl oaly of "an. 
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3. Thus, if a stipulation of the (Hume Rules) meets the (Generality Presupposi-
tion), a stipulation of the (Hume Rules) will bring it about that one undt~rstands 
(C) "#x(x is a planet)=Julius Caesar". 
4. However, a stipulation of the (Hume Rules) cannot bring it about that this state-
ment is understood. For it only fixes a pattern of use for identity statements wherp 
both terms begin with the number operator. 
5. Therefore, a stipulation of the (Hume Rules) does not meet the (Generality 
Presupposition) . 
The question is, of course, whether the second last line of this argument should be accepted. 
Why can a stipulation of the (Hume Rules) not bring it about that statements like (C) 
are understood? Why cannot a use be fixed for mixed identity statements as well? 
One might want to avail oneself of one of the easy responses to the Caesar problem 
sketched in 2.4.1. For example, one might think that Hero can determine that sueh state-
ments should be rejected on independent grounds. Numbers exist necessarily, and persons 
do not. Therefore, so the thought goes, numbers and persons cannot possibly be identical. 
The idea then is, very roughly, that everyone who fully understands what persons are and 
what numbers are, will never introduce an identity statement involving a person and a 
number, always reject such a statement etc. 
Another response is that statements like (C) involve category mistakes, and are mean-
ingless for this reason. Thus, 80 the thOUght goes, it cannot be a requirement that (C) has 
to be understood, and it cannot be a statement relevant for the (Generality Presuppo-
sition). 
However, we saw in 2.4.1 that there are harder versions of the Caesar problem. What 
about identity statements involving different sorts of abstracts? The above responses are 
not readily available in these cases. 
The abstractionist needs to account for what I called the (Categorization of Ab-
stracts), i.e. a principled and metaphysically motivated partition of different abstracts 
into categories .. In 2.4.1, I argued that this will be a difficult task. If the task succeeds, 
however, then it seems 88 if the neo-Fregean standard response can be applied. All this 
requires further work, but here is the basic idea. If two kinds of abstracts belong to the 
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same category, then there will be a shared criterion of identity, and a pattern of use will 
have been fixed. If two kinds of abstracts do not belong to the same category, there are 
two options. If cross-categorial identity statements always need to be decided negatively, 
relevant statements need to be rejected tout court, and a pattern of use will have been 
fixed. If cross-categorial identity statements are evidence-transcendent, then the current 
objection is not a specific objection against Hero's ability to grasp a pattern of use on the 
basis of a stipulation of the (Hurne Rules), but it is a worry that affects understanding 
in general. 
I certainly cannot decide the issue here. Let us assume that there is a solution to this 
version of the Caesar problem, and that the presupposition is true in the relevant cases. 
Then how will the (Generality Presupposition) be warranted in releV'dllt cases? 
I focus on the (Hurne Rules). There are two options: either the (Generality Pre-
supposition) can be justified without regress on the basis of something in a more secure 
a prior epistemic standing, or not. 
As to the former option, one might think that it can be apriori justified on the basis 
of theoretical views on understanding and its preconditions. If it turns out that every 
such justification involves presuppositions in no more secure a prior epistemic standing 
- this would be an interesting result and merits further research - the (Generality 
Presupposition) will be an entitlement in the relevant cases, because the three (~onditions 
for entitlement of cognitive project are met: 
• It is a Wright-presupposition of the project of finding out that our meaning-fixing 
devices are in good standing. 
• Condition (i): by assumption, it cannot be justified (without relying on something 
in no more secure a prior epistemic standing). 
• Condition (ii): there is no sufficient reason to believe that the (Generality Pre-
supposition) is not met (assuming there is a solution to the Caesar problem). 
Thus, given that there is a solution to the Caesar problem, the essential presupposition of 
cognitive success will be internalistieally warranted. This completes my discussion of such 
presuppositions.l71 
111 A complete diIcuIeioD of pr_ppoaitiou ofcopltiw IUc:ceu would have to involve a discussion of the 
notion of impredicativity. However, thiI 11 beyond tlae ICOpe of this thelil. 
7.2.3 Interpretationism 
I now turn to the presuppositions of metasemantic success - the presuppositions ensuring 
that meaning (=reference)172 can be fixed such that the stipulated rules turn out to lw 
sound, or, in other words, the presuppositions ensuring the truth-preservation of instanct's 
of the (Abstractionist Inference). 
What these presuppositions are will depend on the metasemantic background picture. 
It will tell us: (i) what meanings are; (ii) under what conditions meanings are assigm!U; 
(iii) which meanings are assigned. A suitable metasemantics for implicit definitions is what 
Williams (2007, 2008) calls interpretationism. According to interpretationism, complete 
semantic units such as sentences have semantic priority, and we can easily extend the 
picture to the rule case. Let me explain. 
Classical interpretationism is motivated by the task of radical interpretation, i.e. the 
task of interpreting speakers of a remote language and their language from scratch. Lewis 
(1974) nicely explains the task: given all the physical facts (P) about the speaker K of a 
foreign language L and his environment, solve the following three unknowns (Lewis 1974, 
p.332): 
(Ao) K's attitudes, beliefs and desires, as expressed in our language. 
(Ak) K's attitudes, beliefs a.nd desires, as expressed in K's language. 
(M) The "meanings" of K's language. 
Determining (M) includes determining the meanings of K's sentences, and determining 
how the meanings of these sentences are detennined by the meanings of sub-sentential 
expressions of K's sentences. lT3 Interpretationism is designed to solve the problem of how 
we can come to know (M) in particular, and rests on two claims, which correspond to two 
stages of an interpretation process. 
The first claim is that there are observable facts about K and his enviroIlment (P) 
which can be used to determine the semantic values of sentences of K's language. There 
are many ways of spelling this out. . Depending on one's choice of what kinds of thingH 
the semantic values of sentences are, one can make a choice as to how particular semantic 
1T2Throughout this sublection, &Ild uutil 7.2.6, "meulng" should be read as "reference". 
lTSThua, it aIIo includes determiaiqwhat the _&Ill .. of the Bub-sentential expressions are. 
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values are to be assigned on the basis of (P). Collecting these values is the first stage of 
the interpretation process. 
The second claim is that the primary criterion of success for a theory of (M) - and the 
primary criterion of success for a semantic theory of L - is that it matches the semantic 
values collected for the sentences in the first stage of the interpretation process. This is 
not to say that the first and the second stage have to be carried out separately. This is 
just to say that the semantic values of sentences are fundamental: matching the semantic 
value of the sentences is the primary criterion of success. 
This formulation leaves open that it is not the only criterion. In fact, fitting the 
sentential data cannot possibly be the only criterion, because of inscrutability of reference 
objections. Lewis (1984), for example, argues that the semantic theory is additionally 
constrained by criteria of naturalness or eligibility. I agree with Lewis. 
Here are three well-known interpretationist theories: 
• According to Davidson's programme (Davidson 1973), the semantic values of sen-
tences are truth conditions, which can be extracted from observable utterance!> using 
a Principle oj Charity, i.e. we proceed on the assumption that most of the subject's 
utterances are true in the context in which they are uttered. 
• According to Lewis's programme (see e.g. Lewis 1974), the semantic values of sen-
tences are functions from possible worlds to truth values. The meanings of sub-
sentential expressions are chosen accordingly. For example, the semantic values of 
names will be construed as functions from possible worlds to objects. What emerges 
is "an account of language ( ... ) which is truth conditional and intensional, couched 
in the framework of possible worlds" (Holton 2003, p. 2). The propositions can be 
assigned to sentences by a procedure which is related to DavidHon's, but (Illu(:h) more 
sophisticated. I cannot go into detail here. 
• Global descriptivism is a very simple version of interpretationiHm, diHcusse<i by Lewis 
(1984) and Williams (2007). The idea is that the meaning of a range of terms can be 
fixed bll descriptw", whereas fU:tng meaning bll description just means laying down 
a total theof'JI containing all relevant term-introducing statements. The sema.ntic 
values of sentences are truth valu88,&nd the correct semantic theory for the la.nguage 
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of the theory is a semantic theory which renders the total theory true. If the theory 
can be expressed within the resources of first-order or second-order logic, the obviolls 
choice for a semantic theory is the theory that can be extracted froUl a model of 
the theory. What are the term introducing statements? An example of where global 
descriptivism can be applied is when it comes to determining the meaning of some 
range of theoretical tenns operating on top of a more fundamentallauguage (e.g. the 
terms of folk psychology). We could extract their term introducing statements from 
an existing language by just collecting the platitudes containing the terms, i.e. those 
statements containing the terms which are accepted in every situation (Williams 
2007, p.367). 
I think that all three frameworks can be used for my purposes. However, global descrip-
tivism is the simplest theory, and it suffices to render the b88ic idea clear enough, so I 
will endorse it here. The applicability of global descriptivism is obvious. The thought is 
that the correct semantic theory for "#" is specified by an interpretation under which the 
term-introducing statement for "#" comes out true, i.e. an interpretation under which it 
comes out true that the (Hume Rules) are necessarily truth-preserving. 
Consider Hero, who has just made a meaning-fixing stipulation. We can assume here 
that Hero means the same with "neCf!8sarti truth-preservation" as we do. ~ow add the 
claim that the (Hume Rules) are necessarily truth-preserving to Hero's current theory 
about the world. Any function from Hero's concepts to objects under which the (Burne 
Rules) come out as (necessarily) truth-preserving will be a candidate meaning for" #". 
We need to endorse (something like Lewis's) notion of eligibility. For there are many 
models of the (Hume Rules), even if it is fixed how many (and what) objects there are, 
and what concepts there are. There are many choices even for the categorical part of the 
theory. On the face of it, "#z[x :f: x)" might be interpreted as 0 in one model, and as 0 in 
another (assuming 0 :/= 0). 
I contend that there is only one most eligible interpretation of"#" in all relevant cases: 
the interpretation that lets n.aturalnumber terms refer to the natural numbers. Why are 
the natural numbers assigned? One reason might be (Frege's Constraint). The term-
introdUcing principes ahould be interpreted as being about the objects that most naturally 
fit their desaiption, and in the case of the (Hurne Rules) it is very plausible that these 
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are the (natural) numbers we all know and love (see also 7.1.8). This claim requires IIllll:h 
more argument, but I cannot do more here than just to assume that the notion of eligibility 
works this way. 
There are other aspects of this proposal that require further work. It is my view that tIll' 
meaning assigned to "#" will be a function mapping concepts to objects. However, tllPft> 
are problems with using such a semantic theory, at least when we endorse a set-theoretic 
notion of "function". 
Firstly, there might be too many concepts for the domain of the function to be a set. 
Secondly, and more importantly, one might think that the semantics for "#" should be 
formulated without using mathematical terms (e.g. sets). One might think that this is 
required because the theory should be such that it can be warrantedly used by Hero before 
he has introduced any abstract objects by abstraction. These are very interesting and tricky 
issues. My aim here can just be to provide the outlines of one suitable metasemantics of 
the proposal, in such a way that we philosophers can extract the essential presuppositions 
of the (Abstractionist Inference). 
'7.2.4 Mathematical presuppositions 
The above picture of how meaning (reference) is to be assigned immediately generates 
presuppositions of metasemantic success. All relevant conditions on abstraction principles 
ruling out cases in which there is no suitable model-theoretic interpretation for the relevant 
abstraction operator - i.e. a suitable function from concepts to objects -- will count as 
such presuppositions. 
Consistency becomes a presupposition on this picture. Inconsistent abstraction prind-
pIes do not have any models. Moreover, we see that there must be presuppositions other 
than consistency: for Bad Company objections show that not all consistent abstraction 
principles can be interpreted as being true (together). We need to find criteria that single 
out a maximal collection of abstraction p1'lnciples that has a model. I call these criteria: 
(Mathematical Presuppoailtlona) Mathematical presuppositions are the conditioll!; 
ensuring that an abstraction principle is part of the relevant maximal collection of 
abstraction principles that has a model. 
My strategy to find these presuppositions is to Use the criteria that nea-Fregeans dis-
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covered when carrying out (Fine's Programme) - the mathematical project I sketched 
in in 2.4.2. This project exactly corresponds to the project of finding suitable mathemati-
cal presuppositions. For it just is the project of finding a maximal collection of abstraction 
principles that can be jointly true. I briefly go through the most relevant conditions, and 
argue that they are warranted by means of entitlement of cognitive project. 
Consistency The consistency of the (Hume Rules) will be a mathematical presuppo-
sition of the relevant instance ofthe (Abstractionist Inference). It will be warranted by 
means of entitlement of cognitive project, because all conditions are met (for the conditions, 
see 4.4): 
• It is a Wright-presupposition of the project of finding out that our meaning-fixing 
devices are in good standing. 
• Condition (i): it cannot be justified (without relying on something in no more se<:ure 
a prior epistemic standing). We saw in 6.1.2 that we cannot justify the consistency 
of the (Hume Rules) without presupposing a stronger theory, just as we cannot 
justify the consistency of (HP) without presupposing a stronger theory. 
• Condition (ii): we do not have sufficient reason to believe that the (Hume Rules) 
are inconsistent, just as we do not have sufficient reason to believe that (HP) is 
inconsistent. To the contrary: for all we know, these rules are com:listent. 
Conservativeness Although consistency is a presupposition, it is not an essential pre-
supposition in the sense defined above. For it is entailed by another mathematical pre-
supposition: conseftlotitlene88. Conservativeness is a mathematical presupposition because 
there are consistent, but mutually inconsistent abstraction principles. It is a technical 
notion that can be put in a precise way (see 2.4.2). The basic idea is that: 
(Conservativenell) An abstraction principle is conservative just in case it does not 
yield new consequences about any old domain (i.e. any domain of objects we might 
recognize before we introduced. th., abstraction principle). 
How is it warranted? Again by means of entitlement of cognitive project: 
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• It is a Wright-presupposition of the project of finding out that our meaning-fixing 
devices are in good standing. 
• Condition (i): it cannot be justified (without relying on something in no 1l1OTl' seCUT(' 
a prior epistemic standing). Conservativeness entails consistency. Since the regress 
clause for entitlement of cognitive project is met in the case of consistency, it will 
also be met in the case of conservativeness. 
• Condition (ii): we do not have sufficient reason to believe that the (Hurne Rules) 
are not conservative, just as we do not have sufficient reason to believe that (HP) 
is not conservative. To the contrary: for all we know, these rules are conservative. 
Irenicity However, conservativeness shares the same fate with consistency. Although 
conservativeness is a presupposition, it is not an essential presupposition in the sense 
defined above. For it is entailed by yet another mathematical presupposition: irenicity. 
To repeat: the notion ofirenicity has been suggested by Weir (2003), after he observed 
that there are conservative but mutually unsatisfiable abstraction principles. For my cur-
rent purposes, the following informal characterization suffices: an abstraction principle is 
irenic just in case it is consistent with every conservative abstraction principle. Using set 
theory, it can be shown that (HP) is irenic (Weir 2003, pp. 32f). 
Although the discussion about mathematical presuppositions goes 011, and there are 
known complications with irenicity (see 2.4.2), my tentative suggestion is that irenicity is 
the only essential mathematical presupposition of the (Abstractionist Inference). 
How is this presupposition warranted? Again by means of entitlement of cognitive 
project. By now, the reader will be able to see how the argument goes, so I omit it here. 
7.2.5 Ontological presuppositions 
Many will be unsatisfied with the presuppositions proposed so far. m For example, so 
the thought goes, I have ignored ontological questions. What if there are only finitely 
many objects? In this case, there won't be any interpretation for "#" under which the 
(Hume Rules) come out as truth-preserving. This motivates postulating a further type 
of presuppositions, namely: 
mThis corresponds to a worry I dileUlled in 2.4.2, namely that carrying out (FIDe'. Programme) 
does not yet &m01Ult to carrying out what I call the (Neo-Prepan Programme). 
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(Ontological Presuppositions) Ontological presuppositions are the conditions that 
guarantee that nothing goes wrong from an ontological point of view. 
The following is an obvious candidate for such a presupposition: 
(Presupposition of Existence) There is a domain of objects that can serve as the 
domain for a model of the rules in question. 
I now argue (i) that it yields undesired consequences for the abstractionist to acknowl-
edge a (Presupposition of Existence), and (ii) that there are strategies to avoid such 
presuppositions. The idea is that the ontological issue is not really an hlsue, once the 
mathematical presuppositions are met, and thus does not raise further presuppositions. 
Transmission-failure Suppose that the (Presupposition of Existence) is a pre!mp-
position of the (Abstractionist Inference). Then it is plausible that the following coUtli-
tion is a presupposition as well, for it is entailed by the (Presupposition of Existence), 
and the entailment seems direct enough to make the case eligible for presupposition ex-
pansion (for a discussion of this phenomenon, see 6.1.6): 
(Infinity) There are infinitely many objects. 
Thus, Hero needs to possess an antecedent warrant for it in order to acquire internalistic 
knowledge by virtue of carrying out the (Abstractionist Inference). What kind of 
warrant could Hero possess for this claim? It is clear that this warrant could only be an 
entitlement of cognitive project. iTS Part of the nea-Fregean idea was that we can prove 
the existence of infinitely many objects on the basis of the (Hume Rules). And if Ii 
justification on the basis of abstraction principles (or corresponding rules) is the only way 
to justify the existence of infinitely mauy objects - and it is hard to see what other route 
there could be for a nea-Fregeau without giving up too much of the basic idea - then 
we cannot justify (Infinity) without presupposing it. Condition (ii) for entitlement of 
cognitive project is met. 
171lWrlght (2004~, VIII) claims that eatitlementa of cognitive project are not suitable for ontological 
purposes. For feuot1l I eannot 10 lato .e, 1 do not think that this restriction appUea to the case at band, 
and I shall simply aaaume bere that we can uae the notion of entitlement of cognitive project. 
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Moreover, if (Infinity) was a presupposition of the (Abstractionist Inference), it 
would be a Wright-presupposition of the cognitive project of ensuring that uur meaning-
fixing devices are in good standing. Thus, in this case, whether or not (Infinity) is an 
entitlement depends on whether there is sufficient reason to believe that there are only 
finitely many objects. I have already discussed this condition in the last chapter, and 
argued that - disregarding dubious considerations of stubborn nominalists --- we do nut 
have such reasons. So it is plausible that (Infinity) would indeed turn out tu be an 
entitlement of cognitive project. 
If (Infinity) was a presupposition, this would not preclude us from using the (Ab-
stractionist Inference) to acquire internalistic knowledge of the soundness of the (H ume 
Rules). However, if (Infinity) was an entitled presupposition, we could not possibly 
acquire internalistic knowledge of (Infinity) because any argument for it would fail to 
transmit warrant due to the (Information Dependence Template) (see 5.2.2). And it 
was one of the most precious aims of the neo-Fregeans to establish that we can leam of the 
existence of an infinite domain by virtue of Frege's proof. This aim would be impossible 
to achieve if there was transmission-failure. 
There are two additional reasons of why we should avoid an (Infinity) presupposition. 
Firstly, Frege Arithmetic would be a theory that ultimately has a mixed epistemolugical 
status. Some of its members could be internalistically known - e.g. the Peano axioms -
and some of its members could not be internaiistically known - the second-order version 
of (Infinity). This would be an odd result. l76 
Secondly, that we cannot claim to know that there are infinitely many objects is Ii. 
revisionary sceptical consequence. Mathematicians and logicians often claim to know that 
there are enough objects to satisfy axiom systems that only have infinite models. 
Existence What can be said in favour of a (Presupposition of Existence)? I be-
lieve that the considerations in favour of ontological presuppositions exactly match the 
considerations that lead to ep~,c n!jectioniBm, the major objection to neo-Fregeanism 
I discussed in 2.4:3. Rejectionism rests on the worry that the stipulation of an abstraction 
principle (or col'1'tl8p9nding rul-.) Dlight go wrong for the reason that there might not be 
l'1l1Thia relult it remiDiac:eDt ohhe odd . ...wtl paerated by endonlng merely entitled (Hum. Rul .. ) , 
which I used to criticiae Wright'. poeitiou iu 0.1.G. 
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enough objects to render the stipulations good. For example: that there might not be 
enough objects to render the (Hume Rules) sound. So whether or not we can avoid exis-
tence as a presupposition depends on whether the rejectionist objection to neo-FregeanisllI 
can be avoided. 
To repeat: I think that the neo-Fregean can avail himself of various strategies to Ull-
dermine rejectionism. Some of these strategies require further research, and some of thelll 
might be anti-realist in spirit. But I think there are enough options 011 the table to draw 
an optimistic conclusion. 
The current context enables us to assess rejectionism from another angle. It gives us 
a criterion to decide whether we need to invoke ontological presuppositions or not. The 
criterion is whether there is a specific way the process of fixing meaning can fail from 
an ontological point of view - given all other presuppositions are met. So we can avoid 
ontological presuppositions by showing that there is no such way. Here are three such 
strategies: 
• Plain maximalism: we might endorse meta-ontological maximalism, i.e. that every-
thing that can exists, does exist (see Eklund 2006). From the point of view of tht· 
maximalist, (Existence) is trivially met 88 soon as the mathematical presupposi-
tions are met. Hale and Wright reject this strategy, because (i) they think they do 
not need it and (il) they think it has undesired metaphysical impliciations (Haltl & 
Wright 2009, §4). I regard it as an attractive fallback position . 
• Priority of meaning-fixing: this strategy corresponds to the "ought implies can" strat-
egy sketched in 2.4.3. Wright (1999, pp. 311f) argues that we cannot even intelligibly 
ask the question about the existence of a realm of infinitely many numbers before we 
possess the concept of number, and that possessing the concept of number already 
requires accepting the truth of (an un-conditionalized version of) (HP). This thought 
can be applied to my proposal as follows: (i) the relevant ontological presupposition 
would not simply be (Existence), but a claim to the effect that numbers exist, and 
(ii) this claim cannot be a presupposition, because it must be possible for a thinker 
to be able to grasp all presuppositions of the relevant instance of the (Abstraction 
Inference) before having made the stipulation of the (H ume Rules). 
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• Content-recarving: Hale and Wright (Hale 1997; Hale & Wright 2009) reject rejec-
tionism by appeal to a meta-metaphysical picture entailing that the state uf affairs 
of both sides of good abstraction principle are the same. Thus, so the thought goes, 
we do not need to make sure that the objects referred to by instances of tIlt' left-
hand side of (HP) exist before we can responsibly stipulate that (HP) is to 1)(' true. 
All that is required is discharging some specific worries to the effect that both sides 
cannot express the same state of affairs, such as Bad Company worries. As I said in 
2.4.3, making sense of this option, and arguing that it is compatible with Platonism 
certainly requires a lot of further work. 
I do not want to commit myself to any particular response here, but I conclude that it is far 
from clear that we have to accept (Existence) as a presupposition. Moreover, there might 
be intermediate positions. Conceding that there are ontological presuppositions forces us 
to give up knowledge claims for these propositions, but it does not yet entail that we 
cannot claim knowledge of mathematical axioms. Granted, such positions look somewhat 
odd, but they should still be considered as fallback positions. 
7.2.6 Presuppositions of uniqueness 
There might not be a most eligible interpretation of the abstraction operator in relevant 
cases, and this might entail that meaning cannot be fixed at all. This worry is not spedfic 
to my propollal. For example, Lewis (1970) argues that the success of definitions depends 
on there being only one candidate meaning. This generates a presupposition of: 
(Uniqueness) There is a most eligible candidate meaning for the abstraction operator 
in question. 
Do the (Hume Rules) meet this presupposition? Above, I have claimed that they 
do. The thOUght was that the (Hume Rules) meet (Frege's Constraint), and that our 
notion of eligibility works in such a way that it assigns the natural numbers for this reason. 
Of course, this assumption does not license us to dispense with the (Uniqueness) 
presupposition. It seems that there a,re bad stipulations where all presuppositions are met, 
except for (Uniqueness). And these stipulations need to be ruled out. AH an example, 
consider the following abstraction principle: 
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(Interestingly Underdetermined) VFG (a (F) = a (G) H x = x) 
On what basis are we to decide what object "a" assigns to concepts? ~othing specific 
comes to mind. This suggests that the stipulation should be ruled out as bad because it 
fails the (Uniqueness) test. 
Two notes are in order. Firstly, one might think that all such cases are already ruled out 
by the (Generality Condition), and that this renders the (Uniqueness) presupposition 
inessential. If reference is not uniquely determined, so the thought goes, the subject will 
not even be able to understand the abstraction operator. This thought, which is related 
to the Caesar problem, merits further research. 
Secondly, one might hold that (Interestingly Underdetermined) is not a bad case. 
For example, one might think that our notion of eligibility works in such a way that it 
comes with its own specific kind of object - the identity abstractum - which we can only 
come to refer to by virtue of making the relevant stipulation. 
In any case, we should remain open-minded about the possibility that (Uniqueness) 
is a further presupposition, although it is not clear whether this presupposition is essential. 
This completes my discussion of presuppositions of metasemantic success. 
1.2.1 Epistemological presuppositions 
There seem to be cases in which all presuppositions above are met and warranted, but in 
which something goes wrong from an epistemological point of view. This suggests that 
there is a further type of presuppositions, which we may call epistemological presuppo-
sitions. A good candidate is Hale's and Wright's non-arrogance constraint (see Halp & 
Wright 2000). Let me explain. 
Non .. arrogance Put very crudely, the non-arrogance constraint forbids that the stipu-
lation cries out Jor additional epistemic work on the part of the subject. In 2.3, we havp 
seen that the non-arrogance constraint admits of different interpretations: 
• It might provide a special role for abstraction principles such 88 (HP). The thought 
is that direct stipulations of axiom systems and existence claims -- e.g. the Peallo 
axioms - are arrogant, whereas stipulating a.bstraction principles is not arrogant 
253 
because of their biconditional fonn. 111 
• It might rule out abstraction principles which allow for easy knuwledge. For example: 
(HP+FLT) from 2.3.4, which allows for an easy proof of Fermat's Last Them'wl 
(FLT) , 
• It might help to rule out stipulations like "Jack the Ripper is the unique perpetrator 
of these killings" or "Let God be the greatest being that can be conceived", because 
further aposteriori epistemic work needs to be carried out to license such stipulations. 
We can ignore the first and the third role here, because they are not directly concerned 
with the stipulation of abstraction principles.178 The case of (HP+FLT) is the one that 
is of interest here. The problem with (HP+FLT) is that it is a good stipulation from a 
metasemantic point of view, and that it is hard to see how the relevant presuppositions 
of metasemantic success could not be entitled. After all, we know that it fixes the saUle 
meaning as (HP), since we know that FLT is a theorem of PA. However, Hero should not 
be able to acquire knowledge of FLT that easily. This motivates ruling out (HP+FLT) 
by postulating a further presupposition. 
One idea is to simply demand that the stipulation should not allow for easy knowledge, 
However, this requires independently motivated criteria of what easy knowledge is. This 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Alternatively, one might argue that we can do without the non-arrogance constraint to 
rule out such stipulations. For one might think that arrogant stipulations are sueh that 
they provide ~ufficient reasons to believe that some of the other presuppositions of the 
(Abstractionist Inference) are not met, and that this defeats our entitlement for these 
presuppositions. 
However, at first glance it is hard to see which of the conditions we already introduced 
could do the job. For example, intuitively, Hero would not have sufficient reasons to believe 
that (HP+FLT) is inconsistent. 
Things might look better once we regard the truth-preservation of the (Abstractionist 
Inference) as one of its presuppositions. Arrogant stipulations might be such that we have 
17TWe may call this thoupt Hole i, erecIo.I do 1lOt remember a lingle talk OD neo-Fregeaoism, iD which 
he did not str_ that in order to generate exiatence claims out of (HP), ODe first needs to establish 
appropriate iDltances of its right-hand-side. 
1180£ course, these roles become relevut wheD we extend the propoaal to Implicit definition in general. 
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sufficient reason to doubt that they are truth-preserving. Consider the case of (HP+FLT). 
Once we observe that the stipulation builds in a substantial claim about the properties uf 
the objects we want to introduce, we should ask what license we have to build in such a 
claim. This consideration might defeat our entitlement in relevant cases. However, a lot 
depends on what is required for having a sufficient reason to believe that a propo!'itiuJl is 
untrue. Seeing that (HP+FLT) builds in a substantial claim might provide a sufficient 
reason to doubt that we can responsibly make this stipulation, but it might not provide a 
sufficient reason to believe that the abstraction principle is untrue. 
My conclusion is that whether or not we need a non-arrogance cunstraint, and how it 
would look like, can only be decided by further research. 
'7.2.8 Summary: essential presuppositions 
This completes my discussion of the presuppositions of the (Abstractionist Inference). 
To sum up. The following conditions are essential presuppositions of the (Abstractionist 
Inference) : 
• The (Generality Presupposition). 
• Irenicity 
Maybe we have to add one or more of the following: 
• (Uniqueness) 
• Non-arrogance 
The (Generality Presupposition) is a presupposition of cognitive success - it is a 
presupposition ensuring that the abstraction principle generates understanding. Irenie-
ity is a mathematical presupposition: it is used to avoid specific possible shortcomings 
of abstraction principles that arise from (mathematical) Bad Company considerations. I 
provided considerations to the effect that we can reject the claim that there are onto-
logical presuppositions. This is important because such presuppositions would l:Ollstraiu 
the epistemological payoff of my proposal. However, there might be a metaphytdcal pre-
supposition ensuring that a unique referent can be assigned: (Uniqueness). The fourth 
potential presupposition is an epistemological presupposition. It might be required to rule 
out irresponsible stipulations such 88 (HP+FLT). 
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In the course of my investigations, it has become apparent that the classical ubjectiuns 
to neo-Fregeanism are connected to more general issues regarding presuppusitions uf the 
(A bstractionist Inference): 
• The Bad Company problem can be regarded as the problem of selecting apprupriatp 
mathematical presuppositions. 
• One version of the Caesar problem threatens the claim that we pussess an entitlement 
for the (Generality Presupposition) .179 
• In the light of my proposal, epistemic rejectionism arises as the claim that we nped 
to invoke ontological presuppositions. 
1791 have not discussed this above, but the reader will be able to see that some issues regarding (Unique-
ness) are related to the Caesar problem for reference. 
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7.3 Extending the proposal: logic 
Extending the proposal to the logical case is straightforward, given that a stipulation of 
the validity of relevant introduction and elimination rules can bring it about that the 
meaning of logical operators is fixed in such a way that the respective rules are valid. This 
is Gentzen's idea (Gentzen 1934) - (Metasemantic Inferentialism) for logic. I think 
this idea is very plausible. For example: 
• The meaning of the material conditional "-+" can be fixed by virtue of stipulating 
that it is to be assigned a meaning that renders its elimination rule Modus Ponens 
(MP) and its introduction rule Conditional Proof (CP) valid: 180 
(CP) n-¢ and tll-¢-+t/! r,tll-t/! 
• The meaning of conjunction" 1\" can be fixed by virtue of stipulating that it is to 
be assigned a meaning that renders I\-Introduction (1\-1) and I\-Elimination (I\-E) 
valid: 
(1\-1) tAt (I\-E) 1>~t/J 
Corresponding to such meaning-fixing stipulations, there is another instance of the 
(Implicit Definition Inference): 
(Logicist Inference) There is a primitive type of inference allowing non-defecti ve epis-
temic agents to acquire full internalistic apriori warrants for believing that introduction 
and elimination rules are valid, on the basis of internalistic knowledge of our explicit 
meaning-fixing stipulations of these rules, in case we also possess antecedent warral1ts 
for certain conditions ensuring that nothing went wrong with the stipulation in question. 
One note is in order. Although I want to remain neutral as to what validity amoullts 
to, it can be understood as necessary truth preservation throughout this chapter. The 
general proposal is neutral with respect to the notion one uses, although different notions 
might come with different presuppositions of the (Logicist Inference). 
180Throughout this aectioD., I .. WIle that ",..." ia already undentood. 
257 
7.3.1 Another Hero story 
Consider again our non-defective epistemic agent Hero. Hero sits in his armchair and 
makes the following meta-linguistic stipulation, to fix the meaning of a new symbol "-t": 
(Meaning-Fixing Stipulation for Arrow) "-+" is to be assigned a meaning that 
renders MP and CP valid. 
The stipulation can again be conceived of as a command, which brings it about that a 
pattern of use is fixed for "-+" and Hero becomes disposed to reason in accordance with 
this pattern of use (Le. Hero becomes disposed to reason in accordance with MP and CP). 
By virtue of this process, Hero comes to understand "-+". 
Mter that, Hero reflects on his stipulation, by drawing the (Logicist Inference) 011 
the basis of the following premise: 
(Premise for Arrow) I sincerely made the (Meaning-Fixing Stipulation for Ar-
row). 
Let" Stip (M P, C P)" stand for (Premise for Arrow), and let" Valid (R)" stands for 
"R is valid". Hero's argument is this: 
(1) Stip(MP,CP) 
(2) Valid (MP) and VaUd(CP} (1), (Logicist Inference) 
If Hero possesses intemalistic knowledge of (1), he can come to possess internalistic 
knowledge of (2), given that he posseBSeS warrants for the presuppositions of the (Logi-
cist Inference). We can assume that Hero possesses internalistic apriori knowledge 
of (Premise for Arrow), because it would be an instance of maker's knowledge (ttee 
7.1.3).181 But what are the presuppositions of the (Logicist Inference), and does Hero 
possess warrants for them? 
181 Note that I &II81UDe that Hero is already competent in English, and poasesaea the relevant concepts. 
This is important, because making relevant meeuing-fixing stipulations and forming justified beliefs about 
them presuppOIeII some logical, syntactical and conceptual competence. 
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7.3.2 Presuppositions in the logical case 
The presuppositions of the (Logicist Inference) are the conditions ensuring that meaning 
can be fixed in the right way. We can determine these conditions by considering cast'S in 
which meaning-fixing commands of introduction and elimination rules fail. Consider tIlt' 
tonk rules, which are stipulated to be valid in order to fix the meaning of the operator "T" 
(Prior 1960): 
(T-I) R (T-E) ¢~t/J 
These rules cannot be valid, because they lead to triviality. Choose any theorem of 
the background system for l/J. A successive application of (T-I) and (r-E) can be used to 
establish any sentence whatsoever. It is thus impossible that the right meaning is fixed by 
virtue of stipulating them to be valid. 
This motivates imposing additional conditions C (Rlntro, RElim) ensuring that a stip-
ulation of introduction and elimination rules Rlntro and RElim is not defective in the 
way a stipulation of (r-I) and (r-E) is defective. There are at least two candidates for 
C (Rlntro, RElim), depending on how one analyses the failure of the tonk-rules. 
Firstly, one might argue that there is no truth function corresponding to the tonk-rule!> 
(Wagner 1981, Hjortland 2009, section 2.2.2). Secondly, Dummett (1991) propo!>ed that 
the problem with the tonk-rules is that they are not in hannony. Very roughly, for a 
pair of introduction and elimination rules to be in harmony the results of applications of 
the elimination rule must not be stronger than the conditions for applying corresponding 
introduction rules and vice versa. (Hjortland 2009 section 2.3.1).182 It is immediate that 
(r-I) and (r-E) are not in harmony in this sense. We only need p to introduce prq, but 
we can obtain p 1\ q in turn, which is stronger than p. 
This leads to two proposals of what C (Rlntro, RElim) include: one the one hand, one 
might demand that the stipulated introduction and elimination rules must determine a 
unique truth function. Let us denote this condition by "UniqueTF (Rlntro , RElim)". On 
the other hand, one migbt demand that the stipulated introduction and elimination rules 
must be in harmony. Let us denote this condition by "Harmony (Rlntro, REhm)". If one 
of these conditions is met, 80 the thought goes, by (Metasemantic Inferentialism), 
1
12Thia is the same harmony coDStraint that Hale and Wright propOlied in their (2000, p.l36). 
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meaning can be fixed in such a way that the stipulated inferential pattern turns out to he 
valid. Thus, one of these conditions is the only essential presupposition of the (Logicist 
Inference) . 
We obtain two candidate models for how the structure of justification looks like. The 
first model may be called the realist model, since what is at stake is the existence of certaiu 
truth functions. The model invoking the Dummettian condition may be called the anti-
realist model, because all that matters are syntactic considerations. Here is a graphical 
example for both models: 
The realist model The anti-realist model 
I contend that the presuppositions of both models are entitlements of cognitive project 
in the relevant cases. I cannot argue for this claim in full generality. I will just complete 
the argument for the case of MP and CPo 
T .S.S Entitlement. for presuppositions 
The realist model According to the realist model, the presupposition of the (Logicist 
Inference) is that the stipulation determines a unique truth function, i.e. that there is a 
unique way of mapping all propositions to truth values such that the stipulat.ed rules t.urn 
out to be valid. 
Simple meta-theoretical reasoning - e.g. model-theoretic reasoning - shows that 
MP and CP determine a unique truth function. However, such arguments require a lot 
of resources. In particular, they make use of logical reasoning. Since logical reasoning 
presupposes the validity of the used logical rules, and, according to the current proposal, 
acquiring warrants for the validity of logical rules presupposes the existence of appropriate 
truth functions, we cannot justify that a unique truth-function is determined without 
implicitly relying on something in no more secure a prior epistemic standing. The regreSR 
clause for entitlement of cognitive project is met, at least in cases that are sufficiently 
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basic. We can assume here, without loss of generality, that the case of MP and CP is such 
a case. 
It is easy to see that the other conditions for entitlement of cognitive project are met as 
well. First, the conditions for the success of stipulations of basic logical rules are Wright-
presuppositions of an important general cognitive project of finding out about the good 
standing of our meaning-fixing devices. t83 Secondly, we do not have sufficient reason to 
believe that MP and CP do not determine a unique truth function. 
That MP and CP determine a unique truth function is an entitlement of cognitive 
project. According to the realist model, this is the only presupposition. All presupposition 
of the (Logicist Inference) for MP and CP are warranted. Thus, by (Justification 
Generation), it transmits intemalistic knowledge from its premise (the stipulation facts) 
to its conclusion (the validity claim). 
The anti-realist model A similar argument applies to the anti-realist Illodel. According 
to this model, the presupposition of the (Logicist Inference) for MP and CP is that ~1P 
and CP are in harmony. 
It is very simple to argue for the claim that MP and CP are in harmony when harmony 
is understood along the lines sketched above (Gabbay 2007, p. 3). However, there is a 
variety of technical explications of the harmony constraint (see e.g. Hjortland 2009). How 
the argument looks like in full detail will depend on one's exact notion of harmony. 
In any case, it is to be expected that the argument for MP and CP being in harmony 
requires logical reasoning. Since logical reasoning presupposes the validity of the used 
logical apparatus, and, according to the current proposal, our justification for the validity 
of the used logical apparatus presupposes that the used rules meet a harmony constraint, 
we cannot establish harmony in all cases without implicitly relying on something in no 
more secure a prior epistemic standing. The regress clause for entitlement of cognitive 
project is met in at least some cases, namely in those cases that are sufficiently basic. 
Again, we can safely assume that the case of MP and CP is such a case. 
It is easy to see that the other conditions for entitlement of cognitive project are met as 
well. The reasons are analogous to those that apply to the realist model. According to the 
lUThis is the same project ofwbich the presuppositions of the (AbatractloDiat Inference) are entitle-
ments (eee 7.1.2). 
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anti-realist model, harmony is the only presupposition. All presupposition of the (Logicist 
Inference) for MP and CP are warranted. Thus, by (Justification Generation), it 
transmits internalistic knowledge. 
7.3.4 Defending the proposed structure of justification (2) 
Analyzing the structure of justification in the logical case provides yet another argument for 
the claim that we need to conceive of the (Implicit Definition Inference) as primitive, 
with the preconditions for semantic success construed as presuppositions, as opposed to 
premises. The upshot is that alternative models cannot account for the generation of 
(internalistic) knowledge in our epistemological framework. The considerations are similar 
to those presented in 7.1.4, but due to the nature of the logical case there is an additional 
argument available. 
One might think that the most natural way to acquire knowledge of V'dlidity on the basis 
of knowledge of one's own meta-linguistic stipulations is by reflecting on the metasemantic 
process. Why should Hero directly infer the validity of MP and CP from that he stipulated 
MP and CP to be valid? Why should Hero not rather go through an argument such as the 
following: 
(1) Stip(MP,CP) " C(MP,CP) 
(2) If (I), then " ..... " gets assigned a meaning Our metasemantics 
such that MP and CP are valid. 
(3) MP and CP are valid. (1), (2), MP 
It is worth also considering a similar argument that Boghossian defends in his (1996). 
Boghossian's idea is that Hero can reason as follows (see also Ebert 2005b, Jenkins 2008a): 
(IB) "-+" means what it does. 
(2B) If"-+" means what it does, then MP and CP 
are valid. 
(3B) MP and CP are valid. (IB), (2B), MP 
Both arguments are subject· to two devastating objections. The first problem is that 
both (1) and (18) cannot have an epistemic status above (inferential) entitlement. 
We have already seen that C (M P, C P) is an entitlement. Thus, the conjunction (1) 
cannot have an epistemic status above (inferential) entitlement, because of the (Limit) 
principle. Something similar holds for (IB). Our warrant for it cannot be allY stronger 
than our warrant for C (M P, C P). For C (M P, C P) are the conditions ensuring that "-1" 
gets assigned a meaning such that MP and CP are valid. If the notion of "means what it 
does" is to render (2B) true, it is plausible that we could only acquire a warrant for (1 B) 
by using C(MP,CP) as a premise. ls4 Thus, by the (Limit) principle, (IB) cannot have 
an epistemic status above (inferential) entitlement. 
So both arguments rest on an entitled premise. By the (Limit) principle, the condu-
sions cannot have an epistemic status stronger than (inferential) entitlement. This means 
that we cannot acquire internalistic knowledge by virtue of going through these arguments. 
The arguments are subject to leaching. Note that this problem is analogous to a problem 
that arises for the (Metasemantic Reasoning Model) in the mathematical case (see 
7.1.4). 
However, there is an additional problem in the logical case. The problem is that both 
arguments endorse an MP step. They are rule-circular. Thus, they fail to transmit warrant 
(for the argument, see 5.3). No first warrant can be obtained by virtue of going through 
the argument, and we cannot upgrade an antecedent warrant for validity by virtue of going 
through the argument.185 
Ergo: we need to construe our argument for validity in such a way that it does not retoit 
on entitled premises, and that it does not endorse logical inferential steps. The toiolution is 
to endorse the (Logicist Inference). 
7.3.5 Justiftcation generation, and hyper-circularity 
In the logical case, an interesting further circularity worry arises, which becomes apparent 
by applying the standard model of how (Justification Generation) is suppotoied to work. 
Let me explain. 
184In other words: (1B) &I1d (2B) Deed to be coutrued .. claims about reference (see Ebert 20056, Jenkins 
2008 a). 
185 A diflereDt arpJaeDt for the claim that aopo.ian'. template falls to tr&D8oUt warrant is provided 
by JeDldna (2008a). Jenldu arpes that one c&IU1Ot pou.s a W&lTaDt for (18) without already p08lle88lng 
a warr&Dt for a dlaquoted wraloo of (311) - Dote that the conclUlioD of BoghOll8iaD'. template is a meta-
linguistic atatemeDt about infereDtiai patterIUI,1a whieb ".-." is only mentioned aDd not used - aDd that 
the disquoted vaniOIl of (3B) Is the real tarpt of the arlUDlent. Thua, 80 the thought goes, the argument 
already prtIUppoeea the poII8I8ion of " ....... t for what it Is DleaDt to establish. 
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Suppose Hero carried out the (Logicist Inference) for MP and CP correctly, from 
internalistically known premises Stip (M P, CP), and that Hero possesses an entitlement for 
C (MP,CP). (Justification Generation) tells us that Hero thus acquires internalistic 
knowledge of Valid (M P). This requires that the possession of this knowledge is available 
to Hero on reflection. One explanation of why it is available to Hero - which I endorsed in 
both the perceptual and the mathematical case - is that Hero is able to go through some 
line of reasoning to the effect that he knows the conclusion of the (Logicist Inference). 
Consider the simplest proposal of what Hero's argument might look like: 
(1) C(MP,CP) 
(2) K(Stip(MP,CP)) 
(3) C(MP,CP)!\K(Stip(MP,CP» ~K(Valid(MP» 
(4) K(Valid(MP)) (3), (4), MP 
The availability of this line of reflection is supposed to show that Hero can come to 
possess an (inferential) entitlement for (4). However, the above reflection contains an MP 
step. So the one-step argument endorsing the (Logicist Inference) is circular in the 
following sense: 
(Hyper-Circularity) An argument A for the goodness of a belief-forming method M 
is hyper-circular if and only if any (second-level) argument for the claim that one can 
acquire internalistic knowledge of, or internalistic justification for the conclusion of A 
by virtue of going through A, makes use of M. 
The question arises of whether (Hyper-Circularity) is bad in that it undermines 
(Justification Generation). If the answer to this question was positive, then the validity 
of our basic logical apparatus would have to remain a mere entitlement. This would not 
undermine our attempt to vindicate the proposal for mathematics, but the account would 
be incomplete. This is8Ue merits further research. 
1.3.6 Intermediate conclusion: loaiclsm1 
Let me sum up. In principle, the neo-Fregean Hero story can be extended to the logical case. 
On the basis of met&-linguisticstipulations and subsequent reflection in accordance with 
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the (Implicit Definition Inference), so the thought goes, Hero can acquire internalistic 
knowledge of the validity of basic logical laws. 
As in the mathematical case, the proposal is limited by cases of transmission-failure. 
What exactly these limits are will be revealed by examining what the presuppositions of 
the (Implicit Definition Inference) are in the relevant cases. According to the realist 
model, claims about the unique determination of truth functions will have to remain enti-
tlements. According to the anti-realist model, claims about the harmony of introduction 
and elimination rules will have to remain entitlements. Someone who thinks that claims to 
knowledge of harmony, or claims to knowledge of the unique determination of truth values 
are paradigmatic claims to knowledge will think that these are revisionary consequence. 
I regard these consequences as a philosophical insight into the limits of our (claimable) 
knowledge. 
If the proposal for logic works, we will have shown that there is a canonical way of 
forming logico-mathematical beliefs that bases mathematics and logic on the same kind of 
basic belief-forming method. The (Same Source) constraint would be met. We will obtain 
a genuine version of logicism. This motivates further works on extending the proposal to 
the logical case. 
7.4 Extending the proposal: implicit definition in general 
The proposal generalizes further. The second generalization to be made is Hot directly 
concerned with the subject matter of stipulations, but with their form. So far, I focused 
on the stipulations of (the soundness or validity of) (introduction and elimination) ,-ules. 
I now argue that the proposal can also be applied to sentential stipulations, and that 
the proposal thus provides an account of the epistemic workings of implicit definitions ill 
general, including meaning-fixing stipulations of the truth of sentential matrices containing 
one or more undefined terms. However, I can only touch the surface here. The main purpose 
of this section is to carve out aspects of my proposal that merit further research. 
Remember the distinction, drawn in 2.3.1, between the (Traditional Conception 
of Definition) and the (Liberal Conception of Definition). According to the first 
conception, definitions have to meet the criteria of (Eliminability) and (Conservative-
ness). Definitions meeting these criteria can be put in normal form, i.e. they can always 
be stated in terms of introduction and elimination rules (Gupta 2009). 
Sentential stipulations of the truth of a certain explicit definition can be handled by 
my account, because they can be regarded as meta-linguistic stipulations to the effeet that 
certain introduction and elimination rules are truth-preserving. The criteria of (Elim-
inability) and (Conservativeness) can be regarded as essential presuppositions of rel-
evant instances of the (Implicit Definition Inference) (for the definition of "essential 
presupposition", see 7.2). 
Hale and Wright (2000) defend the (Liberal Conception of Definition), in order 
to argue for the apriori knowability of abstraction principles (Hale &. Wright 2000). There 
are more applications for this conception of definition: 
• It has been suggested that mathematical terms can be defined by virtue of stipulating 
the truth of (consistent) axiom systems. Carnap's idea in (1950) must have betm 
along these lines, although there are some complications regarding the endorsed 
notion of truth here. And Hilbert can be read as expressing this idea in a letter 
to Frese (Hilbert to Frege 29.12.1899; in: Frege 1980). 
• It has been suggested that theoretical terms of scientific theories can be defined by 
virtue of stipulating the truth of so-called Camap conditionals. The idea can be 
traced back to Carnap (1966). The idea is taken up, among others, by Lewis (1970), 
Horwich (1998), and Hale and Wright (2000). 
It does not appear too difficult to extend the account to these cases as well. All that needs 
to be done is to determine the essential presuppositions of the inferences assueiatt'd with 
relevant cases of sentential definitions. ls6 
7.4.1 The Sentential Stipulation Inference 
As soon as we have found the right presuppositions, we can incorporate implicit sentential 
stipulations as follows. First, we need to make a metasemantic claim, corresponding to 
(Metasemantic Inferentialism): 
(Metasemantic Interpretationism) By virtue of stipulating that a sentential matrix 
(or a collection of sentential matrices) containing one or more undefined terms is to be 
true (or necessarily true), we can (i) come to understand these terms, and (ii) brin!!, it 
about that these terms get assigned a meaning such that the sentential matrix (or tlu' 
collection) is true (or necessarily true), given that certain preconditions are met (which 
will also be the presuppositions of the corresponding inference). 
To this we add an epistemic claim, corresponding to the (Implicit Definition Infer-
ence) principle: 
(Sentential Stipulation Inference) There is a primitive type of inference that allows 
us to acquire full internalistic apriori warrants for the (necessary) truth of our sentential 
stipulations on the basis of internalistic knowledge of what these stipulations are, ill case 
we also possess antecedent warrants for the preconditions erulUring that nothing went 
wrong with the stipulations in question. 
The (Sentential Stipulation Inference) can be defended in the same way as the 
(Implicit Deftnitlon Inference), assuming that (Metasemantlc Interpretationism) 
holds. And once we accept (Metasemantic Inferentiallsm), it seems Datural to accept 
(Met_mantic· Interpretatloniam) as well. 
l·We can expect that new pre8uppolitiona uiIe for Jiberal Btipulatiou of sentential matrices, or col-
lections of eenteDtiai matrices. For it It tDuch ellier to make bad Itipulatiou if one i8 not restricted to 
makiDs explicit BtipuJationa, or to atiPulatbac introduction and elimination rules. 
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7.4.2 Stipulating abstraction principles 
This opens up an alternative approach to abstractionisIU. \Ve could tell ollr Hero ~t()ry 
in such a way that Hero - who already grasps second-order logic --- makes tlH' followiug 
sentential stipulation to fix the meaning of" #": 
(Meaning-Fixing Stipulation·) "#" is be assigned a meaning such that tlH' ~tate­
ment that (HP) holds necessarily is true (Le. "DB P" is true). 
The meaning that is assigned to "#" by this stipulation is exactly tlw sallle as tlw 
meaning assigned by the (Meaning-Fixing Stipulation) above. Moreover, it is plausible 
that both stipulations have the same presuppositions. I have argued above that Hero 
possesses entitlements for these presuppositions, so all the presuppositions of the relevant 
instance of the (Sentential StipUlation Inference) are warranted. Thus, Hero can come 
to possess internalistic knowledge of the truth of a boxed version of (HP) by virtue of the 
(Sentential Stipulation Inference). 
Hero can then apply a disquotational step to acquire internalistic knowledge of DB P. 
and of (HP) in tum. The disquotational step is unproblematic, because Hero already 
understands (HP), by virtue of being disposed to use "#" in the right way, which has 
been brought about by sincerely making the meaning-fixing command. IS1 Hero call then 
carry out Frege's proof as it is usually presented, using (HP) as a premise. as opposed to 
the (Hume Rules). 
7.4.3 A special role for abstraction principles? 
IT we allow sentential stipulations, two further questions arise for the abstra<:tionist. Firstly, 
the question arises of what distinguishes abstraction principles from axiom sets with re-
gard to their special role as foundations of (reconstructed) mathematical knowledge. Why 
should we not stipulate the (necessary) truth of the second-order Peano axioms dire<:tly, 
bring it about that the relevant terms have meaning, and come to know them by using 
an appropriate instance of the (Sentential Stipulation Inference)? If this possibility 
cannot be excluded, why should We take the long route via Frege's proof and (a stipulation 
of) (HP), or the (Hume Rules)? 
IITThe disquotational step hall been p;;blematized by both Ebert (200M) and Jenkins (20084). I briefly 
discuss the problem below (7.4.6). 
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To make this worry more precise, consider the following variation of our Hero story. 
In the alternative scenario, Hero· - who already grasps second-order logic~- - lIlakt~s tIlt' 
following sentential stipulation to fix the meaning of "0", "8 (x)" (successor), and II N (;r)" 
(" x is a natural number"): 
(Meaning-Fixing Stipulation··) "0", "8 (x)", and "N (x)" are to be a..o.;siglled a Illt'all-
ing such that the boxed conjunction of the second-order Dedekilld-Peallo axioms, rela-
tivized to a natural number predicate" N (x)", is necessarily true. 
According to the current proposal, this stipulation brings it about that "0", "8 (;r)", aud 
"N (x)" get assigned a meaning such that the stipulation indeed turns out to be true. More-
over, one might think that, if the presuppositions of a stipulation of (Meaning-Fixing 
Stipulation·) are entitled, so are the presuppositions of (Meaning-Fixing Stipula-
tion •• ). Thus, so the thought goes, Hero· can come to possess interualistic apriori knowl-
edge of the (necessary) truth of a version of the second-order Peano axioms by drawing the 
appropriate instance of the (Sentential Stipulation Inference), and a disquotational 
step. 
The described route thus promises internalistic knowledge of a version of tlu~ st~:ond­
order Peano axioms, without the need to carry out Frege's proof. Would it not be mudl 
more convenient for Hero to follow Hero·? 
First, note that although Hero· can acquire internalistic knowledge of Ii version of 
second-order arithmetic by the described route, he needs to do more in order to acquire 
something akin to the knowledge of Hero. Hero· does not yet possess intemalit;tic knowl-
edge of Frege Arithmetic, for making the command (Meaning-Fixing Stipulation··) 
does not fix the meaning of a. number operator like "#". And although Hero can inter-
pret FA in his theory - Boo10s (1987) showed how to define "#" and how to proof a 
version (HP) in second-order arithmetic in the course of establishing the equi-collsisteucy 
of second-order arithmetic and FA - the question remains whether Hero·'s knowledge is 
really akin to Hero's in the end, because it is not clear that the meanings of Hero*'s terms 
are the same as the meanings of Hero's terms. 
This question is relevant. I have argued above that Hero's stipulation promille8 to meet 
hermeneutic demands, i.e. that the meaning fixed for "#F' by Hero's 8tipulatioll is tht! 
same as the meaning of "the number of the PsI!. If Hero.'s stipulation does mt!et thiH 
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demand, we have strong reasons to prefer the route via abstraction principles. 
The argument for Hero's stipulation meeting hermeneutic demands rests on the claim 
that a stipulation of (HP) - or a stipulation of the (Hurne Rules) _. meets (Frege's 
Constraint). And, at least prima facie, a direct stipulation of the axioms of secolld-onh~r 
arithmetic fails this constraint. It does not make the applications of numbers immediate. 
So we cannot use the same argument for Hero*'s stipulation. This issue deserves further 
research. 
7.4.4 Against epistemic analyticity 
The (Implicit Definition Thesis) is sometimes associated with the notion of epistemic 
analyticity. The notion has first been endorsed by Boghossian (1996). Boghossian argues 
that, although the classical notion of analyticity - truth in virtue of rneaning HI8 - is 
either unclear or uninstantiated189 , there is an interesting epistemological notion in the 
vicinity, namely: 
(Epistemic Analyticity) A sentence S is epistemically analytic if and only if un-
derstanding S suffices for being in a position to acquire a warrant for the proposition 
expressed by S.190 
According to Boghossian, some interesting statements which have been claimed to he 
true in virtue of meaning are epistemically analytic. For example: statements expressing 
the validity of basic logical laws. Boghossian provides an argument template for establish-
ing the validity of basic logical laws to explain why this is so. We have seen one instanee 
of it above, and I have argued that it is defective (see 7.3.4). However, since my own 
template avoids the difficulties of Boghossian's template, one might think that the notion 
of epistemic analyticity can be vindicated after all. 
So are validity claims and sentential stipulations like (HP) epistemically analytk? 
No. In fact, the considerations above show that one should not posit allY direct link from 
understanding to being in a position to acquire a warrant. 
"'Boghoa8Ian dubs it metaph,.ical IInolyC1city. 
lets. (Williamson 2007, chapter 3) for additional considerations in this regard. 
lllOEvery notion of analyticity should be construed as a property of sentencea, as opposed to prop08itiolUl 
(Ruuell2008, p. 22). 
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Consider again the case of Frege's (BLV). Although a stipulation of (BLV) suffices to 
generate an understanding of "f", (BLV) cannot be true, because of Russell's paradox. HII 
Thus, there is no guarantee that we can acquire knowledge of the truth of stipulations on 
the basis of knowledge of what our stipulations are. 
And such cases also undennine the claim that knowledge of our stipulations already 
suffices for being in a position to acquire a warrant for their truth {or truth-preservation}. 
This is why we conceived of the (Implicit Definition Inference) as an inference with 
presuppositions. One also needs to possess supporting warrants in order to acquire a 
warrant by virtue of drawing the inference. The following claim is false: 
(Warrant by Understanding alone) Knowing that one has just made a certain 
meta-linguistic stipulation to fix the meaning of t suffices for being in a position to 
acquire a warrant for the goodness of the definition. 
Only the following, weaker principle holds: 
(Warrant by Understanding AND warrants for success) Knowing that one has 
just made a meta-linguistic stipulation to fix the meaning of t suffices for being in a 
position to acquire a warrant for the goodness of the definition, given one also possesses 
warrants for the relevant preconditions of semantic success. 
This bears directly on the notion of epistemic analyticity. Ceteris paribus, that one 
knows that one has just made a meta-linguistic stipulation to fix the meaning of t entail!:! 
that one understands t. If understanding was sufficient for being in a position to acquire 
a warrant, then knowing that one has just made a meta-linguistic stipulation would be 
sufficient as well. But we have just seen that it is not. Thus, we should also reject the 
claim that understanding entails being in a position to acquire a warrant. 
1.4.5 A third notion of analyticity 
However, my account motivates introducing a notion weaker than, but still close to the 
notion of epistemic analyticity. The notion of analyticity my proposal really motivates 
is simply the notion of a statement internalistically knowable on the basis of one of the 
simple inferences above, and logic. Such statements are epistemically interesting: they can 
1911 88IUIDe that our background logic is second-order logic with unrestricted comprehension. 
271 
be internalistically known just on the basis of apriori knowable stipulation fads. We may 
call such statements Camap analytic: 
(Carnap Analyticity) A sentence S is Camap analytic if and only if it is ill the 
deductive closure of statements that can be internalistically known on the basis of 
instances of the (Sentential Stipulation Inference) or the (Implicit Definition 
Inference) .192 
There is another, more fundamental way to express the notion of Carnap analyticity, 
which assumes that warrants for the validity of basic logical rules (and the soundness of 
mathematical rules) can be acquired by virtue of the (Implicit Definition Inference): 
(Carnap Analyticity·) A sentence S is Camap analytic if and only if it is in the R-
closure of conclusions of instances of the (Sentential Stipulation Inference) and the 
(Implicit Definition Inference), where R-closure is closure under rules whose validity 
or soundness can be internalistically known on the basis of the (Implicit Definition 
Inference) . 
There are a lot of Carnap analytic truths. For example: 
• The axioms and theorems of Frege Arithmetic: these can be known on the basis of 
(HP) or the (Hume Rules), and logical rules. 
• Statements expressing the validity of MP and CP, and other basic logical laws. They 
are the conclusions of good instances of the (Logicist Inference). 
• Tautologies. They can be obtained on the basis of proofs without premises, using 
only logical rules. 
Moreover, if the proposal for arithmetic can be combined with a weak hermeneutic claim 
(and I have explained in 7.1.8 how such a claim may be established), then Hero will be able 
to justify apriori that, necessarily, a statement of ordinary arithmetic is true if and only if 
the corresponding reconstructed statement is true. This motivates the following notion: 
unl am grateful to Thomas Brouwer for making me aware of a deficiency in an earlier definition of this 
notion. 
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(Metasemantic Analyticity) A sentence S is metasemantically analytic if one can 
acquire apriori knowledge to the effect that necessarily, the proposition expressed by S 
is true if the proposition expressed by a certain Carnap analytic statement is true. 
All metasemantically analytic truths are knowable apriori. If all appropriate hermeneu-
tic claim for abstractionism can be defended apriori (see 7.1.8), many truths of ordinary 
arithmetic will turn out to be metasemantically analytic, and thus knowable apriori. I hope 
that most of what has traditionally been deemed analytic turns out to be metasemantically 
analytic. This merits further research. 
7.4.6 Ebert's proposal 
In his PhD thesis (Ebert 2005a), Ebert presents his own approach to precisifying Hale's 
and Wright's idea of knowledge by stipulation. At a first glance, his approach might look 
very similar to mine. However, there are major differences between our approaches, which 
need to be pointed out. 
According to Ebert, the act of stipulation is best described as a direct, primitive ac-
ceptance of a sentential matrix containing an undefined term (Ebert 2005a, pp. 221f) .193 
Ebert identifies some features of primitive acceptance, which correspond to features of 
belief. For example, the acceptance of a statement S gives rise to assertions of S (Ebert 
2005a, p. 252). However, Ebert repeatedly stresses that primitive acceptance is a state 
different from belief, and considers it to be an important objection to his proposal that 
acceptance might be a doxastic state too weak to underlie knowledge (Ebert 2005a, p. 
252).194 
In any case, according to Ebert, stipulations qua primitive acceptances admit of three 
dimensions of success that are all in place in the paradigmatic cases:195 
• Effectiveness: If the stipulation meets certain conditions - in Ebert's terms: if the 
193It seems that Ebert wants to allow for the stipulation of rules as well, but he does not discU88 this case 
in any detail. 
194Althougb Ebert seems to conceive of stipulations as primitive acceptances of statements - linguistic 
entities - it does not always become clear whether it is really a statement that is accepted, rather than the 
prop08itioll ~eased by it. III fact, construing acceptance as a relation between a subject and a linguistic 
eatity is very implausible. For example: how could warranted true acceptance constitue knowledge, as 
Ebert COllteads, without acceptance being a relation between a subject and a propo,ition? Presumably, 
the tho.t it that the acceptance of a statemeat brings with it an (additional) acceptance of a proposition, 
oaC8 the atateDleat becomes uaderstood. 
1
98Tbenamea for the three dimensions of achievement are taken from (Ebert 2011). 
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stipulation is effective - the subject is "directly confronted with the content of what 
is stipulated" (Ebert 2005a, p. 224). Thus, acceptance immediately leads to an 
understanding of the content expressed by the stipulated matrix. This raises the 
question what exactly the conditions for effectiveness are. For Ebert, a minimal 
condition is Hale's and Wright's Generality condition which I discussed in 2.3 and 
7.2 (Ebert 2005a, p. 124) . 
• Success: A fortiori, in case the stipulation meets some further preconditions, the 
stipulation brings it about that the undefined term gets assigned a meaning such 
that the matrix is true . 
• Epistemic effectiveness: according to Ebert, if certain preconditions are in place -
Ebert's calls them "(epistemic) presuppositions" - the accepted pattern is not only 
true, but becomes an item of (non-inferential) extemalistic knowledge (Ebert 2005a, 
p. 124). Moreover, if the subject meets some additional conditions the subject can 
also claim this knowledge. Let me explain. 
The (epistemic) presuppositions Ebert has in mind are similar to the conditions Hale 
and Wright impose in their (2000). First and foremost, they include consistency and 
conservativeness (Ebert 2005a, p. 226).196197 The relevant presuppositions are met by 
relevant abstraction principles. For example: (HP). Thus, if Hero accepts (HP) to fix 
the meaning of "#", "#" becomes understood by Hero and gets assigned a meaning that 
renders (HP) true. Moreover, Hero thereby comes to possess (non-inferential) externalistie 
knowledge of (HP), or so the thought goes.198 
Ebert does not draw the distinction between hermeneutic and revolutionary programmes. 
However, I take it that he assumes that the meaning fixed for "#" is such that Hero can 
come to possess extemalistic knowledge of the existence and the properties of the numbers 
we all know and love. 
The story does not end bere. Ebert is dissatisfied with the outlook of merely establishing 
til-Ebert does DOt impose a nOll-arrogance condition. However, he thinks he can avoid certain easy 
knowledp worries by referring to the special form of abstraction principles (Ebert 20054, pp. 253f). 
"'Ebert also draws an analogy to the external·world case. He agrees with Wright in that, when it 
comes to perceptual belief·forming methods, there are preconditions such as the non·obtaining of sceptical 
aamarios (Ebert 20050, pp. 225£). As SOOD as these conditions are met, so the thought goes, a subject can 
acquire exterDaIiatic knowledge by virtue of carrying out perceptual belief.forming methods. 
l"Ebert does not endorse the Hero metaphor. I use it to render clearer the connections between my 
proposal and Ebert'. proposal. 
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that it is possible to possess arithmetical knowledge, externalistically conceived. He also 
wants to account for the possibility to claim such knowledge (Ebert 2005a, p. 226).199 
Claiming knowledge of (HP) requires some kind of reflectivity. In particular, it caIlnot 
possibly suffice that the epistemic presuppositions are true. However, Ebert also rightly 
observes that it is better not required that Hero proves that the preconditions are met. 
For this leads to insurmountable regress problems (Ebert 2005a, p. 231). 
This dilemma200 is resolved by appealing to entitlements (of cognitive project). Ac-
cording to Ebert, ''for a subject to claim to know p on the basis of a primitive acceptance, 
he has to make sure that he is entitled to do so" (Ebert 2005a, p. 248). And to be entitled 
to claim knowledge of p just consists in possessing entitlements for the epistemic presup-
positions, or so the thought goes (Ebert 2005a, p. 248). Thus, the condition for properly 
asserting knowledge of a primitively accepted (HP) is that Hero has made sure that he 
possesses entitlements for all the epistemic presuppositions. 
Of course, Ebert also holds that Hero possesses relevant entitlements, and can make 
sure that he possesses them. For example, Hero possesses an entitlement for (HP)'s 
consistency, and Hero can make sure that he possesses it (Ebert 2005a, p. 247). 
What does it involve to make sure that one is entitled? Does Hero need to prove that 
the conditions for entitlement are met, or is some looser kind of access enough? Ebert gives 
a somewhat vague answer for the case of (HP)'s consistency (Ebert 2005a, p. 249). As 
to condition (i), Ebert thinks that Hero needs to show that none of the known paradoxes 
applies to (HP). As to condition (ii), Ebert thinks that Hero needs to show that any 
attempt to justify the consistency of (HP) involves further presuppositiolllS in no more 
secure a prior epistemic standing. In this context, "to show" sounds just like "to prove". 
This suggests that it is not easy to claim knowledge of (HP). For example, if "known 
paradoxes" refers to the paradoxes known to the experts, quite a bit of logical knowledge 
is required on Hero's side. And if one needs to prove that one cannot justify (HP)'s 
consistency without regress, one needs to know of Godel's results. 
Be that as it may, there is a further unclarity: Ebert does not explain why Hero 
can claim knowledge once he has made sure that he possesses entitlements for all the 
preconditions. Maybe Ebert thinks that this is because some additional kind of reasoning 
1HTh_, Ebert seems to share the Wrightean intuition that I discussed in chapter 3. 
200Thia is, of COU1'8e, just another version of the Shapiro-Ebert dilemma I discussed in 2.3. 
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on Hero's side can yield an inferential entitlement for the claim that he knows, and that 
this is sufficient for responsibly claiming knowledge. This adoption of (lIlY interpretation 
of) Wright's suggestion would make Ebert proposal look similar to mine. What are the 
most relevant differences, if we assume that this is how we should complete the picture? 
The most relevant differences are that Ebert thinks (i) that knowledge of abstraction 
principles in non-inferential, and (ii) that it is based on stipulations conceived of as prim-
itive acceptances of sentences of the object language. My own proposal is incompatible 
with both claims. As to (i), I have argued that knowledge of abstraction principles is 
inferential. It is acquired by a primitive inferential belief-forming method on the basis of 
maker's knowledge about one's own stipulations. As to (ii), I conceive of stipulations as 
meaning-fixing meta-linguistic commands. So both the type of knowledge generated, and 
the act of stipulation are fundamentally different. 
I believe that there are things to say in favour of my own choices, and that the reasons 
Ebert gives in favour of his choices are not convincing. 
Ebert offers two reasons for the claim that we should construe knowledge by stipula-
tion as non-inferential and based on primitive acceptance. Fifl:ltly, Ebert wants to avoid 
appeal to a disquotational step. That is: he wants to avoid conceiving of the structure of 
justification in such a way that Hero first acquires knowledge of the truth of (HP) - a 
meta-language claim about a sentence of an object language - and then acquires knowl-
edge of (HP) by a disquotational step. His aim is to allow for Hero acquiring knowledge 
of the (HP) directly. Although I think that I could also construe the (Abstractionist 
Inference) such that it directly delivers object language claims, the way I laid down my 
proposal above (see 7.4.2) requires a disquotational step after a sentential stipulation of 
(HP) has been made, and the truth of (HP) has been inferred by virtue of the (Abstrac-
tionlst Inference). 
The disquotational step has first been problematized by Ebert (2005b). Jenkins (2008a) 
shares the underlying worry. Both Ebert and Jenkins observe that being able to disquote 
presupposes an understanding of the sentence to be disquoted, and contend that the sort 
of understanding required is so substantial that it requires the possession of a warrant 
for the proposition the disquoted sentence expresses, in cases where the sentence to be 
disquoted is the device of a meaning-fixing stipulation. If this was true, then the argument 
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involving the disquotational step could not be used to acquire a first warrant for (HP), 
because one of its inferential steps would already presuppose the possession of a warrant for 
(HP). In fact, the argument would display transmission-failure, because it would exhibit 
the (Information Dependence Template). 
I reject the claim that understanding the matrix of a meaning-fixing stipulation requires 
the possession of a warrant for the proposition expressed by it. One can understand 
"f," - and sentences including "f,", such as (BLV) - on the basis of a meaning-fixing 
stipulation of (BLV) , without possessing a warrant for it. We can even know that (BLV) 
is inconsistent, and nevertheless understand it and use it in our reasoning. On Illy view, all 
that is required for understanding is that one has the right inferential dispositions (which 
can be overridden). 
So I do not think that the envisaged problem arises because of the conditions for 
understanding. However, a full discussion of this worry certainly requires investigating the 
conditions for concept possession, since the argument might be stated, and is probably is 
intended to apply, at the level of thought. Does possessing the concept of naive extension 
require the possession of a warrant for (BLV), if the concept is introduced by a stipulation 
of the truth of (BLV)? I cannot do more here than noting that I do not see why this should 
be the case. I grasp the concept of naive extension, and I know which concept is w;signed 
to "f." by a stipulation of the truth of (BLV), without possessing a warrant for (BLV). 
Maybe the point is that a specific step from T(' H P') to H P can only transmit warrant 
if one already possesses a warrant for H P, even if one already understands H P. I do not 
see why this should be the case.201 I conclude that it is not a good reason to prefer Ebert's 
proposal that a disquotational step must be avoided. 
201~eHero commands that "#" is to be assigned a meaning such that (HP) is true. According to 
my proposal, Hero can acquire a full internalistic warrant for the truth of (HP) by virtue of drawing the 
(Seuteatlal Stipulation Inference). Moreover, by virtue of having made the meaning-fixing command, 
Hero understands "#" and (HP). Why should Hero not be able to acquire a full internaJistic warrant for 
(UP) in this cue, by virtue of applying a disquotationaJ step, without already possessing a warrant for 
(UP)? 
I suspect that at least Jenkins (20080) thinks that the real worry is Bonjour's worry about implicit 
definition (Bonjour 1998, §2.5), i.e. the worry that one already needs to possess a warrant for (HP) in 
order to acquire a warrant for the claim that the stipulation has been 8ucce8ljul and that (HP) is true. 
According to. my proposal, Hero can acquire a warrant tor the truth of (HP) if he possesses warrants for 
thepreeuppositiolUl of the (Sentential Stipulation Inference). So the real worry might be that (HP) 
is among the pieauppositiolUl. Why? In general, the worry might be that the &tipulatiolUl themselves are 
presuppositiOlll of the suggested primitive inferences, maybe becaUBe of the phenomenon of presupposition 
espon.non(aee 6.1.6). This is an interesting objection. Although I think it can be rebutted, it merits 
further 1'eIIIIIItch. 
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Ebert offers a second reason for conceiving of the structure of justification as he does. 
According to Ebert, his account of primitive acceptance "nicely captures the phenomenol-
ogy of knowledge acquisition in mathematics" (Ebert 2005a, p.222). According to Ebert, 
axioms are just accepted, and no reasoning is involved. 
However, firstly, the phenomenology of actual mathematics cannot be decisive in a re-
constructive epistemological project. We are not looking for actual belief-forming methods, 
but for canonical belief-forming methods. Consider the following fact: although the gold 
standard of mathematical reasoning is (formal) proof, many mathematical beliefs are not 
formed on this basis. Mathematicians often say: "I see that this follows from that". But 
this does not show that we should not assign a special role to formal proofs. 
Secondly, mathematicians often explicitly take the axioms to define their terms, and 
mention this to justify the axioms, as e.g. Hilbert in the Foundations of Geometry (Hilbert 
1903). I could just as well offer this fact about actual mathematical practice to support 
my own proposal. 
Note that my proposal can account for something that looks just like primitive accep-
tance. Often the premises of arguments are not explicitly mentioned (or thought of). A 
lot of times, belief-formation happens implicitly, and (partly) unconsciously. We come to 
believe that a place is dangerous without explicitly or consciously basing this belief on any-
thing, or even without being able to articulate the basis for this belief, although the belief 
has a basis, such as other beliefs and experiential states. The same might be said about the 
belief-forming methods for mathematical axioms. The belief-forming process underlying 
our beliefs in axioms might be based on propositions about meaning-fixing commands, but 
this premise might be suppressed and not become explicit in many cases. 
I now turn to a critique of Ebert's proposal. I think that his non-inferential conception 
cannot easily account for the fact that axioms are believed. For Ebert, stipulation is 
acceptance, and acceptance is not belief. What underlies this concession seems to be 
Wright's thought that genuine belief requires the possession of evidence.202 How~wer, 
according to Ebert's proposal, Hero just accepts (HP). This acceptance is not based on 
any evidence. 
This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, we clearly believe that the axioms are true, 
-This is why Wright (20046) construes entitlements as warrants to fnut, and not as warrants to belie!)! 
(see 4.4). 
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and we need to explain how we come to believe that axioms are true. Secondly, Ebert 
admits that, even assuming that acceptance is a belief-like state, substantial argument is 
needed to establish that knowledge can be based on mere acceptance (Ebert 2005a, p. 
252). 
I think that accounting for knowledge will be very difficult, since the possession of 
knowledge - even in the externalist sense - requires the possession of evidence. If there 
is no evidence, there cannot be knowledge. Ebert's proposal construes the structure of 
justification in a wrong way. We need to account for there being evidence for (the truth 
of) axioms. 
Ebert might respond in at least two ways. Either he accepts that there isn't any 
evidence for (the truth of) abstraction principles and argues that this does not lead to 
undesired consequences, or he accounts for there being evidence for them after all. I 
cannot see how the first response can be made good. As to the second response, the 
envisaged evidence could either be a (warranted) proposition, or an experiential state. If it 
is the latter, the proposal will look dangerously similar to rational intuition proposals. If it 
is the former, then the proposal will collapse into something very similar to Illy proposal. 
For what could the proposition be that Hero uses to justify (HP)? The best choice is the 
proposition, knowable by introspection, that he has made a certain stipulation. 
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7.5 Intermediate conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter, I presented an account of the epistemic working of the 
neo-Fregean implicit definition proposal, and applied it to mathematics. In particular, I 
argued that there is a non-deductive inferential route to justifying the good standing of 
explicit meaning-fixing stipulations. I sketched how our non-defective epistemic agent --
Hero - could come to possess internalistic knowledge of arithmetical truths. The demands 
on Hero were relatively moderate: the reader of this thesis could be Hero. This vindicates 
the (Traditional Epistemic Project) for mathematics. 
The limits of the proposal come with transmission-failure. Only a thorough investiga-
tion of the presuppositions of semantic success can reveal these limits. To this end, I have 
examined these presuppositions in more detail. There are interesting connections between 
three classical objections to neo-Fregeanism and the question what the presuppositions for 
semantic success are. The proposal sheds new light on these worries. 
In the third part of this chapter, I argued that my proposal generalizes, and considered 
various objections and rejoinders. I then applied the proposal to logic, and sketched how it 
might be applied to implicit definitions in general. On this basis, I argued that my proposal 
promises to vindicate two epistemologically interesting notions of analyticity: (Carnap 
analyticity) and (Metasemantic Analyticity). 
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8 Conclusion 
To conclude, I sketch what I take to be the most important achievements of this thesis, 
and make some specific remarks as to where I think further research is needed. 
8.1 Insights 
The following points I regard as insights: 
• (Frege's Constraint) has an important role to play in any philosophy of mathemat-
ics that bases mathematical knowledge on logic and definitions. Among other things, 
it is a means to ensure that we engage in a hermeneutic reconstructive project, as 
opposed to a revolutionary one (1.2, 2.3.5, 7.1.8). 
• Some epistemological issues that have only been examined in the context of external-
world scepticism are relevant to the epistemology of mathematics and logic. For 
example, logico-mathematical belief-forming methods have characteristic presuppo-
sitions (4.2, 7.2,7.3.3); Wright's Instability Argument for (Relevance Internalism) 
can be applied to the mathematical case (3.5.2). 
• There are at least two ways to argue for the idea that belief-forming methods with 
non-evidentially warranted presuppositions confer or transmit full internalistic war-
rant (and internalistic knowledge). One of the strategies endorses an externalistic 
notion of knowledge. Thus, we can meet the demands of (Relevance Internalism) 
regardless of whether the ordinary notion of knowledge is an externalistic notion 
(3.3.3, 4.5). 
• In 5.3, I argued that rule-circular arguments fail to transmit warrant because they 
exhibit the (Information Dependence Template). 
• There might be arguments which fail to transmit warrant, but not obviously so. This 
is because an entitled presupposition of an inferential steps entails the conclusion of 
the argument, and the entailment is such that the conclusion also has to count as an 
entitled presupposition. I called this phenomenon presupposition expansion (6.1.6). 
• In chapter 6, I have shown that it would not be devastating to our epistemology if all 
of mathematiaJ and logic was a mere entitlement. Directly applying the entitlement 
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proposal to mathematics remains an interesting option. 
• However, as we have seen in chapter 7, we can do better by embedding the neo-
Fregean (Implicit Definition Thesis) into a general anti-sceptical internalistic 
epistemological framework. 
• The framework enables us to determine the boundaries of claimable knowledge in 
logico-mathematical cases. One result is that, although the Peano axioms can be 
claimed to be known, we cannot claim to know their consistency (7.1.7). 
• Boghossian's notion of epistemic analyticity is flawed, but something close to it can 
be vindicated (7.4.5). 
8.2 Open questions 
Among other things, the following issues merit further research: 
• The question of whether there is a viable form of epistemic consequentialism which 
implies that entitlements have epistemic value (4.6). 
• The question of what exactly the epistemic value of the possession of evidence and 
knowledge is, 88 opposed to the epistemic value of mere entitlement (5.1). 
• The question under what consequence relation entitled presuppositions are closed. 
Answering this question is crucial to understand the phenomenon of presupposition 
expansion mentioned above (6.1.6). 
• The question of whether particular issues with implicit definitions in the logical case 
can be solved. For example: the problem of hyper-circularity (7.3.5). 
As to the (Implicit Definition Thesis), the following more general questions deserve 
further examination: 
• Regarding its interaction with epistemology: what is the extent of the (Implicit 
Deflnition Thesis) beyond logic and mathematics? Can it be applied to the wider 
&priori? For example: conceptual truths of ordinary language ("everything coloured is 
extended"), the apriori content of scientific theories (e.g. their Carnap conditionals), 
and philosophical theories and frameworks. 
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• Regarding its interaction with philosophy of language: how does the proposal work 
together with different meta-semantic theories? What is presupposed for a meaning-
giving stipulation to be successful depends on what meaning is. It would be interest-
ing to examine the consequences of adopting proof-theoretic vs. reference-theoretic 
accounts of meaning in logico-mathematical cases in more detail. This investigation 
promises to reveal (i) how much the account can really achieve on the epistemological 
side - the more substantial the presuppositions are the less epistemic progress we 
make; (ii) whether the mathematical and the logical case can be treated uniformly. 
• Regarding its interaction with metaphysics: my account of knowledge-by-stipulatioll 
stands ready to explain our knowledge of any subject-matter that can be treated via 
abstraction principles in the neo-Fregean way. It would be interesting to take up 
the question of how far this can take us: can abstraction-based accounts be given 
of non-concrete entities appealed to in science and everyday life: linguistic types, 
biological kinds, nation-states, and musical works? 
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